Marcel Ijeoma Ogwuegbu V. Mark Anayo Agomuo & Ors (1999)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
AKINTAN, J.C.A.
The applicant, Marcel Ijeoma Ogwuegbu, was a petitioner/cross-appellant in the appeal in this suit which was disposed of by this court on 16/3/99. The appeal was in respect of an election petition filed after the 10th respondent (INEC) had announced the result of the election held for the chairmanship of Ihitte/Uboma Local Government on 5/12/98. The appeal filed against the decision of the Local Government Election Tribunal was dismissed and the judgment of the tribunal was affirmed. The present applicant was a candidate at the election. He was also a party to the petition before the tribunal and the subsequent appeal in this court in the matter. He was in fact a cross-appellant in the appeal.
The applicant has, in his motion dated 12th April, 1999 and filed in the registry of this court on the same day, prayed the court for the following reliefs:
“to review its judgment delivered on the 16th day of March, 1999 for the purpose of correcting the clerical mistake or other error arising from an accidental slip or omission inherent therein.
Alternatively, the applicant will pray that the said judgment be varied so as to give effect to the its meaning and intention.
The applicant further prays for an order of interlocutory injunction restraining the 10th respondent, INEC, from announcing the result of the bye-election pending the determination of this application.”
The motion was supported by a 17-paragraph affidavit sworn to by the applicant and to which a copy of the judgment of this court delivered on 16/3/99 was attached. The applicant also deposed to a 9-paragraph further affidavit to which a copy of the judgment of the tribunal was attached and a 7-paragraph rejoinder to the counter- affidavit of the 1st respondent to which the statement of result sheets as declared by INEC were attached. The motion was opposed by the respondents. To that end, a 13-paragraph counter-affidavit was deposed to by Mark Anayo Agomuo, a legal practitioner acting on behalf of the 1st and 2nd respondents. Another 12-paragraph counter-affidavit deposed to by Aloy Njoku, a litigation officer at the 10th respondent’s Owerri office, was also filed on behalf of the 6th to 10th respondents.
The facts relied on by the applicant, as contained in the various affidavits deposed to by him, are that the applicant contested for the seat of Chairman of Ihitte/Uboma Local Government Area of Imo State at the election held on 5/12/98. The 1st and 2nd respondents contested the same election respectively for the post of Chairman and Vice Chairman of the same Local Government. At the end of the election, the 1st and 2nd respondents were declared by the 10th respondent as winner of the respective office for which they contested. The applicant was dissatisfied with the result as declared and he filed a petition against the result at the Local Government Election Tribunal. The tribunal heard the petition and delivered its judgment on 15/2/99 in which it upheld the applicant’s petition.
The tribunal held, inter alia, in its said judgment that:-
“In Exh. P19, the 1st respondent was credited with 10,209 votes while the petitioner was credited with 9,041 votes. The total scores of the 1st respondent in the 6 polling stations we ordered nullified, viz: J6, J9, J11, J8, G10 and J7 amount to 1479 votes while those scored by petitioner in those same polling stations total to 99 and we order those figures, i.e. 1479 and 99 votes to be deducted from the overall results of the 1st respondent and the petitioner respectively, thus 10,209 minus 1479 gives a balance of 8,730 while 9,041 minus 99 will give a balance of 8,942 votes for the 1st respondent and the petitioner respectively. Those are their lawful scores.”
The present applicant is the one referred to in the above portion of the judgment of the tribunal as the petitioner while the 1st respondent in this motion was also the 1st respondent referred to in the same judgment. Â
The tribunal thereafter made the following order in its said judgment:
“However, in view of the fact that at least 2 polling stations results are not known to anyone, we order the 10th respondent, INEC, to make arrangements to conduct a bye-election in polling stations D2, D7, J6, J9, J11, J8, G10, and J7 between the petitioner and 1st respondent as candidates in order to determine who emerges as the Chairman of Ihitte/Uboma LGA of Imo State. Any votes scored by the candidates in the bye-election are to be added by INEC to the scores already given above – i.e. 8,730 for the 1st respondent and 8,942 for the petitioner.”
The 1st respondent was dissatisfied with the verdict of the tribunal. He therefore appealed to this court against the judgment. The applicant also filed a cross-appeal against the judgment as he too was dissatisfied with some aspects of the said judgment. The appeal and cross-appeal were heard in this court and judgment in the appeal was delivered by this court on 16/3/99. This court (per Aderemi, J.C.A. to which Pats-Acholonu and Akpiroroh, JJ.C.A. concurred) dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal and affirmed the judgment and orders made by the tribunal. Aderemi, J.C.A. held, inter alia, in the leading judgment:
“Having held that there was over-voting and deducting the votes credited to each of the original 1st respondent (Agomuo 1st respondent/appellant and original petitioner, Ogwuegbu – petitioner/cross-appellant), the lower tribunal found that 9041 votes were standing to the credit of the 1st respondent (Agomuo) and 8942 in favour of the petitioner/cross-appellant. The difference between 9.041 votes and 8,941 votes is not much … The order of the lower tribunal that a bye-election be held in polling stations D2, D7, J6, J9, J11, J8, G10, and J7 is hereby upheld.”
The errors sought to be corrected are the disparities in the statement in this court’s judgment of the valid votes credited to each of the parties as found and contained in the tribunal’s judgment and in the recording of the wards in which bye-elections were ordered to be held by the tribunal. While the tribunal gave the score of the 1st respondent (i.e. 10,209 minus 1,479) as 8,730 and that of the applicant (i.e. 9,041 minus 99) as 8,942, Aderemi. J.C.A. erroneously gave the figures as 9,041 instead of 8,730 to 1st respondent while 8,942 score of the applicant was correctly stated. He also omitted polling booth with code number J8 in his statement of the polling stations where bye-elections were ordered by the tribunal.
He therefore listed 7 stations instead of 8 stations ordered by the tribunal where bye-elections were to be held.
The 10th respondent held the bye-elections in the 7 stations listed in the said judgment of this court on 10/4/99. No bye-election was held in polling station number J8 omitted in the said judgment of this court. The results form the 7 stations where the bye-elections were held on 10/4/99, as set out in INEC Forms EC 8A (exhibited by the applicant in his rejoinder to the counter- affidavit as Exhs X1-X7) gave the total scores of each of the parties in the bye-election as 543 votes to the applicant and 714 votes to the 1st respondent. If therefore the 543 votes scored by the applicant are added to the 8,942 credited to him by the tribunal and as so ordered by the said tribunal, the petitioners total score in the election would come to(8,942 plus 543) 9,485 while that of the 1st respondent would come to (8,730 plus 714) 9,444. But if the 1st respondent’s scores of 714 in the bye-election are added to the erroneous figure of 9,041 given in this court’s said judgment, his total score would come to (9,041 plus 714) 9.755 thereby making the 1st respondent to be the winner of the election. It is the above slip or clerical errors that the applicant is praying this court to correct in his present motion.
As I have earlier stated above, the motion was opposed and to that end the 1st respondent deposed to and filed a counter-affidavit. A counter-affidavit was also deposed to and filed on behalf of the 6th to 10th respondents. The facts relied on by the 1st respondent as set out in his counter-affidavit are that after this court delivered its judgment on 16/3/99, the 10th respondent scheduled the bye-elections for 10/4/99 and the parties were duly informed. The bye-elections were conducted in the wards named in this courts judgment of 16/3/99 and that as a result of the bye-election the total votes of the 1st respondent, when his scores in the bye-election and the score earlier credited to him in this court’s aforementioned judgment, came to 9,755 as against the applicant’s total score of 9,455. The 1st respondent then maintained that he was duly declared as the winner in the election and that INEC Form EC 8E was issued to him (a copy is exhibited with his counter-affidavit as Exh. 1).
The facts relied on by the 6th to 10th respondents, as set out in the counter affidavit deposed to and filed on their behalf, are that a copy of the said judgment and the enrolled order were served on the 10th respondent shortly after the judgment was delivered on 16/3/99. The 10th respondent thereafter took action as ordered in the judgment by conducting the bye-election in the affected wards as set out in the judgment of this court The results of the bye-elections were added to the scores of the parties as given in our said judgment as a result of which the 1st respondent’s score now came to 9,755 while that of the applicant came to 9,485.
The 1st respondent was therefore duly declared the winner of the elections and was accordingly issued with INEC’s appropriate Form EC 8E.
A notice of preliminary objection was filed on behalf of the 1st and 2nd respondents by their counsel, Mr. Yusuf O. Ali. SAN. In the said notice, it is stated, inter alia, that at the hearing of the motion, the 1st and 2nd respondents would rely upon the following objections, notice whereof is hereby given:-
“That this honourable court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the application filed by the applicant herein having regard to the applicable enactments,”
The grounds of the said objection are given in the notice as follows:
“1. The time within this honourable court has in law to consider and determine an appeal on the last Local Government election and other incidental matters thereto has lapsed by effluxion of time.
- The powers of this honourable court sitting as a Constitutional Court in election appeal is highly circumscribed by the enabling legislations unlike in other matter’s.
- The application filed by the applicant is not supported by any affidavit as is legally required.
- The matter in respect of which the application is directed had already taken place and the application thereby overtaken by events.”
When the motion came up for hearing in this court, we decided to take submission on both the preliminary objection and the substantive matter. Mr. Yusuf Ali. SAN. learned leading counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents, abandoned the 4th ground of his objection. He however made his submissions in respect of the remaining 3 grounds.
Mr. Yusuf Ali, SAN. in his submission in respect of his first ground of objection, referred to section 90. paras, 2(2) and 52 of Schedule 5 of Decree No. 36 of 1998 and submitted that the last date this court could do anything on the election should be 18/3/99. He therefore submitted that this court could not extend the time within which to do something in the matter. While conceding that this court has the inherent power to correct slips in its judgment in ordinary civil matters provided the advantage is taken within reasonable time after delivery of the judgment, he however argued that such power does not extend to election appeals as in the instant case. This, he submitted, is because this courts power to correct any slip is circumscribed within the 30 days provided by the enabling law.
On the second ground of his objection, the learned senior counsel submitted that by virtue of Section 89 of Decree No. 4 of 1998, this court has not assumed fully all the powers of the Constitutional court created by the same Decree No. 4 of 1998. It is further argued that since the only power given to this court is only to determine appeals on elections, he therefore urged us to hold that the general power of the Constitutional Court cannot be invoked having regard to section 89 of Decree No. 36 of 1998.
The learned senior counsel submitted, on his third ground of objection, by referring to section 13 of Oaths Act (Cap. 333. Laws or Nigeria 1990) relating to what a deponent to an affidavit must subscribe to and Order 3 rule 3(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules. He then submitted that there is no valid affidavit in support of the applicant’s motion as well as the further affidavit subsequently filed. He therefore urged us to strike out the entire motion as there is no valid affidavit in its support, the decision in New Nigeria Bank v. I.B.W. Nig. Ltd (1998) 6 NWLR (Pt. 554) 446
at 454 is cited in support of this submission.
It is submitted in reply by Mr. Udechukwu, SAN, learned leading counsel for the applicant, that the preliminary objection lacks merit and should be dismissed.
He argued that what was before this court was an application to correct errors in a judgment given within time and that what we are called upon to do is to invoke the slip rule which, he submitted, this court has the inherent power to do by virtue of section 6(6)(a) of the 1979 Constitution. He further contended that the power has not in any way been ousted by enabling Decree No, 36 of 1998 and that there is nothing peculiar about election petitions vis-a-vis other matters that would justify the ousting of the application of the slip rule, He urged us to hold that the slip rule could be invoked and made applicable whenever the need arises regardless of the nature of the proceedings and that it is wrong to suggest that the exercise of the power is time-controlled as suggested by learned leading counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondents,
The learned Senior Advocate further submitted that the power of the court to correct a slip can be invoked at any time and that a judge other than the one that delivered the judgment can make the correction. The decisions in Olurotimi v. Ige (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 311) 257 at 274; and Berlin Nig. Ltd. v. Kachalla (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 420) 478 among others were cited in support of the above submission.
He finally urged us to hold that there is nothing in the said Decree No. 36 of 1998 that abrogates section 6(6) (a) of the 1979 Constitution. He therefore urged us to over-rule the objection on that ground.
On the 3rd ground of objection, the learned Senior Advocate concedes that the deponent did not use the word “solemnly” twice in the concluding paragraph of his affidavits. But it is submitted that the words used; viz “by virtue of the Oaths Act”, are appropriate and quite adequate. He therefore urged us not to follow the decision in the New Nigerian Bank Ltd v. I.B.W. Enterprises Nig. Ltd. (1998) 6 NWLR (Pt 554) 446 relied on in support of the rejection of the affidavits but that the recent decision in Lonestar Drilling Ltd v. Triveni Eng. & Industries Ltd (1999) 1 NWLR (Pt. 588) 622 at 629 should be followed.
Mr. Yusuf Ali, SAN, in reply, re-emphasised that the powers being exercised by this court are part of those of the Constitutional Court and that where there is a conflict between the powers conferred under section 6(6)(a) of the 1979 Constitution and those in the limited power conferred under Decree 36 of 1998, which he says now exists, the latter in time would prevail. He relied on the decision in Labiyi v. Anretiola (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt.258) 139 at 163 in support of this submission.
The two main questions raised in the preliminary objection are whether this court has power to entertain the application by virtue of the limitations created by the 2 Decrees referred to above, and whether the motion is in fact supported by any valid affidavit. It has been argued that since this court was exercising part of the jurisdiction conferred on the Constitutional Court, and the fact that the Local Government (Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions) Decree No. 36 of 1998 specifically provides for a time limit within which all appeals to this court in respect of the Local Government elections held on 5/12/98 must be disposed of, this court cannot entertain an application to correct mistakes under the slip rule, as in the present application, after the expiration of the time prescribed in the said Decree. It is true that it is provided in para. 2(2) of Schedule 5 of the said Decree No. 36 of 1998 that an appeal to this court shall be heard and determined within 30 days from the date the notice of appeal is filed. But correcting errors or slips in a judgment is totally different from hearing and determining an appeal as envisaged in the Decree No. 36 of 1998.
The position of the law is that the court has the inherent power at any time to correct an error in a judgment, decree or order arising from a slip, clerical mistake or accidental omission whether there is or not a general order to that effect: see Berliet Nig. Ltd v. Kachalla (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt.420) 478, Josiah Cornelius Ltd & Ors v. Ezenwa (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 443) 391; Olurotimi v. Ige (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt 311) 257; Thynne v. Thynne (1955) P. 272; Adams & Harvey Ltd v. International Maritime Supplies Ltd (1967) I W.L.R. 445; Aguda, Practice & Procedure of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeal & High Courts of Nigeria, 1980, para. 44.22, page 532 and The Supreme Court Practice. 1985, Vol. 1, para. 20/11/1, page 351.
The exercise of this power is not open only to the very judge who delivered the judgment or who made the order or decree. Any other judge in the same jurisdiction can exercise the power; see Bola v. Latunde (1963) 1 All NLR 161; (1963) 1 SCNLR 288.
In the instant case, it has been submitted, inter alia, that since this court is merely exercising some of the powers of the Constitutional Court and since the provision of the afore-mentioned Decree No. 36 of 1998 which prescribes the time limit within which an appeal before this court must be heard and determined, and since this application is not made within that time, this court therefore lacks the jurisdiction to entertain any application to correct any error or slip in its judgment, order or decree as contained in the present application. I entirely disagree with that view which I consider to be a misconception of the law on the matter. I have no doubt in holding that this court’s power to correct any slip or accidental error in its judgment, order or decree remains intact as part of the inherent powers conferred on the court in section 6(6) (a) of the 1979 Constitution. The subsection of the Constitution provides that:
“The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section –
(a) shall extend, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, to all inherent powers and sanctions of a court of law.”
I believe that the power of a court to correct errors or accidental slips in its judgment, order or decree is one of the inherent powers which is referred to in section 6(6)(a) of the 1979 Constitution. I also believe that the inherent power of a court is of such importance that its removal in any statute must be by express and unambiguous provision. Such provision denying a court of such an important power can therefore not be inferred from a statute which merely prescribes a time limit within which a court should hear and determine an appeal brought before it as it is provided in para. 2(2) of Schedule 5 of Decree No. 36 of 1998. I therefore hold that the provision of the said para. 2(2) of Schedule 5 of the Decree No. 36 of 1998 does not in any way derogate from, or tamper with or in any form affect this court’s inherent power to effect the amendments now sought by the applicant in his motion before this court. I also hold that the fact that this court is merely carrying out part of the jurisdiction conferred on the Constitutional Court in Decree No, 4 of 1998, does not in any way affect the afore-mentioned power of this court to entertain the prayers in the said applicant’s motion now before us, the other point raised in the notice of preliminary objection is whether the affidavit in support of the motion is competent having regards to the provision of section 13 of the Oaths Act (Cap 333. Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990) and Order 3 rule 3(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules. It is submitted that as there is no valid affidavit in support of the motion, the application must be struck out. The submission is premised on the contention that both the affidavit attached to the motion as well as the subsequent ones filed also in its support are incompetent. This is said to be because the said affidavits failed to comply with the requirements of the Oaths Act. A decision of the Benin Division of this court in New Nigeria Bank Ltd. v. I.B.W. Nig, Ltd (1998) 6 NWLR (Pt. 554) 446 at 454 is cited in support of this submission. It is submitted in reply that the three affidavits in question substantially met the requirements of the said Oaths Act. Another decision of this court in Lonestar Drilling Ltd v. Triveni Engineering & Industries Ltd (1999) 1 NWLR (Pt. 588) 622 at 629 is also cited in support or this proposition,
Order 3 rule 3(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules provides, inter alia, that “every application to the court shall be by notice of motion supported by affidavit”, Section 13 of the Oaths Act, on the other hand, provides that: “It shall be lawful for any Commissioner for Oaths, notary public or any other person authorized by this Act to administer an oath, to take and receive the declaration of any person voluntarily making the same before him in the form set out in the First Schedule to this Act.”
The form set out in the First schedule in respect of a Statutory Declaration is as follows:
“I … do solemnly and sincerely declare that (set out in numbered paragraph if more than one matter) and I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true, and by virtue of the provisions of the Oaths Act,”
The affidavit in support or the applicant’s motion in this case started and ended thus:
“I … hereby make oath and state as follows: …
That I make this affidavit in good faith and by virtue of the Oaths Act.”
The further affidavit in support of the motion began as in the earlier one attached to the motion already set out above and concluded thus:
“That I make this affidavit bona fide and by virtue of the Oaths Act.”
The third affidavit filed by the applicant which is said to be a rejoinder to the counter-affidavit also started as in the two earlier ones. But it ended as follows:
“That I do solemnly and sincerely declare that I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true and by virtue of the provisions of the Oaths Act.
In the New Nigeria Bank v. I.B.W. Enterprises Ltd case supra, the Benin Division of this court (per Rowland, JCA.) held that failure of a deponent to comply with the format prescribed in the Oaths Act could render an affidavit incompetent. I have no doubt in holding that what Rowland, J.C.A. said in that case is a true statement of the law. But on a close look at the provisions of the said section 13 of the Oaths Act, one could say that what the section prescribes is that “It shall be lawful for any Commissioner for Oaths, notary public” etc authorised by the Act to administer an oath. “to take and receive the declaration of any person voluntarily making the same before him in the form set out in the First Schedule to this Act.”
I believe that the form prescribed in the 1st Schedule is expected to serve as a guide as to the form an acceptable oath within the provisions of the Oaths Act should take.
The form prescribed, in my view, is not expected to be rigidly followed word for word or letter by letter. I also believe that what is required therefore is to ensure that there is substantial compliance with the requirement of the Act. A situation therefore where an affidavit would be said to have failed to comply with the requirement of the Act would, in my opinion, depend on the facts in every case.
This is because I believe that it is not possible to lay down a totally rigid general principle on the point.
Thus in the recent case of Lonestar Drilling Nig. Ltd. v. Triveni Engineering & Industries Ltd. supra. I held that the deponent in the case who ended his affidavit as follows:
“I depose to this affidavit in good faith” instead of using the exact words prescribed in the Oaths Act, already set out above, substantially met the requirement of the said Oaths Act. Applying the same principles of law as I have already discussed above to the facts of the present case, I believe that the deponent in each of the three affidavits filed in support of the motion in this case substantially met the requirement of the Oaths Act. Each of the 3 affidavits is therefore valid and I therefore hold that the applicant’s motion is duly supported by an affidavit as required in Order 3 rule 3(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules. In conclusion, I hold that there is no merit in the entire preliminary objection and I, accordingly, dismiss it. I will now proceed to consider the motion on its merit.
Mr. Udechukwu, SAN in moving his motion, referred to the facts deposed to in the affidavits in support of the motion and argued that the errors or slips sought to be corrected are that the proper score of the 1st respondent was incorrectly written and that the number of the polling stations where bye-elections were to be conducted was wrongly stated to be 7 instead of 8. The omitted polling booth is the one with code number J8, The effect of not using the correct score would be that the 1st respondent would be wrongly declared winner of the election.
Similarly, the failure to include the polling station No, J8 would mean that the electorates in that ward would be denied their right to vote contrary to what the court had ordered. It is then submitted that a proper case has been made out to warrant granting the prayers in order to give a true meaning to the judgment in question. The decisions in Olurotimi v. Ige, supra; Berliet v. Kahalla, supra; and Eze v. Obiefuna (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 404) 639 “are cited in support of the submission.
Mr. Yusuf Ali, SAN, has, in reply, urged us to refuse the application. He referred to the counter-affidavit filed by the 1st respondent and submitted that the power to correct a slip is never exercised lightly. He then urged us to hold that from the facts established in the case, the applicant has not made out a case to warrant the grant of the prayers. The decisions in Josiah Cornelius Ltd v. Ezenwa, supra; Minister of Lagos Affairs v. Akin-Olugbade (1974) All NLR 748; and Adeniyi v. Asiyanbi (1962) All NLR (Pt.2) 627 were also cited in support of the above submission.
The learned Senior Advocate also urged us not to grant the prayers on the ground of estoppel in that from the facts established in the various affidavits, the applicant should be estopped from complaining against any alleged error in the said judgment delivered on 16/3/99. This is because he took part in the bye-election held on 10/4/99 knowing fully the contents of the judgment in question. The learned senior counsel finally, submitted that the prayers should not be granted in that granting them would amount to resolving an election petition in favour of the applicant, a role in which this court lacks original jurisdiction. It is argued in this respect that tampering with the scores of the parties would amount to changing the result declared by the 10th respondent after the bye-elections ordered by the court in the judgment had been conducted and the results declared.
I have earlier above set out the facts of this case as contained in the various affidavits filed by the parties in the case. What remains to be done is to consider the position of the law and see if, in applying the law to the facts established in the case, the applicant has made out a case to warrant the grant of any of the prayers in his motion.
As I have also held earlier above, this court has an inherent power to correct an error in any of its judgment, order or decree arising from a slip or accidental omission or clerical error. But in exercising this inherent power, the court must be fully satisfied that (a) there is a clerical error or mistake in the judgment or order; or (b) there is an error arising from an accidental slip or omission; (c) it is necessary to do so to carry out its true meaning and to make its meaning plain; and (d) the error or omission must be an error in expressing the manifest intention of the court and the correction can only be made on motion: see Olurotimi v. Ige, supra; Berliet v. Kahalla, supra and Josiah Cornelius Ltd v. Ezenwa, supra.
Applying the law as declared hereof to the facts established in this case, I believe that what this court did in its judgment of 16/3/99 was that it dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal filed by the appellant and the 1st respondent/cross-appellant in the case. It then went ahead to affirm the judgment and orders of the tribunal. The mistakes or slips now sought to be corrected were made by Aderemi, J.C.A. in his re-statement of the orders of the tribunal which the appellate court has affirmed. It was then that the learned Justice recorded that bye-elections were to be held by the 10th respondent in seven polling stations he set out instead of in 8 polling stations as set out in the judgment of the tribunal he had earlier affirmed.
He accidentally omitted polling station with code No. J8 while recording the wards in which the bye-elections were to be held. Similarly, the learned Justice again accidentally recorded 9,041 as the score of the 1st respondent to which any vote he might score in the ordered bye-elections should be added. To that end, he mistakenly gave the score as 9,041 instead of 8,730.
I have no doubt in holding that the errors or slips made by the learned Justice come within those that this court has the power to correct. In the result, I hold that there is merit in the application. The amendment sought is accordingly granted as prayed. The polling stations in which the 10th respondent is required to conduct bye-election is hereby ordered to include the polling station with code No. J8 which was mistakenly omitted in the list set out in the afore-mentioned judgment of this court. Similarly the valid votes scored by the 1st respondent and to which the votes his score in the bye-election is to be added is to be changed from 9,041 to 8,730.
The 10th respondent is hereby directed to give effect to the above amendments made to the said judgment of this court delivered on 16/3/99. The prayer for an interlocutory injunction restraining the 10th respondent from announcing the result of the bye-election pending the determination of this application having been abandoned by the applicant is hereby struck out. I will however make no order on costs.
Other Citations: (1999)LCN/0598(CA)
