James Bassey Uwak (a.k.a. James Bassey) & Ors V. Pius I. Sampson & Ors (2016) LLJR-CA
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
JOSEPH OLUBUNMI KAYODE OYEWOLE, J.C.A.
This is in respect of an appeal against the decision of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State, Uyo Judicial Division delivered on the 19th December, 2012.
The appellants who had successfully litigated against the 1st-3rd respondents in respect of violation of their fundamental rights were awarded the sum of N3,000,000.00 (Three million Naira) as compensation and cost of N12,000.00 (Twelve thousand Naira) by the trial Court. Thereafter they took out garnishee proceedings in respect of bank accounts held by the 4th and 5th respondents and after obtaining orders nisi, the garnishees made returns which were considered by the trial Court, resulting in the refusal of orders absolute. The 4th respondent had earlier been discharged and the subsequent decision discharging the 5th respondent and terminating the garnishee proceedings was delivered as afore-stated on the 19th December, 2012.
This apparently did not go down well with the appellants who then invoked the appellate jurisdiction of this Court via notice of appeal filed on the 5th March, 2013 containing 6 grounds.
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At the hearing of the appeal, Miss Udoeyop who held brief for Mr. Offiong the learned counsel for the appellants, adopted the appellants’ brief settled by Mr. Offiong filed on the 7th June, 2013 as well as the appellants’ reply brief filed on the 6th August, 2013 as the appellants arguments in furtherance of their appeal.
The 2nd and 3rd respondents were the only respondents who contested the appeal and although their counsel was absent at the hearing of the appeal despite being served with the requisite hearing notice, their brief filed on the 17th July, 2013 was deemed adopted pursuant to Order 18 Rule 9 (4) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2011.
The appellants formulated 6 issues for determination from each of their grounds of appeal which issues were adopted by the 2nd and 3rd respondents. The said issues are as follows:
”1. Whether the Nigeria Police Force in Akwa Ibom State is different from the Nigeria Police Force established under Section 214 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended) and Section 3 of the Police Act.
2. Whether it was necessary for the Appellants to state the portion of the money belonging to the 2nd and
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3rd Judgment debtors/respondents in the account sought to be attached when the 2nd Garnishee/respondent had stated in her affidavit to show cause that she has sufficient amount in the account to satisfy the judgment debt and that the judgment debt was set aside for payment.
3. Whether there was anything that made the trial Court unable to make the order nisi made on 22nd October, 2012 absolute in respect of the 2nd Garnishee/respondent who stated in her affidavit to show cause that the 2nd and 3rd judgment debtors/respondents have sufficient funds in the account and that the judgment debt has been set aside for payment.
4. Whether it was proper for the trial Court to use the evidence which was used for the hearing and determination of an interlocutory application struck out by the trial Court to determine the garnishee proceedings.
5. Whether the award of the cost of garnishee in a garnishee proceedings is mandatory.
6. Whether the failure of the trial Court to give parties the opportunity to be heard on the issue of parties in the proceedings resulted in the breach of the right to fair hearing and a miscarriage of justice.”
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The first issue to be resolved therefore is whether the Nigeria Police Force in Akwa Ibom State is different from the Nigeria Police Force established under Section 214 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended) and Section 3 of the Police Act.
Arguing this first issue in his said appellants’ brief, Mr. Offiong submitted that by suing the 2nd and 3rd respondents, the appellants had sued the entire Nigeria Police Force which is one and indivisible as established pursuant to Section 5 of the Police Act and that judgment so entered against them was against the entire Nigeria Police Force and was accordingly enforceable against any of its assets wherever found. He referred to NWOKONOBI v. UDEORAH (2012) 50 NSCQR 314 at 331 and U.T.B. (NIG) LTD v. UKPABIA (2000) 8 NWLR (Pt. 670) 570 at 578.
?In response to this, Mr. Ikey the learned counsel for the 2nd and 3rd respondents, contended that the appellants had disclosed to the learned trial Judge in their affidavit evidence that the account involved was that of the Nigeria Police Force, Akwa Ibom State Emolument Account held by the 3rd respondent for all police personnel in Akwa Ibom State which
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exceeded just the 2nd and 3rd respondents.
Learned counsel pointed out that the Nigeria Police Force established pursuant to Section 214 (1) of the Constitution is different from the office of Commissioner of Police of a State established under Section 215 (b) thereof, and was never made a party to the suit and was accordingly not expected to be bound by the outcome thereof. He referred to BABALOLA v. ALADEJANA (2007) 88 LRCN 2293 and IHO v. WOMBO (2011) ALL FWLR (Pt. 591) 1514.
He finally submitted on this point that the ground of appeal here is not a complaint against any specific decision of the trial Court. He referred toIKWEKI & ORS v. EBELE & ANOR 21 NSCQR.
In his reply brief, Mr. Offiong reiterated his earlier submissions and added that parties are not limited to those named in the suit but includes those in that class and that in the circumstances the 2nd and 3rd respondents defended themselves as representatives of the Nigeria Police Force. He referred toIBIGBAMI v. MILITARY GOVT, EKITI STATE (2004) 4 NWLR (Pt. 863) 243 at 266.
?He disputed the contention that the account involved could not be attached for the
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purposes of the judgment debt in issue and submitted that the decision of a Court is not tied to any particular word but must be taken in totality when construing a ground of appeal otherwise it would amount to adherence to technicalities. He referred toONAH v. OKENWA (2011) ALL FWLR (Pt. 565) 357 at 368.
The formulated issue here is somewhat narrower than the canvassed arguments.
The appellants sued the 2nd respondent a non-commissioned officer of the Nigeria Police Force and the 3rd respondent who is the officer in charge of the police contingent in Akwa Ibom State, one of the several States making up the Nigerian Federation.
The Nigeria Police Force is established pursuant to Section 214 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as follows:
Establishment of Nigeria Police Force.
214.(1) There shall be a police force for Nigeria, which shall be known as the Nigeria Police Force, and subject to the provisions of this Section no other police force shall be established for the Federation or any part thereof.
Command and Operational use
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution –
(a) The
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Nigeria Police Force shall be organized and administered in accordance with such provisions as may be prescribed by an Act of the National Assembly;
(b) The members of the Nigeria Police shall have such powers and duties as may be conferred upon them by law;
(c) The National Assembly may make provisions for branches of the Nigeria Police Force forming part of the armed forces of the Federation or for the protection of harbours, waterways, railways and air fields.
Section 215 thereof provides for functionaries of the Nigerian Police Force as follows:
”Appointment of Inspector-General and control of Nigeria Police Force.
215. (1) There shall be –
(a) An Inspector-General of Police who, subject to Section 216(2) of this Constitution shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Nigeria Police Council from among serving members of the Nigeria Police Force;
(b) A Commissioner of Police for each State of the Federation who shall be appointed by the Police Service Commission.
(2) The Nigeria Police Force shall be under the command of the Inspector-General of Police and contingents of the Nigeria Police Force
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stationed in a State shall, subject to the authority of the Inspector-General of Police, be under the command of the Commissioner of Police of that State.
(3) The President or such other Minister of the Government of the Federation as he may authorize in that behalf may give to the Inspector-General of Police such lawful directions with respect to the maintenance and securing of public safety and public order as he may consider necessary, and the Inspector-General of Police shall comply with those direction or cause them to be compiled with.
(4) Subject to the provisions of this Section, the Governor of a State or such Commissioner of the State Government as he may authorize on that behalf, may give to the Commissioner of Police of that State such lawful directions with respect to the maintenance and securing of public safety and public order within the State as he may consider necessary, and the Commissioner of Police shall comply with those directions or cause them to be complied with.”
These provisions are amplified in Sections 3-5 of the Police Act as follows:
3. Establishment of Police Force
There shall be established for
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Nigeria a police force to be known as the Nigeria Police Force (in this Act referred to as “the Force”).
4. General duties of the police
The police shall be employed for the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, the preservation of law and order, the protection of life and property and the due enforcement of all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged, and shall perform such military duties within or outside Nigeria as may be required of them by, or under the authority of this or any other Act.
[1979 No. 23]
5. Constitution of the Force
There shall be on Inspector-General of the Nigeria Police, such number of Deputy Inspectors-General, Assistant Inspectors-General as the Nigeria Police Council considers appropriate, a Commissioner for each State of the Federation and such ranks as may, from time to time, be appointed by the Nigeria Police Council.
?It is evidently clear from the above provisions therefore that there is a clear distinction between the Nigeria Police Force as an entity and its functionaries. Where the intention is to hold the Nigeria Police Force vicariously
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responsible for the actions of its operatives, it is non-negotiable that the Nigeria Police Force must be made a party to the action.
A major consideration for joinder of parties is to enable the said party be bound by the outcome of the litigation, failure to join a party intended to be bound by the outcome as in this case creates a lacunae that cannot be ignored by the Court in any attempt to enforce the outcome of the said action. See AJAYI v. JOLAYEMI (2006) 6 NSCQR 633 and FIRST BANK OF NIGERIA PLC v. OZOKWERE (2013) 56 NSCQR 503.
The contention of Mr. Offiong that any judgment against any police officer amounts to a judgment against the entire Nigeria Police Force is substantially outrageous and in some sense egregious. The action of the appellant was restricted to the 2nd and 3rd respondents and its outcome cannot in the disclosed circumstances be enforced against the Nigeria Police Force in its entirety.
I therefore resolve the issue against the appellants.
Based on affinity, issues 2-4 shall be taken together. The said issues are;
?Whether it was necessary for the Appellants to state the portion of the money
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belonging to the 2nd and 3rd Judgment debtors/respondents in the account sought to be attached when the 2nd Garnishee/respondent had stated in her affidavit to show cause that she has sufficient amount in the account to satisfy the judgment debt and that the judgment debt was set aside for payment.
Whether there was anything that made the trial Court unable to make the order nisi made on 22nd October, 2012 absolute in respect of the 2nd Garnishee/respondent who stated in her affidavit to show cause that the 2nd and 3rd judgment debtors/respondents have sufficient funds in the account and that the judgment debt has been set aside for payment. And whether it was proper for the trial Court to use the evidence which was used for the hearing and determination of an interlocutory application struck out by the trial Court to determine the garnishee proceedings.
?Arguing this issue, Mr. Offiong submitted that upon the affidavit to show cause by the 5th respondent/2nd respondent admitting liability, it was no longer necessary to establish that the 2nd and 3rd respondents have sufficient portions therein to satisfy the judgment debt as admitted facts need
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no further proof. He referred to Section 123 of the Evidence Act, 2011, TAIWO v. ADEGBORO (2011) ALL FWLR (Pt. 584) 52 at 67 and KWARA STATE MINISTRY OF HEALTH & ANOR v. MALLAM ISSAH ELECTRICAL ENTERPRISES (2011) ALL FWLR (Pt. 602) 757.
The learned counsel submitted that the judgment against the 2nd and 3rd respondents was enforceable against any account held by the Nigeria Police Force since they were not sued in their personal capacities.
He further submitted that by virtue of Section 83 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, it was the Garnishee that should show cause and that the learned trial Judge should not have discountenanced the affidavit of the Garnishee involved and proceed to suo motu show cause.
Learned counsel conceded that the learned trial Court could look at processes in his file but submitted that it was improper to ignore the affidavit of the 2nd Garnishee. He referred to NASCO MANAGEMENT SERVICE LTD v. A.N. AMAKU TRANS. LTD. (2003) 2 NWLR (Pt. 504) 290.
He urged the Court to make the order nisi, absolute.
?On his part Mr. Ikey submitted that although the 5th respondent/2nd garnishee gave an
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incorrect account number as containing sufficient funds to satisfy the judgment debt without stating the name of the account holder, the admission of the appellant that the said account belonged to the Nigeria Police Force for the emoluments of its personnel in Akwa Ibom State made it necessary for the appellants to state the portion thereof belonging to the 2nd and 3rd respondents, thereby validating the discharge of the order nisi. He referred to DIN v. AFRICAN NEWPAPERS (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 139) 392 and A.G NASARAWA STATE v. A.G. PLATEAU STATE (2012) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1309) 419 at 435.
He submitted that the affidavit of the 2nd Garnishee was entangled in ambiguity and could not be relied on by the Court. He referred to BARCLAYS BANK DC v. BADERINWA RE- LEDB (1962) 2 ALL NLR 28.
He further submitted that the learned trial Judge was entitled to take judicial notice of processes in his records and referred to Section 122 (2) (m) of the Evidence Act, 2011.
He urged the Court to discountenance the submissions of the Appellants’ counsel.
In his reply brief, Mr. Offiong submitted that the learned trial Judge made a finding that the 5th
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respondent/2nd garnishee filed an affidavit that it had sufficient funds to satisfy the judgment debt which finding was not appealed against thereby rendering the submissions of counsel worthless. He reiterated his earlier submissions and referred to GUSAU v. UMEZURIKE (2012) ALL FWLR (Pt. 655) 291 at 312-373.
A good description of the garnishee proceedings was given by AKINTAN, JSC as follows:
Garnishee proceedings are a process of enforcing a money judgment by the seizure or attachment of the debts due or accruing due to the judgment debtor which form part of his property available in execution. It is therefore a species of execution of debts for which the ordinary methods of execution are inapplicable. By this process, the Court has power to order a third party to pay direct to the judgment creditor the debt due or accruing due from him to the judgment debtor, or as much of it as may be sufficient to satisfy the amount of the judgment and the costs of the garnishee proceedings. See Words & Phrases Legally Defined, 3rd Edition Vol. 2, page 313-314.
Applications for garnishee proceedings are made to the Court by the judgment
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creditor and the orders of the Court usually come in two steps. The first is a garnishee order nisi. Nisi is a Norman-French word and it means.
“Unless”. It is therefore an order made, of that stage, that the sum covered by the application be paid into Court or to the judgment creditor within a stated time unless there is some sufficient reason why the party on whom the order is directed is given why the payment ordered should not be made. If no sufficient reason appears, the garnishee order is then made absolute and that ends the matter in that the party against whom the order absolute is made is liable to pay the amount specified in the order to the judgment creditor.
See UNION BANK OF NIG. PLC v. BONEY MARCUS IND. LTD (2005) 23 NSCQR 1 at 15.
S. 83 (1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act, Cap S6, LAWS OF THE FEDERATION OF NIGERIA, 2004 Law stipulates as follows:
The Court may, upon the ex parte application of any person who is entitled to the benefit of a judgment for the recovery or payment of money, either before or after any oral examination of the debtor liable under such judgment and upon affidavit by the applicant or his legal
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practitioner that judgment has been recovered and that it is still unsatisfied and to what amount and that any other person is indebted to such debtor and is within the State, order that debts owing from such third person, hereinafter called the garnishee, to such debtor shall be attached to satisfy the judgment or order, together with the cost of the garnishee proceedings and by the same or any subsequent order it may be ordered that the garnishee shall appear before the Court to show cause why he should not pay to the person who has obtained such judgment or order the debt due from him to such debtor or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the judgment or order together with costs aforesaid. (underlining mine).
It is trite that where words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, they should be given their ordinary grammatical meanings. See among several cases, DANGANA v. USMAN (2012) 49 NSCQR 1064.
?From the ordinary words of the unambiguous provisions in Section 83 (1) above, only the debt due to a judgment debtor from the garnishee can be paid over to the judgment creditor in a garnishee proceedings and onus of showing that the
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debt in the hands or possession of the garnishee is that of the judgment debtor, is on the applicant or judgment creditor. Where such onus is not discharged, the onus does not shift to the garnishee to show why the debt could not be paid. The debt in issue must have been shown by the applicant or judgment creditor to belong to the judgment debtor.
The issue before the learned trial Judge was therefore a determination whether there was a debt in the hands of the 5th respondent/2nd garnishee belonging to the 2nd and 3rd respondents/judgment debtors.
In the ex parte application made to the trial Court, the appellants deposed in Paragraph 6 of the affidavit in support contained on page 5 of the record of appeal, as follows:
6. That the 2nd and 3rd Judgment Debtors/Respondents are police and they maintain online or universal pool/joint Account No. 2015950936 (formally 579204000001) with the 1st Garnishee whose branch office is at No. 1 Oron Road, Uyo, Akwa Ibom State within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. The 2nd and 3rd Judgment Debtors/Respondents also maintain another online or universal account Nos. 0003905577 and 0003899348 with
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the 2nd Garnishee whose Branch Office is at Wellington Bassey Way, Uyo, Akwa Ibom State within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court. The implication of the online or universal banking is that all the branches of the Garnishees are in possession of all the customers’ money kept with the Garnishees in Nigeria including the Police/Judgment Debtors herein.
To my mind this is where the appellants got it all mixed up when they equated the 2nd and 3rd respondents with the entire Nigeria Police Force.
This point was earlier made while resolving issue 1.
The affidavit to show cause filed by the 2nd Garnishee, the 5th respondent herein is on page 72 of the record of appeal and Paragraphs 5 and 6 therein are as follows:
5. That Mr. Adesola Afolabi, an employee of the 2nd Garnishee informs me and I verily believe him that there is sufficient funds in account No. 00039015577 as at now to satisfy the judgment sum.
6. That the said Mr. Adesola Afolabi, an employee of the 2nd Garnishee also informs me and I verily believe him that the amount sought to be attached is confirmed to be in the said account and has been set aside to satisfy the
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judgment debt.
This affidavit to show cause which should ordinarily be conclusive of the issue at stake ended up creating more confusion. First it failed to identify the owner of the account stated as containing the funds or expressly tying the said account to the 2nd and 3rd Respondents/Judgment Debtors and secondly gave a different account number from that stated by the Appellants/Judgment Creditors. While the Appellants gave the accounts containing funds to be attached as 0003905577 and 0003899348 both 10 digits account numbers, the affidavit of the 5th Respondent/2nd Garnishee disclosed account no. 00039015577 an 11 digits account number without names. This affidavit cannot in the circumstances be considered an admission. What constitutes an admission was described thus by KALGO, JSC;
Section 19 of the Evidence Act defines “admission” as “a statement, oral or documentary which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact and which is made by any person.” But such admission must be clear and unequivocal and not based on misapprehension as in this case. See I.M.B. Plc v. Comrade Cycle Co. Ltd. (1988) 11 NWLR (Pt. 574) 460. And
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although by the provisions of S. 75 of the said Act what is admitted needs no proof. (See Nwankwo v. Nwankwo (1995) 5 NWLR (p.894) 153 at 171; Owosho v. Dada (1984) 7 SC 149 at 163 ), the proviso to that Section gives the trial Court the discretion in relevant cases to require the fact admitted to be proved. Since in law, admission per se do not constitute conclusive evidence of the matter admitted, the Court in considering the worth of such admissions must take into account the circumstances under which they are made and the weight to be attached thereto. See Kamalu v. Umunna (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 627) 349: Ojiegbe v. Okwaranyia (1962) 2 SCNLR 358: Afide v. Kelari (1985) 3 NWLR (Pt. 12) 248. See NARINDEX TRUST LTD & ANOR v. NIGERIAN INTERCONTINENTAL MERCHANT BANK LTD. (2010) 6 NSCQLR 79 at 88-89.
?While at that stage, the learned trial Judge could have taken the neater alternative of directing the 5th Respondent/2nd Garnishee to clarify the situation by deposing to a further and better affidavit he instead relied on the affidavit evidence of the Appellants/judgment creditors in his records in respect of the objection argued in the same
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proceedings, which he is entitled to take judicial notice of pursuant to Section 122 (2) (m) of the Evidence Act, 2011. See alsoNWORA v. NWABUNZE (2011) 48 NSCQR 256 at 278 and GARUBA & ORS v. OMOKHODION & ORS (2011) 46 NSCQR 876.
The said affidavit wherein the Appellants/Judgment creditors gave further information on the accounts sought to be attached, is on pages 83-85 of the record of appeal and in Paragraph 2(i) and (ii) thereof states as follows:
2. That Paragraphs 2, 4 and 5 of the supporting affidavit are denied and in answer thereto, I state.
(i) That Account No. 0003905527 and 0003899348 in the 2nd Garnishee belong to the 2nd and 3rd Judgment Debtors, but the one with sufficient funds to settle the judgment debt is 0003905577 with Access Code No. 0144010360 which normally appears at the bottom of the Managers Cheques issued in respect of that account by the 2nd Garnishee.
(ii) That the name of the Account is Nigeria Police Force, Akwa Ibom State Emolument Account and it is held by the 3rd Judgment Debtor who holds same in favour of all the Police personnel in Akwa Ibom State Police Command including the 2nd Judgment
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Debtor.
With this disclosure, the learned trial Judge declined to make the order nisi earlier granted, absolute.
As earlier stated, onus is on the Judgment Creditor in a garnishee application to show that the debt in the hands of the garnishee belonged to the Judgment debtor. The account disclosed by the Appellants/Judgment Creditors herein was shown by them to belong to the entire police personnel in Akwa Ibom State as their emoluments. That disclosure indicates conclusively that what was at stake with the 5th Respondent/2nd Garnishee in that account was not a debt due to only the 2nd and 3rd respondents alone.
I am therefore in agreement with the learned trial Judge in refusing to make an order absolute in respect of the contents of that account which would have jeopardized the emoluments of innocent individuals not privy to the judgment debt and by extension expose their families to needless hardship.
I therefore resolve these issues against the Appellants.
Issue 5 is whether the award of the cost of garnishee in a garnishee proceedings is mandatory.
?Arguing this issue, Mr. Offiong submitted that pursuant to
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Section 86 of the Sheriffs and Civil Processes Act it was erroneous for the learned trial Judge to have made an order nisi without including cost of garnishee proceedings.
In response Mr. Ikey submitted that the Appellants failed to complain against the non-award of cost at the material time and were accordingly precluded from doing so at this stage.
Sections 83 (1) earlier had earlier been set out in this judgment while Section 86 of the Sheriffs and Civil Processes Act (supra) states as follows:
If the garnishee does not within the prescribed time pay into Court the amount due from him to the judgment debtor, or an amount equal to the judgment debt, together with the costs of the garnishee proceedings, and does not dispute the debt due or claimed to be due from him to such debtor, or if he does not appear upon summons, the Court upon proof of service may order execution to issue and it may issue accordingly without any previous writ or process, to levy the amount due from such garnishee, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the judgment or order, together with the costs of the garnishee proceedings.
?The operative
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word in each of the said provisions is “may”. While this word could in special circumstances be mandatory, it seems evidently clear to me however that in the sense used in these sections, it is permissive, allowing for the discretion of the Court attending to the garnishee application. See ANOCHIE v. OBICHERE & ORS 1 EPR 406 at 423.
I therefore hold that the learned trial Judge was well within his discretion in refusing to make orders for cost of the garnishee proceedings. I accordingly resolve the said issue against the appellants.
The remaining issue is whether the failure of the trial Court to give parties the opportunity to be heard on the issue of parties in the proceedings resulted in the breach of the right to fair hearing and a miscarriage of justice.
On this issue, Mr. Offiong submitted that the learned trial Judge was in error to have raised issues concerning parties and ownership of money sought to be attached suo motu without the address of parties. He referred toEFFIOM v. C.R.O.S.I.E.C. (2010) ALL FWLR (Pt. 552) 1610 at 1634.
?In response, Mr. Ikey submitted that the case was contested on the affidavits of the
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parties and the written addresses of their counsel with each side ventilating its case and that all the issues arose from the positions of the parties and not suo motu as contended by the appellants.
It is no longer in dispute that a Court must not raise an issue suo motu and resolve it without the input of the parties. This had been stated and restated in several decisions of the Apex Court including UMARU v. ABDUL-MUTALLABI (1998) NWLR (Pt. 573) 247.
A perusal of the entire proceedings herein however indicates that the issues complained about arose from the affidavits and submissions of the parties and their counsel. It is not therefore appropriate to assert as was done by the learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Offiom that the learned trial Judge raised the issues involved and resolved them suo motu. I therefore resolve this issue as well against the appellants.
?A feeble attempt was made by the appellants in the tail end of their reply brief, to challenge the right of the 2nd and 3rd respondents to file briefs in this appeal, it shall be discountenanced. This is mainly because it was inappropriately raised at the time the parties
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being challenged have no opportunity to respond.
In totality therefore, this appeal is devoid of merit and it is accordingly dismissed.
Parties shall bear their respective costs.
Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8639(CA)
