Jos University Teaching Hospital & Anor. V. Dr. Chris O. Ajeh (2006)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

TSAMIYA, J.C.A.

This is an appeal against the ruling and judgment of the High Court of Justice, Plateau State, sitting in Jos, delivered by Naron, J., dated 27/7/98 in suit No. PLD/J/4/79. At the trial court the appellants were the defendants while the respondent herein was the plaintiff.

The facts that led to this appeal are briefly as follows:

The respondent, as plaintiff at the trial instituted an action against the defendants claiming.

“(a) A declaration that the decision of the appellant to dismiss/or terminate his appointment (vide letters marked exhibits 4 and 6 dated 31/1/94 and 9/8/94 respectively) from employment of the first defendant is unconstitutional, illegal, unlawful, null and void and is of no effect whatsoever,

(b) An order re-instating him into his post of Senior Registrar II with effect from 31/1/94 and payments of all his salaries and allowances as well as promotions,”

From the statement of claim, the plaintiff is a Senior Registrar II in Psychiattic Department in the employment of the first defendant.

The second defendant is the Chief Medical Director with the first defendant. During the course of his employment, the plaintiff became sick and was detected to have been alcoholic due to his excessive alcohol drinking habit. He waited for his employers to treat him, but surprisingly they did nothing. He continued working not knowing the full nature of the illness until he was summarily dismissed, after which his dismissal was turned to termination of appointment with the first defendant.

This action after completion with the pleadings, on 10/12/96 went on trial. The plaintiff testified for himself and did not call any other witness but tendered 8 documents and all were admitted in evidence as exhibits. The defendants filed their statement of defence out of time but with the leave of the trial court, which leave was granted on 23/9/96. (See page 28 of the printed record of appeal).

The defendants, though filed their statement of defence, they led no evidence in support of the averment contained therein.

At the close of the plaintiffs case, the case suffered some adjournments to enable the defendants open their case but non-was forth coming. Consequently, after the address of the plaintiff’s counsel, the case was on 2/3/98 adjourned to 5/5/98 for judgment, which could not be delivered. And on 8/5/98 a further adjournment to 9/6/98 for judgment was made.

Before the date of 9/6/98 and precisely on 21/5/98, the defendants filed a notice of preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court. Also on 22/5/98 the same defendants filed another motion on notice praying for:-

1. An order arresting the judgment and
2. An order allowing the defendants to enter their defence.

In the course of his submission on the preliminary objection before the trial court, learned counsel for the defendants/applicants contended that by virtue of section 230(1) (r) and (s) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1979 as amended by Decree 107 of 1993, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs suit on ground that the plaintiff’s claim is for a declaration against the first defendant which is an agency of the Federal Government.

On the motion on notice, learned counsel for the defendants/appellants argued that they are willing to testify to prove their defence. He said that the trial court by virtue of Order 10 rule 2 of the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules of Plateau State, ought to order for the issuance of hearing notice to them to attend the court whenever adjournment was made in their absence. He further stated that the failure to comply with the said rules by the trial court amounted to the denial of fair hearing guaranteed by the Constitution of Nigeria 1979. The learned counsel relied on a number of legal authorities to support his contentions.

In his ruling on the preliminary objection as well as the motion on notice, which were argued together, the learned trial Judge considered the arguments of both counsel to the parties and decided the issues raised against the defendants/applicants. He ruled after reviewing the plaintiff’s claim. In his ruling relying on the case of Bob-Manuel v. Briggs (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt.409) 537 at 541; he stated:

“From the interpretation given to the provisions of subsection (1) of section 230, clauses (q) (r) and (s), and what this court stated above, it s clear that the plaintiff’s case is one for an order for specific performance of contract of employment which the defendants determined. The suit therefore falls within the ambit of the proviso to the said section 230 (1) (q – s) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree 107 of 1993, and the proviso gives concurrent jurisdiction to both Federal and State High Courts. The trial court, therefore, holds that it has jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff’s suit as it did. On the motion to arrest the judgment, the procedure adopted by the defendants/applicants is alien to the Nigerian Civil Procedure Rules.” (Italics mine for emphasis).

Thereafter, the learned trial Judge examined the merits of the plaintiff’s case, and delivered his judgment the same day he delivered his ruling. In his judgment, the learned trial Judge found against the defendant and entered judgment in favour of the plaintiff. He adjudged as follows:

“1. The termination of the appointment of the plaintiff by the defendants is unconstitutional, illegal, unlawful, null and void and is of no effect.

2. The Court ordered the plaintiff be re-instated to his job as a Senior Registrar II forthwith; and
3. Ordered the plaintiff to be paid all his salaries and allowances with effect from 31/1/94 as well as his promotions as and when due.”

Being dissatisfied with both the ruling and the judgment of the trial court, the defendants (herein referred as “appellants”) appealed to this court on 4 grounds, and here (in this appeal) again, question of jurisdiction of the trial court came up.

It is pertinent to note that, in accordance with the rules of this court, parties are to file and exchange their briefs of arguments. The appellants, therefore, with leave of this court granted on 17/6/2002 filed their brief and the appellants’ brief already filed on 22/10/2001 was deemed as properly filed and served. On the other hand, the respondent filed his brief on 1/8/2002. The appellants, with leave of this court granted on 14/10/2003 amended their brief and on 15/10/2003 filed their amended brief while the respondent’s amended brief was filed on 29/10/2003.

The issues which have emerged for consideration in this appeal based on the grounds of appeal filed can now be stated thus:

1. Whether the trial Judge rightly assumed jurisdiction to entertain the respondent’s case in view of section 230(1) of the Decree No. 107 of 1993 ousting the jurisdiction of the State High Courts in matters relating to the Federal Government and its agencies. (grounds 1 & 2).
2. Whether the learned trial Judge rightly exercised his judicial discretions by refusing appellant’s application to enter their defence, and therefore breached the rules of natural justice on fair hearing. (ground 4).

The respondent formulated 2 issues in his amended respondent’s brief. They are:

1. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the case of the plaintiff.
2. Whether the appellants were denied fair hearing.

However, on 2/8/2002 the respondent’s counsel filed a notice of preliminary objection against the hearing of this appeal.

During the hearing of this appeal on 6/4/2006 the learned SAN informed this court that after he files the notice of objection and served on the appellant counsel, the appellant’s counsel applied to amend their brief and in the amendment, he took care of the objection.

The learned SAN, informed this court that he is withdrawing the notice of objection. Consequently, the notice of objection filed on 2/8/2002 was struck out having been withdrawn.

On the above issues, I dare say with respect, that the issues formulated by the parties in their respective briefs, are from all intents and purposes the same. I shall therefore adopt the issues of the appellants for the purpose of this appeal.

FIRST. The gist of the appellants’ complaint as contained in their brief of argument is that, in the circumstances, the trial court, being a State High Court, lacked the competence to entertain the respondent’s action. This, according to them, is because the subject matter of the action, namely,

A declaration to nullify the decision of the appellants terminating the appointment/employment of the respondent is one of the matters in respect of which only the Federal High Court had the exclusive jurisdiction conferred by section 230 (1) (q) (r) and (s) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree 107 of 1993.

Reliance is placed on

1. Ali v. C.B.N (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt.498) 192 at 203, paras. G-H; University of Ilorin v. Olutola (1998) 12 NWLR (Pt.576) 72 at 79 – 80, paras. C-A. in support of their contention. It is further contended that the case of N.D.I.C v. F.M.B. (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt.490) 755, para. F, and page 735, para. D relied on by the learned trial Judge is not applicable in this case because it is not the same with the present case. The appellants also contended that, despite the clear provisions of section 230(1) as well as proviso to the clauses (q)(r) and (s) of Decree 107 of 1993, the trial Judge held that the case of the respondent was one for an order of specific performance of contract of service determined by the appellants.

In response, the respondent in his brief of argument, argued that a State High Court has jurisdiction. He added that, it is the claim before the trial court that has to be looked at or examined to ascertain whether the claim comes within the jurisdiction conferred on the court, and looking at the claim of the respondent as contained in the statement of claim, the trial court, therefore, has jurisdiction. Reliance is placed to support his argument, on the cases of:- N.E.P.A. v. Edegbero (2000) 14 NWLR (Pt.688) 615 at 624 – 625, para. E.; N.D.I.C v. F.M.B.N (supra).

He further argued that, it is not only the Federal High Court that had the exclusive jurisdiction on a claim founded on contract of service, as in this case, with the relief for specific performance, a State High Court equally had jurisdiction. He relied on the cases of Unilorin v. Akilo (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt.703) 246 at 257, paras. F-B.; and Olaniyan v. Univ. of Lagos (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 9) 599 at 684, 685.

According to him also, a claim founded on tort, though against the Federal Government or any of its agencies does not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court but triable by State High Court.

Having stated briefly the submissions, on the 1st issue, of the parties to this case, I must first dispose of the respondent’s contention that the claim of the respondent having been founded in breach of contract of service with relief for specific performance, the appropriate court that can hear and determine the case is the State High Court, and the trial Court, therefore properly assumed jurisdiction over the respondent claim. He relied on the principle contained in Olaniyan v. Univ. of Lagos (supra).

In Olaniyan’s case, the issue examined was sections 17 of the University of Lagos Act No.3 of 1967 (as amended) and section 277 of the 1979 Constitution. In this case, the issue to be examined is the provisions of section 230(1), (q), (r) and (s) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree 107 of 1993. The principle of law stated therein is the correct statement of law in that circumstance but is not applicable in the circumstance in the present case.

In Unilorin v. Akilo (supra) and Okafor v. Hashim (supra) the facts are not similar with the facts of the present case ever though section 230 (1) (q) (r) and (s) was examined. In Akilos case, the parties were sued jointly and severally in tortuous liability, for negligent treatment of the respondent carried out by the 3rd and 4th defendants who were employees of the appellant as Medical Doctors.

At the time material to the suit they discharged their duties as medical Doctors. This court stated that while the 3rd and 4th defendants were discharging their duties as Medical Doctors, they were not under control or management of the appellant. They are therefore individually liable for any tort they might have committed in the course of discharging such duty. Under that circumstances a State High Court has jurisdiction to determine such case.

This court, in the same case, even went to the extent to hold (at page 257 of the report) that, there is no doubt that from the opening paragraph of section 230(1), (q) of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria as amended (i.e. “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Constitution etc.”) it is intended to give the Federal High Court exclusive jurisdiction in matters specified in the section to the exclusion of any other court, (italics mine). This court finally decided in that case that the wrong diagnosis is not in any way linked to administration or the management and control, on the part of the appellants. It is a case of professional negligence.

In Okafor’s case (supra) the matter to be adjudicated upon before the trial High Court was for a declaration and injunction against the action of the Federal Government over a land matter.

This court, after considering section 230(1), (q), (r) and (s) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1979 as amended by Decree 107 of 1993, held that both the trial High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja and the Federal High Court have concurrent jurisdiction to determine the matter at hand. This court, in reaching the decision relied on the cases of N.D.I.C. v. F.M.B.N. (supra), Ona v. Atenda (2000) 5 NWLR (Pt.656) 244; Musa & Drs. v. Hashim (unreported Appeal No. CA/A/39/99).

But the Supreme Court, in NEPA v. Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt.798) 79 at 95 – 96 per Ogundare J.S.C. (of blessed memory) stated, “with respect to their Lordships of this court, that they wrongly applied these cases to the matter before them. Equally if their Lordships had correctly applied the dictum of Akintan, JCA (as he then was) who read the lead judgment of this court in Ona v. Ateda (supra) to the instant case before them, they would have held that the State High Court had no jurisdiction in that case before them.”

The dictum reads thus:

” ….. But since it has been shown above that the provisions of the Land Use Act requiring the State Governor to deliminate portions of the lands in a State as urban as against non-Urban areas are in applicable in the Federal Capital Territory, the division of jurisdiction between the High Court and the Area Court/Customary Court in the Federal Capital Territory will therefore not arise. It follows therefore that the appropriate court having jurisdiction in land matters in Federal Capital Territory by virtue of section 236 of the 1979 Constitution since it has been shown that there is no customary right of occupancy in the Federal Capital Territory and that section 41 of the Land Use Act is also in applicable in the Territory. The jurisdiction of that court however, is subject to the provisions of section 230(1)(q) and (r) of Decree No.107 of 1993 (now section 251 of the 1999 Constitution) whereby the Federal High Court would assume jurisdiction where the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies is a party to the action.” (Italics are for emphasis).

This above dictum was affirmed by the Supreme Court as correct statement of the law.

In the light of the above dictum, affirmed by the Supreme Court in NEPA v. Edegbero (supra) it is no longer the law for the proposition that that both the State and the Federal High Court have concurrent jurisdiction to determine the matter specified under section 230(1)(q) and (s) of the Constitution 1979 as amended by Decree 107 of 1993 is now section 251(1)(q)(r) and (s) of 1993 Constitution of Nigeria).

In Federal Mortgage Bank’s case, what comes up for determination of this court, was the interpretation of the proviso to paragraph (d) of section 230(1) of the 1979 Constitution. This court, sitting as a full court decided that by the said proviso, an action between a bank acting as a customer to another bank and that latter bank could come before a State High Court, and that decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court in F.M.B.N. v. N.D.I.C. (1999) 2 NWLR (Pt.591) 333. That issue is not the issue arising in the instant case ..

The decision of this court in NEPA v. Edegbero (supra) was over ruled by the Supreme Court in NEPA v. Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt.798) 79. Therefore that decision is not applicable or be relied upon.

It is clear from what I said above, the cases and the principles of law stated above, and relied upon by the respondent are not applicable because the principles of law governing the subject matters are different.

The question of jurisdiction is a fundamental issue involved in the competence of a court to adjudicate on a case. This is why it is essential for a court to determine the issue in limine to avoid embarking on an exercise in futility. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341; Attorney General of Federation v. Sode (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt.128) 500; and Odofin v. Agu (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt.229) 350. No matter how well conducted a case may be, if the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the decision will be a nullity ab initio.

Having said this, let me now deal with the main question for determination, which is, whether the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the action challenging the decision of the appellants in terminating the respondent’s employment. The contention of the appellants is that the trial court has no such jurisdiction, but the Federal High Court. They relied on section 230(1), (q),(r) and (s) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1979 as amended by Decree 107 of 1993.

In order to answer the above question effectively, this division of this court in the case of FUTECH, Yola v. Futuless (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt. 938) 175 at 192 per Obadina J, (as he then was) in order to answer the above question effectively, had raised three questions which must first be answered, namely:

1. Whether the 1st appellant, University Teaching Hospital is an agency of the Federal Government;
2. Whether the decision of the appellants dismissing/terminating the employment of the respondent was an Executive and/or administrative decision taken in the course of administration or management and control of the appellants; and,
3. Whether the validity of the decision can be challenged in a State High Court.

I must say with respect that I adopt these three questions.

These questions relate to section 230(1) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree 107 of 1993.

It is necessary, therefore, to set out the provisions of section 230(1) of the said Constitution in so far as it is relevant to the determination of this appeal. It reads:

“230(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly or a Decree, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters arising from:

(q) the administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of it’s agencies;

(r) subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the operation and interpretation of this Constitution so far as it affects the Federal Government or any of its agencies; and

(s) any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of it’s agencies, provided that nothing in the provisions of paragraphs (q), (r) and (s) of this subsection shall prevent a person from seeking redress against the Federal Government or any of it’s agencies in an action for damages, injunction or specific performance where the action is based on any enactment, law or equity.” See section 251(p), (q) and (r) of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1999.

In order to determine the first question out of the three questions above, it is also necessary to have a thorough look at the object for which the 1st appellant was established.

The first appellant, University Teaching Hospital, Jos (JUTH) was established for the purpose of providing proper courses of instruction for Medical students of the associate University. See The University Teaching Hospital (Re-constitution of Board etc), Act, 1985, Cap. 463, Laws of the Federation, 1990. The objects of the 1st appellant spelt out by the said Act left no one in doubt, is in fulfillment and implementation of the Federal Government of Nigeria’s Educational objectives set out in the Constitution of Nigeria of 1979. The Act also gives the appellants’ board, power (under section 5(5) of the Act to appoint (including power to appoint on promotion and transfer and of confirmation of appointments), advance, terminate or discipline employees, holding or acting in any office in the Hospital. Also the appellants have power to do anything, subject to the Act, calculating to facilitate the carrying out of the functions of the appellants under the Act.

By the scope of the objects, powers and the relationships with the president, which governs the appellant’s Hospital, indisputably, make the first appellant an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria within the meaning of section 230( 1)(p – r) of the Constitution as amended by Decree 107 of 1993. I therefore hold that the appellant Hospital is an agency of the Federal Government.

On the second question above, consideration has to be given to the statement of claim and the statement of defence before the trial court.

By paragraphs 1,3,4,5,6-10 of the statement of claim, and paragraphs 4 and 8 and 10 of the defence, it is clear that the decision of the appellants in dismissing/or terminating the employment of the respondent was based on an alleged illness detected on, and suffered by the respondent. As shown in the statement of claim, the respondent admitted being ill which illness was as result of excessive alcohol drinking. With the powers (contained in sections 5(5) and 9 – 10 of the Act), vested in the appellants to remove, and discipline the staff (clinical, administrative or technical) of the appellants’ hospital, this proves that the cause of action in this matter arose out of the administrative action or decision of the appellants.

By the relief sought before the trial court, the respondent’s actions is for a declaration, and the principal purpose of it is to nullify the decision of the appellants, dismissing/terminating the employment of the respondent. In the light of all these, I have no doubt that the decision/action taken by the appellants, considering the respondent’s mental fitness on the alleged chronic alcohol illness levelled against him was, in my view, an administrative decision relating to the administration or management and control of the appellant Hospital, and I so hold.

In order to answer the 3rd question above, it is necessary now to consider the provisions of section 236(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1979, and section 230(1) of the same Constitution.

In considering which of the two sections of the 1979 Constitution of Nigeria, i.e. sections 230(1) and 236(1), shall prevail should there be conflict in their interpretations, this court, per Obadina JCA (as he then was) in FUTECH, Yola v. Futuless (supra) stated that regard must be had to opening phrase in the respective sections.

Section 230(1) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree 107 of 1993 opens with the following phrase:

“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may conferred upon it …”

Section 236(1) of the same Constitution opens with the following phrase:

“Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it … ”

When the two Sections, therefore, are read together, it is clear that whatever might have been contained in the other section of the Constitution, including section 236(1) that are contrary to the provisions of section (230)(1) thereof, the provisions of section 230(1) would prevail. In that regard, section 236(1) is subject to section 230(1) of the 1979 Constitution. It is pertinent to note that section 236(1) of the 1979 Constitution gave the High Court of a State unlimited jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue, while the provisions of section 230(1) of the same Constitution gave the Federal High Court exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine any issue arising from the matter specified therein. It is therefore very clear that the frontiers and the jurisdiction of the two courts, i.e. Federal High Court and the High Court of a State, mentioned in those section respectively, had been whittled down since the promulgation of the Decree 107 of 1993, when the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court was enlarged at the expense of the State High Court.

Similarly, in interpreting section 230(1), (q), (r) and (s) of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1979 as amended by Decree 107 of 1993 in the case of Ali v. C.B.N. (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt.498) 192 where the issue for determination of the court was whether section 230(1) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1979 as amended by Decree 107, divested of jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate on the matters which touch on the administration or management and control of the Federal Government or any of it’s agencies. At page 203 of that report, this court per Ogebe, JCA, delivering the lead judgment stated inter-alia:

“With the greatest respect to the learned Senior Advocate for the appellant, there is nothing in paragraphs (r) and (s) of section 230(1) of the 1979 Constitution to suggest that both the Federal High Court and the State High Court had concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the matters specified in that section … ”

I adopt the above dicta. In NEPA v. Edegbero (supra), Uwais, CJN (as he then was) succinctly stated that, the clear intendment of the modification to section 230 of the 1979 Constitution, by Decree 107 of 1993, was to confer on the Federal High Court exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the matter specified under subsection (1) (a – s) thereof. The proviso to that section does not whittle down the exclusive jurisdiction. The proviso seeking redress in action for damages, injunction or specific performance does not extend to the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court to a State High Court or the F.C.T. High Court. I am bound by the CJN’s dictum ..

As already stated, the respondent’s claim before the trial court seems to show that it is an action challenging the validity of the dismissal/termination of the respondent’s employment from the appellant Hospital, and accordingly touches on or relates to the administration or management and control of the appellant Hospital, which I hold to be an agency of the Federal Government. The claim also touches on or relates to action or proceeding for declaration affecting the validity of the executive/administrative action and/or decision of the appellant Hospital in dismissing/terminating the employment of the respondent from appellant’s Hospital.

Consequently, in my view, the suit of the respondent as instituted before the trial State High Court is caught by the provisions of section 230 (1), (q) and (r) of the Constitution of Nigeria 1979, as amended, by Decree 107 of 1993, and accordingly, the State High Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the action.

This court has adequately dealt with the constitutional provision in the past in a number of cases. I think it necessary to mention a few of them. In University of Abuja v. Professor Ologe (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt.445) 706, this division held inter-alia, that the provision of section 230(1), (q), (r) and (s) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree 107 of 1993, confers the exercise of jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters arising from the administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies.

In Ayeni v. University of Ilorin (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt.644) 290, the Ilorin Division of this court, held that section 230(1) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree 107 of 1993 divested the State High Court of jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate on matters which touch on the administration or management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies and vested the same exclusively in the Federal High Court.

In Adebileje v. NEPA (1998) 12 NWLR (Pt.577) 219, the Kaduna Division of this court, held that, by section 230(1), (q) of the Constitution (suspension and modification) Decree 107 of 1993, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly or a Decree, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters arising from the administration or the management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies.

This court held that, the respondent in the above case, i.e. the N.E.P.A. (the appellant in the appeal) being an agency of the Federal Government, the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the matter.

In University of Agriculture, Makurdi v. Jack (2000) 11 NWLR (Pt.679) 658, this Division also interpreted the proviso to section 230(1). This court held that the proviso by no means confers State High Court with any jurisdiction in matters provided for under section 230(1). Rather, it only expands the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, where the action is against the Federal Government or any of its agencies is for damages, injunction or specific performance, and the action is founded on some enactment, law or equity.

I have decided to examine the decision of this court to pin-point that the trial court in this case, under our consideration, took alone view which, with respect, did not justify the proper legal position.

And what is more, the trial court, with greatest respect, wrongly applied the cases of N.D.I.C. v. F.M.B.N. (supra) and Olaniyan v. University Of Lagos (supra), the cases which have been distinguished in this judgment.

I think that my above conclusion on the first issue disposes this appeal. There is no need for me to consider the second issue in this appeal.

In the final analysis, this appeal has merit and should be allowed. The appeal succeeds and it is accordingly allowed. Therefore the decisions of the trial State High Court contained in its ruling and judgment, and respectively delivered same day, on 27/5/98, in suit No. PLD/J/4/79 are hereby set aside for lack of jurisdiction.

There shall be N10,000.00 costs against respondent, and in favour of the appellants.

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Other Citations: (2006)LCN/2024(CA)