Mr. Valentine Ozigbo & Ors. V. Peoples Democratic Party & Ors. (2009)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

MARY U. PETER-ODILI, J.C.A.

The Appellants/Applicants had on 20/11/09 filed a Motion on Notice praying for the following:-

1. An order restraining the 1st and 3rd Respondents from selecting, recognizing, endorsing, accepting or ratifying the selection of the 2nd Respondent and in any manner whatsoever and howsoever as the candidate of the 1st Respondent in the election into the Governorship of Anambra State of Nigeria to be conducted by the 1st Respondent on the day of February 2010, or on any other date pending the hearing and determination of the Appellants’/Applicants’ appeal to the Court of Appeal.
2. An order restraining the 2nd Respondent from parading himself as the candidate of the Respondent or holding himself out in any manner in the election into the office of Governor of Anambra State scheduled to be held on the 6th day of February, 2010 or any other date pending the determination of the appeal herein filed by the appellants/applicants against the Ruling delivered by the Lower court (Hon. Justice Danlami Senchi of the FCT High Court) in the matter on the 16th day of November, 2009.

Contending against this application for injunction pending appeal the Respondents 2nd and 1st respectively filed two Preliminary Objections.

These two preliminary objections, the first of which was from the 2nd Respondent, Prof. Charles Chukwuma Soludo wherein he stated as follows:-

(a) The Motion on Notice dated 20th November 2009 is grossly incompetent and an abuse of process.

(b) The Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Motion on Notice nor to grant the prayer contained therein.

The grounds of this Preliminary Objection are as follows:-

1. The application is contrary to Order 3 Rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules.
2. There is no evidence whatsoever that the Appellants/Applicants complied with the mandatory requirements of Order 3 Rules 4 and 13 of the Court of Appeal Rules.
3. There is no jurisdiction in the Court (whether the Court of first instance and or this Honourable Court of Appeal) to grant an order of injunction over a completed act.
4. The Application is an abuse of process and grossly incompetent.

The Second Preliminary Objection is from the 1st Respondent, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the Objection seeks:-

1. AN ORDER of this Honourable Court striking out the Applicant’s application for being incompetent as this Honourable court (Sic) lacks jurisdiction to entertain it.
2. AND for such further order or other orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit to make in the circumstance.

GROUNDS FOR THE OBJECTION in the Preliminary Objection of 1st Respondent;

(i) The motion for interlocutory injunction is incompetent, the condition precedent to its filing having not been fulfilled.

(ii) This Honourable Court is not seized with the jurisdiction to entertain the application.

(iii) The application constitutes an abuse of Court’s process having been filed and being prosecuted while a similar application is pending before the Lower Court.

(iv) The application is not maintainable.

(v) No valid written address has been filed and served by the Applicants’ as directed by this Honourable Court.

FACTS:

The Appellants are aggrieved by the process that led to the emergence of the 2nd Defendant/Respondent as the purported candidate of the 1st Defendant in the gubernatorial elections to be conducted by the 3rd Respondent in Anambra State on the 6th day of February, 2010. They therefore filed a Suit No. FCT/CV/37/09 at the FCT High Court presided over by Hon. Justice Danlami Senchi, who on the 23rd day of October, 2009, granted them an interim injunction pending the hearing of the motion on notice. When that motion on notice was served on the Respondents they filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection to the suit which the learned trial judge in a considered ruling delivered on the 16th day of November, 2009, upheld and struck out the entire action on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Dissatisfied with that decision, the Appellants have appealed to this court through a Notice of Appeal.

The Appellants subsequently filed an application at the Lower Court for injunction pending appeal. Following the absence due to pilgrimage of the trial judge and the possible untidiness of another judge of the High Court FCT stepping in that application could not be taken and as a result the Appellants filed the Motion on Notice for injunction pending the appeal to which the Respondents 1st and 2nd have raised the preliminary objections earlier mentioned.

Sequel to the order of this Court, the applicants and Respondents filed written addresses for the Motion on Notice and the objections and the replies to the necessary addresses.

It needs no saying that the Preliminary Objection of the 2nd Respondent had to be taken first.

Learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondent Mr. P.I.N. Ikwueto SAN adopted their written address filed on 2/12/09, the reply to the appellants composite address on 3/12/09. He also referred to 2,d Respondents counter affidavit of 1/12/09 and a Reply Affidavit of 4/12/09.

Chief Olusola Oke learned counsel for the 1st Respondent moved their Preliminary Objection of 3/12/09 by adopting their written address filed on 3/12/09. They also filed a response to Appellants’ motion which 1st Respondent opposed and filed a counter affidavit on 1/12/09 and a written address on 9/12/09. A further affidavit was also filed on 4/12/09.

Mr. Nwaiwu SAN for the 3rd Respondent filed a written address on 3/12/09 and another address in response to the Preliminary Objection to the 2nd and 1st Respondents’ objection on 4/12/09. Also adopted by 3rd Respondent is a written address of 4/12/09 in response to Appellants’ address.

For the 3rd and 4th Appellants Mr. Abe on their behalf filed no written address.

Mr. Sani, learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Appellants referred to a counter affidavit dated and filed on 3/12/09 to the Preliminary Objection of the 2nd Respondent. Also a Further and Better Affidavit in support of their motion of 3/12/09, both affidavits found in a Composite document. He said their written Composite address filed on 3/12/09 contended against the Preliminary Objections and for their motion for interlocutory injunction pending appeal. He referred to Section 35 of the Electoral Act to the effect that the act they are asking for a restraining order is not a completed act.

PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS:

Learned Counsel for the 2nd Respondent, Mr. Ikwueto SAN contended that it is trite that after an appeal has been filed but before it is entered, the Court of Appeal ordinarily has no control over the proceedings. That an appeal is entered in the Court of Appeal when the record of appeal has been received in that Court and entered in the cause list. That as a general rule, the Court of Appeal has the jurisdiction to make an order to preserve the res in an appeal, the instant application by the appellant/Applicants is patently incompetent and this Court has no jurisdiction to grant same. He cited Okotie-Ebo v, Jadesimi (1999) 8 NWLR (pt. 616) 598 at 604; Ezomo v. A. G. Bendel State (1986) 4 NWLR (Pt. 36) 448; Chief Ogunremi v. Chief Dada (1962) All NLR (pt, 2) 657; Order 7 Rule 4 of the Court of appeal Rules 2007; Pharmotek Ind. Ltd. v. Mr. Bayo Ojo &. Anor (1994) 7 NWLR (pt. 359) 751 at 759.

The learned Senior Counsel for the 2nd Respondent stated that the purported earlier application to the Court below which is alleged to have been fixed for hearing on the 14th December 2009 is not annexed to the present application. That such a document if any, filed before the Court Below is a public document within the meaning of section 109(a) (iii) of the Evidence Act and under Section 113(i) of the Evidence Act, the only proof of such a motion filed in the Lower court is a certified true copy thereof and none has been shown. He said the ipsi dixit of the Appellants/Applicants cannot be a substitute for the statutorily prescribed certified copy of any motion filed in the Lower Court. That as provided by Section 132(1) Evidence Act oral evidence of the contents of a written document which in this case is a record of judicial proceeding is prohibited and should not be allowed.

Mr. Ikwueto of counsel for 2nd Respondent/Objector contended that assuming but not conceding that the Appellants/Applicants made such an application in the Lower court this application the ground on which their application is founded is grossly incompetent. That such an application is being made before this court without first in the Court below showing special circumstances which make it impossible or impracticable to apply to that Court below. That Hon. Justice Senchi travelled to Mecca on Hajj does not qualify as a special circumstance for that impossibility or impracticability in view of Section 1 of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja (Number of Judges) Act Cap H6 Vol.7 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2007.

Learned counsel for the 2nd Respondent/Objector submitted that what will constitute special circumstance as envisaged by Order 7 Rule 4 requires the exercise of the discretion of this Court based on the facts and circumstances prevailing. He referred to 7-Up Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Abiola & sons Co. Ltd. (1992) 1 NWLR (pt. 215) 21 at 33.

That the appellants had said their application in the Court Below was fixed for 14th December, 2009 and is still pending before that Lower Court and so the same application brought before the Court of Appeal is an abuse of Court process. He cited Owoyemi v. The Governor of Ogun State (1993) 2 NWLR (pt. 278) 703; Amachree v. Isokariri (1985) 5 NWLR (pt. 396) 457 at 481; Ezegbu v. FATB Ltd. (1992) 1 NWLR (pt. 216) 197 at 203 – 204; Agwasim v. Ojichie (2004) 10 NWLR (pt. 882) 613 at 624.

Learned Counsel for 2nd Respondent, Mr. Ikwueto further contended that there is need for consistency, that from the counter affidavit of 3/11/09 the Appellants/Applicants recognize that the 2nd Respondent has been selected as at 9/10/09 and his names/particulars published by the 3rd Respondent as required by Section 32(3) of the Electoral act, 2006 and so the act for which the injunction is sought has been completed and so cannot be granted. He cited Governor of Akwa Ibom State v. Umah (2002) 7 NWLR (pt. 767) 738 at 768 B – C; Ajide v. Kelani (1985) 2 NSCC (Vol. 16) 298; A.G. Anambra State v. Onuselogu Enterprises ltd. (1987) 4 NWLR (pt. 66) 547; John Holt Nigeria Limited. V. Holt African Workers Union of Nigeria and Cameroons (1963) All NLR 385 at 390; Ajewole v. Adedimo (1996) 2 NWLR (pt. 431) 391 at 400.

Learned Senior Advocate contended by saying that this appeal is not yet entered in this court and the merits of the appeal are yet to be determined and so this court should not pre-judge the main issue in the proceedings relative to the interlocutory application. He cited Mortune v. Gambo (1979) 3 – 4 SC 36 at 40; Nigeria Civil service Union v. Essien (1985) 3 NWLR (pt. 12) 306.

Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent, Chief Olusola Oke in raising their preliminary objection said the grounds upon which the objection of the 1st Respondent are based are substantially, similar and identical with those raised and argued by the 2nd respondent in their Preliminary Objection which arguments, 1st Respondent agrees and adopts as theirs to avoid a duplication of efforts. He cited Ezeobi v. Ezeobi (2002) FWLR (pt.188) 1370; Onyesoh v. Nnebedum (1992) 3 NWLR (pt. 229) 313.

That there is a plethora of authorities in this Court and Supreme Court in which it has been held that the nomination of candidates by a political party is not justiciable. He referred to Ehinlanwo v. Oke (2008) 16 NWLR (pt. 1) 35 7; Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) FWLR (pt. 174) 247; PAM v. ANPP (2008) 4 NWLR (pt. 1077) 224; Bakam v. Abubakar (1991) 6 NWLR (pt. 1991) 564; Onuoha v. Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 244.

That the rights sought to be protected (right to participate in party primary) are political rights and not legal rights and so the decision of the Court below striking out the applicants’ case for being incompetent and for lack of jurisdiction is still valid, binding and subsisting until set aside by this Court.

Learned counsel for the 3rd Respondent, Mr. Amaechi Nwaiwu SAN responding to 2nd Respondent’s objection said it is settled that this Court has the jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the Appeal before it or not. He cited Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1976) 6 SC 659 at 679; Osho v. A.G. Ekiti State (2002) 2 NWLR; Shodeinde v. The Reg. Trustees of Ahmadiyya Movement (1980) 1-2 SC 163; Ratisco Nig. Ltd v. S.G.S. (1990) 6 NWLR (pt. 158); Okoya v. Santilli (1990) 2 NWLR (pt. 131) 172.

Mr. Nwaiwu said it is open to this Court to look at the surrounding circumstances, the bundle of documents filed before it and the nature of the subject matter to determine whether there are special circumstances which made it impossible or impracticable to apply to the Court Below to hear the application filed in that Court. He also stood on the ground that the Court cannot grant an injunction over a completed act. In response to the Objection of the 1st Respondent, Mr. Nwaiwu for the 3rd Respondent said that the position of the law is that the primary role of nomination and sponsorship of a candidate to contest an election is that of a political party to which a candidate belongs subject to the doctrine of lis pendens as decided by the Supreme Court in Rotimi Amaechi v. INEC 8

For the 1st and 2nd Appellants/Applicants/Respondents, Mr. Abubakar Sani on their behalf submitted that it is not the duty of Appellant or his counsel but that of the Registrar of the Court Below to transmit the record of appeal. He cited Effiong v. Ironbar (1998) 13 NWLR (pt. 582).

Mr. Sani went on to state that the Objectors seem to have lost sight of the timing of the application in this Court and the provisions of section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act. He cited also Nwosu v. Minister of Housing & Urban Development (2005) 11 NWLR (pt. 937) 441 at 453 – 454; Akeem v. University of Ibadan (2001) 15 NWLR (pt. 736) 352 at 370.

Learned Counsel for the Appellants 1st and 2nd said there is nothing to show that the act for which Appellants seek the injunctive reliefs had been completed. He cited Sodeinde v. Registered Trustees (1980) 1-2 SC 163 at 181.

Mr. Sani stated the principles which he said are in Appellants favour for the refusal of the objection.

In Reply on Points of Law, Mr. Ikwueto SAN said the Notice of discontinuance of the Appellants in the Court Below dated and filed on 30th November 2009 is an abuse of Court process since the application in this Court was already pending. He cited Okorodudu v. Okoromadu (1977) 1, 2 & 3 SC 13 at 18; Usman v. Baba (2005) 5 NWLR (pt. 917) 113 at 127; Oluntinrin v. Agaka (1998) 6 NWLR (pt. 554) 366 at 375 para E; Olaware v. Olanrewaju (1998) 1 NWLR (pt. 534) 436 at 455.

Learned Senior Counsel for the 2nd Respondent/Objector said a cursory examination of Exhibit AYI the purported Motion on Notice filed before the Lower Court on 17th November 2009 will show that there is nothing indicating that the said motion was fixed for hearing on 14 December 2009 an alleged in paras 7 and 8 of the affidavit in support filed on 20 November 2009. That what is evident is that the affidavit in support of that application is false and should be struck out. He cited Mokwe v. Ezeuko (2004) 14 NWLR (pt. 686) 143 at 155.

The arguments in support of these preliminary objections are founded on the 2nd and 1st Respondents view that the record of Appeal not having been transmitted to this Court the appeal had not been entered and the motion for injunction pending appeal is incompetent and this Court divested of jurisdiction thereby. Also that the act for which the injunction in that motion is sought has been completed, coupled with this motion before the Court of Appeal existing pari passu with a similar one before the Court Below. These arguments do not seem to be flowing from the tune or state of facts available from supporting documents such as affidavits for and against, as well as Order 7 Rule 4 of the Court of Appeal Rules 2007.

Firstly, I am satisfied that the special and exceptional circumstances which make it impossible/impracticable to remain in the Court below to have the motion first taken there has been established as the fact of the learned Judge having gone on Hajj and the efforts made by the Applicants to have another judge handle the matter not being feasible. Therefore the matter of abuse of Court process in having two applications simultaneously pending before two Courts cannot be supported by what’s on ground especially when the Applicants discontinued the one in the Court Below.

I would here refer to Section 15 of the Court of Appeal Act which provides.

“The Court of Appeal may, from time to time make any order necessary for determining the real question in controversy in the appeal and ….. may make an interim order or grant any injunction which the Court below is authorised to make or grant …. And generally shall have full jurisdiction over the whole proceedings as if the proceedings had been instituted in the Court of Appeal at court of first instance and may re-hear the case in whole or in part”.

Also reliance is placed on the cases of Nwosu v. Minister of Housing & Urban Development (2005) 11 NWLR (pt. 937) 441 at 453 – 454; Akeem v. University of Ibadan (2001) 15 NWLR (pt. 736) 352 at 370 per Adekeye JCA (as she then was). From these authorities it can be said that where the exigencies propel, the court can grant the injunctive relief inspite of their having not been filed previously in the court below a similar motion dealt with thereon either way. Also the issue of the appeal not having been entered since the Record was not in this Court is an omission which is that of the Registrar of Court not of the Appellants. See Effiong v. Ironbar (1988) 13 NWLR Pt. 582.

On the issue of the incompetence of the Motion for Injunction based on the fact that the act complained of had been completed in the light of the provisions of sections 32 – 34 of the Electoral Act which in the main require 120 days before the date for the general election for the publication of the list of candidates. Those Sections as pointed out by Appellants/Applicants counsel are not the only provisions of the Act in relation to matter at hand since the final publication of the list which require 30 days covered in Section 35 of the Electoral Act has shown that the act has not been completed as there is still time. Therefore the cases of John Holt Nigeria Limited v. Holt African Workers Union of Nigeria and Cameroon (1963) All NLR 385; Ajewole v. Adedimo (1996) 2 NWLR (pt.431) 391 at 400 do not apply to the present proceedings as the act has not been completed in view of Section 35 of the Electoral Act 2006.

All the arguments in support of these preliminary objections having been properly demolished I dismiss the objections as lacking in merit. I shall proceed to consider the Motion on Notice for injunction pending appeal.

In respect to the Motion by the Appellants for injunction filed on 20/11/09 and argued on their behalf by Mr. Sani, he submitted that the guiding principles for the grant of an injunction pending appeal are as contained in the cases of Onuzuluike v. Commissioner For special Duties (1990) 7 NWLR (pt. 161) 262; Akeem v, University of Ibadan (2001) 15 NWLR (pt. 736) 352 at 370 had been established. That the issue of jurisdiction will constitute such a special or exceptional circumstance for the purposes of an injunction and that similar conditions for stay of execution and the grant of injunction pending appeal apply. He cited Ike v. Ugboaja (1989) 2 NWLR (pt. 103) 332.

Mr. Sani for the Appellants submitted further that the grounds of appeal herein raise several issues in an area where the law is recondite and the balance of convenience has necessitated the preservation of the res and the fact that damages would not be adequate compensation were the injunction not to be granted and the Appellant succeeds in the appeal.

Also the Court should be mindful of the uniqueness of the res in this circumstance which protection Appellant seeks by this injunction. He referred to Yusuf v. Edu (2055) 16 NWLR (pt.950) 34; Ajomale v. Yaduat No.2 (1991) 7 NWLR (pt. 191) 266.

In response learned counsel for the 1st Respondent said it is settled that for an Applicant to succeed in an application such as this he must show by credible affidavit evidence an existence of a legal right deserving the protection of the Court pending appeal and this is absent here since the main claim or complaint of the Applicants is that due to the mode adopted by the 1st ….. for the nomination of the 2nd Respondent, the Applicants were not afforded opportunity to be voted for by delegates. That the right they are standing on is one unknown to law. He cited AIC Ltd. v. NNPC (2005) 1 NWLR (pt. 937) 563 at 599; Onuoha v.

Okafor (1983) 2 NCLR 244; Adewale v. Governor of Ekiti State (2007) 2 NWLR (pt. 1019) 634.

Chief Oke for 1st Respondent said the case of Rotimi Amaechi v INEC (supra) has established that a wrongful nomination of candidate can be reversed even after the general election. That where the grant of an injunction will result in instability or disequilibrium of society or give rise to unnecessary oppression or hardship to the society, or its people, a court should be reluctant to grant it. He further stated that where the grant of an interlocutory injunction will have the effect of entering judgment for the applicants when the issues raised in the action has not been tried the Court should reject it. He cited Ezebilo v. Chinwuba (1997) 7 NWLR (pt. 571) 125; Okoma v. Ideozu (2001) FWLR (pt. 51) 1887 – 1888.

Learned Counsel for 1st Respondent said the balance of convenience is in favour of not granting this application. He cited Okafor v. Nnaife (1987) 4 NWLR (pt. 64) 112 at 137; Fatoyinbo v. Osadeji (2002) FWLR (pt. 110) 1770 at 1778.

Mr. Ikwueto SAN for the 2nd Respondent contended and added that the selection of a candidate by a political party is the inalienable right of that political party and is not one that should be fettered by the Court or interfered with. He cited Ehinlanwo v. Oke (2008) 16 NWLR (pt. 1113) 357 at 363; Onuoha v. Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 244 at 265; Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (pt. 843) 310 at 335; Abdulkadir v. Mamman (2003) 14 NWLR (pt. 836) 1 at 30; Ladunni v. Kukoyi & ors (1970) All NLR 136 at 141; Commissioner for Works Benue State v. Devcom Development Consultant Ltd. (1983) 3 NWLR (pt. 83) 407; Kotoye v. CBN (1989) 1 NWLR (pt. 98) 419.

3rd Respondent through Amaechi Nwaiwu SAN on their behalf said it is from the documents before this court that would aid the court in exercising its discretion to grant or not to grant this Application for injunction pending appeal. Also the court should be guided by the principle of lis pendens at the time the action complained of was undertaken. He cited Peter Obi v. INEC & Ors (2007) 11 NWLR (pt. 1046) 565; Rotimi Amaechi v. INEC & 2 Ors (2008) 5 NWLR (pt. 1080) 227.

The above being in summary the submissions of counsel on either side it is necessary to recast the facts of this case which are:-

The Applicants who were plaintiffs in the Court Below commenced this action by an Originating Summons dated 23rd October 2009. In brief the totality of the claim in that Court was a challenge to the procedure by which the 1st Respondent nominated the 2nd Respondent as its candidate for the Anambra State governorship Election to be held in February 2010. The Respondents challenged the competence of the suit which position the trial Court endorsed and gave a decision in favour of the Respondents.

That decision brought about the appeal to this court and this application for injunction pending appeal.

Parties filed copious affidavits to buttress their standpoints. While the applicants contend that the injunction ought to be granted since the grounds of appeal involve substantial issues of law especially that of jurisdiction of court in relation to the 1999 Federal constitution, the Electoral Act 2006 the respondents 1st and 2nd posit that the nomination and presentation of the 2nd Respondent being the domestic affair of the 1st Respondent cannot qualify as a serious issue of law for which an injunction should be granted as granting it would fetter the hands of the political party which in this case is the 1st Respondent (PDP). That the injunction is not an option since even after the general election the Court can still order that the 2nd Respondent if elected was not the proper candidate that ought to be. Indeed the position of the respondents have rightly alarmed the Appellants/Applicants whose fear that a situation of a fait accompli would be foisted upon the Appellants at the end of the day and it would be difficult for the Court which would then be helpless to be of any assistance in their quest to have their right acknowledged and protected.

The guiding principles in the grant of an injunction pending appeal was been properly captured in the case of Onuzuluike v. Commissioner For Special Duties (1990) 7 NWLR (pt. 161) 262 when that Court held thus:-

1. There must be a competent appeal on which the motion for injunction pending appeal is predicated.
2. The grounds of appeal must raise substantial legal issues in an area of law that is recondite
3. The existence of special/exceptional circumstances that justify its grant.
4. It must be right to put matters in status quo and that it will be equitable to maintain the status quo or preserve the res so as not to render the appeal nugatory.

Those four broad criteria operate as beacon lights in considering the materials available to this Court and clearly what is before this court is weighty enough and a decision could be given either way especially where as in this case the circumstances surrounding the nomination of the 2nd Respondent are such as have thrown up a novel scenario and a situation whose recondite cannot safely be ignored. It is seductive as learned counsel for the Respondents have opined the Court waits for the outcome of the general Election in 2010 to decide when called upon as to who the right candidate for the 1st Respondent ought to be. That in my view is an extreme position and almost in the realm of the speculative especially when an immediate option is readily available. I refer to the cases

Onuzuluike v. Commissioner For Special Duties (1990) 7 NWLR (pt. 161) 262; Akeem v. University of Ibadan (2001) 15 NWLR (pt. 164) 595 at 611; Ajomale v. Vaduat (No.2) (1991) 7 NWLR (pt. 191) 266.

Furthermore the reference to Amaechi v. INEC & ors (2008) 5 NWLR (pt. 1080) 227 at 317 – 318 to persuade this Court to await the general election is an argument that is futuristic on the presumption that 1st Respondent is going to win the general election and does not apply in this case at hand where there is another way to tackle the different positions of the parties coupled with the issue of balance of convenience which I see in favour of the Appellants/Applicants who had established properly that the res need be protected, that a return to status quo would not be achieved in the event that they succeed in appeal and the injunction was not granted. In fact it would be untidy were the parties to proceed to the general election were the questions which are indeed very serious not to be answered before that election. There would certainly be some confusion in my humble view and extra difficulties for the Court which can be averted now which option I think should be utilised. I place reliance on this view point to the case of Nwosu v. Nnajiuba (1997) 12 NWLR (pt.5310) 160 at 166 per Katsina-Alu JCA (as he then was) when he said:

“The purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to maintain the status quo and thereby preserve the Res, the subject matter of the litigation from being wasted, dam aged or frittered away with the result that if the case succeeds, the result would be nugatory in that the successful party would reap an empty judgment”.

What my Lord Katsina-Alu JCA (as he then was) said has answered the question in this instant application as to whether or not the injunctive relief sought should be granted and I say it should.

It is with that conclusion that I grant the application sought and make the following orders:-

1. An order restraining the 1st and 3rd Respondents from selecting, recognizing, endorsing, accepting or ratifying the selection of the 2nd Respondent and in any manner whatsoever and how so ever as the candidate of the 1st Respondent in the election into the governorship of Anambra state of Nigeria to be conducted by the 3rd Respondent on the 6th day of February 2010, or on any other date pending the hearing and determination of the appellants’/Applicants appeal at the Court of Appeal.
2. An order restraining the 2nd respondent from parading himself as candidate of the 1st Respondent or holding himself out in any other manner in the election into the office of governor of Anambra State scheduled to be held on the 6th day of February 2010 or on any other date pending the determination of the appeal herein filed by the appellants/applicants against the Ruling delivered by the Lower court (Hon. Justice Danlami Senchi of the FCT High Court) in the matter on the 16th day of November, 2009.

Parties to bear their own costs.

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Other Citations: (2009)LCN/3475(CA)