Jammal Steel Structures Ltd V. African Continental Bank Ltd (1973)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
O. ELIAS, C.J.N
This is an appeal from the ruling of Adefarasin, J., in Suit No. LD/970/73 given in the High Court of Lagos State on October 25, 1973, in which he held, inter alia, that notwithstanding the provisions of the Federal Revenue Court Decree 1973, (in particular Section 7 (1) (b) (iii) thereof) the High Court of Lagos State has jurisdiction in the cause or matter the subject-matter of this appeal. The plaintiffs/respondents in their writ of summons dated September 17, 1973, claimed inter alia the sum of N641,328.39 (Six Hundred and Forty One Thousand, Three Hundred and Twenty-eight Naira and Thirty-Nine kobo) from the defendants/appellants, being the balance due to the plaintiffs for an over-draft granted by the plaintiffs to the defendants at their Idumota branch, Lagos, in the normal course of their business as bankers to the defendants and for money paid by the plaintiffs to the defendants as banker at the latter’s request, which said sum the defendants have refused and/or neglected to pay in spite of repeated demands.
When the case first came before the High Court of Lagos State on October 15, 1973, Chief F.R.A. Williams, leading counsel for the defendants/appellants sought the leave of the court to argue that the said court has no jurisdiction to deal with the cause or matter having regard to the provisions of the Federal Revenue Court Decree 1973. After hearing arguments from both parties on October 22nd, 1973 on the issue of jurisdiction, the learned Judge gave the ruling three days later as already stated. Dissatisfied with the ruling, the defendants/appellants applied for leave to appeal on the same day, and the learned trial Judge, after hearing arguments of counsel for both sides, granted leave to the appellants to appeal against the ruling.
The two grounds of appeal argued before us are as follows:
“The learned trial Judge erred in law in failing to observe that the plaintiffs’ action being a claim connected with or pertaining to their business as bankers it clearly falls within the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal Revenue Court under Section 7(1) (b) (iii) of the Federal Revenue Court Decree 1973 Number 13. Accordingly, the High Court of Lagos State has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
2. The learned trial Judge erred in law in assuming that the intention of the Federal Revenue Court Decree is to confer on the said court jurisdiction in civil causes and matters in respect of the matters specified under paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) of subsection (1) of Section 7 of the said Decree only in cases where they relate to the revenue of the Government of the Federation
Particulars of Error
(i) There is no such limitation on the jurisdiction of the Federal Revenue Court except in respect of the matters specified under paragraphs (a) of Section 7 (1);
(ii) Section 33 of the Federal Revenue Court makes it clear that the jurisdiction of the Federal Revenue Court is not confined to ‘revenue causes and matters as defined in subsection (2) of the said Section 33.”
In order to deal with the important subject-matter of the appeal fairly expeditiously, we granted the application by the counsel for the defendants/ appellants that the appeal be heard and determined on the papers filed in support of the application. It is agreed that the substance of the appeal requires a determination of the scope of the jurisdiction which is vested in the Federal Revenue Court by Section 7(1), (a), (b), (c) and (d) of the Decree. The relevant provisions as Section 7(1) are as follows:
“The Federal Revenue Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction in civil causes and matters-
(a) relating to the revenue of the Government of the Federation in which the said Government or any organ thereof or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the said Government is a party;
(b) connected with or pertaining to-
(i) the taxation of companies and of other bodies established or carrying on business in Nigeria and all other persons subject to Federal taxation,
(ii) customs and excise duties
(iii) banking, foreign exchange, currency or other fiscal measures;
(c) arising from:
(i) the operation of the Companies Decree 1968 or any other enactment regulating the operation of companies incorporated under the Companies Decree 1968,
(ii) any enactment relating to copyright, patents, designs, trade marks and merchandise marks:
(d) of Admiralty jurisdiction.”
As the learned Attorney-General asked for and was granted permission to make his comments on Section 7 of the Federal Revenue Court Decree before going on to the Federal Executive Council Meeting soon afterwards, we may record his argument as follows. After submitting that the learned trial Judge referred to drafting errors without specifying them and that he wrongly concluded that the legislative intention has not been properly brought out by the phraseology employed in the drafting, he submitted that the learned trial Judge was in error when he held that, if the legislative intention had been properly expressed in Section 7, it would have been clear that not all banking transactions were intended to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Revenue Court. He submitted that the learned trial Judge’s observations are merely speculative and his interpretation is highly idealistic; the learned trial Judge’s appraisal of Section 7 has resulted from his lumping together all the subsections instead of taking then separately. It is his submission that the various subsections under (a), (b), (c) and (d) are not necessarily inter-related and that each of them stands on its own. He pointed out that if the legislative intention is only to protect Federal Government revenue, as the learned trial Judge would appear to have assumed, the reference in (d) to Admiralty cases is not apt. He further submitted that “banking” has a strong revenue element since the Federal Military Government now has financial participation in three commercial banks and even the African Continental Bank Ltd., is being propped up with a 2-million Naira loan from the Federal Government. The learned Attorney-General conceded to the trial Judge that, in paragraph 3 of the Explanatory Note, the use of the word “such” might be considered ambiguous, but he contended that, if one looks at Section 33(1) (i), the seeming ambiguity disappears and it becomes clear that the Federal Revenue Court is required to deal with two types of Matters – revenue and other matters. He finally submitted that the learned trial Judge might have been misled by the title of the Decree when he held that only revenue cases come within the jurisdiction of the Federal Revenue Court; and that priority applies only in revenue cases, the court being endowed with power to deal with cases other than revenue ones. Before leaving the court, the learned Attorney-General’s final submission is that ‘all banking transactions” are included within Section 7(1) (b) (iii) of the Decree. The result of this submission is that the Lagos State High Court has no jurisdiction in the case which is the subject-matter of this appeal, and that all disputes of whatever nature relating to “banking” must go to the Federal Revenue Court.
Chief Williams began by adopting the arguments of the learned Attorney-General and said that he would only concern himself with the question of the kind of order which this court should make on the determination of this appeal. He contended that Section 8 (1) and (2) of the Decree, which ousts the jurisdiction of the State High Court, takes effect from April 13, 1973 when the Decree came into force (see Section 5(1), (3) and (4) of Decree No. 1 of (1966) so that the jurisdiction of the High Court of Lagos State ceased from that date. The saving clause is Section 8(3) of the Decree which must be read with the phrase “part-heard” in the light of the recent Amending Federal Revenue Court Decree 1973 in place of “pending” cases. The date of assumption of function by the Federal Revenue Court is August 1, 1973, by virtue of Legal Notice 61/73, Section 2. Chief Williams submitted that although the jurisdiction of the High Court ceased on April 13, 1973, the Decree enables the court to continue to exercise the jurisdiction in respect of a cause or matter which was part-heard on August 1, 1973; the result is that all revenue cases filed since August 1, 1973 and all other cases filed since April 1, 1973 are outside the jurisdiction of the High Court. The recent amendment to the Federal Revenue Court Decree therefore has the effect of nullifying the exercise of jurisdiction by a State High Court between April 13, 1973 and August 1, 1973. Learned counsel filed before the jurisdiction was conferred on the Federal Revenue Court and cases filed after such conferment; cases filed before should be deemed to be within the jurisdiction, while those completed since the Federal Revenue Court in fact began to function are clearly outside its jurisdiction. He contended that, in the instant case, the action was filed on September 17, 1973, after the Federal Revenue Court has started work and the High Court no longer has any jurisdiction. His final submission at this stage of the proceedings is that it is up to the Federal Military Government to put the position right by further statutory amendment of the Amended Federal Revenue Court Decree, 1973; and that, in the meantime, the Supreme Court should make an order striking out the action before the High Court on the ground that it has no jurisdiction.
Mr. Enwerem, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that the judgment appealed from is right, including the learned trial Judge’s observations about punctuation and drafting errors. He contended that only banking matters that relate to revenue come within the jurisdiction of the Federal Revenue Court, and that he would interpret Section 7(1) (b) (iii) as referring to fiscal matters, not to a simple contractual relationship such as that between banker and customer. His reply to the learned Attorney-General’s argument that the Federal Government has revenue interests in three commercial banks is that it is difficult for him to see what the position is in relation to all the other banks in which the Federal Government has no such interest. He would similarly not accept the learned Attorney-General’s argument that “banking” in the con of Section 7(1) (b) (iii) means all “banking transactions.” In his submission, “banking” in this con can only mean transaction in which the Federal Government is interested, since, under Section 7(1) (b) (i) and (ii) the Federal Government is clearly a party, whereas in Section 7 (1) (b) (iii) the Federal Government may not be interested in “banking”, though it is interested in foreign exchange, currency and other fiscal measures. Mr. Enwerem agreed with Chief Williams that Section 8 (3) as recently amended requires further consideration on the part of the Federal Government with a view to further amendment to clarify the position.
At this point, the court drew the attention of Chief Williams to the word “measures” which occurs as the end of the enumerated subjects in Section 7 (i) (b) (iii) and invited him, if he would, to comment on the possibility that the word “measures” attaches also to “banking” at the beginning of the subsection. Chief Williams asked for time to consider the point and the court to adjourn further hearing in the appeal for a week till November 21, 1973. At the further hearing, Chief Williams submitted the following propositions for our consideration:
“(i) The punctuations in Section 7 of the Federal Revenue Court Decree are part of the enactment and due attention must be paid to them in construing the Section (see Section 3 (1) of the Interpretation Act 1964).
(ii) The phrase “or other fiscal measures” must be construed in its ordinary and natural sense and in the con of the entire Section 7.
(iii) The phrase “or other fiscal measures” must be construed disjunctively and not as implying similarity with or modification of the specifically enumerated subjects preceding it in sub-paragraph 1(b) or even sub-paragraph 1(b).
(iv) In the alternative to (iii) above, the meaning of the phrase “or other fiscal measures.” may be modified or restricted by the scope of specifically enumerated subjects preceding it in accordance with the ejusdem generis rule, which, however, does not operate in the reverse. Accordingly, the phrase “or other fiscal measure” cannot modify, restrict or otherwise give colour to the specifically enumerated words which precede it, including the word “banking”.
(v) Therefore, it is submitted that the court should not modify or curtail the scope and meaning of the word “banking” in Section 7(1) (b) (iii), either on account of the phrase “other fiscal measures” or because it is put together in the same paragraph with foreign exchange and currency.
In his submission, the ordinary natural meaning would be fiscal measures other than those which come within the scope of the specifically enumerated matters, and that phrase cannot mean or imply that the preceding words are fiscal measures, in view of the express provision of Section 18(3) of the Interpretation Act, 1964, which provides that the word “or” and the word “other” shall be construed disjunctively and not as implying similarity. Learned counsel conceded that Section 1 of the Interpretation Act provides for a situation in which a contrary intention appears in a particular enactment, but contends that no such intention exists in the present con. Learned counsel submitted that, while it is possible to argue that the ejusdem generis rule applies and that all the words have the same meaning, the rule requires that the general words have the same meaning, the rule requires that the general words take their colour from the specifically enumerated words, not vice versa; and he referred us to Nasr. v. Bouri (1969) NMLR 38 at pp. 40 and 42. He also cited in Re Wellsted (1949) Ch 296, pp. 298 and 318; Amarasigjah v. State of Rajasta (1965) ALIR Sup. Ct. 504 at 523; Khan v. God Almighty Through Asaf Ali Kha & Ors. (1962) AIR (Alhahabad) 364 at 368; and Salomon v. Salomon (1987) AC 22 at p. 38 – All in support of his contention that the ejusdem generis rule does not apply in the con of Section 7 (1) (b) (iii). The final submission of learned counsel for the respondents that the consequences of holding that all banking cases must go to the Federal Revenue Court would be grave is to refer us to Section 26 of the Federal Revenue Court Decree which provides for smaller claims to be remitted by the Federal Revenue Court to the Magistrate’s Courts of the States. In his view, banker-customer cases are not so time-consuming as to create any problem for the Federal Revenue Court. He concluded his argument by referring us to Sutters v. Briggs (1960) AC 1, at p. 8 and Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Hincy (1960) AC 748 at 767 to buttress his argument that this court need not be unduly concerned with possible inconvenient results of a legislative enactment, but to leave any remedial steps to be taken by the Government..
The learned Attorney-General, who was also present on this occasion at our invitation, said that he would support Chief Williams on his submissions regarding the ejusdem generis rule, and would submit further that the maxim noscitur a sociis applies in this case. It is his contention that the scope of the word “banking” is in issue in this case, not the scope of the phrase “other fiscal measures.” If it were otherwise, he contended, item 9 of the Exclusive Legislative List shows that only “currency”, “coinage” and “legal tender” have a relation with fiscal measures, and that the use of the phrase “foreign exchange” in Section 7 of the Decree instead of the phrase “exchange control in item 14 shows that the first phrase is not a term of art. The learned Attorney-General maintained that, in his submission, all disputes relating to “banking” no matter where they arise and who the parties to the disputes are, must go to the Federal Revenue Court. In this connection, he drew our attention to Section 8(2) of the Decree which provides that the Head of the Federal Military Government may by order vest a State High Court or any other State Court with jurisdiction in revenue matters. The learned Attorney-General also submitted that when the word “or” is used before the last of a series of specifically enumerated subjects as in the present con, the presumption is against the application of the ejusdem generis rule in interpreting the provision; and that in Section 7(1) (b) (iii) the word “banking” is used as a noun, as is each of the words there stated – “foreign exchange,” “currency” and “other fiscal measures,” each being independent of the other.
Mr. Enwerem’s additional submissions are that the legislative intention in Section 7(1) (b) (iii) is not to give so wide a jurisdiction to the Federal Revenue Court as is contended for by both Chief Williams and the learned Attorney-General; that “banking” in this con must be limited to such banking disputes as the Federal Government is interested in, that the word “measures’ qualifies each of the words enumerated, including “banking” and that the consideration of the jurisdiction granted to the Federal Revenue Court in Section 7(2) of the Decree along with Section 7 (1) as a whole in relation to offences connected with all the enumerated subjects would show that the consequences of giving Section 7 (1) (b) (iii) the interpretation suggested by both the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned Attorney-General would be difficult to define.
After a very careful consideration of all arguments put before us, we think that the ejusdem generis rule applies to the interpretation of Section 7(1) (b) (iii) with the result that the word “measures” must be taken to qualify each of the preceding specifically enumerated subjects, including “banking”. This means that the natural and ordinary meaning to be given to the subsection is that it should be as “banking measures, foreign exchange measures, currency measures or other fiscal measures.” The words “or” and “other” in this con are not disjunctive within the meaning of Section 18(3) of the Interpretation Act, 1964, but by virtue of Section 1(4) of the same Act, they imply similarity as between the preceding specifically enumerated subjects – banking, foreign exchange and currency – and the generic words “other fiscal measures.” Thus in Nasr v. Bouari (1961) 1 NMLR 38, 40 and 42 where in ascertaining the meaning of “premises” in the Rent Control (Lagos) Amendment Act, 1965, this court held that the words “or other lawful purposes” in Section 1(4) of the Act must be construed as lawful purposes similar to “living or sleeping.” The particular phrase in that case is “a building of any description occupied or used by persons for living or sleeping or other lawful purposes.” (Italics ours). That the repetitive “or” between the three specifically enumerated subjects makes no grammatical difference to the result but replaces the comma in our own phrase in Section 7(1) (b) (iii) of the Decree is borne out by the House of Lords decision in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Frere (1965) AC 402 that the word “interest” in the phrase “interest” annuities or other annual payments” in the Income Tax Act, 1952, meant “annual interest” as Viscount Radcliffe observed, at p. 246 ibid:
“The collocation of interest with annuities and other annual payments is the same as in the preceding heading, and as a straight-forward question of construction alone I think that any reader would naturally suppose that the word ‘interest’ was being used in the same sense in each of the two successive headings, and would never guess that in the second one it was being used with a different meaning from that which he had attributed to it in the first. In my opinion, there is no change in the meaning that is intended.”
See also Letang v. Cooper (1965) 1 QB 232. The Court of Appeal in England held in Coleshill and District Investment Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Local Government & Anor. (1968) 1 WLR 600 at 605 that in determining the meaning to be given to the phrase “building, engineering, mining or other operations” in Section 12 (1) of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, the words “other operations” must be construed ejusdem generis with “building” “engineering” and “mining.”
We are accordingly of the opinion that in Section 7(1) (b) (iii) of the Decree, the word: “other measures” must be construed ejusdem generis with the words “banking”, “foreign exchange” and “currency”. Thus construed, banking measures would cover such pieces of legislation, orders and regulations of the Federal Government as relate to banking -for example, the Banking Decree 1969, Central Bank of Nigeria Act (Cap. 30 of 1958 edition), and ancillary enactments. Where any dispute relates to breach of or non-compliance with certain formalities required by law for the lawful operations of banking business, it is a matter for the Federal Revenue Court because it involves a Government measure and the Government is a necessary party. Thus in Merchants Bank Ltd. v. Federal Minister of Finance (1961) All NLR 598 the question at issue was the revocation of the licence of the plaintiff bank by the defendant under the Banking Act, 1958 Edition. Such a case must go to the Federal Revenue Court. But where there is involved only a dispute between a bank and one or more of its customers in the ordinary course of banking business or transaction, as is the case with the subject-matter of the present case, because the Government is not really interested in the outcome of the dispute, apart of course from its interest in the general maintenance of law and order. We would even go further to say that certain criminal offences related to banking transactions, such as embezzlement or criminal breach of trust committed by anyone against a commercial bank (because it may be different in the case of the Central Bank of Nigeria) should be different prosecuted like any other crimes in any appropriate State High Court and not in the Federal Revenue Court. This is the essence of the Supreme Court decision in Akwule & Ors. v. Queen (1963) NNLR 105 in which it was held that the relevant provision of the Penal Code relating to banking offence (e.g. criminal breach of trust) was within the competence of the Northern Nigeria Legislature. In our view the subject-matter of this case would still be cognisable today in a High Court in the Northern States, and not in the Federal Revenue Court. We think that this is the true import of Section 7 (2) of the Decree. All offences arising out of the other items enumerated in Section 7(1) are triable in the Federal Revenue Court because they involve a revenue element in which the Federal Government is interested. All the various subsections relate to matters and causes involving the Federal Government. It is significant to note that all the items enumerated in Section 7 of the Decree, including “banking”, are in the Exclusive Legislative List in the Constitution of the Federation, 1963, and the common denominator of them all is that they are matters of Federal competence and Federal revenue interest.
It was argued by the learned Attorney-General that the inclusion of subsection (d) in Section 7(1) of the Decree in respect of admiralty case is an indication that the Federal Revenue Court was intended to have jurisdiction in other cases than revenue matters This may be so, but we observe that the original jurisdiction in admiralty cases in respect of which the Supreme Court formerly had a monopoly was taken away from it and expressly given to the High Courts of the States by the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1962, which is also referred to in Section 63(4) of the Federal Revenue Court Decree, 1973. This last provision seem to say that, for the avoidance of doubt, the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1962, “shall be construed with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it into conformity with the provisions of the Federal Revenue Court Decree. We do not understand this to mean that the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1962, is thereby repealed, leaving jurisdiction in admiralty cases only to the Federal Revenue Court. It seems to us that only such causes or matters of admiralty as pertain to Federal Government vessel or property or revenue are within the jurisdiction of the Federal Revenue Court. If the true intention had been to take all admiralty jurisdiction out of the hands of all State High Court, express provision would have been made for such a contingency in the Federal Revenue Court Decree. We are of the view that the precise scope and character of the original admiralty jurisdiction which was conferred upon the Supreme Court under the Supreme Court Act, 1960, and which was later transferred to the State High Courts by the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 1962, and now also conferred upon the Federal Revenue Court by the combined operation of Section 7(1) (a) and Section 63(4) of the Decree will one day have to be determined, as what constitutes “admiralty cases” and “admiralty jurisdiction” is not free from controversy even in modern English Law: See The Queen v. City of London Court Judge (1892 )1 QB 273, at pp.303 & 304. It is, however, unnecessary for us to decide the point in the present case.
We also think that another reason for giving Section 7(1) (b) (iii) of the Decree the construction we have adopted above is that the true object and purpose of the Federal Revenue Court Decree, as can be gathered from the four corners of it, is the more expeditious despatch of revenue cases, particularly those relating to personal income tax, company tax, customs and excise duties, illegal currency deals, exchange control measures and the like, which the State High Courts were supposed to have been too tardy to dispose of especially in recent years. It does not seem to us that the legislative intention behind the Decree was to clutter up the new Revenue Court with ordinary cases involving banker-customer relationship, such as disputes in respect of an over-draft, or the negligent payment of a forged cheque – all “banking transactions” having nothing to do with Federal revenue concern. All the State High Courts and other appropriate courts must continue to exercise their jurisdiction in these and similar matters if the Federal Revenue Court must be allowed to concentrate on its essentially revenue protection functions. In any case, we would require a clearer and more definitive provisions than that in Section 7(1) (b) (iii) of the Decree before we should be disposed to assent to the submission of Chief Williams, for the appellants, and the learned Attorney-General that jurisdiction matters” throughout the Federation and whatever their nature has in fact been exclusively vested in the Federal Revenue Court. We find ourselves in agreement with the following passage from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, at pp. 128-9:
“It is supposed that the legislature would not make any important innovation without a very explicit expression of its intention; especially since in recent years such an intention has often been very explicitly expressed. It would not be inferred, for instance, from the grant of a jurisdiction to a new tribunal over certain cases, that the legislature intended to deprive the Superior Court of the jurisdiction which it already possessed over the same cases. Thus, an Act which provided that if any question arose upon taking a distress it should be determined by a commissioner of taxes would not thereby take away the jurisdiction of the High Court to try an action for an illegal distress.’
On the importance of construing a statute in the light of its consequences, we would endorse this passage, again from Maxwell, 12 edn, at p. 105:
“Before adopting any proposed construction of a passage susceptible of more than one meaning, it is important to consider the effects or consequences which would result from it, for they often point out the real meaning of the words. There are certain objects which the legislature is presumed not to intend, and a construction which would lead to any of them is therefore to be avoided. It is not infrequently necessary, therefore, to limit the effect of the words contained in an enactment (especially general words), and sometimes to depart, not only from their primary and literal meaning, but also from the rules of grammatical construction in cases where it seems highly improbable that the words in their wide primary or grammatical meaning actually express the real intention of the legislature. It is regarded as more reasonable to hold that the legislature expressed its intention in a slovenly manner, than that a meaning should be given to them which could not have been intended.”
And as Lord Reid said in Brown v. N.C.B. (1962) AC 574, sometimes the meaning of words is so plain that effect must be given to them regardless of the consequences; but more often a construction should be adopted with due regard to the consequence which must follow from it. Again, Lord Reid emphasized this point in Gartside v. I.R.C. (1968) AC 553, at p. 612 when he said:
“It is always proper to construe an ambiguous word or phrase in light of the mischief which the provision is obviously designed to prevent, and in the light of the reasonableness of the consequences which follow from giving it a particular construction.”
If we may quote yet another of Lord Reid’s recent statements in Gill v. Donald Humberstone & Co. Ltd. (1963) 1 WLR 929, at p. 934:
“If the language is capable of more than one interpretation, we ought to discard the more natural meaning if it leads to an unreasonable result, and adopt that interpretation which leads to a reasonably practicable result.”
We would say at once that the Decree is inelegantly drafted in a number of provisions including Sections 7 and 33, and that a pruning knife would improve it. We think that there is merit in the criticism of Section 8(3) of the Decree suggested by learned counsel for the appellants regarding its intendment with regard to “pending” and “part-heard” appeals as recently provided for in the Federal Revenue Court Decree (Amendment) Decree, 1973. We are of the view that the Federal Government should cause another look to be had into the various provisions of this Decree in the light of its true object and purpose. Careful review of the Decree would seem to be called for in order to remove uncertainties and ambiguities from some of its provisions.
In the view we have taken of Section 7(1) (b) (iii) of the Decree that only “banking measures” are contemplated therein and not “all banking transactions” whatsoever, we hold that the subject – matter of this appeal, which is a simple dispute between banker and customer in respect of an overdraft account, is within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Lagos State, and not that of the Federal Revenue Court. We accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs assessed at N120 payable to the respondents.
Other Citation: (1973) LCN/1661(SC)
