Ke Umazi Ndukwe V The Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (2007)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

W.S.N. ONNOGHEN, J.S.C.

This is an appeal against the decision of the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Committee on Petition No.BB/DCNB/021 delivered on the 7th day of October 2002 pursuant to the provisions of section 12(7) of the Legal Practitioners Act, Cap. 207 Laws of the Federation 1990 as amended by the Legal Practitioners (Amendment) Decree No. 21 of 1994. The appellant is a legal practitioner with a law firm in Abia State where he carries out his law practice. In the course of that practice his professional services were retained by the 2nd respondent, Mrs. Nwanna Awa Agwu, a business woman based in the Cameroon, in respect of the execution of judgment obtained in Cameroon for CFA 20,000,000.00 against three fellow Nigerians namely Ebi Erne, Ume Ukpai and Uka Mbila Philip. An agreement evidencing the transaction was entered into by the appellant and the 2nd respondent. Appellant took steps to execute the foreign judgment at the High Court of Abia State, holden at Ohafia in the process of which he recovered only N25,000.00 out of the total judgment debt. The appellant discontinued the proceedings against the 3rd defendant Uka Mbila Philip in circumstances which the 2nd respondent considered controversial. The sum of N25.000.00 recovered was from fifa and sale of the movable property of the judgment debtors. The 2nd respondent eventually lost confidence in the appellant’s conduct of the case and consequently debriefed him but the appellant refused and or neglected to pay the 2nd respondent the N25.000.00 recovered from the sale of movable assets of the said judgment debtors or any part thereof, inspite of repeated demands. At the end the 2nd respondent petitioned the office of the Chief Justice of Nigeria which petition was forwarded to the Nigerian Bar Association for investigation at the end of which the said Bar filed a complaint against the appellant with the 1st respondent on allegations of professional misconduct.

The complaint, as reproduced by the appellant in the Appellant’s Amended Brief of Argument deemed filed by this Court on 16/11/06 at page 6 thereof and relevant to the proceedings, is inter alia, that:

“In his capacity as a Legal Practitioner for the Petitioner he recovered the sum of N25,000.00 in part settlement of judgment debt but refused to pay it over to the Petitioner.”

At the conclusion of the hearing by the 1st respondent a decision was handed down on the 7th day of October 2002 in which the 1st respondent found the appellant guilty of infamous conduct in a professional respect pursuant to the provisions of section 11(a) of the Legal Practitioners Act, Cap. 207, Laws of the Federation 1990 and suspended the appellant from the Bar with a direction that appellant should not engage in practice as a legal practitioner for a period of one year effective from the 7th day of October, 2002. Appellant is dissatisfied with that decision and has consequently appealed against same to this Court. In the Appellant’s Amended Brief of Argument settled by learned counsel for the appellant, Ubong Esop Akpan Esq and deemed filed on 16/11/06 which was adopted in argument of the appeal, the following four issues have been identified for the determination of the appeal:

“(1) Whether the first complaint against the Appellant before the LPDC amounted to a crime (Ground 4). (2) Whether the LPDC proceedings were initiated by due process of law (Ground 3) (3) Whether the LPDC was in the circumstances of this case properly constituted when it made its finding of guilt against the appellant (Ground 1 and 2) (4) Whether the actual decision of 7th October 2002 was lawful, credible and sustain able. (Grounds 5, 6 and 7).”

On the other hand learned counsel for the 1st respondent. DELE OYE Esq. in the 1st respondent’s brief of argument deemed filed on 27/4/06 identified two issues for determination. These are as follows:

“(a) Whether the decision of this Court in M.D.P.D.T v. Okonkwo (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 711) 206 is applicable in the circumstances of this case, even though there was an allegation of misconduct (against the appellant) which would appear to have criminal implications. (b) Whether in the circumstances of this case there had been a breach of the Appellant’s right to a fair trial capable of vitiating the hearing and determination reached on the allegation of professional misconduct raised against the appellant herein.”

Looking at the 2nd Respondent’s Amended Brief of Argument deemed filed on 27/4/06 settled by N.I. QUAKERS Esq, of counsel the following three issues have been identified for determination.

“i. Whether the finding of the. LPDC on the 2nd respondent’s petition amounted to a finding of guilt for the offence of stealing

ii. Whether there is any feature in the proceedings before the LPDC, especially the absence of a formal charge and the composition of the LPDC on the day it delivered its ruling, that amounted to a denial of fair-hearing to the Appellant to invalidate the decision of the LPDC finding the appellant guilty of infamous conduct in a professional respect

iii. Whether the decision being appealed is supported by the weight of evidence before the LPDC?” In arguing appellant’s, issue No.1 learned counsel for the appellant O.E. AKPAN Esq. referred the court to pages 2, 23 and 26 of the record where the first complaint against the appellant is stated and submitted that three elements appear from the complaint and that these are:

“1st that E.U. Ndukwe acted as Legal Practitioner to the petitioner. 2nd, that E.U. Ndukwe, in that capacity recovered and held N25,000 on behalf of the petitioner; 3rd, that E.U. Nkdukwe refused to pay the N25,000 over to the petitioner;” and that they allege that the appellant came into possession of N25.000 with the initial consent of the petitioner, but that he thereafter dealt with that sum:

(a) in a manner inconsistent with the petitioner’s title to it, and

(b) in a manner aimed at depriving the petitioner permanently of the use of her money by refusing to pay it over; that the first complaint against the appellant therefore alleges the crime of stealing by conversion under sections 383 and 390 of the Criminal Code, Oshinye v. Police (1960) 5FS.C 105; Adewusi v. Queen (1963) 1 All NLR 316 at 319; Sagoe v. Queen (1963) 1 All NLR 290 at 294 –295; R. v. Orizu (1954) 14 WACA 455; R v. Williams (1953) 1 All ER 1068; R v. Cockburn (1968) 1 All ER 466. Referring to the case of Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v. Okonkwo (2001) 7 NWLR, (Pt. 711) 206 at 237 – 238, (2001) 4 SCM, 78 learned counsel submitted that if the test stated therein is applied to the facts of this case the facts will not support a charge in a court of law for which appellant would have been found guilty sections 383 (1) (2) (a), (b) and (f) and section 390(c) or 390(9) of the Criminal Code that the 1st respondent had no jurisdiction to try the 1st complaint since that complaint charged the appellant with the criminal offence of stealing by conversion covered by section 383 and 390 of the Criminal Code and relied on Garba v. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt. 18) 550. On his part, learned counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that the decision of this court in M.D.R.D.T v. Okonkwo supra and similar decisions which compel the trial of criminal allegation by a court does not apply in the circumstances of this case. Learned counsel referred to the testimony of the appellant on record and stated that appellant admitted still having the money he collected on behalf of the 2nd respondent in his possession and submitted that having clearly admitted the unjustified retention of client’s funds, appellant cannot be heard to contend that he ought to have been tried before a court of competent jurisdiction before facing the 1st respondent; that where there is an admission of the particulars of a criminal allegation the matter need not be referred first to a court for trial, relying on Dangote v. C.S.C Plateau State & Ors. (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt. 717) 132 at 159, (2001) 5 SCM, 59 and that where the allegation is substantially of a professional misconduct in character it need not be referred to a court of law first, relying on Alalade v. Accountants Discipli-nary Tribunal of ICAN (1975). All NLR 136; Okike v. LPDC (No.2) (2005) 7 S.C (Pt. 111) 75 at 96 – (2005), 5 SCM, 109, 10-11 SCM 223; sections 10(1) (b) and 11(1) of the Legal Practitioners Act, Cap. 207 Laws of the Federation 1990. On his part, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent in the 2nd Respondent’s Amended brief deemed filed on 27/4/06 and adopted in argument of the appeal, submitted that the submission of counsel for the appellant on this issue is misconceived and that the cases of Denloye v. Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Committee (1968) All NLR 298 at 304; Garba v. University of Maiduguri (1986) 1NWLR (Pt. 18) 550 and M.D.P.D.T. v. Okonkwo (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt.711) 206 at 237 are inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of this case in that the complaint of the 2nd respondent did not suggest an allegation of crime neither did the petition of the 2nd respondent suggest the commission of a crime by the appellant. Learned Counsel referred to the letter under the hand of the Chairman of the Committee at page 2 of the record and stated that it contains only allegation of misconduct; that there is a difference between a sanction for withholding of money recovered by a legal practitioner for a client and the offence of stealing and that infamous conduct in a professional respect is viewed from the norms of the legal profession; that since appellant came upon the money in question lawfully and was never alleged to have spent it at his will or misappropriated same, his liability for infamous conduct was definitely not based on allegation of commission of crime of stealing and conversion under S 390 of the Criminal Code as argued by learned counsel for the appellant. Arguing further, learned counsel submitted that the submission by appellant at page 42 of the brief as to whether

(a) the petitioner demanded for her money to be returned

(b) the appellant refused to accede to a demand for return of the money? as well as the answers supplied therein removed the case from stealing by conversion; that the case of MDPDT v. Okonkwo supra at 235 cited and relied upon by counsel for the appellant is distinguishable from the facts of this case in that the court held that where infamous conduct cannot be established without proving facts that would amount to an offence covered by the Criminal Code, a disciplinary tribunal should yield to the criminal courts established for the trial of such offence and that the Okonkwo’s case eventually decided that the offence with which Dr. Okonkwo was charged did not come under the purview of the criminal code.

The simple question that needs an answer in the issue under consideration is whether the complaint against the appellant amounts to an allegation of the commission of a crime of stealing by conversion under the criminal code as contended by learned counsel for the appellant. The complaint is simply that the appellant “while acting as legal practitioner for the petitioner recovered the sum of N25,000 in part settlement of judgment debt but refused to pay it over to the petitioner.

Learned Counsel for the appellant has referred the court to sections 383(1) (2) (a) (b) and (f), 383(3) and 390 of the Criminal Code as making provisions grounding the complaint of stealing by conversion thereby rendering the complaint against the appellant criminal in nature and deny the 1st respondent, upon decided authorities, of the jurisdiction to entertain the same without a competent court first determining the criminal aspect of the complaint. The question then is what do the said sections of the criminal code provide? Section 383(1)

“A person who fraudulently takes anything capable of being stolen, or fraudulently converts to his own use or to the use of any other person anything capable of being stolen is said to steal that thing. (2) A person who takes or converts anything capable of being stolen is deemed to do so fraudulently if he does so with any of the following intents:

(a) an intent permanently to deprive the owner of the thing of it;

(b) an intent permanently to deprive any person who has any special property in the thing of such property;

(f) in the case of money; an intent to use it at the will of the person who takes or converts it, although he may intend afterwards to repay the amount to the owner.

(3) The taking or conversion may be fraudulent although it is effected without secrecy or attempt at.” From the above provisions, it is very clear that what is proscribed is the act of dealing with goods or property which lawfully comes into the possession of the person in a manner inconsistent with the right of the true owner provided that it is also established that there is an intention on the part of the defendant or accused in so doing to deny the owner’s right or to assert a right which is inconsistent with that of the owner. Thus the conversion must be to the use of the person converting or to the use of any other person with intent to permanently deprive the owner of the goods, and in the case of money there must exist the intent to use it at the will of the person who converts it, notwithstanding the fact that he intends to repay same to the owner on, a later date. In the instant case, the facts and circumstances do not even suggest that appellant intended to use the money recovered on behalf of the 2nd respondent neither has it been alleged that appellant spent the money so recovered nor withheld the money with the intention of spending same. In fact appellant contends that the 2nd respondent never demanded for the money in his possession.

The question is whether appellant, a legal practitioner can be said to have ever entertained the slightest thought of being accused of stealing by conversion when he maintained throughout that the 2nd respondent never demanded for the money in his possession. I hold the view that the complaint against the appellant speaks for itself and it is simply that appellant was being accused of infamous conduct in a professional respect and not of the commission of any crime let alone the offence of stealing by conversion. It should also be noted that throughout the trial appellant never raised an objection to the complaint being of a criminal nature or plead to the jurisdiction of the 1st respondent to hear his matter.

In any event, what was the reaction of the appellant to the complaint of the 2nd respondent? It is very clear from the record of trial that appellant admitted receiving on behalf of the 2nd respondent by way of part payment of execution of judgment the sum of N25.000,00 which he failed to pay over to the 2nd respondent. Now, granted that I am wrong in holding that the complaint against the appellant does not charge him with the commission of the offence of stealing by conversion, which I very much doubt, can it still be said that the matter ought first to have been referred to and settled by a court of competent jurisdiction before disciplinary proceedings can be commenced against the appellant? The relevant law is as settled by this court in the case of Dangote v. C.S.C. Plateau State (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt.717) 132 at 159, (2001) 5 SCM 59 at 75 – 76 per KARIBI-WHYTE, JSC, inter-alia as follows:

“The contention of the appellants is that even on the facts respondents should have waited for the criminal prosecution of the appellant before taking any disciplinary action arising from the criminal offences alleged against him. The decisions of F.C.S.C. v. Laoye (supra); Garba v. University of Maiduguri (supra) UNTHMB v. Nnoli (1994) 8 NMLR (Pt.363) 376 were cited and relied upon. These are decisions where the allegations of the commission of criminal offences have been denied and disputed. In such cases the burden rests on the accuser to prove the commission of the alleged criminal offences beyond reasonable doubt, this burden can only be discharged by a court established by law and constitutionally vested with powers to exercise criminal jurisdiction. The decisions have not considered and have not decided the situation where the admini-strative body has proceeded to exercise its jurisdiction to impose sanctions where the person accused has admitted the commi-ssion of criminal offences. It cannot be disputed that where there is an admission of the commission of the criminal offences alleged the question of establishing the burden on the accuser to establish the commission of the offences does not arise. Accordingly, the question of violating the rights of the accused is not an issue. It seems too preposterous to suggest that the administrative body should stay the exercise of its disciplinary jurisdiction over a person who had admitted the commission of the criminal offences.

The inevitable inference is that criminal prosecution should be pursued thereafter before disciplinary proceedings should be taken. I do not think the provision of the law and effective administration contem-plates or admits the exercise of such circuitous route to the discipline of admitted wrong-doings. It is established law that after a plea of guilty by the accused before the court exercising jurisdiction in respect of criminal offences, the court must formally proceed to conviction without calling upon the accuser to prove the commission of the offence by establishing the burden of proof requited by law – see S.218 of the Criminal Procedure Act; see also R. v. Wilson (1959) SCNLR 462; (1959) 4 FSC 175.This is because the admission of guilt on the part of the accused had satisfied the required burden of proof In the instant case there is nothing precluding the respondents from resorting to the relevant necessary administrative machinery and of imposing the appropriate applicable sanctions after the admission of the appellant of the commission of the offences of conspiracy and theft alleged against him had been established.”

Emphasis supplied. The above decision of this court clearly establishes the principle that where a charge or complaint against a person before an administrative tribunal or body doubles as a crime under the criminal code and the person accused has admitted committing the offence or offences the administrative tribunal or body has the jurisdiction to proceed to sanction the erring officer without first referring the matter for trial and determination before a court of competent jurisdiction because the admission of guilt discharges the burden of proof placed by law on the accuser. This clearly is an exception to the general rule that where an allegation against a person before an administrative tribunal is also an offence under the criminal code, the administrative tribunal cannot hear the complaint except the criminal aspect of same has been heard and determined by a curt of competent jurisdiction as decided by this court in a number of cases including Garba v. University of Maiduguri supra, etc, etc. That apart, by the provisions of section 10 of the Legal Practitioners Act, the 1st respondent was established to exercise and does exercise disciplinary jurisdiction over members of the Legal Profession. The 1st respondent has no jurisdiction to try criminal cases neither has it ever pretended to have such jurisdiction by even attempting to exercise any. Therefore in whatever angle one looks at the issue under consideration, it must be resolved against the appellant and I hereby order accordingly.

On issue No.2, learned counsel for the appellant referred the court to the Legal Practitioners (Disciplinary Committee) Rules. Legal Notice No.69 of 1965 as Amended by Statutory Instrument No. 17 of 1994 paragraph 4 thereof and submitted that the proceedings of the 1st respondent in the instant case ought to have been originated by a charge formulating the offences charged and notice of which ought to have been served on the appellant before the trial, but that the instant proceeding was not so initiated and therefore not in accordance with due process, learned counsel further submitted; that the provisions of paragraph 4 of S.1 No.17 of 1994 should be interpreted as imperative particularly as the procedural provisions is for the benefit of the person accused of an offence, relying on the Secretary of State for Defence v. Warn (1968) 3WLR 609 at 614; Okegbu v. State (1979) 11 S.C 1 at 51-52; that failure by the 1st respondent to give a charge to the appellant with sufficient information of the offence for which he was to be tried offends appellant’s right as enshrined in section 36(a) of the 1999 Constitution. Learned counsel then stated that

“The charge may not conform strictly, with the form prescribed under the Criminal Procedure Law, but it must be a charge framed in such a way that it discloses to the person to be tried, full details of the essential elements of the offence which he is to defend himself against. For the main purpose of a charge is to give the person accused of committing an offence notice of the case against him. See Fard v. IGP (1964) 1 All NLR 6 at 7-8”

Learned counsel further submitted that in the following cases, formal charges were framed:- LPDC v. Chief Fawehinmi (1985) 2NWLR (Pt. 7) 300; Denloye v. Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (1968) 1 All NLR 306; Medical & Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v. Okonkwo (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 711) 206 and that failure by the 1st respondent to present the appellant with a formal charge before the trial was a funda-mental breach of the appellant’s right to fair hearing particularly as he was found guilty of an offence which was not contained in a charge brought to his notice and the essential ingredients of which were never disclosed. On his part, learned counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that as a domestic tribunal, the 1st respondent is structured with some form of latitude and as such by virtue of Rule 9 of the Legal Practitioners (Disciplinary Committee) Rules, Cap 207, Laws of the Federation 1990, the 1st respondent has the capacity to determine its procedure subject to the caution that such procedure meets the demands of natural justice. Learned counsel then submitted that appellant had adequate information, knowledge and particulars of the charge raised against him in the proceedings in question. Referring to page 22 of the record, counsel stated that it reveals the allegations made by the Nigerian Bar Association against the appellant at the commencement of the proceedings and the PAGE| 8 appellant duly responded by denying the allegations; that appellant heard and understood the allegations against him and proceeded with the trial and cannot now be heard to complain that a formal charge was not brought against him. Citing and relying on the case of Okike v. LPDC (No.2) supra learned counsel submitted that the word “charge” should be construed to mean a process by which all the essential elements of an allegation are brought to the notice of the respondent. Counsel referred the court to the decision on similar facts in the case of Okike v. LPDC (No.2) supra at page 93, 113 and 116 thereof and submitted that the decision of this court in LDPC v. Chief Fawehinmi supra and Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v. Okonkwo supra are inapplicable to the facts of this case.

On his part, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent submitted that an allegation of denial of the right to fair hearing must not be made omnibus but on a firma terra and that from the facts, appellant was given adequate time and ample opportunity to defend himself. Referring to page 10 of the appellants brief, learned counsel stated that appellant therein admitted that LPDC took evidence from both parties and adjourned proceedings to 31st July, 2002 for judgment; that appellant does not deny that the petition containing certain allegations was brought to his attention neither has he claimed not to have understood the allegations therein that appellant duly responded to the allegations. Referring to section 36(6) of the 1999 Constitution, learned counsel submitted that appellant not having been charged with a criminal offence cannot properly take refuge under the said section and that all formalities associated with formal criminal trials do not apply to quasi-judicial proceedings before Disciplinary Tribunals such as the 1st respondent. On the other hand, learned counsel submitted that section 36(6) of the 1999 Constitution does not prescribe a format through which an accused person should be informed promptly and in detail of the nature of his offence, and that the 1st respondent does not apply the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act or Criminal Code and cannot be expected to draft a formal charge after an accused had been promptly informed in the language he understands of the nature and details of the allegations against him; that nowhere has this court held that a denial of fair hearing would occur where a formal charge is not drafted in a proceeding before the 1st respondent and urged the court to resolve the issue against the appellant. Section 36(6) (a) of the 1999 Constit-ution provides thus:

“Every person who is charged with a criminal offence shall be entitled to be informed promptly in the language that he understands and in detail of the nature of the offence.”

On the other hand, paragraph 4 of the Statutory Instrument No. 17 of 1994 provides thus:

“4. References of case to Tribunal by Panel. In every case where in pursuance of section 10(1) of the Act the Disciplinary Committee is of the opinion that a prima facie case is shown against a Legal Practi-tioner, the Nigerian Bar Associa-tion shall forward a report of such a case to the secretary together with all the documents considered by the Nigerian Bar Association, and a copy of the charges on which the Nigerian Bar Associa-tion is of the opinion that a prima facie case is shown.”

It is not disputed that the 1st respondent is not a court of law exercising jurisdiction in criminal matters under the criminal code and applying the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act. It is conceded by both parties that the 1st respondent is an Administrative Tribunal or body exercising quasi-judicial functions or jurisdiction. I agree with the learned counsel for the 1st respondent that as an administrative body or tribunal, the 1st respondent possesses the capacity to determine its procedure by virtue of Rule 9 of the Legal Practitioners (Disciplinary Committee) Rules Cap. 207, Laws of the Federation 1990 and that the said “capacity is restrained only by the caution that such procedure meets the demands of natural justice and in accordance with the Evidence Act.”

It is principally in that light that one can properly appreciate the provisions of section 36(6) (a) of the 1999 Constitution which is designed to apply not only to formal courts exercising criminal jurisdiction but also to police officers effecting arrest of a suspect, admini-strative tribunal or bodies or generally speaking judicial or quasi judicial, bodies. In fact the current trend is to apply the principles of fair hearing or natural justice to purely administrative bodies which are now expected to have the duty to act fairly in the exercise of their duties as such bodies particularly where their decisions affect the rights and obligations of people. When viewed in that light it becomes very clear, and I hereby hold that the word “charged” as contained in the said section 36(6) (a) of the 1999 Constitution is not limited to a formal charge as recognized in the Criminal Code and the Criminal Procedure Act and applied by courts of competent jurisdiction but extends to complaint or information as to the offence with which a person is accused delivered to the person so accused or charged in a language that he understands with sufficient details of the alleged offence. The information may not necessarily be in writing as when a police officer, in the course of his duties, arrests a person for an offence. He is duty bound to inform him of the “charge” for which he stands arrested in a language that he understands and the detail of the nature of the offence. You may call it a caution if you wish. It is usually on that basis that the suspect is cautioned before he volunteers a statement in answer to the “charge” or allegations against him. What later takes place in the court of law where a formal charge is drafted, filed and a copy served on the accused to which he formally pleads either guilty, or not guilty is a formality required by the specific provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, which in this case does not apply to the 1st respondent. At page 23 of the record, the Nigerian Bar Association laid out the allegation against the appellant before the 1st respondent as follows:

“The complaint against the Respondent, E. Ndukwe, Esq. is that in his capacity as legal practitioner for the petitioner he recovered the sum of N25,000,00 in part settlement of judgment debt but refused to pay it over to the petitioner. The respondent was alleged while acting as legal practitioner for the petitioner to have compromised the case of his client in breach of his instruction.” At the said page 23, appellant responded to the charge thus:

“I deny all the allegations.” It is very clear from the record that appellant never protested to the mode of charging him before the 1st respondent neither has he complained that he did not understand the charges against him which, from the passage quoted above, are two:

(a) that he, as legal practitioner representing the petitioner recovered N25,000.00 as part payment of judgment debt but refused to pay it over to the petitioner, and,

(b) compromising the case of his client; Neither did he object to the hearing of the charges against him without a formal charge or charges being filed. Appellant rather went ahead and testified before the 1st respondent and participated in the trial fully but turns round to complain about the absence of a formal charge before the 1st respondent. I do not think that he should be allowed to do so, granted, without conceding, that a formal charge was needed to be drafted and filed in the matter.

It should also be noted that prior to the proceedings before the 1st respondent, a copy of the petition of the 2nd respondent was duly served on the appellant who had even had to appear before the Hon. Attorney-General of Abia State on the same petition of the 2nd respondent, so he knew all along the complaints against him by the 2nd respondent. He does not say that what the Nigerian Bar Association charged him with before the 1st respondent is different from the complaint of the 2nd respondent neither has he complained that the 1st respondent found him guilty of a different offence from what he was petitioned against. In any event, this court, on similar relevant facts, decided in Okike v. L.P.D.C (No. 2) supra at pages 93, 113 and 116 as follows:

“In my view, the word “charges” used under the rule does not mean and cannot mean formal charges in a criminal trial before a criminal court.

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UoC. 40/2003