Makanjuola Ayoola V. Alhaji Habibat Yahaya (2004)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
WALTER SAMUEL NKANU ONNOGHEN, J.C.A.
This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Kwara State in suit No. KWS/267/94 delivered by J.F. Gbadeyan, J. on the 12th day of November, 1999 in which the court granted the counter-claim of the respondent and awarded the sum of N200,000.00 by way of general damages.
The appellant is not satisfied with the decision, hence, the appeal.
The complaints of the appellant as contained in his two grounds of appeal are as follows:
Grounds of appeal:
“1. The learned trial court erred in law in granting the declaratory reliefs asked for by the 1st defendant in the counter-claim against the 2nd defendant.
Particulars of Error
(a) There was no evidence adduced to support the grant of the reliefs in favour of the 1st defendant.
(b) The averments in support of the 1st defendant’s counter-claim was abandoned as the 1st defendant did not proffer evidence on same.
(c) The assertion of the counter-claimant was never proved
(2) The learned trial court erred in law in coming into the conclusion that the 2nd defendant was liable in trespass and to pay jointly and severally with the plaintiff a sum of N200,000.00 to the 1st defendant for inconveniences and disturbances suffered by the counter-claimant.
Particulars of Error
(a) The issue of whether the 2nd defendant committed trespass or not was placed before the court.
(b) The court granted to the 1st defendant a relief she did not claim.
(c) There was no evidence that the 2nd defendant entered the 1st defendant’s land (if any) to entitle her to the damages awarded.
(d) The damages awarded is excessive.
The judgment of the learned trial court has occasioned a miscarriage of justice.”
In the appellant’s brief of argument filed on 13/7/2000, learned counsel for the appellant, Dayo Eniwaye, Esq. has submitted two issues to this court for the determination of the appeal.
The issues are as follows:
“(a) Where (sic) or not the trial court was right to have granted the declaratory relief of the 1st defendant against the 2nd defendant without taking evidence?.
(c) Whether or not the trial court was right to have found the 2nd defendant liable for trespass and thereby awarded N200,000.00 damages when it was not a relief placed before the court?.”
The facts of the case include the following: on the 14th day of November, 1994, one Alhaja Tajudeen Olagunju caused a writ of summons to be issued against the respondent in this appeal claiming:
“1. A declaration that the plaintiff is the bonafide purchaser without notice of all that piece or parcel of land with the developments thereon situate, lying and being at Geri-Alimi roundabout (known as Ayoola Estate) along Ilorin-Lagos road near Ilorin Grammar School Ilorin, covered by customary rights of occupancy No. 245 dated 14/9/94 issued by the Ilorin West Local Government of Kwara State.
2. An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant either by himself, agents, servants, privies or through any person(s) however, from further trespassing and/or disturbing the plaintiff on the said property situate lying and being at Geri Alimi roundabout (known as Ayoola Estate) along Ilorin-Lagos road near Ilorin Grammer School, Ilorin and covered by customary right of occupancy No. 245 dated 4th September, 1994 issued by the Ilorin West Local Government Kwara State.”
In the course of the proceedings, the present appellant was joined in the action as a second defendant when it became apparent that he was a common vendor to the plaintiff and the original defendant in the action.
By an amended statement of claim the plaintiff, in addition to the two reliefs earlier reproduced, claimed the following:
“(3) An order of the court compelling the 2nd defendant to give to the plaintiff possession of the said premises in dispute situate, lying and being at Geri-Alimi roundabout (known as Ayoola Estate) along Ilorin-Lagos road near Ilorin Grammar School, Ilorin and covered by permit to alienate land No. 0024 dated 16/11/94 as well as by customary right of occupancy No. 245 dated 14/4/94 issued by the Ilorin West Local Government of Kwara State.
(4) An order of court for the two defendants jointly and severally to account for and pay over to the plaintiff in dispute from the date of deed of transfer from the 2nd defendant to the plaintiff to date of giving possession to the plaintiff.
(5) N1,408,069 (one million, four hundred and eight thousand and sixty-nine naira) against the 1st defendant being the cost of the 3 bedroom bungalow demolished by her on the property.
(6) General damages for loss of use, trespass, pains and humiliation suffered by the plaintiff in the hands of the defendants.”
On the other hand, the respondent in this appeal who was the 1st defendant in the suit counter-claimed against the plaintiff and jointly with the 2nd defendant who is appellant in this appeal as follows:-
(ii) A declaration that as between the plaintiff and herself, she is the prior and bonafide purchaser for value and or without notice of an interest of the plaintiff of all that piece or parcel of land and all the appurtenance therefore situate, lying and being at Geri-Alimi round about, Ilorin-Lagos road which has been styled, known and called Alhaja Habibat Yahaya Estate since November, 1993 and long before the purported negotiation between the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant on the said estate.
(25) The defendant further counter-claims against the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant jointly and severally as follows:
(a) A declaration that all (if any) transactions or negotiations between the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant relating to or connected with the estate of the defendant situate, lying and being at Geri-Alimi round about, Ilorin-Lagos road and otherwise known and called as Alhaja Habibat Yahaya estate after the 27th day of November, 1993 when the 2nd defendant collected from defendant a sum of N1 million (one million naira) being the purchase price of the said estate is illegal, immoral, questionable, condemnable and, therefore, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(ii) An order of perpetual injunction restraining each of the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant either by himself, agents, solicitors, servants, privies or through any person or person(s) howsoever from trespassing on the said estate or from disturbing or obstructing the defendant’s peaceful or peaceable enjoyment of the said estate which is popularly, commonly and legally known as Alhaja Habibat Yahaya estate.
(iii) A sum of N1 million (one million naira) being general damages for the embarrassment, pains, inconveniences and disturbances suffered by the defendant in the hand of the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant.”
Evidence revealed that the estate in dispute was first sold by the appellant to the respondent before it was allegedly resold to the plaintiff in the suit as a result of an alleged demand by the respondent for and a refund of her purchase price of the property following delay in releasing the title documents to the property by the Bank of the North to whom the property was mortgaged. At the conclusion of trial, the learned trial Judge dismissed the main case and granted the counter-claim based on the evidence on record though the respondent did not testify at the trial. It is against that judgment that the appellant has appealed.
On the 26th day of the February, 2004 when the appeal came up for hearing appellant was not represented by counsel while A.O. Adelodun, Esq. represented the respondent. The registrar of this court informed the court of the several efforts made by the court officials to serve the appellant and his counsel with hearing notices to no avail. That the appellant’s counsel has relocated to Abuja from Ilorin without leaving a forwarding address just as the appellant who had moved base from Ibadan to Lagos also without a forwarding address.
Thereupon, learned counsel for the respondent, A.O. Adelodun, Esq. applied to the court to hear the appeal on the briefs already filed which application was granted. Mr. Adelodun then referred the court to the appellant’s brief filed on 13/7/2000 and reply brief filed on 4/7/02. He then adopted in argument the respondent’s brief deemed filed on 24/6/02 together with the preliminary objection therein contained and urged the court to dismiss appeal.
It is better to deal with the preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for the respondent in the respondent’s brief which issues have been duly joined by the learned counsel for the appellant in the reply brief.
The objection is primarily to the effect that the notice of appeal is not dated and as such it is useless and worthless and that no issue for determination could have been predicated on same. Learned counsel cited and relied on Ojo v. Adejobi (1978) 3 SC 65 at 73-74; Tsalibawa v. Habiba (1991) 2 NWLR (Pt.174) 461.
Learned counsel further submitted that grounds of appeal cannot be argued but issues formulated therefrom. That where there is no notice of appeal as submitted there is no ground of appeal as such no issue(s) can be distilled from same.
On his part, learned counsel for the appellant in the reply brief filed on 4/7/02 stated that the notice of appeal in this case was duly filed on 19th November, 1999 and that by the operation of Order 3 rule 2(1) and 5 of the Court of Appeal Rules the relevant date on a process is the date of filing of that process after payment of the assessed filing fees. Counsel then cited and relied on Okpoido v. Udoikpong (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt.604) 595 at 605; UBA v.Taan (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt.287) 368 at 379.
Finally, learned counsel submitted that the cases of Ojo v. Adejobi and Tsalibawa v. Habiba cited supra and relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent do not support his contention and urged the court to overrule the preliminary objection.
I have carefully gone through the record of appeal and the notice of appeal contained at pages 187 and 188 thereof. I agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that the notice of appeal is not dated. I also confirm the fact that from the endorsement on the said undated notice of appeal, it was assessed and duly paid for and filed on the 19th day of November, 1999, while the judgment appealed against was delivered on the 12th day of November, 1999.
The question is: what is the legal effects of an undated notice of appeal which was duly assessed, paid for and filed?
Order 3 rule 2(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules provides thus:
“2(1) All appeals shall be by way of rehearing and shall be brought by notice (hereinafter called ‘notice of appeal’) to be filed in the registry of the court below…” (Emphasis supplied by me).
The above provision emphasises the filing of the notice of appeal, not the date the notice of appeal was prepared. Looking at the notice of appeal in this matter it was only filed in the registry of the court below as required by the above rule of the court, and within time too.
That apart, it is the law that an appeal is deemed filed or brought when the notice of appeal has been duly filed in the registry of the court below – see Order 3 rule 5 of the Court of Appeal Rules.
Learned counsel for the respondent has cited and relied on the case of Oja v. Adejabi and Tsalibawa v. Habiba (supra) in support of his contention that a notice of appeal which is not dated is a worthless and useless piece of paper. I have gone through the two cases cited and I am unable to find where it was decided that an undated notice of appeal which was duly assessed, paid for and filed in the registry of the court below, is a useless and worthless piece of paper, as submitted by learned counsel for the respondent. In fact, the two cases did not deal with notice of appeal. For instance, in Ojo’s case the document on which the respondent relied and obtained judgment in a land.
Matter in the lower court was a photocopy of a supposed copy of a deed of conveyance written in long hand and was not signed by anybody. That apart the people mentioned therein did not sign the document. There was nothing about the document being undated.
However, in the case of UBA Ltd. v. Taan (1993) 4 NWLR (Pt.287) 368 at 379, the Court of Appeal, per Tobi, J.C.A. (as he then was) in considering the issue as to when an appeal is said to be pending before this court stated thus:
“In my humble view, an appeal will be deemed to be pending in this court the moment the notice of appeal is filed in accordance with the rules of this court.”
I am of the considered opinion that having regards to the provisions of the relevant rules of this court earlier cited in this judgment and the decision of this court in UBA case (supra) that the proposition of the law so stated is still sound law and therefore applicable to this case. That being the case, I hold the view that the appellant’s appeal filed vide a notice of appeal on 19th November, 1999 against the judgment of the lower court delivered on 12th November, 1999 is deemed to have been duly filed and pending before this court since the 19th day of November, 1999. Consequently, I find no merit in the preliminary objection which is accordingly overruled.
Turning now to the merits of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted on issue A in the appellant’s brief of argument that the respondent who counter-claimed at the lower court did not call evidence after the case of the plaintiff and the appellant but rested her case on those of the plaintiff and appellant.
Learned counsel then cited section 137(1) of the Evidence Act, 1990 and the case of Odofin v. Mogaji (1978) 4 SC 91, (1978) 11 NSCC 275 at 277 and Dado v. Numshuwan (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt.212) 696 at 703 and submitted that civil cases are proved on balance of probabilities and that the respondent having elected not to give evidence on her counter-claim is deemed to have abandoned the claim against the appellant, relying on FCDA v. Naibi (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt.138) 270, (1990) 5 SCNJ 180 at 184.
That pleadings are mere notice which cannot be substituted for evidence required in proof of the fact pleaded relying on Honika Sawmill (Nig.) Ltd. v. Hoff (1994) 2 NWLR (Pt.326) 256. That the respondent’s failure to give evidence means that no declaratory relief could be awarded in her favour relying on Ogbonna v. A.-G., Imo State (1992) 1 NWLR (Pt.220) 647 at 698; Owners M/V Baco Liner 3 v. Adeniji (1993) 2 NWLR (Pt.274) 195 at 202 – 204; Ogunjumo v. Ademolu (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt.389) 254.
Finally, learned counsel submitted that the burden placed on the respondent by section 136 of the Evidence Act, 1990 has not been discharged and urged the court to resolve the issue in favour of the appellant, relying on Bello v. Eweka (1981) 1 SC 101 at 103.
In arguing the issue under consideration, learned counsel for the respondent in the respondent’s brief of argument filed by Ayodele Ogundele, Esq. on 20/6/02 submitted that with the evidence of DW2, the averments contained in the respondent’s counter-claim were extensively established, making it unnecessary for the respondent to testify. That DW2 testified on behalf of the appellant. That the evidence of DW2 confirmed that the respondent was the 1st purchaser of the property in dispute having made full payment for same and that despite this fact the appellant refused to release the document of title to the property to the respondent. That exhibits 2D3, 2D4, 2D5, 2D6, 2D7, 2D8, 2D9, and 2D10 confirm that the respondent bought the property in issue. That the documents/exhibits were issued by the appellant to the respondent. That the evidence of the plaintiff and appellant confirmed the fact that the respondent had taken possession of the property.
That the respondent’s case is for declaratory and injunctive reliefs apart from claim for damages and that it falls within the exception to the rule that a plaintiff’s case must succeed on it’s own strength and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case. That plaintiff can properly rely on the case of the defendant which support his case to establish and prove his case.
That it is not required at all times that a party should physically be present or give evidence in his case if the case can be otherwise proved, particularly where there are documentary evidence in support of his case, counsel further submitted, relying on C.R.S.N. Corp. v. Oni (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt.371) 270 at 293; Kehinde v. Ogunbunmi (1967) 1 All NLR 306.
That by virtue of sections 135(2) 136, 137 and 139 of the Evidence Act the burden of prove in civil cases does not remain static but shifts on who will fail if the evidence is not produced relying on A.-G., Kwara State v. Olawale (1993) 1 NWLR (Pt.272) 645 at 666; NBCI v. Standard (Nig.) Eng. Co. Ltd. (2002) 8 NWLR (Pt.768) 104 at 199.
That since the respondent had elicited by oral and documents from witness evidence against the case of the plaintiff and appellant and thereby prove or establish her counter-claim, the onus of proof no longer resides in the respondent.
In the reply brief, learned counsel for the appellant argued that even though the burden of prove is not static, it is nevertheless on the respondent who asserted the facts in her counter-claim to prove same. That the failure cannot shift the burden on the appellant.
As stated earlier in this judgment, the reliefs claimed in the counter-claim by the respondent include a declaratory relief as contained in relief No.1. The other two reliefs are for injunction and damages. It is not disputed by the parties that the respondent did not testify at the trial. It is clear from the record that the respondent rested her case on those of the plaintiff and the appellant.
It is now stated law that declaratory relief will not be granted without oral testimony from the claimant or on his behalf – see Bello v. Eweka (1981) 1 SC 101; Ogbonna v. A.-G., Imo State (1992) 1 NWLR (Pt.220) 647 at 698 etc.
It is the law that in civil cases, the standard of proof is that of balance of probabilities and the burden of first proving the existence or non-existence of a fact lies on the party against whom the judgment of the court would be given if no evidence were produced on either side, regard however being had to any presumption that may be raised on the pleadings- see section 137(1) of the Evidence Act, 1990; Odofin v. Mogaji (1978) 4 SC 91, (1978) 11 NSCC 275 at 277; Dado v. Numshuwan (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt.212) 696.Bearing in mind the position of the law on standard and burden of proof in civil cases and the issue of declaratory relief, it is important to note the rationale behind the principle that such a relief would not be granted without evidence being produced at the trial.
This principle applies even if the other party has admitted the case of the plaintiff. The rationale is that declaratory relief calls for the exercise of the discretion of court in favour of the person asking for same. Therefore, any party who desire the court to exercise its discretion in his favour must oblige the court with the materials on which the court can act in exercising its discretion – see Bello v. Eweka supra. Williams v. Hope Rising (1982) 1-2 SC 145 at 152.
This principle of law, it is my humble view, is not in conflict with another principle which is to the effect that there is no rule of law or practice which requires a plaintiff in a civil suit to be physically present in court or testify if he can otherwise prove his case. What that means is that if a plaintiff can otherwise prove his case without giving evidence, the law allows him to do so. The question then is whether in the present case involving declaratory relief the respondent proved his case when she did not testify at the trial? In other words, is there evidence on record in proof of the respondent’s counter-claim even though she did not testify and whether she is entitled to rely on such evidence for the declaratory relief?.
From the pleadings, the case of the respondent is that she is the 1st purchaser of the property from the appellant, having paid fully for same and entered into an agreement. That receipt was issued for the payment in November, 1993. That the appellant, despite these facts, refused to release the documents of title to the respondent but later on purported to sell the same property to the plaintiff. The respondent then claimed, inter alia, a declaration, in terms reproduced earlier in this judgment.
The question is whether these facts have been proved.
At page 112 of the record, the 2nd defendant, who is the appellant in this appeal stated this in examination-in-chief:
“…The lawyer intimated me that he has got a prospective buyer who offered to buy it for N1 million which he had taken. I was paid the N1 million cash in November, 1993. It was receipted for. I did not give the 1st defendant (meaning the respondent in this appeal) any other document apart from the receipt and the prepared agreement which I executed.”
The receipt he said he gave to the respondent was tendered through him as exhibit 2D5 during cross examination at page 117 of record, where also exhibit 2D6, the assignment between the parties was also admitted as evidence of payment since it was not registered. After the purchase, the appellant, by exhibits 2D7 and 2D8 also tendered by him under cross-examination, refunded certain sums of money to the respondent as outstanding rents on the estate.
DW2 was called by the appellant. He is a police officer who investigated the criminal aspect of the case earlier. He confirmed that from the result of his investigation, the appellant first sold the property to the respondent for N1 million before reselling it to the plaintiff. That the appellant did not give the respondent the title documents before the second sale.
It must be noted that before going into a consideration of the counter-claim, the learned trial Judge had already found, while considering the main case, that when the purported sale of the property to the plaintiff by the appellant was made, the sale to the respondent had already taken place. The court therefore went on to hold, also in the main case, that the appellant had nothing to sell to the plaintiff at the time the purported sale took place.
It is my considered view that having regards to the pleadings, the evidence on record, both oral and documentary, there was sufficient evidence before the lower court to grant the declaratory relief in the counterclaim and that the lower court is right in granting same. It is trite law that evidence elicited from a plaintiff’s witness under cross-examination forms part of the case for the defence. Therefore, where a counsel, by skilful application of the weapon of cross-examination, is not only able to destroy the case of the plaintiff but in the process brings out facts or evidence in prove of the case for the defence, he can legitimately rely on such facts in establishing his case. It is trite law that cases are proved not by the number of witnesses called but by the quality of evidence produced in prove of the averments in the pleadings.
It is apparent that learned counsel for the appellant is under the wrong impression that since the evidence in prove of the counterclaim did not come through the respondent personally and viva voce, the respondent and the court cannot rely on same to grant the declaratory relief sought. This is very erroneous. For instance, the receipt of purchase of the property which shows the time of sale to the respondent by the appellant was already in evidence tendered through the vendor himself, the appellant in this case. In short, I am of the view that issue A be and is hereby resolved against the appellant.
On issue B, learned counsel submitted that the lower court erred in awarding damages to the respondent for trespass when the issue of trespass was not pleaded. That parties are bound by their pleading relying on Balogun v. Adejobi (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt.376) 131; Karibo v. Grend (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt.230) 426 at 440-441. That the finding at page 173 of the record to the effect that the appellant and the plaintiff broke and entered the land of the respondent and thereby committed trespass amounts to making a new case for the respondent relying on Coker v. Adetayo (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt.249) 612 at 625; Awaye Motors Co. Ltd. v. Adewumi (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt.292) 236 at 243.
Learned counsel further submitted that the respondent was not in possession of the property in dispute. Referring to paragraph 16 of the amended statement of defence and counter-claim, learned counsel submitted that only tenant in possession can sue for trespass, not even the landlord, relying on Adepoju v. Oke (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt.594) 154 at 169; Okolo v. Uzoka (1978) 4 SC 77. That since the respondent pleaded that she has tenants in possession of the property, she was not the proper person to sue for trespass granted that it was pleaded, which he denied.
Learned counsel further submitted that the court will only award damage when evidence has been adduced in that respect. That since no evidence was adduced by the respondent in that respect, the trial court was wrong in assessing and awarding the damages relying on Transkomplet (Nig.) Ltd. v. Galadima (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt.596) 631 at 645. Relying further on the case of Savannah Bank (Nig.) Plc v. PMS Ltd. (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt.621) 160 at 165, learned counsel submitted that the award of damages was based on wrong principle of law and therefore subject to be set aside by the court and finally urged the court to resolve the issue in favour of the appellant.
Reacting to the issue under consideration, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the issues of trespass was duly pleaded in the counter-claim and referred the court to relief No. 11 where the respondent asked for perpetual injunction restraining amongst others the appellant from trespassing on the estate. That the damages the respondent claimed was for ’embarrassment, pains, inconveniences and disturbances suffered’. That the trial court never made out a new case for the respondent neither did it grant a relief not claimed.
In the alternative, counsel submitted that a court is bound to a make consequential orders that will give effect to its decision. That the order flowed directly, naturally and necessarily from the judgment of the court based on the evidence before it. Learned counsel then cited and relied on Ogbahon v. Registered Trustees of C.C.C (2001) FWLR (Pt.80) 496 at 1517-1518. Counsel further submitted that only a person in possession can maintain an action in trespass against anyone except the person who has a better title relying on Anyabunsi v. Ugwunze (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt.401) 255 at 268.
That a Court of Appeal, when faced with conflicting decisions can choose any of them as applicable to the facts relying on Enang v. Obeten (1997) 11 NWLR (Pt.528) 255 at 266. Finally, counsel urged the court to resolve the issue against the appellant.
To begin with, I reproduce, once again, relief No. 11 in the counter-claim of the respondent. It reads thus:
“An order of perpetual injunction restraining each of the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant either by himself, agents, solicitors, servants, privies or through any person however from trespassing on the said estate or from disturbing or obstructing the defendant’s peaceful or peaceable enjoyment of the said estate which is popularly, commonly and legally know as Alhaja Habibat Yahaya estate.”
From the above, I agree with learned counsel for the respondent that counsel for the appellant is not correct in submitting that ‘there was nowhere in the respondent’s amended statement of defence/counter-claim that the issue of trespass was raised’. Secondly, though the learned trial Judge did find at page 173 of the record thus:
“Since the first defendant enjoyed her quiet possession since 1993 when the plaintiff with the support of the second defendant went into the estate without the permission of the first defendant on a business intended to disturb her peaceable enjoyment of her lawful quiet possession, he was committing trespass for which the plaintiff and the second defendant are liable.”
That finding is supported by the pleadings and evidence before the court. However, in awarding damages, the lower court did not do so for trespass as contended by learned counsel for the appellant. The court, after making the findings supra concluded the judgment thus, on award of damages:
“The plaintiff and the second defendant shall jointly and severally pay to the first defendant/counter-claimant N200,000.00 general damages for the inconvenience and disturbances suffered by the claimant.”
This is clearly in line with the relief claimed in paragraph 25 111 of the counter-claim.
Generally speaking, it is trite law that trespass is a wrong against possession… The pleadings, the respondent pleaded acts…, including collection… From tenants, repair and refurbishing of the estate… The submission of learned counsel for the appellant in the issue of possession confuses occupation with possession.
In Anyabunsi v. Ugwunze (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt.401) 255 at 268 the Supreme Court stated thus:
“In this connection, I think the point must be made that it appears there is always the tendency to confuse the term ‘occupation’ with ‘possession’. Whereas, the term ‘occupation’, in relation to land entails mere physical control of the land in the time being, possession of land although it may some time connote occupation of such land, is not necessarily always synonymous with occupation such land… a landlord who collects rents from his tenants in respect of his piece or parcel of land is clearly in demure possession of such land, even though he is not in physical occupation or de facto possession thereof.”
In short, I am of the view that issue be and is hereby resolved against the appellant.
In conclusion, I find no merit whatsoever in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed with N10,000.00 cost against the appellant.
Other Citations: (2004)LCN/1577(CA)
