Mutairu Togun Ajamogun & Anor V Tunde Oshunrinde & Anor (1990)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
AKPATA, J.C.A.
This appeal centres on the settled Yoruba customary law that the head of the family is the manager of family property ,and that any disposition of family land without his consent is void ab initio.
Apart from the 1st defendant all the parties in this case belong to the same extended family of Ajamogun and Onikotun family, owners of a large tract of land at Mafoluku, in Lagos State. On 16th August, 1977 eight members of the family including one Chief Musa Aina Bale for themselves and as ‘principal members and accredited representatives of Ajamoguni/Onikotun family of Lagos State’ appointed eight members of the same family. including Mutairu Togun.
1st plaintiff and Abudu Seidu 2nd defendant and also Fasasi Oshoade 5th defendant as attorneys for Ajamogun/Onikotun family, amongst other things, to ‘mortgage, charge, sell, lease, let and otherwise dispose of the said family land.’ Pursuant to the power of attorney Exhibit ‘P.W.2/F,” the donees, all of them apparently, leased a parcel of land, the subject matter of this appeal to the 1st defendant, Tunde Oshunqnde, for a term of years for N14,000.00 This was by a lease agreement dated 19th July, 1979. By a writ of summons dated 24th February, 1984, five members of the family. including Murairu Togun Ajamogun as 1st plaintiff, instituted an action against the 1st defendant, the lessee, and the 2nd to the 8th defendants (seven of the donees of the power of attorney) seeking that the lease be set aside and claiming damages from the 1st defendant for trespass and perpetual injunction restraining him from further trespass on the land. Pleadings were ordered and filed and exchanged. In the amended statement of claim the full reliefs sought by the plaintiffs were set out at paragraph 25 as follows:-
(1) ‘An order declaring as null and void the power of attorney dated the 16th day of August, 1977and registered as No. 92 at Page 92 in Volume 1623 of the Lands Registry or in the alternative an order setting aside the said power of attorney. (2) An order setting aside the lease dated this 19th day of July, 1979 and registered as No.7 at page tin Volume 1984 of the Register of Deeds kept at the Lagos State Lands Registry Lagos Nigeria; (3) The sum of N50,000.00k being damages for trespass committed by the 1st Defendant. his servants agents and privies on all that piece or parcel of land situate lying and being at Mafoluku and more particularly delineated with its dimension and abuttals on Plan No. OGER 38A/78 attached to the Deed of Lease dated 19th day of July 1979 and registered as No.7 at Page 7 in Volume 1784 of the Lands Registry in the office at Lagos; (4) Perpetual injunction restraining the 1st Defendant his servants, agents and privies from further trespass on the said land.’ The 1st defendant filed a separate statement of defence. So also did the 2nd defendant. The 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th defendants filed one statement of defence, the 3rd and 7th defendants having died.
The 1st and 2nd plaintiffs testified as the 1st and 2nd plaintiff witnesses, while one Napoleon Omodiagbon of State C.I.D., a finger-print expert testified as 3rd P.W. His evidence was necessary because the 1st Plaintiff denied affixing his thumb impression on the lease agreement Exhibit ‘P. W.2/A’. The 2nd plaintiff tendered four previous judgments Exhibits ‘P.W.21 B,’ P.W.2IC’ ‘P.W.2D’ and ‘P.W.2/E’ to show that there had been previous litigations over the family land and that Musa Aina Bale one of the said f ‘principal members of the family’ who executed the power of attorney was not the head of the family at the material time.
Although it was the case for the plaintiffs that one Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun, the, father of the 2nd plaintiff, who died in 1981 was the Head of the family when the power of attorney and the lease agreement were executed, the 1st plaintiff who was one of the donees of the power of attorney but denied affixing his thumb impression on the lease agreement, admitted under cross-examination that Aina Bale was the Head of the family. The 1st defendant, the lessee, did not testify. He however called as a witness, the 5th defendant, Fasasi Oshoade Onikotun who was one of the donees of the power of attorney and one of those who executed the lease agreement in favour of the 1st defendant. He testified to the effect that the power of attorney was given by the representatives and accredited members of the four branches of the Ajamogun Onikotun family. He however agreed that Musa Gbadamosi got judgment in suit No. 1D/418/76, Exhibit ‘P. W.2/ C’ but stressed that the judgment was not against those of them appointed as attorneys of the family. The 2nd defence witness for the 1st defendant was Johnson Adelaja Adewopo, a legal practitioner who claimed to be solicitor to the family.
He asserted that Aina Bale was the head of the family. He prepared the power of attorney which did not describe Aina Bale as the Head of the family. He testified that the 1st plaintiff affixed his thumb impression on Exhibit ‘P.W.2!A’ the lease agreement. The 2nd defendant admitted that Musa Gbadamosi was the Head of the family. His main grouse was that the 5th defendant and one Ayinde Akinyel1)i embezzled the money paid by the 1st defendant and that he got nothing out of it. The 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th defendants adduced no evidence on their own behalf. Learned counsel appearing for them relied on the evidence already given by the 5th defendant when he testified as a witness for the 1st defendant.
After a detailed review and appraisal of the evidence adduced before him, and after considering the submisions of counsel, the learned trial Judge, Ilori J., dismissed the claims of the plaintiffs. In coming to his decision, he held that the power of attorney was made validly by the Ajamogun Onikotun family with the consent of the Head and members of the family. According to him, it was apparent ‘from a review of the evidence that the least that can be said of the plaintiffs evidence on the issue of the headship of the family at the material time, is that it is conflicting and confused. The claim that the power of attorney was not executed by the Head of the family must in the circumstances fail.’ The learned trial Judge also held that since the donees of the power of attorney were agents of the family, the lease to the 1st defendant was valid. He was convinced that all the donees executed the conveyance. Obviously dissatisfied with the judgment the plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal based on five grounds. In this court amended grounds were substituted for the original grounds. In the main the appellants complaints are (1) that the learned trial Judge failed to consider the evidential value of the previous judgments admitted in evidence; (2) that there was nothing to show in the power of attorney that it was executed by the Head of the family and (3) that it was erroneous to hold that Musa Aina Bale was the head of the family. In the appellants brief nine issues are said to be questions for determination. The 7th-9th alleged issues are not formulated as issues but in form of assertion of facts or grounds of appeal. The first six issues which are correctly formulated read:
‘(1) Whether the learned trial Judge should have evaluated more I positively and relevantly the documentary evidence especially I when they relate to the parties and their privies and also in relation to the family land portion of which was the subject matter of this suit. (2) Whether the learned judge did not come to a wrong decision having not given the judgment tendered and admitted as Exhibits no consideration or very little consideration. (3) Whether the Power of Attorney showing on the face of it that those who executed it were only Principal members could be interpreted by oral evidence that the head of the family was also a donor and therefore a valid document. (4) Whether the learned judge misdirected himself as to the standard of proof.
(5) a. Whether the Power of Attorney is a valid document and can pass any interest to anyone. b. Whether the learned judge misdirected himself as to the standard and burden of proof particularly as regards the acceptability of the Power of Attorney. (6) Whether the learned trial Judge erred in law when he failed totally to consider the fundamental principles of practice and procedure that parties are bound by their pleadings and that evidence given and not pleaded goes to no issue.’ Four issues are formulated in the 1st respondents brief as follows: ‘1. Is the Power of Attorney (Exhibit P. W .2F) valid having regard to the evidence before the court with respect to the headship of the family at the relevant time and the judgments tendered for the plaintiffs?
2. Did the learned trial Judge rely on extrinsic evidence on matters not pleaded in making his findings in respect of the Power of Attorney, and if so is that enough for this court to reverse his conclusion as to the validity of the Power of Attorney having regard to all the evidence before him? 3. Whether the learned trial Judge did not properly evaluate the evidence of P.W.3, the finger-prints expert, and whether in any event, this Court can interfere with his findings thereon and as to other evidence with respect to the execution of the lease? (4.) Whether having regard to the onus of proof in civil cases and the evidence, the plaintiffs case was not bound to fail? Four issues were also framed in the brief filed on behalf of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th respondents.
They are: ‘(i) Whether the learned Judge misdirected himself in any way as to the Standard of Proof. (ii) Whether the learned Judge correctly directed himself as to the onus of proof having regard to the pleadings and evidence. (iii) Whether the series of judgments the basis of the appellants grounds 2 and 5 are relevant, admissible in evidence and properly admitted as Exhibits. (iv) Whether in view of the conflicts, inconsistences and contraditions in the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs and witnesses they proved their case as required by law.’
It seems to me that the central issue in this appeal is whether the head of the Ajamogun/Onikotun family was one of the donors of the power of attorney Exhibit P.W.2JF’. In effect the main issue is whether the learned trial Judge was right in coming to the conclusion from the totality of the evidence placed before him that the power of attorney was valid in the sense that it was made with the consent of the head of the family.
At paragraph 12 of the statement of defence of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th defendants it was averred that ‘these defendants will contend at the trial of this action that Musa Aina Bale was the Head and the eldest member of the Ajamogun/Onikotun family since 1942 until his death on Sunday the 7th of October, 1979 and that no head of family had since being elected.’ At paragraph 15 of the amended statement of claim, the plaintiffs averred that at all material times between 1965 and 1981 when he died Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun was the overall head of the Ajamogun family as well as Onikotun family. The plaintiffs went on to aver at paragraph 16-18 thus:-
‘(16) That at the time the power of attorney was executed Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun was in court-with his most junior brother Momodu Gbadamosi the 3rd Defendant and some other members of the family for selling family land without his knowledge and consent and the approval of other principal members of the family in Suit No. ID/418176.
(17) That Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun has consistently since 1965 fought that the family should unite and has been vindicated in the following judgments (1) Suit No. HKlll/62 Alli Gbadamosi Ajamogun & 4 Ors. v. Musa Aina Bale & 3 Ors. (2) Suit No. HKl11162 Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun & 4 Ors. v, Musa Aina Bale & 3 Ors. (3) Suit No. IKl25/65 Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun & 4 Ors. v. Rasaki Agbaje & 3 Ors. (4) Suit No. IKl418176 Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun & Ors. v. Alhaja Anifatu Adelekan & 7 Ors. (5) Suit No. IKl41 1179 Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun & Ors. v. Ambali Yaya & Drs. (6) Suit No.IK1262171 Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun v. Rasaki Onikotun & 2 Ors.
(18) That the head of the family was never consulted nor was his consent given to the purported lease executed on behalf of the first Defendant and registered as No.7 at Page 7 in Volume 1784 Lagos of the Register of Deeds kept at Lagos State Lands Registry Lagos Nigeria nor were the important principal members of the family consent and approval received.’ It is true that the 1st plaintiff under cross-examination said: ‘I know Chief Musa Aina Bale. He is my elder brother. He was the head of family before he died some three or four years ago.
This witness also said: ‘It is true that Musa Aina Bale and Lamina Audu put us forward to represent our branch of the family. Besides being the overall head of the Ajamogun/Onikotun family, Musa Aina Bale was also the Head of our own branch of the family.’ Contrary to the evidence of the 1st plaintiff on this issue, the 2nd plaintiff emphasised that when Exhibit ‘P.W.2/A’ was executed in 1979 Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun was the head of the Ajamogun/Onlkotun family at the material time. He became the head of the family in 1965 and remained so until he died in 1981. He also testified that ‘Musa Aina Bale was removed as the Head of the family in 1963 as a result of the judgment in HK/11/62, Exhibit ‘P.W.2/B’ Although it was pleaded by the 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th defendants that Musa Aina Bale was the Head of the family, they called no member of the family as a witness to adduce evidence to support their contention that Musa Aina Bale was in fact the Head of the family. Indeed the 2nd defendant admitted under cross-examination by learned counsel for the plaintiffs that Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun was the head of the family.
The only witness for the defence who claimed that Musa Aina Bale was the Head of the family was Johnson Adedoja Adewopo, a legal practitioner 1 who is not a member of the family. He claimed that ‘on the day the lease was to be executed, the family assembled at Aina Bales house. He was the Head of the family at the time.’ It was this witness who prepared the power of attorney. He did not describe Musa Aina Bale as the head of the family in the document. Suffice it to say that the learned trial judge did not come to the conclusion that Musa Aina Bale was the Head of the family because of the evidence of this witness. He based his conclusion on the contradictions in the evidence of the 1st plaintiff and the 2nd plaintiff on the issue.
The question now is whether he was right to have come to the conclusion that Musa Aina Bale was the Head of the family. I agree with Mr. Fasanu, learned counsel for the 1st Respondent that the learned trial Judge considered the judgments tendered as Exhibits. He did so from pages 235-236 of the records. It is however the complaint of Ms. Kuye, learned counsel for the appellants, that the trial Judge did not do so ‘more positively and relevantly’.
It is my view that the learned trial Judge erroneously failed to apply a material finding of fact relevant to the issue in this case. In suit No. I D/4 ISn6, Exhibit P.W.2/C, between Musa Gbadamosi Ajamoglln & 3 Ors. v. Alhaja Adelekan & 7 Drs., the learned trial Judge Agoro, J., held thus at page 269 (of this record of appeal): ‘The evidence of the only witness for the defendants was to the H effect that there was no head of the family at the time of the sale of portion of the family property to the 1st defendant. The true position of things from the evidence which I have accepted is that sometime in 1965, Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun (1st plaintiff) was duly appointed Head of the Ajamogun/Onikotun family ata family meeting.
The 1st plaintiff who has attained a ripe age of 90 years is still alive but due to ill-health he could not testify during this proceedings.’ The evidence of the only witness for the defendants also showed that a faction of the Ajamogun/Onikotun family resolved to sell and did sell portion of the family property to the 1st defendant without obtaining the consent or concurence of the head of the family (1st plaintiff) nor did the 2nd-8th defendants consult other principal members of the family.’
The judgment in Exhibit ‘P.W.2/C’ was delivered on 22/6/82. The present suit, the subject of this appeal was filed on 24/2/84. Going by the judgement of Agoro. J., Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun was at first the only plaintiff, but during the proceedings, the 2nd-4th plaintiffs sought and obtained court order dated 14th May, 1979 to be joined as co-plaintiffs. It is during the pendency of that case that the power of attorney Exhibit ‘P.W.2/E’ was executed and the lease Exhibit ‘P.W.2/A’ to the 1st respondent was executed.’
This accords with paragraphs 16 of the statement of claim, which I have already reproduced and which I again reproduce for ease of reference that at the time the power of attorney was executed Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun was in court with his most junior brother, Momodu Gbadamosi the 3rd defendant and some other members of the family for selling family land without the knowledge and consent and approval of other principal members of the family in suit No. ID/418/76.’
It was the contention of Mr. Ladimeji, learned counsel for the 4th, 5th, E 6th and 8th respondents, that the learned trial Judge was not bound to follow the decisions or judgments pronounced by other judges in related cases because (1) the facts involved in those cases are not on all fours with the facts of this case, and (2) even if the facts are on all fours, those decisions being decisions of courts of concurrent jurisdiction are not binding on the learned trial Judge but only persuasive. Besides, argued the learned Counsel the said judgments Exhibits ‘P. W.2IB’, P.W2/C’, P. W.2/D’ and ‘P.W.2/E’ are inadmissible in law and ought not to have been admitted in evidence even though tendered by the consent of all parties. With due respect to learned counsel, he appears to be unmindful of the rule that every judgment is conclusive proof as against parties and their privies, of facts directly in issue in the case, actually decided by the court. This principle of law is covered by Section 53 of the Evidence Act.
Exhibit P.W.2/C was in respect of a case between members of the same family in respect of a case between members of the same family in respect of family land involving the interest of all the plaintiffs and defendants, except the first defendant, in the present case. None of the members of the family in the present case claimed to be ignorant PAGE| 9 of the judgment Exhibit ‘P.W.2/C’ None of them pursued his constitutional right as an interested party to appeal against the far-reaching decision touching on the headship of the family. Indeed the 3rd and 8th defendants in this case Momodu Gbadamosi Ajamogun and Mustapha Kamiyomi were the 6th and 4th defendants respectively in suit No.ID/418/76 Exhibit P.W.2/C. Even if the decisions had been given by a customary court, Ilori J., was A bound to act on it.
It is also elementary that the fact that a judgment was wrongly decided will not prevent it from operating as res judicata. (See the old case of Fabunmi Larinde v. Salami Ajiko (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 108. Also the fact that a finding of fact was made in the earlier judgment during the pendency of the action in which the plea is raised will also not prevent it from operating as res judicata. (See Bell v. Holmen (1956) 1 W.L.R. 1359 and B (1956) 3 All E.R. 449). The learned trial Judge Ilori, J., was conscious of the binding effects of the judgment of Agoro, J.
The finding that Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun constitutes an issue estoppel. Unfortunately, the Judge rejected the finding of fact reached by his brother in a subtle manner. Said he: ‘This averment does not claim that he (Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun) was the Head of the Ajamogun – Onikotun family. The difference in law between the term ‘Head’ and the term principal members’ of a family, and the legal implication~ of that difference in the disposition of family land; is in a plaintiff who pleaded only that he is a principal member of the family cannot be rightly said to claim by that averment, that he is the Head of that family.
Be that as it may, the defendants in that suit averred in paragraph 5 of their statement of defence that Madam Raliatu Ajamogun was at the material time the oldest and Head of the family. I do not find on the records, anything to show that the plaintiffs therein, filed a Reply to rebut the new issue introduced by the defendants averment on the Headship of the family. My learned Brother, Agoro, J., prefixed his judgment with this caution: that the trial of the action commenced on 17th April, 1980 in the absence of the defendants and their counsel and that the three witnesses of the plaintiffs were not subjected to any cross-examination. His Lordship nevertheless held that Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun was ‘the head and principal member of Ajamogun Onikotuil family’ at the time material to the points in issue in that case.’ There is no doubt that the learned trial Judge Hori, J., picked holes in the judgment of Agoro, J., so as to depart from it. It is wrong.
As I have already stated, the fact that a judgment was wrongly decided is no ground for not giving effect to it as a res judicata or issue estoppel. If the learned trial Judge had accorded Exhibit ‘P.W.2/C’ the legal effect it has he would have accredited the evidence of the second plaintiff against that of the first plaintiff. It is obvious, to me that where two or more persons are plaintiffs in a case and one of them gives evidence adverse to their claim the court is not bound to reject the evidence of the other plaintiff or plaintiffs if it is clear from documentary or other indisputable evidence that the plaintiff who gave ad-H verse evidence was being mendacious.
It is also obvious from Exhibit ‘P.W.21B’ that the 1st plaintiff and Musa Aina Bale were amongst those sued in suit No. HK/11/62 as defendants by members of the Gbadamosi Ajamogun family that the land belonged to Ajamogun and Onikotun family and not to Onikotun family alone. The defendants in that case claimed to be exclusive owners. He, the 1st plaintiff in this case, and Musa Aina Bale and others from their own branch of the family were restrained from selling family land without the consent of the plaintiffs.
The evidence of the 1st plaintiff contradicting the evidence of the 2nd plaintiff as to the Headship of the entire family can best be understood if it is set against the background of Exhibit P.W.2/B. The submission of Mr. Ladimeji that the judgments admitted in evidence by consent of counsel, including counsel for the 4th, 5th, 6th and 8th respondents, whom they represent in this court, are inadmissible in law and ought not to have been admitted in evidence is devoid of any merit.
For his submission he relied on Section 34(1) of the Evidence Act. Section 34(1) is to the effect that evidence given by a witness in a judicial proceeding is only admissible in subsequent judicial proceeding when the witness is dead or cannot be found. Suffice it to say that the admission of judgments in evidence is not governed by Section 34(1) of the Evidence Act. Besides, if the learned counsel had wanted the Judgment of the trial Judge to be affirmed on other grounds he ought to have filed the necessary notice as provided for by Order 3 Rule 14(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules 1981. I now turn to the validity or otherwise of the power of attorney. It is clear ex facie ‘Exhibit P. W .2/F that the head of the family was neither a donor or a donee of the power of attorney. The donors, including Musa Aina Bale, were described as ‘principal members and accredited representatives of Ajamogun/Onikotun’.
The expression ‘Head of Family’ was, it seems to me, deliberately omitted. In obliquely criticising the judgment of Agoro, J., Exhibit ‘P. W.2/C,’ the learned trial Judge had this to say amongst other things at page 235 of the records: In paragraph 8 of the statement of claim in that case, it was averred, inter alia, that Musa Gbadamosi was, ‘the principal member of Ajamogun family….’ This averment does not claim that he was the Head of the Ajamogun/Onikotun family.
The difference in law between the term ‘Head’ and the term ‘principal members’ of a family and the legal implications of that difference in the disposition of family land is in my view of such great consequence that a plaintiff who pleaded only that he is a principal member of a family cannot be rightly said to claim by that averment that he is the Head of the family. I say with due respect that it ought to have occurred to the learned trial Judge that a donor who claims to be ‘a principal member and accredited representative of a family cannot be rightly said to claim by that averment that he is the head of that family’.
The mere fact that donors described themselves as accredited representatives of the family and as representing various sections of the family will not vest them with authority to supplant the Head of the family or undermine his authority. What it all amounts to is that the power of attorney given not by the head of the family or with his express consent is void. Any disposition of family land pursuant to that power of attorney is of no effect whatsoever. As rightly submitted by Mr. Kuye, the power of attorney cannot pass any interest to anyone unless the head of family waives his right.
The learned trial Judge agreed with learned counsel for the 1st defendant that in an action to declare a power void ab initio, all the grantors, the grantees and all those who have acquired rights under due exercise of the power should be made parties to the suit and such a declaration should not he made where its result would affect rights conferred by plaintiffs themselves and result in equitable fraud on those who acquired those rights. Ogundairo v. Okanlawon (1963) 1 All N.L.R. 358 was cited in support.
I have read over and over again the decision in Ogundairo v. Okanlawon & Ors. (supra) and I have not succeeded in coming across any statement of the law akin to the proposition stated by the learned trial Judge at pages 241-242 of the records and as canvassed by counsel for the 1st defendant/respondent: Indeed neither the counsel nor the learned trial Judge referred to the exact page in the authority cited where the legal proposition was allegedly stated. I however admit that there is some sense in the proposition of the law canvassed by the learned counsel and accepted by the learned trial Judge.
The position however is that in this case only the 1st plaintiff was a donor of the power of attorney. Also it was he alone amongst the plaintiffs who allegedly executed the lease agreement in favour of the 1st defendant respondent. I use the word ‘allegedly’ advisedly because it cannot be said D that the evidence of the 3rd P. W., the fingerprint expert, supported the finding that the 1st plaintiff in fact thumb-impressed Exhibit ‘P. W/A’. It is a finding of fact by the learned trial Judge based on the totality of the evidence adduced before him touching on the credibility of witnesses which I cannot interfere with.
In his evidence however, the 2nd plaintiff said he knew nothing about other conveyances made pursuant to the said power of attorney. The learned trial Judge did not hold that the 2nd plaintiff was being untruthful. I therefore find it unacceptable that in the circumstances of this case that all those who had acquired interest in the family land by virtue of the power of attorney should have been made parties in this action before Exhibit ‘P.W.2/F’ could be declared void. There is evidence that the 1st defendant/respondent was challenged in 1979 when found operating on the land with a caterpillar.
He was arrested by the police at the instance of the PAGE| 12 2nd plaintiff who had contacted his father Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun about the trespass being committed by the 1st defendant by the 2nd-8th defendants and the 1st plaintiff. The 1st defendant in his statement of defence claimed that the plaintiffs G were at all material times aware of his presence on the land. He claimed he had expended a fortune on the land. Strange enough he did not testify to refute the allegations of the 2nd plaintiff that he was warned of the consequences of his action which in fact led to his arrest by the police.
To my mind he was plainly being foolhardy in continuing to develop the land after he had been accosted by the 2nd plaintiff. I am of the firm view therefore that the learned trial Judge ought to have H entered judgment for the plaintiffs (1) in view of the judgment of Agoro, J., Exhibit P.W.2/C which clearly pronounced Musa Gbadamosi Ajamogun as the Head of the family, (2) in the light of the power of attorney which was not executed by the Head of the family and (3) in that the lease agreement
Other Citation: (1990) LCN/2439(SC)
