Home » Nigerian Cases » Court of Appeal » Mr. Jimoh Bakare V. Mr. David Ojo Dada (2016) LLJR-CA

Mr. Jimoh Bakare V. Mr. David Ojo Dada (2016) LLJR-CA

Mr. Jimoh Bakare V. Mr. David Ojo Dada (2016)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

MOHAMMED AMBI-USI DANJUMA, J.C.A.

 This is an appeal against the decision of Hon. Justice A. O. Odusola of the High Court of Ondo State, sitting at Akure Judicial Division delivered on the 27th June, 2014 wherein the learned trial judge entered judgment in favour of the claimant.

The claimant, now respondent by a writ of summons and a statement of claim dated and filed 10th September, 2013 respectively, commenced this action against the defendant herein the appellant claiming the following reliefs:
(a) A declaration that the claimant is entitled to the statutory Right of Occupancy in respect of the land located at No. 55, Odundun Road, Akure with all the appurtenances thereof measuring about 7819 square feet as contained in the approved site plan obtained by the claimant from the Akure District Drawing Office dated 30/8/56 and registered as No. 46/56.
?(b) A declaration that the wanton and forceful taking over of a portion of the land measuring about 15 feet x 30 feet by the defendant on 14th January, 2013 and the erection of one- room shop thereupon is illegal, vexatious, unconstitutional,

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null and void.
(c) A declaration that the forceful ejection of the rent paying tenants of the claimant from the land taken over by the defendant is brutish, barbaric and detrimental to the economic well being of the claimant, the rent being paid to the claimant who is an old man being his major means of live -hood and sustenance.
(d) An order or orders of the Honourable Court nullifying the forceful taking over of aforesaid portion of the claimant’s land and restoring same to the claimant.
(e) An order of perpetual injunction restraining the defendant either by himself, agents, privies, servants or any person or officers of the defendant from further act of trespass on the said land or any part thereof and cessation of unwarranted harassment and intimidation of the claimant.
(f) An order granting N5, 000.000.00 (Five Million Naira) as general damages to the claimant against the defendant for continued trespass to his person and unlawful interference committed on the land.

The defendant filed a statement of defence dated and filed 23rd January, 2014. The claimant reacted by filing a reply to the statement of defence dated and file d 12th February,

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2014 as on pages 55 to 59 of the record.
SUMMARY OF FACTS
The appellant was the defendant at the trial Court while the respondent herein was the plaintiff/claimant.
Whereof, the claimant claim against the defendant the reliefs itemized under Paragraphs A-F above.

In establishing his case, the respondent relied on both traditional evidence and exercise of numerous and positive acts of ownership over a sufficient length of time. The appellant on his part equally relied on traditional evidence.

At the trial the claimant called one witness and testified for himself as CW2 while the defendant called two witnesses and also testified for himself as the DW2.

At the close of hearing, counsel on both sides filed and exchanged their respective written addresses after which judgment was entered by the learned trial Court. On being dissatisfied, the appellant approached this Court vide a notice of appeal dated and filed 21st August, 2014 containing three grounds of appeal.

In compliance with the rules of this Court, appellant filed his brief of argument dated and filed 9th February, 2015 and deemed 25th January , 2016 while

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respondent’s brief is dated and filed 23rd February, 2016. Appellant filed a Reply brief dated and filed 29th February, 2016. All briefs of arguments were adopted by counsel on both sides on the 1st of March, 2016.

The appellant formulated the following issue for the determination of the appeal.
(1) Whether in view of multitude of authoritative declaration of this Honourable Court and the Apex Court on what is required to be pleaded and proved by any person asserting positivity under the traditional evidence as a means of title, could it be adjudged that the respondent herein (i.e the plaintiff at the trial Court) had sailed through to be so entitled to the judgment of the lower Court.

The respondent on his part formulated two issues for the determination of the appeal as follows:
1. Whether the respondent sufficiently proved his root of title under customary law to be entitled to the judgment of the Court.
2. Whether evidence of numerous and positive exercise of acts of ownership over a period spanning from 1954 to date of judgment in 2014, a period of about 60 years, is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial Court and award

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of damages in favour of the respondent.

It is pertinent and also convenient to start with the preliminary issues arising before determining the central point of the appeal.

In his brief of argument on pages 5 and 6 the respondent raised an issue on grounds 2 and 3 of the grounds of appeal contained in the appellant’s notice of appeal. That the appellant’s only issue was distilled from ground one of the grounds of appeal resulting in the abandonment of grounds 2 and 3.

He urged us to strike them out relying on the following authorities :
– Unical & Anr. V. Socket Works Ltd. & 3 Ors. (2014) ALL FWLR (Pt. 743) 1947 CA @ 1953
– Daniel v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2014) ALL FWLR (Pt.735) 319 @ 323.

On his part the learned counsel for the appellant contended in their reply brief that issue No. 2 of the respondent does not relate to any of the grounds of appeal in this case.

He urged us to strike out same, referred to the case of NEPA V. SAVAGE (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt.717) 230 @ 238.

I find it necessary to reproduce the grounds of appeal as contained in the notice of appeal on pages 104-105 of the record:

?GROUND

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ONE
The learned trial judge erred in law when he held thus:
“From the totality of evidence adduced by the claimant, I am satisfied that the claimant has made out sufficient case against the defendant warranting this Court to consider the defence of the defendant.”
And concluded thus:
“l am however satisfied that the claimant has successfully proved his root of title. I am also satisfied with his evidence on acts of ownership and possessory rights coupled with how he successfully warded off trespassers on the land vide Exhibits B and C. In the circumstance, I hold that the claimant has successfully proved his case and is entitled to judgment.”
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
i. The claimant woefully failed to establish his ownership of the land in dispute
ii. The claimant did not trace his root of title to who first settled on the and as such his root of title is defective and short of the requirement of the law.
iii. The claimant testified in the course of trial that his root of title was from Chief Familusi, the Ijimikin of Akure who bequeathed the land to Late Chief Fagbemi, the Saribi of ljimikin.
iv. The claimant did not lead evidence

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to establish who gave Chief Familusi the land in dispute or how he i.e Chief Familusi became the owner of the said land.

GROUND TWO
The learned trial judge erred in law when His Lordship held that the claimant has successfully proved his case and is entitled to judgment despite evidence of possession by the appellant, when on the face of the evidence adduced, the shop built on the land in dispute was built to the knowledge of the respondent.
Particular of Error
i. There is ample evidence before the Court to the effect that the appellant has since been in possession of the land in dispute via the building of a shop on the land in dispute
ii. All through the period of construction of the said shop the building materials used for the shop were kept in the respondent?s house to the knowledge and consent of the respondent.
iii. It was only after the completion of the shop that the claimant raised an alarm.

See also  Alhaji Musa Bello & Anor V. Farmers Supply Company (Kds) Limited (1998) LLJR-CA

GROUND THREE
The learned trial judge erred in law when his Lordship held thus:
“I therefore hold that there is no enforceable arbitration to create estoppels on the part of the claimant.”
PARTICULARS OF ERROR
i. There

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is evidence on record that parties had submitted themselves before customary arbitration prior to the institution of the matter at the lower Court.
ii. The said arbitration panel sat and came out with an award at the end of the arbitration proceedings.
iii. By the Apex Court decision inOkereke V. Nwankwo (2003) 9 NWLR (pt. 826) 592 at 621 ? 622 Paragraphs H – C parties to customary arbitration are bound by the award made and stopped from further litigating on the subject matter. The respondent is therefore stopped from instituting this suit at the trial Court, having earlier submitted to customary arbitration which made a pronouncement on the same matter with this suit and between the same parties.

The law is trite that where no issue is formulated from a ground of appeal before the Court, such a ground is deemed abandoned and liable to be struck out. See the cases of Alima V. UBA (2013) SCNJ 1 @ 11; S. Udoechi v. J.L. Alinarat (2000) FWLR (Pt. 22) 2003 @ 210; Alhaji Abudu W. Akibu v. Alhaji Muniratu Oduntan & Ors. (2000) 7 SCNJ 189; Sparkling Breweries Ltd. & Anr. v. Union Bank Ltd. (2001) 7 SCNJ 321.

?I agree with

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the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent on this issue. Grounds 2 and 3 of the grounds of appeal were left barren with no issues tied to them. Both grounds are deemed abandoned, they are hereby struck out. The only subsisting ground of appeal before the Court therefore is ground No.1 .

On the respondent’s issue No. 2 as complained by the appellant, let me for ease of reference reproduce same hereunder:
Whether evidence of numerous and positive exercise of acts of ownership over a period spanning from 1954 to date of judgment 2014, a period of about 60 years is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the trial Court and award of damages in favour of the respondent.

Juxtaposing the above issue and the surviving ground of appeal which borders on the root of title and ownership of the land in dispute, one cannot really separate both as being unrelated. To my mind, they do relate, more so that the title to the disputed land has been put in issue.

It is without doubt that this Court and the Supreme Court frown at and vehemently discourage the proliferation of issues in line with the principle of law that issues should not outnumber

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grounds of appeal upon which they are predicated. In Michael V. BON (2015) 12 NWLR (Pt. 1473) 370 @ 402, the Supreme Court per Akaahs JSC deprecated the practice of formulating more than one issue from a ground of appeal.
The learned justice of the Apex Court stated thus “This Court has discouraged the practice of splitting a ground of appeal into a number of issues. See A. G. Bendel State V. Aideyen (1989) 4 NWLR (pt. 118) 646: Adelaja V. Fanoike (1990) 2 NWLR (pt. 131) 137: Agu V. lkiwibe (1991) 3 NWLR (pt. 180) 385. The splitting of a ground into more than one issue renders the issues wider than the ground complained of. The purpose of the formulation of issues for determination is to enable the parties narrow the issues in the grounds of appeal filed in the interest of accuracy, clarity and brevity. See Ogbuanyinya V. Okudo (No2) (1990) 4 NWLR (pt. 146) 551. lssues 1 and 2 of the respondent having emanated from the only ground subsisting ground of appeal are incompetent and are hereby struck out.

?However, I feel that the issue formulated by the appellant will sufficiently determine the appeal on the merits. I shall therefore be adopting same and

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it is so adopted.
ARGUMENTS:
Whether in view of multitude of authoritative declaration of this Honourable Court and the apex Court on what is required to be pleaded and proved by any person asserting positivity under the traditional evidence as a means of root of title, could it be adjudged that the respondent herein (i.e the plaintiff at the trial Court) had sailed through to be so entitled to the judgment of the lower Court.

Learned counsel for the appellant argued setting out 5 ways of proof of title to land as follows
(a) By traditional evidence
(b) By production of title documents which are duly authenticated
(c) By acts of selling, leasing, renting out all or party of the land or family on it or on a portion.
(d) By acts of long possession and enjoyment of the land, and
(e) By proof of possession of connected or adjacent land in circumstances rendering it probable that the owner of such connected or adjacent had would, in addition, be the owner of the land in dispute.

He cited the following cases:
– Odubole V. Okafor (2012) 11 NWLR (pt. 1312) 419 @ 434
– Isegbekan V. Adelakun (2013) 2 NWLR (pt. 1337)

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140 @ 164
– Matanmi V. Dada (2013) 7 NWLR (pt. 1353) 319 @ 332
– Nruamah V. Ebuzaeme (2013) 13 NWLR (pt. 1372) 474 @ 494.
– Olaniyan V. Fatoki (2013) 17 NWLR (pt. 13834) 477 @ 501
– Apata V. Olanilokun (2013) 17 NWLR (pt. 1384) 221 @ 243.

On traditional evidence relied upon by both parties, counsel contended that litigants are bound by their pleadings and evidence adduced before the Court.

He referred to the Claimant?s statement of claim (Paragraph 4), Reply to statement of defence (Paragraph 16) and his sworn statement on oath (Paragraph 36) to support his argument.

He went ahead to excerpt the position of the trial Court on page 98 of the record to wit:
“From the pleadings and evidence before the Court, the crux of the claimant’s case is on traditional evidence and exercise of numerous and positive acts of ownership over a sufficient length of time”.

That the learned trial Court having rightfully identified the issues as submitted by the respondent herein, ought to have equally appreciated the position of the law that the respondent must first and foremost establish his case with prima facie evidence in

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order to succeed.

He contended that the respondent has the onus of establishing the traditional evidence upon which he relied in this case. That the asserting party in order to prove traditional evidence must specifically plead and prove the founder of the land; the manner in which the land was founded and names and particulars of successive owners through whom he claims.

Relying on the case of Nrumah V. Ebuzoeme (supra), Learned counsel argued that Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the statement of claim and Paragraph 16 of the Reply to statement of defence only go to show the trend upon which the disputed land got to the respondent. That who and how the land was founded was not specifically pleaded. He held the view that counsel did not plead whether the land was founded by settlement, grant or conquest.
He cited the case of Odubote V. Okafor (supra).

Counsel urged the Court to set aside the trial Court’s position that the respondent did establish his case through traditional evidence. He said respondent failed to establish the root of title to his predecessors and that all the acts of ownership exercised by him are based on unproved traditional

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evidence, making the foundation of this case defective.

Learned counsel submitted that the failure of the respondent to establish traditional evidence has taken away the merit of relying on the acts of ownership he pleaded. He urged us to so hold. Counsel aver that where parties’ traditional evidence is inconclusive, that Court is enjoined to take into consideration facts in recent times given by them in order to determine which of the traditional evidence is more probable.
He contended that the acts of ownership of the respondent are anchored on the unpleaded and unproved traditional evidence.

See also  Chief Udochukwu Callistus Azudibia V. Independence Ogunewe & Ors (2003) LLJR-CA

That the acts of ownership does not avail the respondent, having failed to prove traditional evidence. He urged us to so hold. Counsel relied on the case of Kojoh Vs. Bonse (1957) 1 WLR 1223 in making his submissions.

He argued that the respondent having not been able to prove his root of title, that the resultant effect of the trial Court’s decision was a miscarriage of justice against the appellant. That the respondent failed to establish a prima facie case against the appellant and did not the strength of his case. He cited Sanusi Vs

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Ameyogun (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt. 237) 527 @ 547 and NEPA v. INAMETI (2002) 11 NWLR (P. 778) 397 @ 425 where it was held to wit:
“With all due deference to the learned judge of the Court below, the mere fact that the appellant did not defend the suit is no reason for him to accept hook line and sinker the case of the respondent. In a civil case the plaintiff has the burden to make out a prima facie case before the burden shifts on the defendant to rebut and his failure to do so may lead to the dismissal of his case without the consideration of the defendant’s case for generally a plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his case and not on the weakness of defence.”

Counsel urged us to dismiss the case of the respondent.

In reaction to the argument put up by the appellant, the respondent argued through his counsel, referred to Paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the statement of claim on pages 3 & 4 of the record wherein he said contains facts pleaded on how the disputed land devolved on him. Counsel further referred to the sworn statement on oath of the claimant on pages 11 to 16, of the record which he said corroborate facts contained in the

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statement of claim. He contended that the claimant consistently showed through evidence on record how the land in question devolved on him and that those pieces of evidence were not challenged before the lower Court. That the respondent satisfactorily proved customary roots of title which according to him entitles him to judgment. He relied on the case of Nwachukwu V. Onwunwane (2011) 25 WRN 1 @ 31 to argue that a declaration of title to land is granted at the discretion of the Court once evidence is satisfactorily led to narrate a continuous claim of possession. That there are situations in law where proving original founder of a particular land is needless. That the Claimant averred in his pleadings supported by evidence that he got his land from his father and that since the defendant neither denied nor challenged the averment, the claimant has no duty to prove his own father’s source of title. Counsel cited Anukam V. Anukam (2008) ALL FWLR (pt. 413) 1267 – 1269.

Learned counsel held on strongly that appellant did not challenge the averments of the claimant and that that not being the issue at hand, the Court need not inquire into claimant’s

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predecessor’s title. He relied on Yakubu V. lmpresit Bakori (2011) ALL FWLR (pt. 589) 827 @ 837 – 838.

That proof of title accompanied with continuous claim of devolution is the material ingredient and not origin. He further referred to Nwachukwu V. Onwunwane (supra).

Learned counsel continued that the claimant showed in his pleadings how he was in continuous possession of the disputed property for over sixty years (60). He referred us to Paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the statement of claim on the records. Counsel submits that it is the pleadings and evidence adduced by a claimant for declaration of title that determines whether he has proof or not. Referring to other means of proof of title, counsel argued that a claimant may adopt one or more ways of proving ownership such as traditional evidence or by means of evidence of acts of ownership and possession. He relied on Mkpinang v. Edem (2013) ALL FWLR (Pt. 666) 468  @ 475 where it was held that:
“it is only where a plaintiff fails to prove his case by means of traditional evidence and also fails to establish it by means of evidence of acts of ownership and

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possession where these were means pleaded and relied upon, that the plaintiff’s case should be dismissed.”

Learned counsel further referred to Arum V. Nwobodo (2013) ALL FWLR (pt. 688) 870 @ 893 and Union Bank of Nigeria Plc. V. lshola (2002) ALL FWLR (pt. 100) 1228 @ 1250 where the Apex Court held that:
“The principle of law is well settled that a plaintiff in a declaration of title can rely on either traditional history or positive and numerous acts of ownership over a long period of time to sustain his claim”.

In an effort to establish his point on this issue, counsel again cited the cases of Olalere lge & Ors. V. David Akoju (1994) 6 SCNJ 88 and Uka V. lrolo (2002) ALL FWLR (pt. 127) 1167 @ 1198 where the Court held to wit:
“it is enough that a plaintiff pleads and succeeds on one of the five methods of proving title, even where he pleads more than one methods…?

In his conclusion, learned respondent?s counsel referred to the five methods of proof of title in the case of of Goni Kyari V. Alhaji Ciroma Alkali & 2 Ors. (2001) 8 SCM 43 @ 59 to submit that the respondent herein

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by impeccable evidence was able to satisfactorily prove:
(i) How the land got to him from his great grand father
(ii) How he exercised numerous and positive acts of possession for about 60 years
(iii) How he enjoyed possession by giving the portion in dispute to various rent paying tenants and
(iv) That the adjoining or connected land still vest in him.

That the learned trial Court reached its decision by evaluating all the pieces of evidence adduced before it based on the pleadings on record. That, in the event that there was no injustice occasioned by the said decision, the appellate Courts are careful not to reverse same. He relied on Atanda v. Saffeindine Transport Ltd. (2008) ALL FWLR (pt. 401) 985 @ 994 A ? D Akinkugbe V. Ewulum Holdings Nig. Ltd. (2008) ALL FWLR (Pt.423) 1269 @ 1289.

Learned counsel urged us to dismiss the appeal with a cost of N200.000.00 against the appellant.

The appellant through his counsel filed a Reply brief wherein he argued that the respondent’s issue two was incompetent as it is according to him, not related to any of the three (3) grounds of appeal raised.

?That the respondent’s

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issue two and arguments thereon be discountenanced and struck out. He relied on the case ofNEPA V. Savage (Supra).

On the case of Anukam v. Anukam (supra) relied upon by the respondent in his argument, counsel is of the view that the facts of the above case supports that of the appellants instead. That the facts therein, unlike the instant case were admitted and needed not to be proved. To further make his point counsel referred to Paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the statement of defence to contend that the defendant/ appellant denied the respondent’s ownership of the land in dispute. That the respondent failed in his duty to show how his father/overlord became the owner of the land in dispute.

He urged us to allow this appeal.

RESOLUTION:
(1) Whether in view of multitude of authoritative declarations of this Honourable Court and the Apex Court on what is required to be pleaded and proved by any person asserting positivity under the traditional evidence as a means of root of title, could it be adjudged that the respondent herein (ie the plaintiff at the trial Court) had sailed through to be so entitled to the

See also  (Mrs) Bomo Ivbiyaro (Nee Francis) & Ors. V. Mrs Omokaro Moni Francis (Nee Obire) (2001) LLJR-CA

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judgment of the lower Court.

It is elementary practice that the standard of proof in civil cases are discharged on the balance of probabilities or the preponderance of evidence. It can be inferred from the above position that where parties to a suit give evidence on their claims before the Court, the trial judge has the duty of weighing the evidence by resorting to the imaginary scale of justice. S. S. Alagoa, JSC in the case of Odutola V. Mobogunje (2013) 1 SCNJ 175 @ 216 cited the case of Mogaji V. Odofin (1978) 4 SC 91 @ 94 where it was held that: .before a judge before whom evidence is adduced by parties in a civil case comes to a decision as to which evidence he believes or accepts and to which evidence he rejects, he should first of all put the totality of the testimony adduced by both parties on an imaginary scale; he will put the evidence adduced by the plaintiff on one side of the scale and that of the defendant on the other side of the scale and weigh them together. He will then see which is heavier not by the number of witnesses called by each party but by the quality of the probative value of the testimony of those

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witnesses.”

In the instant case, the claimant/respondent traced his root of title to one late Chief Familusi who was the Ijemikin of Akure who passed title to the respondent’s maternal grandfather, late Chief Fagbemi who was the Saribi of Ijemikin from whom the respondent’s father Late Daniel Odetola Dada inherited same before it devolved on the respondent who is the eldest son and head of the family of late Mr. Daniel Odetola Dada. This was pleaded in Paragraph 4 of the statement of claim.

Claimant tendered Exhibits A, B, C, D, E and F in support of his case and also gave evidence as shown on the record how he had exercised possessory and ownership rights over the land in dispute since he inherited same from his father in 1954.

It is also in evidence how the claimant let part of the land in dispute to one Mr. Johnson Okeke and Mr. S. Kolade a carpenter in exercise of ownership which convincingly, is exclusive.

Considering the five methods through which title to land may be proved as provided in the case of Idundun V. Okumagba (1976) 9- 10 SC. Tabai JSC held in the case of Anukam V. Anukam (Supra) at page 1268 that “…The burden and

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standard of proof of each case depends on the nature of the case as pleaded. Whereas in this case, the plaintiff alleges that he got the land from his father and the defendant does not deny or challenge this allegation, then plaintiff has no duty to prove the father’s own source of his title…”
The claimant in this case is therefore on the above authority, not under any obligation to prove his father’s title to the land in dispute.
The law is that it is sufficient if the claimant can prove any one of the means of proving title to land. This is supported by plethora of cases.

It was held in the case of Garan V. Olomu (2013) 10 SCM 88 @ 94 that:
“Ordinarily, since appellant?s claim is for trespass to land, all he needs to establish to succeed is that he either has exclusive possession or the right to such possession of the land in dispute. However, since the respondent has asserted ownership of the land in dispute also, title to the land has automatically been put in issue thereby making it necessary for the appellant to establish better title than that of the respondent in order to succeed…”

?CW1 described the

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land in dispute as very small and measuring 15ft by 12ft while DW1 described it as a small portion of land not more than three metres by 12 metres. Exhibit ‘A’ tendered by the respondent herein is a survey plan describing the land in dispute as forming part of the larger portion of the family land he inherited from his father in 1954.

Apart from letting the land as mentioned earlier, claimant was able to show the Court how he vehemently resisted trespassers on the land and also his disagreement with the decision of the arbitration on the land in dispute. CW1 confirmed this assertion in evidence. The argument by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent cannot rely on acts of ownership therefore, cannot stand.

I am in accord with the learned trial Court that there was no enforceable arbitration on the disputed land, the claimant having not accepted the decision to share the disputed land with the defendant.

The learned trial Court held on page 101 of the record thus:
“I have accordingly examined the evidence of the parties and weighed them against each other. I note the evidence, oral and documentary proffered by both parties

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which I have reviewed in the cause of this judgment. I am however satisfied that the claimant has successfully proved his root of title. I am also satisfied with his evidence on acts of ownership and possessory right coupled with how he successfully warded off trespassers on the land vide Exhibits B and C…”

The law is settled that an appellate Court should not ordinarily disturb or interfere with the findings of facts made by the trial Court, particularly, if such findings and conclusions reached are supported by credible evidence.
The above principle is premised on the fact that the duty of appraising of evidence given at a trial is pre – eminently that of the trial Court that saw and heard the witnesses. See Achilihu V. Anyatonwu (2013) 1 SCNJ 332; Mogaji V. Odofin (1978) 4 SC 91.

On the basis of the evidence on record, I have no doubt in my mind that the traditional evidence relied upon the claimant/respondent and his various exercise of acts of ownership, possession and control of the land in question are quite overwhelming.

It was held per Niki Tobi JSC in Oyedare V. kejin 21 NSCQR 58 @ 73 that: It is good law that a plaintiff

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who succeeds in proving acts of possession can obtain judgment claiming trespass. Acts of possession and enjoyment of land could be evidence of ownership or of Right of Occupancy – see Okechukwu V. Okafor (1961) 1 ALL NLR 685. Where a plaintiff proves sufficient acts of possession, the burden is thrown on the defendant under Section 145 of the Evidence Act to prove the contrary. In order to get judgment, the defendant has the onus to rebut the evidence of the plaintiff. See: Onyekanonwu V. Ekumbiri (1966) 1 ALL NLR 32. See also Oyeyiola V. Adeoti (1973) NWLR 10: Adegbola V. Obalaja (1978) 2 LRN 164. Acts of long possession and enjoyment of land can be prima facie evidence of ownership of the particular piece of land within reference to which such acts are done. See Odi V. Osofile (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 57) 510.

I find that the learned trial judge exhaustively evaluated the evidence placed before him and I am completely convinced that he dispassionately arrived at a just decision of which I have seen no reason to fault. Issue is resolved in favour of the claimant/respondent.

The resultant effect of all that I have said above is that this appeal is

26

unmeritorious and it is accordingly dismissed.

The judgment of the lower Court delivered by Hon. Justice A. O. Odusola on the 27th June, 2014 is hereby upheld.


Other Citations: (2016)LCN/8852(CA)

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