Home » Nigerian Cases » Court of Appeal » Mrs. Matilda M. Nwobodo V. Rivers State Primary Education Board & Ors. (2007) LLJR-CA

Mrs. Matilda M. Nwobodo V. Rivers State Primary Education Board & Ors. (2007) LLJR-CA

Mrs. Matilda M. Nwobodo V. Rivers State Primary Education Board & Ors. (2007)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

DONGBAN-MENSEM, J.C.A.

This appeal is against the decision of the Rivers State High Court, Coram Hon. Justice Acho Ogbonna pronounced on the 22nd day of March, 2001 at High Court, Port Harcourt.

In a rather peculiar procedure, the learned trial Judge heard the case fully, after which he declared he lacks the jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter, but also found and pronounced that the appellant was rightly dismissed under the provisions of Decree No. 17 of 1984. The learned Judge then proceeded to dismiss the suit of the appellant, while citing the provisions of Decree No. 17 of 1984 as ousting the jurisdiction of the State High Court to enquire into the matter. The appellant filed four grounds of appeal from which four issues were distilled for determination in this appeal. The two sets of respondents also each formulated four issues for determination.

The issues are hereby reproduced for the ease of reference:

Appellant’s issues:

  1. Whether the 1st defendant/respondent is an agency of the Federal Government so as to oust the jurisdiction of lower court to entertain the suit in which the 1st defendant/respondent is a party and in which the 1st defendant/respondent’s executive or administrative action is challenged.
  2. Whether from the totality of the evidence adduced before the lower court, the dismissal of the plaintiff/appellant from the Public Service of Rivers State Government was the act of the Military Administrator of Rivers State pursuant to Decree No. 17 of 1984 so as to oust the jurisdiction of the lower court to entertain the plaintiff/appellant’s suit challenging her dismissal from the public service of Rivers State.
  3. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in dismissing the suit after holding that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the same.
  4. Whether the failure of the 2nd respondent and particularly of the 3rd respondent to contest the appellant’s action in the court below did not amount to an admission, in law, of the appellant’s claim notwithstanding that the 1st respondent, who was not responsible for the alleged dismissal of the appellant from service, contested the appellant’s action in the court below.

1st respondent’s issues:

  1. Whether the 1st defendant is not an agency of the Federal Government for the Implementation of the National Primary Education Programmes in Rivers State.
  2. Whether from the totality of evidence adduced before the lower court, the dismissal of the plaintiff from the Public Service of Rivers State was not the act of the appropriate authority.
  3. Whether the learned trial Judge was not right in dismissing the suit after finding that the law on which the action is based, ousts the jurisdiction of all courts from hearing the matter.
  4. Whether the appellant was automatically entitled to judgment, notwithstanding that the learned trial Judge had no jurisdiction over the matter because the 2nd and 3rd respondents did not participate in the trial, without more.
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2nd & 3rd respondents’ issues:

  1. Whether the 1st defendant is an agency of the Federal Government as to oust the jurisdiction of the court in this action in which the administrative action of the 1st defendant is being challenged.
  2. Whether from the totality of the evidence adduced, the dismissal of the plaintiff from the Public Service of Rivers State was an act by the Military Administrator pursuant to Decree No. 17 of 1984 so as to oust the jurisdiction of the court.
  3. Whether the learned trial Judge was not right in his dismissal of the suit when he identified that the action was caught by Decree 17 of 1984 and also that the 1st defendant is an agency of the Federal Government.
  4. Whether the none participation of the 2nd & 3rd defendants in the proceeding at the lower court entitled plaintiff to judgment without more and, inspite of the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court.

The facts of the case are rather scanty as to the nature of the employment of the appellant with the 1st respondent. Paragraph six of the statement of claim however, states that:

“In 1977, plaintiff was appointed Headmistress of the State Primary School Amaigh, Mile 11 Diobu, Port Harcourt.”

By the general averments in the statement of claim, it appears the appellant has always been an employee of the Primary School Education Authority, by whatever nomenclature described. Her first appointment as “a qualified teacher” was with the Anglican Mission from 1962 until the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war.

One of the four issues formulated for determination in this appeal, is the issue of the jurisdiction of the trial court to determine the suit of the appellant. The determination of this issue turns on the thorny question of whether the 1st defendant is an agent of the Federal Government or of the State.

See also  Chief G. N. Okoye V. Mr. Frank Tobechukwu (2016) LLJR-CA

It is not denied by any of the parties that the National Primary Commission Act, Cap. 271, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990 or Decree No. 96 of 1993 is relevant in the matter under consideration.

A motion was taken out at the trial court challenging the jurisdiction of the Court under the provisions of section 220(1)(g)(s) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree 107 of 1993 on the grounds that the 1st respondent is an agency of the Federal Government and only the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to determine a suit involving it.

The learned trial Judge upheld the argument and declined jurisdiction upon the said provisions. The appellant’s learned counsel challenges the decision of the trial court declining jurisdiction on the ground that the 1st respondent is not an agent of the Federal Government but that of the State and therefore, the State High Court has the jurisdiction to try and determine the appellant’s suit. Conversely, the two sets of respondents maintain that by the provisions of section 7(1)(a-n) of the National Education Commission Decree of 1993, the 1st defendant is an agent of the Federal Government and carries out its functions on behalf of the Federal Government as an agent.

It is the submission of each learned counsel on behalf of the 1st and 2nd and 3rd respondents respectively, that the various states Primary Education Boards are established by the Federal Government to function uniformly as its agents.

It appears a consideration of the provisions of the Act/Decree establishing the National Education Board will put paid to this thorny issue.

Section 1(1) of the National Primary Education Commission Decree, 1993 establishes the Commission. Section 1(2) states that the Commission be based in and be supervised by the Federal Ministry of Education.

Section 2(1) sub (a-h) provides for the membership of the Commission which includes five members from the State and FCT on a rotational basis.

Section 3(1)(a) states that the functions of the Commission shall be to:

“(a) prescribe the minimum standards of Primary Education throughout Nigeria”.

By section 6(3), the Commission has the responsibility to disburse funds to the State Primary Education Board.

It is equally instructive that by the provisions of section 7(1)(c), the function of State Primary Education Board includes the “posting and deployment of staff including inter-state transfer”.

Now, in a Federal Republic, only an agency of the Federal Government can have powers to effect inter-state transfers. This therefore should lay to rest, the controversy as to whether the 1st respondent is a State or Federal Agent.

See also  Michael Okeke V. The State (2016) LLJR-CA

Further, the appellant placed no evidence whatsoever to establish who her employers are other than the 1st respondent.

By her pleading, the Primary Education Board employed her. All other details are those of her numerous postings, acquisition of additional education and promotion or demotions.

Thus, the 1st respondent being a Federal Government agency, only the Federal High Court has jurisdiction over it. The learned trial Judge was thus right in declining jurisdiction.

Whatever else the said trial court did was an illegal and wasteful exercise. The other issues premised on the decision of the trial State High Court therefore come to no issue, having not been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction.

(Refer 1. Kotoye v. Saraki (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 357) p.414

  1. Ojokolobo v. Alamu (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) pg. 377;
  2. Galadima v. Tambai (2000) 11 NWLR (Pt. 677) p.1).

Time without number, judicial officers has been admonished to refrain from assuming jurisdiction in matters outside their jurisdictional competence. The cardinal reason is that it is a monumental waste of precious time and resources. However well the proceedings is conducted, however, brilliant and sound the judgment, it remains a product of an incompetent exercise of no legal value.

Having determined that the 1st respondent is a Federal Government Agency, it follows that by the provisions of Decree No. 107, the jurisdiction of the State High Court is ousted (Refer: Shell Petroleum Development Co. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Isaiah (2001) 11 NWLR (Pt. 723) p.168).

The suit of the appellant which clearly challenges the action of the 1st respondent can only be adequately determined in the Federal High Court.

Accordingly, this appeal is without merit and is hereby dismissed. I make no order as to cost.


Other Citations: (2007)LCN/2182(CA)

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