Latifu Salami Vs Chairman L. E.D.B. & 3 Ors. (1989)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

The only issue raised in this appeal is as to the jurisdiction of and competence of the High Court of Lagos State to entertain the action instituted by the plaintiff/appellant. The contention of the appellant is that the reliefs claimed fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Lagos State while the Respondents’ contention is that the reliefs claimed are matters falling squarely within the jurisdiction of the Lands Tribunal of Lagos State.

The plaintiff/appellant filed his writ of summons on the 5th day of August, 1970, a period of over 19 years ago claiming in terms of the endorsement on the writ of summons, the following reliefs:

“(1) The plaintiff seeks the following orders declaring

(a) that the purported acquisition by the 1st Defendant of the plaintiffs property at Surulere, in the city of Lagos and described in a Deed of Conveyance dated 30th April, 1956 and registered as No. 70 at page 70 in Volume 1055 of the Lands Registry is invalid and void.

(b) The purported lease dated 30/7/69 by the 1st Defendant to the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants and registration of the same by the Registrar of Titles without compliance with the provisions of Registration of Titles Act, Cap. 181 of the Laws of Nigeria is void and rectification of the said Register by expunging the names of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants (and the Mainland Builders Stores) from the said Register.

(2) The plaintiff claims from the Defendants jointly and severally 300pounds damages for trespass to the land;

(3) Injunction restraining the Defendants, their agents or servants from further trespassing on the land.”

Pleadings were ordered, filed and served.

The statement of claim was filed on the 27th day of November, 1970, while the statement of defence of 1st Defendant was filed on the 10th day of March, 1971. The statement of defence of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants was filed on the 26th day of February, 1971. At the time the Defendants filed their statement of defence, the time ordered by the court had expired. However, on their application by motion, the High Court, on the 15th day of March, 1971, granted them extension of time in which to file the statements of defence till the 15th day of March, 1971 thus regularising the filing of the two statements of defence by their solicitors. Thereafter, the case was fixed for hearing for 3 days, i.e. 22nd, 23rd and 24th of February, 1972.

On the 22nd day of February, 1972, it was adjourned for mention on 20th March, 1972. On 20th March, 1972, the case was further adjourned to be heard on 11th October, 1973 and 18th October, 1973. On the 11th October, 1973 the case was not heard but further adjourned to be heard on the 21st and 22nd March, 1974. The case was not heard on the 21st of March 1974. Instead, it was adjourned to 20th September, 1974. On the 20th September, 1974, parties and counsel appeared before the court and a proposal for settlement out of court was made and agreed to by all counsel and the court. The proposal was that the 1st Defendant give the plaintiff another plot. The case was then adjourned to 10th March, 1975 for mention. On the 10th March, 1975 the 1st Defendant’s counsel asked for 3 months to enable 1st Defendant execute the proposed settlement. The case was then adjourned to the 12th of May, 1975.

When on 12th May, 1975 the settlement had not been effected, the learned trial Judge, O. R. I. George, J., adjourned the matter and fixed the case for hearing on the 20th day and 21st day of November, 1975. There is nothing on record to show what happened on the 20th day of November, 1975, but on the 8th day of December, 1975, the case was listed before Akibo Savage, J. As only the plaintiff appeared in court, the learned Judge ordered that Hearing Notices be served on the parties and adjourned the matter to the 2nd day of February, 1976 for mention.

On the 2nd day of February, 1976 after 1st Defendant’s counsel reported that they were doing their best to settle the matter out of court and asked for adjournment till November, 1976, the learned Judge, Akibo Savage, J., adjourned the matter to 19th July, 1976 for mention. On the 19th day of July, 1976 as the settlement had not been effected and 1st Defendant’s counsel still pleaded that there was no board in existence at the last hearing and that the new board was just settling down, the learned Judge adjourned the matter to 15th November, 1976 for further mention, the application of plaintiffs counsel for a date for hearing notwithstanding.

On the 15th day of November, 1976 when the learned Judge found the Defendants and their counsel absent from court, on the application of counsel for the plaintiff, he fixed and adjourned the case for hearing on the 17th and 18th May, 1977 and ordered Hearing Notices to be served on the parties.

On the 17th day of May, the plaintiff was present in court but the Defendants were absent. However, counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for 1st Defendant were present.

Counsel for the plaintiff agreed and the case was adjourned to 5th September, 1977. On 5th September, 1977 parties appeared with their counsel and on the report of plaintiffs counsel that no move had been made to settle the learned Judge fixed the case for hearing on the 2nd and 3rd of May, 1978 and adjourned the matter accordingly. This process of adjournments to settle, continued until December, 1979 when Shode, Esq., counsel to 1st Defendant submitted as follows before Akibo Savage, J.

“I believe the jurisdiction of the court has now been ousted by Decree No. 33 of 1976. I will file the papers.”

On the 3rd day of November, 1980, he then filed a motion:

“for an order that this case be struck out for want of jurisdiction.”

The facts relied on and deposed to in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the affidavit by Alhaji Mufutau Akanbi Shode filed in support of the motion read:

3. That this case deals with the acquisition of Plaintiffs/Respondent’s property at Itire Road, Surulere, Lagos State which was compulsorily acquired by the Defendant/applicant for public purposes:
4. That by virtue of the provisions of sections 13, 18 and 23 of the Public Lands Acquisition (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 33 of 1976 proceedings relating to or concerning any property compulsorily acquired are not maintainable before this Honorable court and abated with effect from 1st July, 1976.”

The objection to jurisdiction was opposed by counsel for the appellant and the issue was argued before Akibo Savage, J.

In a Reserved Ruling, he upheld the contention of the 1st Defendant’s counsel saying:

“It is my view, therefore, that by virtue of the provisions of sections 13, 18 and 23 of the Public Lands Acquisition (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 33 1976 the present action is no longer maintainable before this court having abated with effect from 1st July, 1976.”

He then struck out the case for want of jurisdiction. This was on the 8th day of February, 1980.

The plaintiff was dissatisfied with the ruling and accordingly appealed to the Court of Appeal without success. The two grounds set out in the notice of appeal were:

“1. That the learned trial Judge erred in law in declining jurisdiction despite the pleadings in the case and the provisions of the Public Lands Acquisition

(Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 33 of 1976 and of the Nigerian Constitution;

2. That the judgment is against the weight of evidence.”

Briefs of arguments in the appeal were filed by the parties and after a brief oral hearing the Court of Appeal reserved its judgment to allow for a properly considered judgment. This was on the 6th day of February, 1985. On the 12th day of March, 1985, the court (coram Ademola, Mohammed and Kutigi, JJ.C.A.), delivered a considered judgment dismissing the appeal unanimously. It is clear from the judgment that the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal directed their attention mainly to the provisions of Decree No. 33 of 1976 ousting the jurisdiction of the High Court in matters in respect of which the Decree vested jurisdiction in a Lands Tribunal established for the States.

Kutigi, J. C.A., in his judgment (concurred in by Ademola and Mohammed, JJ.C.A.) observed.

“While Mr. Sikuade learned counsel for the appellant does not dispute the ousting of the High Court’s jurisdiction under section 13(a) above, his contention as I understand it, is that it does not apply where acquisition has already taken place. To me, this is rather surprising because it is clear from the pleadings and the briefs filed that notice of acquisition of the land has been given to the appellant in accordance with the provisions of the Public Lands Acquisition Act and that compensation in respect of the land has not been paid, even though the Respondents have taken possession. This, according to the Respondents, is due to the fact that the appellant has since refused to comply with the notice served on him.” I think it is relevant to consider section 18(3) of the Decree which provides thus:

‘The reference in section 13 and in this section to land to be compulsorily acquired by the Government is a reference to any land in respect of which a notice of intention to acquire the land has been given by or on behalf of the Commissioner pursuant to section 5 of the Public Lands Acquisition Law or on behalf of the appropriate Commissioner pursuant to section 5 of the Public Lands Acquisition Law or on behalf of the appropriate Commissioner under any applicable law.’

I am satisfied from all that I have said earlier on that this is the land in respect of which a notice to acquire has been given and no compensation has yet been paid. I accordingly agree with the learned trial Judge that by virtue of the provisions of sections 13, 18 and 23 of Decree 33 of 1976, the High Court has ceased to have jurisdiction in the matter as from 1st day of July, 1976.”

The appellant was dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal and has therefore appealed to this court against the decision. Only one ground of appeal was filed with the notice of appeal. The notice of appeal was later amended to increase the grounds of appeal to three.

“1. That the learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in law in dismissing the appellant’s appeal:

Particulars

The provisions of sections 13, 18 and 23 of the Public Lands Acquisition (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 33 of 1976 did not apply to the appellant’s case having regard to the pleadings.

2. The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal failed to give effect to section 236(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979

(a) The provisions of sections 13, 18, 23 of the Public Lands Acquisition (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 33 of 1976 do not apply to the appellant’s case having regard to the pleadings.

3. The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal erred in and misdirected themselves on the fact when they held at page 103 line 28 thus

‘The 1st Respondent as required by law sent out the appropriate notice of its intention to acquire the land to the appellant. The appellant has not complied with the notice to enable compensation to be paid to the Respondents’

(a) The only facts before the Court of Appeal for the determination of the appeal are contained in the affidavit of Alhaji M.A. Shode on pages 51-52 of the record in support of the first application for the 1st Respondent on page 51 of the record and in particular paragraph 3 thereof which is totally silent on the issue of any notice having been given to the appellant by the 1st Respondent.”

There is therefore one issue raised in this appeal. It has been the only issue contested so far since the move to settle out of court was abandoned by the 1st Respondent. It is the issue of jurisdiction.

Since the lower court upheld the objection to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that by virtue of the provisions in sections 13, 18 and 23 of the Public Lands Acquisition (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree now Act No. 33 of 1976, the Decree has terminated the proceedings in the High Court, it will be proper to commence the consideration of the issue by an examination of the provisions of the said sections. They read as follows, taking section 13 first:

“13. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, a lands tribunal shall to the exclusion of any other court have power to hear and determine

(a) any question relating to or concerning the ownership whether beneficial or otherwise, of any land to be compulsorily acquired by the government for public purposes of the Federation or of a state; and

(b) any question relating to or concerning the amount of compensation payable in respect of such acquisition and the persons entitled to such compensation.”

It does not appear from the pleadings that any such question has been raised in the pleadings filed and exchanged in this case. The 1st Defendant acknowledged that the plaintiff/appellant is the owner of the land in dispute but contends that it has acquired the land compulsorily. The appellant on the other hand contends that the acquisition is a nullity. The issue therefore is whether the acquisition is valid or is invalid, null and void.

As will be shown when the pleadings are examined later on, no issue of the amount of compensation or the person entitled has been raised.

The recent case of Attorney-General of Bendel State v. Aideyan (1989) 4 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 118) 646 at 650 is apposite and I shall in the course of this judgment have cause to refer to and deal with it in detail. I will now turn to the provisions of section 18.

Section 18 reads:

“(1) As from the commencement of this Decree and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, the High Court of a State or any other court having original jurisdiction in land matters shall not have jurisdiction to hear and determine

(a) Any question relating to or connected with the ownership, whether beneficial or otherwise, of any land to be compulsorily acquired by the government for public purposes of the Federation or of a State; and

(b) Any question relating to or concerning any such land including the amount of compensation payable in respect of any such acquisition and the persons entitled to such compensation, and no action whatsoever shall be brought in any such court in respect of any such question, and if such action is pending in any such court or on appeal any court, the action shall abate: Provided that where before the commencement of this Decree

(i) Compensation has already been paid by the government to any person or into the registry of the High Court of a State or any other court; and

(ii) Action in respect of such land is not connected with the adequacy of the amount of compensation so paid then such proceedings may be continued and disposed of by the court having jurisdiction in the matter either at first instance or on appeal, as if this Decree had not been made;

(2) For the purposes of this section, “action” means any civil proceedings commenced by writ or in such other manner as may be prescribed by rules of court, but does not include a criminal proceeding.

(3) The reference in section 13 and this section to land to be compulsorily acquired by the government is a reference to any land in respect of which a notice of intention to acquire the land has been given by or on behalf of the Commissioner pursuant to section 5 of the Public Lands Acquisition Act or on behalf of the appropriate Commissioner under any applicable law. “

The last section of the Decree on which the learned trial Judge based his Ruling which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal is section 23. That section only deals with the citation or Title of the Decree and the date of commencement of its operation. It did not really expressly confer jurisdiction apart from prescribing the date when a lands tribunal acquires jurisdiction and the High Court loses it in the matters prescribed in the Decree.

The said section 23 provides that

“(1) This Decree may be cited as the Public Lands Acquisition (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree 1976;

(2) This Decree shall be deemed to have come into operation on 1st July, 1976. ”

It is thus clear that the jurisdiction a Lands Tribunal is to exercise is as set out in section 13 of the Public Lands Acquisition (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree 1976. The jurisdiction thus conferred is made exclusive to the Lands Tribunal by section 18 which specifically excludes the High Court of a State or any other court having original jurisdiction in land matters thus prescribed. The intention of the Federal Military Government in promulgating the Decree – Decree No. 33 of 1976 cannot be gathered from the reading and consideration of sections 13, 18 and 23 alone. All the sections of the Decree have to be read and interpreted to enable a clear picture of the purport of the Decree to emerge. In other words, the Decree has to be read as a whole. The Decree consists of five parts. Part I (sections 1 to 3) deals with general matters and is headed “General”. Part II deals with computation of compensation and is so headed. Part III deals with compensation for State’s land and is so headed. It deals specifically with compensation payable for resumed state lands under section 24 of the State Lands Act. Part IV deals with the Establishment, Constitution and Powers of Lands Tribunals while Part V contains miscellaneous provisions and is headed “Miscellaneous Provisions”. The Decree has not conferred unlimited jurisdiction in land matters on the Lands Tribunal. It has not given the Lands Tribunal jurisdiction in all land matters. It has only given it jurisdiction to hear and determine claims for compensation payable in respect of land compulsorily acquired under the Public Lands Acquisition Act, the State Land Act or any other enactment or law permitting the acquisition of land compulsorily for the public purposes of the Federation or of a State (see section 1(1)). It sets out the principles that should guide the assessment of compensation payable and the method of computation of the compensation (see section 4).

The point being made here is clearly brought out by the provisions of section 3 of the Decree (Decree No. 33 of 1976) which reads:

“Any claim in respect of compensation payable by virtue of the Public Lands Acquisition Act or the State Lands Act or other enactment or law shall be determined in accordance with the provision of this Decree and any dispute arising from such claim shall be referable by any party to the dispute for adjudication by a lands tribunal established under section 12 below.”

The dispute referable for adjudication by a lands tribunal must therefore be one arising out of a claim for compensation.

An examination of the provisions of section 1 of the Decree brings to therefore the real aim of the Decree. The said section reads:

“(1) Compensation payable in respect of land compulsorily acquired under the Public Lands Acquisition Act, State Lands Act or any other enactment or law permitting the acquisition of land compulsorily for the public purposes of the Federation or of a State shall be assessed and computed in accordance with the provisions of this Decree notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Constitution of the Federation or in any other enactment or law or rule of law.

(2) Without prejudice to subsection (1) of this section, where before the commencement of this Decree any land has been compulsorily acquired by the government or notice for the acquisition of any land has been given in accordance with the provisions of the Public Lands Acquisition Act, or any other applicable law and compensation in respect of such acquisition has not been paid, the compensation payable shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of this Decree, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Constitution of the Federation or in any other enactment or law or rule of law.

To ascertain the extent of the jurisdiction conferred on a Lands Tribunal, sections 1, 3, 13, 18 and 23 have to be read together. The words are clear and no ambiguity arises from their provisions. The only meaning that can be given to the provisions is that the jurisdiction conferred on a lands tribunal is to hear and determine a dispute arising from a claim for compensation, for land compulsorily acquired under the Public Lands Acquisition Act or State Lands Act or any other enactment or law.

That, in my opinion, is the jurisdiction conferred by the Decree and the questions set out in section 13(a) and (b) and section 18(1)(a) and (b) of the Decree are questions to be determined in exercise of this jurisdiction. Having dealt with the interpretation of the jurisdiction conferred by sections 13 and 18 of the Decree on a Lands Tribunal, I shall now proceed to deal with the issues raised in this appeal.

Counsel to the parties in this appeal filed briefs of arguments on behalf of the parties they represented and at the oral hearing, elaborated briefly on the submissions set out in the briefs. The issues formulated in the brief filed by the appellant is threefold:

(1) whether or not the central issue arising on the pleadings of the parties for determination by the High Court is the validity or otherwise of the purported acquisition;

(2) whether or not the parties on the pleadings before the court raised any issue either as to the ownership of the land in dispute (prior to the purported acquisition) or the amount of compensation payable on the purported acquisition of same.

(3) whether or not the parties by the pleadings before the court have joined issue on the giving of the required notice for the acquisition by the 1st Respondent on the appellant.

The 1st and 2nd issues of the 3 issues formulated by the 1st Respondent in his brief as issues for determination quite appropriately derive from the ground of appeal. The three issues read:

“1. Whether the High Court of Lagos State has jurisdiction to hear this case by virtue of sections 13, 18 and 23 of the Public Lands Acquisition (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree 1976 No. 33 the land having been compulsorily acquired.

2. Whether or not the learned trial Judge failed to give effect to section 236(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979.
3. Whether or not appropriate notices of acquisition were brought to the notice of the appellant. ”

The 2nd, 3rd and 4th Respondents in their briefs also formulated three issues for determination as follows:

“1. Has the High Court of Lagos State jurisdiction to try this case

2. Whether or not the appropriate notices were brought to the attention of the appellant;
3. Whether a suit should be tried after it was struck out based on a successful preliminary objection.”

Mr. C. O. I. Joseph, learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the jurisdiction conferred on the Lands Tribunal is limited to the questions set out in Decree No. 33 of 1976 sections 13 and 18 and does not extend to the determination of questions of the validity of the compulsory acquisition of the land under the relevant statute. He contended that a relief the appellant claimed relates to the validity of the acquisition by the 1st Respondent and not to the amount of compensation or his entitlement thereto.

Mrs. O. A. Ashiru, learned counsel for the 1st Respondent and Mr. C. O. I. Okwusogu, learned counsel for the 2nd and 4th Respondents submitted that by virtue of section 18 of the Decree, the appellant’s claim has abated and the High Court no longer has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.

As the facts pleaded in statement of claim must not only establish a cause of action but also contain the relief or remedy claimed, an examination of it will disclose whether the relief claimed is now within the jurisdiction of a lands tribunal and therefore caught by the provisions of section 18 of the Decree.

The facts pleaded in paragraphs 5, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16 and 17 of the statement of claim are relevant and show not only the complaint but also the relief. They read as follows

“5. The plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of the said land and has already submitted a building plan to the 1st Defendant which the 1st Defendant had approved after due scrutiny and payment of all fees demanded. The Lagos Town Council had also approved the plan.

8. The Defendants wrongfully entered upon the land on or about 28th April, 1970, brought a large quantity of cement blocks upon it and erected a store thereon and made preparations for erecting a building on the land;
9. The plaintiff after due inquiry and investigation discovered that the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants were responsible for the wrongful entry.
10. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants notwithstanding the said warning began to excavate the land and lay foundation for erection of a store on the land.
11. The 1st Defendant has not acquired the land and the property therein has never vested on the board.
12. The 1st Defendant has never served any notice of the purported acquisition on the plaintiff or anyone on his behalf nor is the land required for any purposes for which 1st Defendant could validly acquire private land.
13. That the purported acquisition which the plaintiff denies, was mala fide and not for any public purpose nor for any other purpose stipulated in the Act establishing the 1st Defendant’s Board.
14. That in consequence of the above and for the non-compliance with the statutory requirements for a valid acquisition, the 1st Defendant had not validly acquired the land and consequently the purported lease to the Mainland Builders Stores is void and of no effect;
15. That in consequence of the non-compliance by the Registrar of Titles of the requirements for advertising the application of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants of the purported lease, as required by law, the registration of the said lease was irregular and void and the Register of Titles ought to be rectified. Whereupon the plaintiff seeks the following orders declaring:

1 (a) that the purported acquisition by the 1st Defendant of the plaintiffs property at Surulere in the City of Lagos and described in a Deed of Conveyance dated 30th April, 1956 and registered as No. 70 at page 70 in Volume 1055 of the Lands Registry is invalid and void;

(b) The purported lease dated 30th July, 1969 by the 1st Defendant to the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants and registration of same by the Registrar of Titles without compliance with the provisions of Registration of Titles Act, Cap. 181 of the Laws of Nigeria is void and rectification of the said Register by expunging the names of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants (and the Mainland Builders Stores) from the said register.

2. The plaintiff claims from the Defendants jointly and severally:300pounds damages for trespass to the land.
3. Injunction restraining the Defendants, their agents and or servants from further trespassing on the land.”

Taking the statement of claim alone, the reliefs – declaratory orders, damages for trespass and order of injunction – claimed are definitely outside the jurisdiction of a lands tribunal set out above under the Public Lands Acquisition (Miscellaneous Provisions)Decree 1976 No. 33.

Turning to the statement of defence filed by the 1st Defendant and that filed by the 2nd to 4th Defendants, the facts pleaded have not raised issues or questions for adjudication by a Lands Tribunal. Of particular relevance are the facts pleaded in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 of the statement of defence filed by the 1st Defendant. They joined issue with the plaintiff on the issue of the validity of the acquisition. This is not a question for adjudication by a Lands Tribunal envisaged by Decree no. 33 of 1976. They are as follows:

3. The first Defendant is not in a position to admit or deny paragraphs 1, 8, 9, 10, 11 of the statement of claim;
4. The first Defendant denies paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the statement of claim and puts the plaintiff to strict proof of the averments therein made;
5. The first Defendant avers that the land in dispute was never included in any Town Planning scheme;
6. The first Defendant further avers that the land, the subject matter of this suit was compulsorily acquired by the 1st Defendant Board as portion of Light Industrial site, otherwise known as Industrial Site No. 6 and became vested in it by the service of the Acquisition Notice No. SL.2705 of the 14th February, 1968;
7. The plaintiff did not comply with the conditions contained in the Notice of Acquisition mentioned in paragraph 6 above;
8. With reference to paragraph 12 of the statement of claim the first Defendant will contend at the trial of this action that the plaintiffs land, the subject matter of this action has been properly acquired and will rely on section 45(2) of the Lagos Town Planning Act, Cap. 95 Volume IV of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria;
9. The first Defendant will contend that the acquisition and the allocation of the said land complied with the provisions of Cap. 95 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria;

As the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Defendants derive their leasehold title from the 1st Defendant, they naturally, in their statement of claim, took the stand and position of the 1st Defendant and went on to plead in paragraphs 2 and 6 as follows:

“2. These Defendants deny paragraphs 1, 3, 5, 6, 7,8,10,11,12,13 and 14 of the statement of claim;

6. These Defendants aver that the said land or site was validly acquired and that the requirements of Cap.95 aforesaid were complied with by the first Defendant notice of acquisition having been served by the 1st Defendant on the plaintiff.”

The issues joined on the pleadings as to the validity of the acquisition raises a question outside the jurisdiction of a Lands Tribunal set out in Decree No. 33 of 1976. Further, the facts pleaded in paragraph 12, 13 and 14 of their statement of defence shows clearly why the appellant has persisted in the vigorous prosecution of the action instituted by him. They read:

“12. These Defendants aver that the plaintiff has instituted a previous action (suit LD/537/66) with respect to the land or site wherein he made wild allegations of fraud against the Defendants therein and others and contended that he had not been served with notice of acquisition of land claimed by him by the L.E.D.B.

13. These Defendants will at the trial refer to the writ of summons, the pleadings, the evidence and judgment in the said suit;
14. The action was tried by the Hon. Justice Kazeem who held that he was not satisfied on the evidence before him that the plaintiff herein had been served with the notice of acquisition.”

The jurisdiction of the High Court of a State is unlimited both in civil and criminal matters and is prescribed by section 236(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 as amended. Before the 1979 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the State High Court was prescribed in the various State High Court Laws and the 1963 Constitutions of the various States and the Federation.

It is not the contention of the Respondents that the High Court of Lagos State had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim when it was filed in Lagos State. It is common ground that the High Court then had jurisdiction. The contention of the 1st Respondent is that section 18 of Decree No. 33 of 1976 abated or terminated the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the claim and conferred exclusive jurisdiction in such matters on a lands tribunal of a State set up by the Decree.

Having examined the provisions of sections 13, 18 and 23 of the Decree, I find myself unable to accept this submission and hold that the Court of Appeal and the High Court erred in law to have so held. Such a construction cannot be found within the four walls of the Decree. The words of the Decree are so clear and unambiguous that it does not appear to me that the lower courts were construing the words used in the Decree. It is only the words of the statute that can properly convey the intention of the legislature and it is an act of violence to read into the statute the words that are absent from its provisions

See Awolowo v. Shagari (1979) 6-9 S.C.51; (1979 N. S. C. C. 87; Attorney- General, Bendel State v. Attorney-General of the Federation and 22 Others (1982) 3 N. C. L. R. 1; (1981) 10 SC. 1; (1981) N. S. C. C.314.

In the recent case of Attorney-General, Bendel State v. Aideyan 4 N. W .L. R. (Pt.118) 646, this issue of ouster of the jurisdiction of the High Court by sections 13 and 18 of the Public Lands Acquisition (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree now Act 1976 was examined by this court. On this issue, my learned brother, Nnaemeka-Agu, J.S.C., who read the judgment said at page 665 of the report:

“I shall however, consider ground 5 in this appeal for two reasons, first, it raises an issue of jurisdiction. If, in fact, the court of trial had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, it cannot acquire jurisdiction by acquiescence or submission, the issue of jurisdiction is most fundamental. See Onyeama & Ors. v. Oputa & Anor. (1987) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt.60) 259. Secondly that ground was fully argued by counsel on both sides.

By that ground, the learned counsel for the appellants is saying that the High Court of Bendel State had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit because it was a matter cognizable by a Land Tribunal constituted under the Public Lands Acquisition (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act No. 33 of 1976. In her submission, the substance of the claim was the quantum of compensation payable to the Respondent.

In reply, the learned Senior Advocate of Nigeria for the Respondent pointed out that the main action of the Respondent was one seeking for a declaration that the acquisition was null, void and of no effect, and claiming damages for trespass, the claim for mesne profits being in the alternative. As the Act is a law which merely regulates the payment of compensation, it is not appropriate for the claim in this suit, he submitted;

For a proper appreciation of the intendment and scope of Act No. 33 of 1976, I shall quote in full section 13, which inter alia learned counsel for the appellants relied upon in her argument. The section provides as follows:

Sections 1 and 20 have nothing to do with jurisdiction as such. It appears to me that section 13 clearly vests in the Land Tribunal established under section 12 of the Act the jurisdiction to hear and determine cases in which all questions relating to or concerning

(1) The ownership of all lands to be compulsorily acquired by Government for public purposes of the Federation or of a State;

(2) The amount of compensation payable in respect of such acquisition and the person entitled to such compensation.

Clearly, the Land Tribunal was thus created as one of limited jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction took it for granted that there had been a valid act of acquisition, leaving the live issues to be questions of the quantum of compensation for the acquisition and the person or persons entitled thereto. It has not conferred general jurisdiction of dealing with all questions relating to acquisition of such lands which could have left it arguable whether or not the dispute as to whether or not a particular land has been acquired by government is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. ”

I agree with my learned brother Nnameka-Agu, J.S.C., that the Lands Tribunal has only limited jurisdiction. That tribunal cannot exercise jurisdiction outside the confines of that prescribed by section 13 of the Act in relation to the dispute referred to it under section 3 of the Act. A land tribunal therefore cannot exercise jurisdiction to hear and determine the questions raised in these proceedings.

The provisions of a statute depriving a court of its jurisdiction must be strictly construed as the jurisdiction of superior courts is not taken away except by express words or necessary implication (see Alban v. Pyke (1842) 11 M & G 421,424 per Tindel, C.I.). The jurisdiction of the superior courts in Nigeria must not be excluded unless there is clear language in the statute which is alleged to have that effect (see Goldsack v. Shore (1950) 1 All E.R. 276, 277 per Evershed, M.R.)

The matters in respect of which jurisdiction to adjudicate is conferred on a lands tribunal having been clearly stated in section 3 of Decree No. 33 of 1976, the Court of Appeal and the High Court have no jurisdiction to include other matters which are not expressly stated, and thereby depriving the High Court of its jurisdiction. This is what the Court of Appeal and the High Court had done in this case. The claim for declaratory orders that the acquisition of the appellant’s land by 1st Respondent is null and void for failure to comply with the statutory procedure prescribed which is appellant’s claim, is incompatible with and outside the claim for compensation or entitlement thereto in respect of which jurisdiction has been ousted from the High Court and vested in a land’s tribunal. The High Court of Lagos State is competent to try the appellant’s claim and grant the reliefs as it is not a claim for compensation or entitlement to compensation. Its jurisdiction has not been ousted in respect of such matters.

A general rule applicable to the construction of statutes is that there is not to be presumed without express words, an authority to deprive a State High Court of the jurisdiction it had previously exercised.

Very clear words will be required to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court of a State in matters of private rights. (See Southampton Bridge Co. v. Southampton Board of Health (1858) 8 E & B 801, 804 (n) per Lord Campbell. See London Hospital Governors v. Jacobs (1956) 1 W.L.R. 662 per Lord Evershed, M.R.)

It appears to me that the lower court failed to appreciate the issue before it and fell into the error of classifying the issue as one of compensation.

The appeal therefore succeeds and I hereby allow it. The decision of the High Court together with the decision of the Court of Appeal affirming that High Court decision that” by virtue of the provisions of sections 13, 18 and 23 of the Public Lands Acquisition (Miscellaneous Provisions) Decree No. 33 of 1976 the present action is no longer maintainable before this court having abated with effect from 1st July, 1976″ is hereby set aside and in its stead is substituted an order overruling the objection to the jurisdiction of the High Court.

The appellant is entitled to costs in this court fixed at N500.00 and in the Court of Appeal fixed at N300.00. Costs in the High Court shall abide the conclusion of the hearing.

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Other Citation: (1989) LCN/2384(SC)