Lukuman Adeniyi V. The State (2016)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
MOJEED ADEKUNLE OWOADE, J.C.A.
This is an appeal against the judgment of Hon. Justice I. O. Adeleke of the High Court of Justice, Osun State sitting at Ikirun delivered on 27th June, 2013.
The Appellant was one of the five (5) accused persons arraigned before the High Court of Osun State at Ikirun for the offences of conspiracy, to commit Armed Robbery and Armed Robbery contrary to Section 6 (b) and 1 (2) (a) and (b) respectively of the Robbery and Firearms Act, cap R-11 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004. The charges were read over and explained to the Appellant and the other accused persons. They pleaded not guilty to each count of the charge.
The prosecution called six (6) witnesses including the Investigating Police Officer and tendered the statements of the Appellant and the other accused persons. The Appellant and the other accused persons gave evidence in defence but called no witnesses.
The case of the prosecution is that on 13th March, 2006, a gang of Armed Robbers armed with dangerous weapon including guns and cutlasses invaded and robbed a new site at Obagun via Ikirun the
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robbers fired shots at and wounded some vigilante men who pursued them. The Appellant was arrested and he named the other members of the gang which led to their arrest.
None of the prosecution witnesses was able to identify the Appellant or any of the other accused persons as a perpetrator of the crime on the day of the incident. The learned trial Judge however, based essentially on the purported confessional statements convicted the Appellant and the other accused persons as charged.
Dissatisfied with the judgment, the Appellant, at first filed a Notice of Appeal containing four grounds of appeal on 11/7/2013. And later filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on 1/4/2015.
The Appellant’s grounds of appeal together with their particulars as contained in the Amended Notice of Appeal are as follows:-
GROUNDS OF APPEAL:
GROUND ONE: ERROR OF LAW
1. The Learned trial Judge erred in law when he relied on the evidence of prosecution witnesses to convict the 1st Accused/Appellant.
PARTICULARS
(i) All the purported eye witnesses called by the prosecution i.e. PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4 and PW5 both in their statements to the Police as
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contained in the proof of evidence, their evidence in chief and under cross-examination said they could not identify any of those who participated in the alleged armed robbery if seen.
(ii) The prosecution witness infact maintained in the witness box that they could not identify any of the accused persons including the 1st Accused/Appellant herein as part of the robbery gang.
(iii) The learned trial Judge however in his judgment while reviewing both the evidence in chief and under cross-examination of PW1 said:
“He stated further that he did not know any of the accused persons in the dock but that the robbers did not cover their faces, Under cross-examination by Learned Counsel for the 1st, 3rd and 5th Accused, he said that he did not know any of the accused in the dock and identify them as being responsible for robbery attack at his house. He maintained that the said Armed Robbers did not cover their faces”. (underlining ours for emphasis).
(iv) The underline portion of the above quoted trial Judge’s judgment did not form part of the evidence given by PW1.
(v) The Judgment was therefore perverse as the trial Judge deliberately
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imported what is not on record into his judgment so as to convict the 1st Accused/Appellant at all cost.
GROUND TWO: ERROR OF LAW
2. The Learned trial Judge erred in Law when, despite the counsel’s and Accused’s objection to the admissibility of Exhibit A, (i.e. 1st Accused/Appellants statement) on the ground that the said statement was obtained under duress, he failed to conduct trial within trial before admitting the said statement in evidence as required by Law.
PARTICULARS
(i) When the Prosecuting State Counsel sought to tender the statement of the 1st Accused/Appellant in evidence, the trial Judge hurriedly admitted it without allowing the 1st Accused/Appellant (the alleged Maker of the Statement) or his Counsel to see the statement.
(ii) Even, when the Counsel raised objection, the trial Judge deliberately and perversely failed or refused to record the objection during trial.
(iii) However, since the truth and facts of the objection raised by Counsel was in the mind and sub-conscience of the learned trial Judge, he himself admitted in his judgment that the defence counsel raised objection to the admissibility of the
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statement on ground that it was obtained by duress when he held as follows:
“The defence also objected to the tendering of the confessional statements made by the accused persons mainly on the basis that it was obtained by force. They were not contesting the contents of the statements.
This objection was overruled and the confessional statements were admitted as Exhibits A – E.”
(iv) There was no trace of trial-within-trial in the Record of Proceedings despite the above quoted portion of the trial Judge’s Judgment.
(v) The trial Judge made up his mind from the word ‘go’ to convict the 1st Accused/Appellant at all cost.
(vi) The trial Judge convicted the 1st Accused/Appellant relying on his purported confessional statement.
GROUND THREE: ERROR OF LAW
3. The trial Judge erred in law when he failed to give the 1st Accused/Appellant fair hearing.
PARTICULARS
(i) The admission of the purported confessional statement of the 1st Accused/Appellant in evidence as Exhibit A without conducting trial-within-trial has denied the 1st Accused/Appellant fair hearing.
(ii) The statement was hurriedly admitted without more by
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the trial Judge.
(iii) The trial Judge would have rejected the statement if a trial-within-trial had been conducted.
(v) The trial Judge erroneously based his conviction of the 1st Accused/Appellant on his purported confessional statement.
GROUND FOUR
4. The Learned trial Judge was perversed in the conduct of the entire trial of the 1st Accused/Appellant.
PARTICULARS
(i) The trial Judge deliberately doctored the record of proceedings during trial when he refused or failed to record the objection raised by both the 1st Accused/Appellant and his Counsel to the admissibility of Exhibit A (i.e. the purported confessional statement of the 1st Accused/Appellant) on the ground that the said Statement was obtained by Force.
(ii) The trial Judge deliberately did not write the objection in order to paint a picture that no objection was raised by Counsel.
(iii) But as fate would have it and due to the existence of its truth in the trial Judge’s subconscious mind, the trial Judge in his judgment admitted the fact that counsel raised objection to the admissibility of Exhibit A on ground that it was obtained by duress. He however held
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that: “This objection was overruled and the confessional statements were admitted as Exhibits A – E”.
The relevant briefs of argument for this appeal are:
(a) Appellant’s Amended brief of argument dated and filed 1/4/2015 – Settled by Abiodun Olaide Esq.
(b) Respondent’s brief of argument filed on 1/2/2016 and deemed filed on 21/3/2016 – Settled by Fola Akinru Jomu (Mrs.) Director, Legal Drafting, Osun State.
Learned Counsel for the Appellant nominated three (3) issues for
determination. They are:
1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right to have relied on the evidence given by all the prosecution witnesses (particularly PW1, PW5 who were eye witnesses) in finding the Appellant guilty of armed robbery. (Ground one).
2. Whether considering the way and manner the so-called “Confessional Statement” of the 1st Accused/Appellant was admitted by the trial Judge of the deliberate omission of the objection raised by the Defence to its admissibility from the record during trial, the 1st Accused/Appellant was given fair hearing. (Grounds 2 and 3).
3. Whether the learned trial Judge did not perversely doctor the record
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of proceeding through deliberate omissions from and additions to the Record. (Ground 4)
Learned Counsel for the Respondent adopted the issues formulated by the Appellant.
It is important to start a consideration of this appeal from Appellant’s Issue 2. This is because issue 2 raises a question of fair hearing and may ultimately turn out to be the determinant factor in the appeal.
On the said Issue 2, Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the only evidence left upon which the trial judge could base the conviction of the Appellant was the so-called “Confessional Statement” – Exhibit A. That the statement was admitted as Exhibit A at page 113 of the Record.
He submitted that the statement of the Appellant was wrongly admitted in evidence by the trial Judge and this has occasioned a miscarriage of justice as the Appellant was denied fair hearing. When despite the objection raised to the admissibility of the statement, the trial judge failed to conduct a trial within trial to confirm the voluntariness or otherwise of the statement before admitting it to evidence.
Counsel referred to the cases of Ogudo v. State (2011)
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11- 12 (pt. 1) SCM P. 209 at 222 and Eke v. State (2011) 1 SCM P. 155 at 162 and submitted that where a confessional statement is challenged on ground of involuntariness or that it was obtained by force, “a trial within trial must be held”.
Appellant’s Counsel referred to the provision of Section 36 (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) to demonstrate that an accused person is entitled to fair hearing and submitted that the refusal of the trial judge to test the voluntariness of Exhibit ‘A’, his failure to allow the Defence to see the confessional statement as well as his failure to record the objection raised to its admissibility before admitting it in evidence as well as the trial of the Appellant between January 2007 and June 2013 (a period of over six years) have denied the Appellant of fair trial and occassioned a miscarriage of Justice.
Learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted on Issue Two that a trial within trial is necessary only where a confessional statement is effectively challenged and not where all the opportunity offered for such were not utilized. He referred to page 113 of the record.
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He submitted that a confessional statement having been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit could no longer be made the subject of any trial within trial. On this, Counsel referred to the cases of Nwachukwu V. State (2004) All FWLR (Pt. 206) 525 and Ogudo V. State (2011) 48 NSCC 377 at 430.
The question, according to Counsel is when is the appropriate time to raise involuntariness of a confessional statement? He answered that the appropriate point to raise the involuntariness of .a confessional statement is when it is about to be tendered in evidence especially as in this case, the accused person is represented by Counsel and it is assumed they ought to know what to do at every stage of the proceedings, He argued that both Counsel and the Court are bound by the record of the Court. That it was stated at page 113 of the record of proceedings that No objection was raised as to involuntariness of the Appellant’s confessional statement.
He referred to the case of Okaroh V. The State (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 81) 214 and Alarape V. State (2001) FWLR (Pt. 41) 1872 and concluded on the issue that the confessional statement was tendered without
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objection from the defence. That none of the prosecution witnesses was cross-examined as to their voluntariness. And, that it was not until the prosecution had closed its case and the Appellant was testifying in defence that the issue was belatedly raised.
He submitted that the learned trial Judge was right to have dismissed this aspect of the defence case as an afterthought, having regard to the qualitative evidence tendered by the prosecution and accepted by the trial Court on the subject.
There are three sets of excerpts from the record of proceedings that are particularly relevant in the determination of Issue Two in this appeal. The first is an excerpt from page 113 of the record at the point the Appellant’s confessional statement was admitted. The second is at page 119 of the record which is a portion of the Appellant’s statement in defence. And, the third is at page 135 of the record which is part of the judgment of the trial Court.
Page 113 lines 26 – 29
“Mrs. Akinrunjomu sought to tender the statements of the 1st and 2nd accused as Exhibits. The statement made by 1st accused, Lukuman Adeniyi is admitted and marked Exhibit ‘A’.
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Statement made by the 2nd accused is admitted and marked Exhibit B”‘.
Page 119
“Opening of Defence DW1 I am Lukuman Adeniyi.
Xxx Cross Examination. I volunteered statement to the Police in Yoruba, but it was recorded in English. I appended my signature. Yes, this is my statement Exhibit A’
Re Examination Nil “.
Page 135 Paragraph 2
“The defence also objected to the tendering of the confessional statements made by the Accused Persons mainly on the basis that it was obtained by force. They were not contesting the contents of the statements. This objection was overruled and confessional statements were admitted as Exhibits ‘A – E’, Under cross-examination of 1st Accused all that he said that “I volunteered statement to the police in Yoruba but recorded in English language. I appended my signature and he admitted his statement is Exhibit ‘A’. And 2nd Accused admitted that he volunteered a statement to the Police but said that it was obtained by force.”
We can easily deduce the following inferences from the aforementioned pages of the record:-
1. At page 113, that the learned
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trial judge did not record any suggestion that the confessional statement of the Appellant was shown either to Appellant or his Counsel.
2. Still on page 113, that the learned trial Judge did not record whether or not the Counsel to the Appellant objected to the admissibility of the statement – either by saying – No objection or that we are objecting.
3. At page 135, it became obvious that indeed the learned Counsel for the Appellant objected to the admissibility of the Appellant’s confessional statement on the ground that it was not made voluntarily.
4. Still at page 135, that the learned trial Judge referred to a ruling which was not so recorded.
5. That All through the proceedings in spite of the ground of objection to the admissibility of the statement by the defence that the statement was not voluntarily obtained as stated by the learned trial Judge at page 135, a trial within trial was not ordered or conducted.
To all of these, the fact that the Appellant was recorded to have accepted volunteering Exhibit ‘A’ does not in my view cure the fundamental defects in this case – which are (i) the failure of the learned trial judge to
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allow the Appellant and/or his Counsel to view the Appellant’s statement at the point of tendering (ii) the failure of the learned trial judge to record the objection to the admissibility of the confessional statement, raised by the Appellant’s Counsel (iii) the failure in the circumstances to order a trial within trial for the admissibility of the confessional statement and the failure to rule on such.
From the above lapses in the trial, there is no doubt that the Appellant was denied a right of fair hearing. Fair hearing and fair trial are synonymous concepts. The test of determining whether there was a fair hearing in criminal cases is always the impression of reasonable people listening and present in the open Court.
See Mohammed v. Kano N. A. (1968) 1 All NLR 424; Gaji v. State (1975) 1 All NLR 266, Effiom V. State (1995) 1 (Pt. 373) 207; Uguru v State (2002) NWLR 9 NWLR (Pt. 771) 90 and Ogunsanya V. State (2010) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1213) 349 at 362.
Section 36 (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) provides that a person charged with a criminal offence, unless the charge is withdrawn, is entitled to a fair
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hearing in public within a reasonable time by a Court or Tribunal and by virtue of Section 36 (6) of the same Constitution he (the accused) is entitled to adequate time and facility for the preparation of his defence, and to defend himself in person or by legal practitioner of his own choice.
Hearing could not be said to be fair when at the point of tendering an accused’s confessional statement, the statement was not shown to the Appellant nor his Counsel and Counsel was either not granted the opportunity to ventilate his views on admissibility of the statement or for the Court to adequately record the objection of Counsel.
Fair hearing incorporates a trial done in accordance with the rules of natural justice and must include giving a party or a legal practitioner of his choice the opportunity to present his case before an impartial Court or free from fear and intimidation. Furthermore, the rule of audi alteram partem postulates that the Court or other Tribunal must hear both sides at every material stage of the proceedings before handing down a decision at that stage. It is a rule of fairness and a Court or Tribunal cannot be fair unless it
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considers both sides of the case as presented by both sides.
Thus, the very essence of fair hearing under Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution is a hearing which is fair to both parties, prosecution or defence. The Section does not contemplate a standard of justice which is biased in favour of one party and to the prejudice of the other. Indeed, patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of justice.
See Adamu V. Sadi (1997) 5 NWLR (Pt. 504) 2005; Ndu V. State (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 164) 550; Amadi V. Thomas Aplin & Co. (1972) 4 SC 228; Offor V. State (1992) 12 NWLR (Pt. 632) 608; Isamode V. Okei (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt. 538) 455; Onuoha V. State (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 101) 23; Akinfe V. State (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 85) 729; F.R.N V. Akabueze (2010) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1223) 525.
Clearly and in all the circumstances of the case the Appellant was denied fair hearing at the stage of tendering his confessional statement and also for the failure of the learned trial Judge to have decreed the procedure of a trial within trial when the defence raised objection to the admissibility of the Appellant’s confessional statement on the ground that it was not voluntarily
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made.
Undoubtedly, the right to fair hearing is at the root of a just and fair administration of criminal justice – An absence of it always amounts to grave injustice in a matter in which the liberty of the citizen is very much in issue. Thus, its breach in any trial nullifies same.
Kim V. State (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 233) 17; Onagoruwa V. State (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 221) 33; Mohammed V. Kano N.A (1968) 1 All NLR 424, A.G. Rivers State V. Ude (2006) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1008) 435; FRN V. Akabueze (Supra) at 544.
In the instant case, there has been fundamental irregularities in procedure of such character that we are unable to say that there has been no miscarriage of justice.
Issue No. Two is accordingly resolved in favour of the Appellant.
Having resolved this, important issue in favour of the Appellant, I do not find it any longer necessary to consider the other issues in this appeal.
Based on Issue Two alone, this appeal is meritorious and it is allowed.
In the circumstance, the trial, conviction and sentence of the Appellant on 27/6/2013 by I. O. Adeleke J. in charge No. HIK/1C/2007 is hereby set aside.
However, as the trial of the
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Appellant was only vitiated by unfairness, I consider it proper to make an order of re-trial.
See. Okafor V. State (1976) 5 SC 13; FRN V. Akabueze (supra) Pp. 540 – 541.
Suit No, HIK/1C/2007 is accordingly remitted to the Hon. Chief Judge of Osun State for trial de novo before another Judge of the high Court of Osun State other than Hon. Justice I. O. Adeleke.
Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8693(CA)
