Minakiri Iro Tubonemi & Ors V. Tom Benebo Dikibo & Ors (2005)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
SAKA ADEYEMI IBIYEYE, J.C.A.
This appeal was prompted by the decision of Denton-West, J. of the Rivers State High Court of Justice, sitting in Port Harcourt, delivered on the 16th day of June, 1998, in Suit No. PHC/194/78.
The case which culminated in the decision appealed from had a chequered history having suffered series of transfers from one Judge to another coupled with several adjournments as well as change of learned Counsel from its initiation in 1978, until finally determined in the trial court on the 16th of June, 1998, making a total litigation period of about two decades.
The parties in this case are made up of the plaintiffs and two sets of defendants. The parties filed and exchanged their respective pleadings. The plaintiffs who are now the respondents at paragraph 10 of their joint Statement of Claim sought the reliefs reflected in the Writ of Summons.
The reliefs which are jointly and severally against the two sets of defendants are as follows:
“1 . Recovery of possession of a piece or parcel of land situate at Dikibo Ama in Okrika District within the jurisdiction of the Honourable Court, the possession of which was granted by the plaintiffs to the defendants vide the document dated 14th June, 1913.
- Perpetual injunction restraining the defendants and each of them, whether by themselves or their servants, workmen or agents or otherwise howsoever, from interfering with the plaintiffs’ rights and interests in and over the use of the said land, the plan of which will be more particularly delineated and shown in a survey plan to be filed with the statement of claim in this suit.”
The two sets of defendants in their separate statements of Defence separately denied the several averments made by the plaintiffs to sustain the reliefs sought.
At the hearing of the suit in the trial court, only the plaintiffs adduced evidence by calling one witness who apparently was not cross-examined at all.
Despite the absence of the defendants at the trial of this suit the learned trial Judge entered judgment in favour of the plaintiffs at page 72 of the record of proceedings, inter alia, as follows:
“From the totality of the foregoing, I find that the Plaintiffs are entitled to their claim of possession as contained in exhibit B, except that in order to avoid unnecessary hardship that could be occasioned the defendants in relocation (sic), they shall be granted a period of grace of three months to move their business, sheds, etc if they so desire from the disputed land. See OBIJIAKU v. OFFIAFI (1995) 7 KLR page 1554.
Further order of perpetual injunction of this Court is hereby granted the plaintiffs against the defendants restraining the defendants with effect from the 15th day of September, 1998, from further infringing on the rights of the plaintiffs in respect of their land in exhibit B, more particularly delineated and verged red in exhibit C.
Finally, damages in the amount claimed N100,000.00 (one hundred thousand Naira) is hereby awarded to the plaintiffs.”
The 1st set of defendants, Minakiri Iro Tubonemi, Alaboma Iro Tubobemi and Idaye Andry, being utterly dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial Court appealed to this Court on six grounds of appeal. The said defendants now appellants thereafter sought and got leave of this Court to file three additional grounds of appeal to make a grand total of nine grounds of appeal. The appellants identified only six issues from the nine grounds of appeal for the determination of this appeal in their joint brief of argument filed on 19th March, 2002, but deemed filed on 16th April, 2002. The six issues are as follows:
“(a) Was the trial Judge right to award to the plaintiffs damages of N100,000.00 unsolicited in the pleadings or evidence of the plaintiff’s and in any case, did the plaintiffs make out any case to justify the award?
(b) Was the procedure adopted by the Hon. Judge in conformity with the due process of law as enunciated by the rules of court and can the defendants be said to have been granted fair hearing in the overall determination of the case?
(c) Whether it was proper for the trial Judge to have ascribed the defendants a capacity not supported by the evidence before the court and to have acted on it?
(d) Was it right for the learned trial Judge to accept and rely heavily upon clear inadmissible evidence (exhibit C) to arrive at the judgment and did this occasion a miscarriage of justice to the defendants?
(e) Was exhibit A admissible and was the Court right to act upon it the way it did?
(f) In all the circumstances of the case, was the order for possession or forfeiture made by the court proper or equitable having due regard to the long possession, native law and custom and the Land Use Act of 1990?
The respondents, on their part, jointly identified the following eight issues for the determination of this appeal:
“1. Was the learned trial Judge under any legal duty to consider the statement of Defences in an uncontested Suit?
- Can the hearing of a suit in the absence of a defendant and his counsel who were present in court when the case was fixed for hearing, but chose to be absent for no known cause amount to absence of fair hearing?
- Was the learned trial Judge correct in stating that the defendants were sued in a dual representative capacities (sic) and, if not, did it occasion a miscarriage of justice?
- Was the award of N100,000.00 (One hundred thousand Naira) to the plaintiffs/respondents for the use and occupation of the land in dispute justifiable in law?
- Was the admission and use of Exhibit “D”, a survey Plan, in a previous judgment which dealt with a piece or parcel of land including the land in dispute correct?
- The plaintiffs/respondents adopt Issue (F) of the defendants/appellants.
- Was exhibit A an agreement entered into in 1913, by the parties on the land in dispute admissible in law?
- Was the order for the reversion of the land in dispute to the plaintiffs/respondents correct?”
The background of his matter is briefly as follows: it was initiated on the 28th of July, by a Writ a summons to which the particulars of claim were endorsed. Pleadings were filed and exchanged by the plaintiffs/respondents and defendants/appellants. The two reliefs sought by the plaintiffs/respondents have already been reproduced (supra) while the two sets of defendants/appellants severally denied the claims of the plaintiffs/respondents.
At the hearing before the trial court, the plaintiffs opened their case on the 18th of November, 1997, apparently in the absence of the defendants and their learned Counsel. Only one witness, Emmanuel Wokoma Dikibo, testified in behalf of the plaintiffs. Some documents which included written agreement made in 1913, a photocopy of the Survey plan of the land in dispute, a certified true copy of the judgment in a case with suit No.PHC/36/72 involving parties other than the instant matter delivered on the 11th of November, 1973 and another photocopy of a survey plan used in the 1972 case (supra) and a letter to the defendants dated 11th of April, 1978, were respectively admitted in evidence as exhibit A, B, C, D and E. At the close of his testimony, the sole witness for the plaintiff said at page 10 of the record of proceedings:
“I want this court to give us possession of our land. Second relief we claim is perpetual in junction against the defendants and finally we want one hundred thousand naira for loss of use of the land.”
The peculiar circumstances of this case are that the sole witness was not cross-examined and only the learned Counsel for the plaintiffs addressed the court on the 19th November, 1997, being the day after the plaintiffs closed their case. The learned trial Judge in his judgment held as stated earlier on.
At the hearing of this appeal, both learned Counsel for the appellants and the respondent seriatim adopted and relied on the respective briefs for the parties without any amplification. The learned Counsel for the appellants and the respondents also urged the Court to respectively allow and dismiss the appeal.
I shall, at the initial stage, observe that both the appellants and the respondents respectively adumbrated six and eight issues from the nine grounds of appeal filed by the appellants for the determination of this appeal.
There is nothing amiss with their approaches as the issues raised did not amount to any proliferation of issues which will attract adverse comment from the Court. See MACAULEY V. NAL MERCHANT BANK LTD (1990) 4 NWLR (PART 144) 283 at 321; ANIE & ORS. v. UZORKA (1993) 8 NWLR (PART 309) 1 at 16 and OLADEJO & ORS v. THE STATE (1994) 6 NWLR (PART 348) 101 at 120. The issues in this appeal are within the scope and/or confines of the nine grounds of appeal. There is, however, need to consider the respondents’ attack on ground one of the Grounds of Appeal. Thus, the respondents at page 5 of their brief of argument urged the Court to strike out the appellants’ Issue 1 as it did not emanate from Ground 1 of the Grounds of Appeal. I have considered the vexed issue and I agree with the respondents that no issue was identified from Ground 1 of the Grounds of Appeal. I also observed that the appellants failed to pursue or canvass argument in their brief of argument on the said ground of appeal. It is firmly settled that where no issue is formulated in respect of a ground of appeal and the appellant fails to canvass argument in his brief of argument such a ground of appeal is deemed to have been abandoned and should thereby be struck out by the appellate Court. See NDIWE v. OKOCHA (1992) 7 NWLR (PART 252) 129 at 138 and ATUNRASE & ORS v. PHILLIPS & 7 ORS (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt.427) 637 SC. In the instant case, Ground I of the Grounds of Appeal is accordingly deemed abandoned and it is struck out.
A careful study of the two sets of briefs of argument filed by the parties in this appeal are, in my respectful view, not dissimilar from each other. I shall therefore use the issues raised try the appellants for the determination of this appeal.
On issue (a) (supra), S.A. Somiari Esq., the learned Counsel for the appellants referred to the trite principle of law that a court of law can only grant to a party the reliefs which he seeks and not the unsolicited reliefs or an excess of solicited reliefs. He expatiated this principle by saying that the court of law may award less but not more than that which a party claims in his pleading as the court is neither a Father Christmas or a charitable institution. He relied on the case of UDOFIN v. AGU (1992) 3 NWLR (Pt.229) 350 at 351; OLAROTIMI v. IGE (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt.311) 257 at 259 and UNION BANK OF NIGERIA LTD v. ADENIRAN (1993) 6 NWLR (sic). The learned Counsel for the appellants argued that the plaintiffs/respondents did not in their particulars of claim and/or Statement of claim urge for the sum of N100,000.00 damages form the defendants/appellants or at all. The very first time the issue of the sum of N100,000,00 damages came up, he added, was when the PW1 testified and asked for a number of reliefs in his uncontested evidence. The defendants/respondents’ learned Counsel henceforth amplified this claim in his address. He contended that the plaintiffs/respondents, claim for damages for the said amount was neither supported by the pleadings before the court nor was their pleading amended. He urged the court to hold that the said claim had no basis and that it was a surplusage to the claim brought by the trial court by the plaintiffs/respondents. He submitted that the plaintiffs/respondents did not adduce any satisfactory evidence on which to base the award of N100,000.00 damages as the figure was arrived at as a matter of conjecture.
In reply to Issue (a) as reflected in the respondents, Issue 4, Chief Tagbo Nwogu, the learned Counsel for the respondents, referred to part of the dictum in the case of FIRST AFRICAN TRUST BANK LTD & ORS v. BASIL EZEGBU & ORS (1993) 6 SCNJ 122 where the supreme Court as per Kawu, JSC., said:
“While it is my view that a Court should not generally grant to a party a relief not claimed by that party, there is nothing wrong in a Court, in the exercise of its inherent power to grant to a party a relief which, in the circumstances of the case, that party is entitled to.”
He also relied on the case of GARBA v. In UNIVERSITY OF MAIDUGURI (1986) 1 NWLR (PART 18) 550. The learned Counsel for the respondents argued that the third head of claim in the suit accommodated the award being complained about by the appellants. He further argued that as far as the Statement of claim is concerned the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs/respondents are deemed to be incorporated by the words:
“Wherefore the plaintiffs claim as per the writ.” He contended that the defendants/appellants have not demonstrated in their brief of argument that the amount awarded by the trial Court was a wrong exercise of judicial discretion’ He urged the Court to resolve this instant issue in the positive.
I shall start by considering the issues raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents. Thus, the principle enunciated in the case of FIRST AFRICAN TRUST BANK LTD v. EZEGBU & ORS (supra) deals with exercise of inherent powers by a court of law. These are equally enshrined in Section 6(6)(a) of the 1979 (1999) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which reads:
“(6) The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this Section:
(a) shall extend notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this constitution to all inherent powers and sanctions of a Court of law.”
The purport of inherent powers of a Court had been elaborately dealt with in a number of decided cases. Thus, in the case of ERISI & 2 ORS v. IDIKA & 2 ORS (1987) ALL NLR 529 at 546/547, the Supreme Court held, inter alia;
“(i) The powers or inherent powers of the court of law are powers which enable it to effectively exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it.
(ii) It is clear from the wording in section 6(6)(a) of the constitution of 1979 (now 1999) that the exercise of judicial powers is intended to include all the powers and sanctions which a court of law ought to exercise in order to do justice, and uphold its dignity.
The inherent power of a court is the power which is itself essential to the very existence of the court as an institution charged with the dispensation of justice…
Inherent powers of the court give therefore those powers that are reasonable necessary for the administration of justice.
(d) It is doubtful if justice can be effectively administered in our courts if the courts do not possess inherent powers to make consequential orders the directly or indirectly … promote the process of litigation and ensure proper administration of justice.”
(Italics mine for emphasis)
The purport of the foregoing is that inherent powers inure to a superior Court of record in order to enable it make such orders or take such actions as will protect or enhance the dignity of the Court or promote the speedy or fair dispensation of justice. See ADIGUN v. A-G. OYO STATE (1987) 2 NWLR (PART 56) 197. It is further trite that a Court enjoys inherent powers in order to enforce its Rules of practice and to suppress any abuse of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of its powers. See also, ESIRI & 2 ORS v. IDIKA & 2 ORS (supra) at page 538.
In the circumstances of the instant case, where the relief sought and granted without being reflected in the pleading of the respondents which is an affront on the rules of pleadings can hardly put the trial court in good stead to invoke its inherent power to grant such a relief.
Furthermore, the omnibus relief such as “Any other reliefs the Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance” does not, in my own opinion, accommodate a relief such as the one in point being a substantive relief which must be pleaded, The relief for the sum of N100,000.00 was apparently not pleaded. It is utterly wrong for the respondents to adduce any evidence on it or for even the learned Counsel for the respondents to address the Court on it. Since the said relief was not pleaded, it was fundamentally wrong to lead any evidence on it. Such evidence went to no issue as it was not a legal evidence. Such evidence should be expunged and it is accordingly expunged by this Court.
I entirely agree with the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellants on the instant issue. It is a cardinal rule of pleadings that parties to a suit are bound by the pleadings on which they predicate their claims. The primary aim of pleadings is therefore to define or limit with clarity and certainly the real issues in controversy between the parties and thus ensure that neither party takes the other by surprise. The defendant should know in the clearest possible term in the Statement of Claim or Amended Statement of Claim, the case he has to meet. See OLAWUYI & ANOR v. ADEYEMI (1990) 4 NWLR (PART 147) 746 at 780; OVERSEAS CONSTRUCTION LTD. v. CREEK ENTERPRISES LTD (1985) 3 NWLR (PART 13) 407 at 419; EMEGOKWE V. OKADIGBO (1973) 4 SC 113 AT 117 AND EUNICE AGUOCHA V. MADAM ELECHI AGUOCHA (1986) NWLR (PT.37) 566. In the instant case, the plaintiffs/respondents neither pleaded the controversial relief of N100,000.00, nor did they seek leave to amend their Statement of claim to reflect the relief. In effect, the said relief was arbitrarily introduced in the proceedings in the course of trial. The duty of a trial court is limited, strictly limited and confined to trying issues arising from the pleadings. It is not the function of a trial court to go on a wild goose chase or embark on an academic exercise in which all sorts of questions are discussed at will without reference to the pleadings. The respondents’ case in this respect was not limited by their claim in their Statement of claim. The relief of N100,000.00 granted by the trial court cannot stand in the light of its baselessness. The learned trial Judge, with due regard, ought to have:, in the circumstances of this case, cautioned himself from being over charitable to the respondents. I therefore hold that there is merit in Issue (a) and it is allowed.
As regards Issue (b), the learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that all cases before the High court are governed primarily by the relevant Rules of court and in the instant case the Rules of the High court 1987 as applicable to Rivers state. He argued that for a court to have jurisdiction to properly determine a matter, conditions precedent to the exercise must be fulfilled and he relied on the cases of MADUKOLU v. NKEMDILIM (1962) 1 ALL NLR 595 at 597 and EZE v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA (1987) 2 SCNJ 76. He further contended that where a judgment is obtained against a party who was never served with the initiating or subsequent processes, it is void ab initio and he cited in support the case of CRAIG v. KANSEEN (1943) 1 ALL E.R. 108 a: 1 13, A.-G. OF LAGOS STATE v. DOSUNMU (1989) 3 NWLR (PART III) 522 and SKENCONSULT NIG. LTD. V. UKEY (1981) 1 SC 6. The learned Counsel conceded that this case had a chequered history of over two decades its observed by the learned trial Judge, but argued that there was no need for the said learned trial Judge to allow the locomotive of justice to run so desperately as to sacrifice justice in its trial. He contended that the procedure adopted by the eventual learned trial Judge to hurriedly dispose of this case which gathered, in its trial, a lot of vices which were prejudicial to fair hearing for the defendants/appellants. Thus, he referred to a number of instances where some motions on notice were not taken, initiating processes or notices were not served on the 1st and 2nd defendants who had since died and the 3rd defendant and hearing notices were never served on the 2nd set of defendants. The learned counsel submitted that it was a bounden duty to effect service of all processes in this suit on the defendants as provided for by Order 12 Rules 1 &,2 of the Rules of the High Court of Rivers State and that non-service of process on the defendants as in this case is fatal to the just determination of this case and he relied on the case of DIMIYI v. CHUKWUNYERE (1994) 8 NWLR (Pt.364) 535 and particularly, the case of WILLOUGHBY v. I.M.B. LTD (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.48) 105 at 118 where Eso, JSC (as he then was ) stated:
“A Judge must be bound by rules made under the law of the land in order not to leave the populace in fear of saucy dreams of a judge who would believe like Humpty that “when I say this, it will be so – And why? Because I say so and consider to be so in the interest of justice.”
The learned Counsel referred to other irregularities in the course of trial that, after the sole witness had testified in the absence of the defendants, the case was not adjourned to another date for cross-examination nor was it adjourned for defence. The written address of the plaintiffs was not served on the defendants. He submitted that all these irregularities amounted to breach of the fundamental principles of audi alteram partem which is guaranteed under Section 33 of the 1979 Constitution. He further submitted that it is trite that where a party is denied his rights to fair hearing such a proceeding is a nullity and cited in support the case of EKIFOR v. BARNER (1997) 9 NWLR (PART.519) 255; ATSER v. GACHI (1997) 6 NWLR (PART 510) 609 and ADIGUN v. A.G. OYO STATE (1980) 1 NWLR (PART 53) 678.
In reply, the learned Counsel for the respondents made copious submissions in their Issue 4. The aspects of moment in his submissions are that on 30/10/95, the 3rd defendant/appellant and his learned counsel, G.I. Abibo Esq., were in Court when the case was adjourned to a date (not specified) at the instance of the learned Counsel for the 3rd defendant and that subsequently neither the 3rd defendant nor his counsel appeared in Court again. He submitted that they need not be served any further processes of the Court in the matter and he relied on the case of MAISONKA CO. (NIG). LTD v. ADZEGE (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt.718) 312 and SALAWU OKE & ORS v. AIYEDUN (1986) 2 NWLR (pt.23) 548 at 565.
I shall remark that I have read page 565 of the latter authority cited and I dare say that, it is not relevant to the issue of service of process. Pages 588 and 559 of the case are instead of relevance to the issue of service of process. Thus, it was held, inter alia, that failure to serve process where service of process is required renders null and void an order made against the party who should have been served. Inability of the Court to serve process in a proceeding was dealt with in the case of CRAIG v. KANSEEN (supra) at pages 262-263. Thus, it reads in part as per Lord Greene M.R.:
“…The question we have to deal with is whether the admitted failure to serve summons upon which the order in this case was based was a mere irregularity or whether it was something worse which would give the defendant the right to have the order set aside. In my opinion, it is beyond question that failure to serve process where service of process is required, it is a failure which goes to the root of our conception of proper procedure in litigation. Apart from proper ex parte proceedings, the idea that an order can validly be made against a man who had no notification of any intention to apply for it is one which has never been adopted in England. To say that an order of that kind is to be treated as a mere irregularity and not something which is affected by a fundamental vice, is an argument which, in my opinion, cannot be sustained.”
(Italics mine for emphasis)
See SKENCONSULT (NIG) LTD & ANOR v. GODWIN S. UKEY (supra) where the Supreme Court of Nigeria referred to the dictum in CRAIG v. KANSEEN CASE (supra) and approved it at pages 25 to 27, thus:
“The learned Counsel in the course of his argument before us conceded that there had been no compliance with Section 99 of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act but had asked us to regard it as an irregularity due to administrative problems of the High court Registry. I am of the contrary view and I think that all the breaches in the instant case of the regulations relating to service and appearance are fundamental defects and go to the question of competence and the jurisdiction of the Court which pronounced the orders sought to be set aside. I may add that even if they were irregularities, mere acquiescence of the parties (as claimed by learned Counsel for the respondent) cannot give the Court competence or jurisdiction.”
(Italics for emphasis).
The essence of the foregoing is that service of Court processes on the parties to a litigation is of the essence in order to confer jurisdiction on the court. Apart from the principles reproduced above, Order 12 Rules 1 and 2 of the Rivers State High Court (Civil Procedure ) Rules 1987 are also of relevance as far as service of process particularly hearing notices in the instant case are concerned. Rule 1 of the said Rules reads in part:
“1. service of writ of Summons, notice a petitions, pleadings, orders, summonses, warrants and all other proceedings, documents or written communications of which service is required, shall be made by the sheriff or a deputy sheriff, bailiff, officer of the Court…”
(Italics for emphasis).
The foregoing provision, makes it mandatory that processes and particularly hearing notices shall be served on the parties to a litigation. It is settled that under our system of adjudication, proceedings before Courts of law must be initiated by due process of law and it is a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction for the parties to have been duly served with hearing notices or at least shown to have been aware of hearing notices. Where a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction is not fulfilled then the proceedings before the court must be regarded a nullity. See MADUKOLU v. NKEMDILIM (supra).
Failure to effect hearing notice on one of the parties to a litigation and the case is prosecuted to finality without the participation of that party is an affront to one of the rules of natural justice of audi alteram partem which has metamorphosed into Section 33 or 36 of the 1979 or 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on fair hearing. See SKENCONSULT NIG LTD. V. UKEY (supra); SAUDE v. ABDULLAHI (1989) 4 NWLR (PART 116) 387 and ANITA v. ASUQUO (1990) 5 NWLR. (PART.151) 446 at 456/457.
I have read the record of proceedings in the instant case and I found that the learned trial Judge, on the several occasions he adjourned this case, he failed to make an order that the defendants who were not in Court be served hearing notices. This inadvertence persisted up to the point when judgment was delivered on the 16th of June, 1998. In effect, the trial Court, with due regard, adopted a procedure which is outlandish to our jurisprudential system and a patent affront to the doctrine of fair hearing. This approach also occasioned a naked miscarriage of justice. It is apparent in this case that there is a breach of fair hearing or one of the rules of natural justice that the other party must be heard. The consequence of the breach of the rule of fair hearing is that the proceedings and indeed the judgment in the instant case are null and void. See ADIGUN v. A.-G. OYO STATE (supra).
The judgment of the trial Court is set aside as it is ineffectual and of no legal effect. An act which is a nullity is completely shorn of legal consequences. It is trite that if an act is void, it is in law a nullity. It is not only bad but it is incurably bad. See U.A.C. v. MCFOY (1961) 3 ALL ER 1169 and NDIGWE v. NWUDE (1999) 11 NWLR (Pt.626) 314. The instant judgment is incurably bad and at the risk of repeating my self, it is set aside. In the circumstance, the proper order to make, since there was no trial at all is to order a retrial of the case before another Judge of the High Court of Rivers State.
I am mindful of the general rule which is now settled that an appellate court has a bounden duty to consider all the issues placed before it. But where it is of the view that a consideration of one or more is enough to dispose of the appeal it is not under any obligation to consider all other issues posed. see ANYADUBA V. N.R.T.C LTD (1992) 5 NWLR (PT.243) 535; OKONJI V. NKOKANMA (1991) 7 NWLR (PT.202) 131 BAMAIYI V. THE STATE & ORS (2001) 8 NWLR (PT.715) 270 AT 285/286 AND 294/295 AND 7UP BOTTLING CO. ORS V. ABIOLA & SONS BOTTLING CO. LTD. (2001) 13 NWLR (PT.730) 469 AT 493/494, 514 and 516.
In the instant case in which I have opined that the entire proceedings in the trial Court are null and void, it will be academic or futile exercise to consider the remaining issues.
In the final analysis, I find merit in the appeal and it is allowed. The judgment of the trial Court is set aside. I accordingly order a retrial before another Judge of the Rivers State High Court. I make no order as to costs.
Other Citations: (2005)LCN/1840(CA)
