National Union Of Road Transport Workers & Anor V. Road Transport Employers Association Of Nigeria & Ors (2012)
LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report
JOHN AFOLABI FABIYI, J.S.C.
This is an appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Ilorin Division (‘the Court below’ for short) which found in favour of the 1st and 2nd respondents herein that the trial Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the action and struck out the claim before the trial Federal High Court, Akure (‘the trial Court’ for short).
The 1st and 2nd appellants herein, as plaintiffs at the trial Court, filed their originating summons on 23rd August, 1999, by which they prayed for the determination of the question-
“Whether by Decree No 4 of 1996 Trade Union (Amendment) Decree 1996, the plaintiffs are the rightful parties to engage in the transportation of passengers and goods by road at the motor-parks in the various towns and villages in Ekiti State of Nigeria.”
If the answer to the question is in the affirmative, then the plaintiffs claim:-
“1. Declaration that the members of the 1st plaintiff Union including the other plaintiff are the rightful persons by law to engage in the transportation of passengers and goods by road in various motor-parks in Ekiti State.
- Perpetual injunction restraining any other Unions, Association and/or groups of persons not authorised by law to engage in transportation of passenger and goods by road from operating, interfering and/or disturbing the plaintiffs and/or their agents, servants or members at the various motor parks in Ekiti State, where they are lawfully engaged.
- Perpetual injunction restraining the 2nd defendant and the Ekiti State House of Assembly under his authority from entertaining, considering or making any resolution tantamount to amending Decree 4 of 1996 by allowing or permitting a non-authorised Union, Association or group(s) of persons to operate at the motor-parks in the State to engage in the transportation of passengers and goods by road in various motor-parks in Ekiti State.
- An order directing the 1st, 3rd and 4th defendants to enforce Decree 4 of 1996 by seeing to the EXIT of NON-AUTHORISED UNIONS and non-registered or non-recognized, Union or Associations from various motor parks in Ekiti State.”
The 1st and 2nd respondents herein were not made parties by the plaintiffs at the trial Court. They applied to be joined thereat as defendants. On 23rd November, 1999, they were found to be necessary parties so that all issues in dispute as placed before the Court could be properly pronounced upon and to obviate being accused of standing by.
The 1st respondent was a party who should have been joined by the plaintiffs in the first instance. It was a party whose presence before the court as a defendant was apt to enable the Court to effectually and completely adjudicate or settle all the questions involved in the matter. It was not right for the plaintiffs to keep it out of the game and attempt to ‘steal the show’ behind the back of a deserving defendant. After all, any judgment made with an order against a necessary and desirable party behind its back will be to no avail. It cannot be allowed to stand. See: Chief Abusi David Green v. Dr. E. T. Dublin Green (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 60) 480; Uku v. Okumagba (1974) 1 ALL NLR 475. In short, the learned trial Judge acted in the right direction on this point.A preliminary objection was raised to the jurisdiction of the trial Court to entertain the matter. This, he over-ruled on 12th October, 2000. Thereafter, the trial Judge heard arguments on the originating summons. In his reserved judgment handed out on 26th September, 2000, he held as follows:-
“But by Decree No 1 of 1999 Trade Union (Amendment) Decree No.1 of 1999, the Third Schedule of the Principal Act (Trade Unions Act Cap. 437) was amended by the addition of Part C which contains the Senior Staff Employers Association. In this new Part C, the 5th defendant was recognized. It is important to note that not been given although the name of the 5th defendant was recognized it has any specific area or jurisdictional operation. Section 6 of Decree No 4 of 1996 has not been repealed so also Part B of the Third Schedule which contains the Trade Unions and their jurisdictional scope. It is therefore my view that the 5th defendant’s name has only been inserted for the sake of it. If the legislature intended to give it any jurisdictional scope having provided by the relevant enactment (sic). I will answer the question posed for determination in this originating summons in favour of the plaintiff….”
The 1st and 2nd respondents herein, felt unhappy with the above stance of the trial Judge and appealed to the Court below where issue of jurisdiction of the trial Court was again raised along with other issues. The Court below, in its own judgment handed out on 7th May, 2004, decided to only treat the issue of jurisdiction. It held as follows:-
“The name of the Road Transport Employers Association of Nigeria (1st appellant is listed as No 29 under the Third Schedule Part C thereof. It is therefore a trade union. Being a trade Union, the dispute between it and the 1st respondent cannot be heard by the lower Court.”
On point of jurisdiction, the Court below allowed the appeal and declared the trial as null and void. The appellants herein have decided to appeal to this Court.
Three (3) issues formulated in the appellants’ brief of argument read as follows:-
“(a) Whether the lower Court was right by refusing to consider the appellants’ complaint and argument that the issue formulated by the 1st and 2nd respondents at the lower Court did arise in the Notice and Ground Appeal filed at the lower Court.
(b) Whether the claim of the appellants at the trial Court is a trade union dispute.
(c) Whether the trial Court was clothed with jurisdiction to hear and determine the subject matter of this appeal.”
On behalf of the 3rd-6th respondents, three similar issues were also formulated. They read as follows:-
“(a) Whether the claim of the appellants at the Court of trial is a trade union dispute.
(b) Whether the trial Court was clothed with jurisdiction to hear and determine the subject matter of this appeal.
(c) Whether the lower Court was right by refusing to consider the appellants’ objection that issues B and D formulated before the lower Court by the 1st and 2nd respondents did not arise in the Notice of Appeal filed by the 1st and 2nd respondents, as appellants at the lower Court.”
Issue (c) formulated by the appellant is similar to issue (b) couched on behalf of the 3rd -6th respondent. It is an issue which touches on jurisdiction of the trial Court to determine the subject matter of this appeal.
It has been pronounced by this Court several times that jurisdiction is very fundamental. It is the live wire of a case which should be determined at the earliest opportunity. If a Court has no jurisdiction to determine a case, the proceedings remain a nullity ab initio no matter how well conducted and decided. This is so since a defect in competence is not only intrinsic, but extrinsic to the entire process of adjudication. See: Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) SCNLR 341; Oloba v. Akereja (1988) 3 NWLR (Pt. 84) 508
Consequently, I now at this point proceed to determine the issue touching on the jurisdiction of the trial Court to determine the subject matter of this appeal.
On behalf of the appellants, it was submitted that the Court below was wrong when it held that the trial Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter and subsequently declared the judgment of the trial Court as null and void. Learned Counsel contended that it is not the duty of any Court to go on an expedition to find or garner facts to support the position of the 1st and 2nd respondents that the issue in dispute is a trade dispute. He observed that it has been held by this Court that what a court should examine in determining whether or not, it has jurisdiction to entertain an action is the claim as contained in the plaintiffs’ claim; in this case, the appellants’ originating summons. Learned Counsel cited the case of Ladoja v. INEC & ors. (2007) 4 WRN 1 at 37-38; 42-43, 66.
Learned Counsel referred to the case of Western Steel Works Ltd. v. Iron and Steel Workers Union of Nigeria (2004) 7 WRN 58 at 85 where this Court affirmed that section 15 of the Trade Dispute Act, 1976, which conferred jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court in respect of certain specie of cases did not include jurisdiction to make declarations and to order injunctions as in this case. He observed that all matters within the competence of the National Industrial Court must be referred to it by the Minister as prescribed by section 10 of the Trade Dispute Act, 1976. He felt that the necessary implication of this is that no individual union can directly approach the National Industrial Court except through the Minister after a trade dispute must have arisen which is not the situation in the subject matter of this appeal. He observed that the request of the appellants at the trial Court is a declaration of right and its enforcement by the appropriate government authorities.
Learned Counsel further reiterated that the relief being claimed are declaratory and injunctive. He felt that no trade dispute existed and none was declared as provided by sections 1 to 6 of the Trade Dispute Act as between the parties in this appeal and the reliefs being claimed are not within the jurisdictional competence of the National Industrial Court.
Learned Counsel submitted that the trial Court, by virtue of section 231 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 has jurisdiction to the exclusion of the National Industrial Court to entertain the appellants’ claim as constituted. Learned Counsel further submitted that the provision of the section of Decree 47 of 1992 (now Act) cannot infract or take away the jurisdiction conferred by section 251 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on the trial Court and if it is in conflict, as it seems to be, with the Constitution, it is void to the extent of the inconsistency. He referred to section 1 (3) of the 1999 Constitution. Learned Counsel urged this court to hold that the trial Court was right to assume jurisdiction over the subject matter of the appellants’ suit.
On behalf of the 3rd – 6th respondents, it was submitted that a Court is only competent to entertain a case when the subject matter of the action is within its jurisdiction. Learned Counsel cited the cases of Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 1 SCNLR 341; Akeem v. University of Ibadan (2001) 15 NWLR (Pt. 736) 352 at 369.
Learned Counsel submitted that the claim of the appellants determines the jurisdiction of the Court; and in this case, the Originating Summons of the appellants before the trial Court. He cited the cases of Shittu v. Nigeria Agric & Coop Bank Ltd. (2001) 3 NWLR (Pt. 647) 25; Adeyemi v. Opeyemi (1976) 9-10, SC.31; and Savannah Bank Ltd. v. Pan Atlantic (1987) NWLR (Pt. 29) 212.) Learned Counsel submitted that the Originating Summons of the appellants and the reliefs sought therein before the trial Court disclosed trade dispute, jurisdiction upon which is exclusively conferred on the National Industrial Court. Learned Counsel cited the cases of National Industrial Court. Learned Counsel cited the cases of National Union of Road Transport Workers v. Ogbodo (1995) 6 NWLR (No part) 56, Index Nig. Ltd. v. Maskau (1998) 3 NWLR (Pt. 542) 404 at 422. Learned Counsel urged that the issue be resolved in favour of the respondents.
It is basic and not in contention that a Court is only competent to entertain a case when, inter alia, the subject matter of the action is within its jurisdiction and the action is initiated by due process of law. See: Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (supra); Akeem v. University of Ibadan (supra).
It is now trite that the claim of the plaintiffs (herein appellants) determines the jurisdiction of the Court. In this matter, same is the Originating Summons of the appellants as initiated at the trial Court. The cases of Adeyemi v. Opeyemi (supra) and savannah Bank Ltd. v. Pan Atlantic (supra) are clearly in Point.
I need to state it here that the law which is applicable to a case is the law as at the time when the cause of action arose and the suit was initiated. See: Mustapha v. Governor, Lagos State (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 58) 539 at 591.
It is of moment to reiterate it that the suit of the appellants was initiated at the trial Federal High Court on 23rd August, 1999. I note it that the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria came on board effectively as from 29th May, 1999. Section 251 (1) (r) of same imbued the Federal High Court with jurisdiction to determine –
“Any action or Proceeding for declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or” any of its agencies;
The suit of the appellants at the trial Court, as earlier set out in this judgment, relates to declaratory and injunctive reliefs against the defendants thereat that include the Commissioner of Police of the Nigerian Police Force, no doubt, for agency of the Federal Government. It is incontestable that the subject matter of this suit, as constituted, is within the jurisdiction of the trial court as at 23rd August, 1999 when the cause of action emanated.
It is the claim of the plaintiffs as in this case, the appellants’ Originating Summons that a Court should examine to determine whether or not it has jurisdiction to entertain the action. In the case of Ladoja v. INEC & Ors. (supra), this Court at pages 3 7 -38, in a similar circumstance, pronounced as follows per Mohammed, JSC –
“This law is indeed trite that in a situation that arose at the Court below regarding the determination of whether or not the trial Federal High Court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the appellant as contained in the Originating Summons, it is that claim that needed to have been examined… Looking at the appellant’s Originating Summons… I am of the view that the declaratory and injunctive reliefs sought therein are squarely within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as prescribed under section 251 (1) (q) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution.”
And Aderemi, JSC at page 66 further pronounced on the same point that:-
“Generally it is the claim of the plaintiff that determines the jurisdiction of a court that is invited to adjudicate in the matter.”
Let me now depict the side of this matter as it relates to the National Industrial court. It is well settled by this court in the case of Western Steel Works Ltd. v. Iron and Steel Workers Union of Nigeria (supra) that section 15 of the Trade Dispute Act, 1976 conferring jurisdiction on the National Industrial Court in respect of certain specie of cases did not include jurisdiction to make declarations and to order injunctions as in this case.
Apart from the above, as at the time this action was initiated, all matters within the competence of the National Industrial Court must be referred to it (National Industrial Court) by the appropriate Minister of Labour as prescribed by section 10 of the Trade Dispute Act, 1978. In this matter, no trade dispute was set in motion and none was referable by the Minister to the National Industrial Court.
By implication, no individual Union could directly approach the National Industrial Court except through the Minister after a trade dispute must have arisen. Same is not the situation in the subject matter of this appeal. This is so since the request of the appellants at the trial Court is a declaration of right and its enforcement by injunctive orders by appropriate government authorities including the State’s Commissioner of Police.
The claim/reliefs of the appellants, I repeat are declaratory and injunctive in nature and purport. No trade dispute existed and none was declared as provided by sections 1 to 6 of the Trade Dispute Act as between the parties in this appeal. The utmost of it all is that the reliefs being claimed were not within the jurisdictional competence of the National Industrial Court. On the other hand, they were within the jurisdictional competence of the trial Federal High Court as at 23rd August, 1999, when the suit was rightly initiated before that Court.
I have tried to depict it clearly that jurisdiction in this matter rightly inheres in the Federal High Court as at the time the suit was initiated before it. The Court below took a narrow and rather simplistic view that since the 1st appellant and the 1st respondent are trade unions, the matter must per force go before the National Industrial Court. With due diffidence, as at that time that view was erroneous.
In short, the order of the Court below in which the trial by the trial Court was declared null and void was ill tuned and same is hereby set aside. I pronounce that the inherent jurisdiction imbued in the trial Court at the material time was without blemish.
The above is not the end of this matter. The Court below after treating the issue relating to jurisdiction left the other issues before it undetermined for reasons best known to it.
After finding that the Court was imbued with jurisdiction, I am of the opinion that issue B before the Court below which was formulated from Ground 2 of the Grounds of Appeal thereat is of moment here. Stricto sensu, the issue relates to a crucial point of law. The arguments of parties are extant in the transcript record of appeal. I am of the opinion that vides section 22 of the Supreme Court Act, Cap.S.15, LFN, 2004 same should be determined by this Court right away. See: Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria v. Wamal Express Services (Nig.) Ltd. (2011) 1-2 SC (Pt.11) 93 at 112. And, I so embark on it.
The issue reads as follows:-
“B. Whether the lower Court is right in holding that the Road Transport Employers Association was only inserted for the sake of it without jurisdictional scope. (Appeal Ground 2).”
On page 250 of the record of appeal, the trial Court, in respect of the above quoted issue stated as follows:-
“But by Decree No 1 1999 (Trade Unions [Amendment] Decree No 1 of 1999) the Third Schedule of the Principal Act (Trade Unions Act Cap 437) was amended by the addition of Part C which contains the Senior Staff and Employers Association. In this new Part C, the 5th defendant was recognized. It is important to note that although the name of the 5th defendant was recognizsd it has not been given any specific area or jurisdictional operation. Section 6 of Decree No 4 of 1996 has not been repealed so also Part B of the Third Schedule which contains the Trade Unions and their jurisdictional scope. It is therefore my view that the 5th defendant’s name has only been inserted for the sake of it.”
The brief of argument of the 1st and 2nd appellants at the Court below who are 1st and 2nd respondents in this appeal was settled by A. O. Akanle, SAN (of blessed Memory). Arguments in respect of the issue thereat as contained on pages 264-266 of the record should be recapitulated as follows:-
(a) The trial Court held that:”
“It is therefore my view that the 5th defendant’s name has only been inserted for the sake of it.”
(b) It is curious that a High Court can hold that a Decree could be made for fun and that a Trade Union registered for mere sake, yet it is recognized.
(c) If only by its name the 5th defendant (1st defendant – appellant is registered for transportation the implied hope is transportation by road and not by air or water.
(d) Article 4(g) of the government made Constitution of first defendant -appellant (fifth Defendant) says –
“The Association shall have absolute control and authority, subject to the law or by-law of the land, over all motor-park activities orderliness and secure complete welfare of the passengers and the safety of their luggages.
(e) The quotation above is the jurisdiction scope which the lower Court says does not exist.
(f) It was plainly established before the Court that the great omission was made in Decree 4 of 1996 and it is only understandable that the scope cannot be given in respect of a Trade Union whose name is omitted.
(g) But even then, Decree 1 of 1999 does supersede Decree 4 of 1996 and the former (sic) (Decree 1 of 1999) does not give any scope to either first plaintiff (first plaintiff-respondent) or fifth defendant (1st defendant-respondent) .
(h) It was hence wrong to go back to the 1999 (sic) Decree which has been superseded to fish out the jurisdictional scope of first plaintiff respondent.
(j) The 1978 Trade Unions Decree listed both Trade Unions as Numbers 54 and 55.
(k) It is wrong for the lower Court to have given a negative interpretation to Decree 1 of 1999; such an act is against the canon of interpretation of laws.
(i) Ibrahim v. Barde 1996 9 NWLR (Pt. 474) 513 at 582 F-G
(ii) U. A. Ventures v. FCNB 1998 4 NWLR (Pt. 547) 546 at 559 E.G.
(l) This Court is prayed to resolve the issue here in favour of the appellants.
In respect of this issue before the Court below learned Counsel for the 1st and 2nd respondent thereat who are appellant in this Court merely opined that the ground upon which the issue was as grafted did not arise in the proceedings at the lower Court. I should state it right away that in view of the findings of the trial Court as quoted above, the stance of counsel herein failed to stand the test of time. The point made is in direct confrontation with the finding of the trial Court. It cannot stand as it fails to hit the target.
The learned Counsel for the 3rd-6th respondents thereat was more pragmatic and down to earth. He asked a pertinent question – If the 1st appellant was not given any area or jurisdictional scope of operation, then what was it registered and recognized to do
He submitted that the 1st appellant was not and could not have been inserted in Decree 1 of 1999 just for the sake of it as the whole purport and objective of same was to cater and provide for Senior Staff and Employers Associations as shown on the explanatory note to the Decree. He further submitted that the trial court gave a negative interpretation to Decree 1 of 1999 instead of giving it a holistic interpretation as required by law. He cited the case of Mobil Oil (Nig) Plc v. IAL 36 Inc. (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 659) 146 at 168 D-E. Learned Counsel urged that the issue be resolved in favour of the appellants and allow the appeal before the Court below.
It is basic that one of the vital canons of interpretation of statutes is that a Court of record should be minded to make broad interpretation or what is sometimes referred to as giving same a liberal approach. See: Rabiu v. The State (1980) 8-11 SC 130 at 151, 195. A Court should give a holistic interpretation to a statute as required by law. See: Mobil Oil Nig Plc v. IAL 36 Inc. (supra). A Court should aim at giving a statute purposeful interpretation; I dare say.It sounds ludicrous that the trial Court could say that the name of the 1st respondent herein was only inserted in Decree No 1 of 1999 for the sake of it. The legislator does not act in vain. The 1st respondent was registered for transportation by road; not by air or water. Article 4 (g) of the 1st respondent’s constitution as quoted above by the counsel at the court below supports same.
It is clear that the 1st respondent was not inserted in Decree 1 of 1999 just for the sake of it. The objective and purport of same was to cater and provide for Senior Staff Employers Association as extant in the explanatory note to the Decree.
Learned trial Judge failed to appreciate that he should not have made a restrictive, negative and purposeless interpretation of the law. In my opinion, he should have made a holistic, broad, and liberal interpretation which encapsulates the inescapable point that the 1st respondent having been registered and recognized has, by implication, jurisdictional scope to operate in Ekiti State motor-parks and roads just like the 1st appellant herein. I hereby pronounce in this respect as I set aside the erroneous pronouncement of the trial Court. I dismiss the claim of the appellant before the trial Court in its totality as same is ill-tuned.
One word more and I shall be done. The perennial hegemony between the 1st appellant and the 1st respondent should come to an end. Both of them have come to stay as transporters on land. One cannot disappear into the thin air for the other. After all, it is often said that the sky is wide enough for two birds to fly without colliding with each other.
I come to the conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed, and I order accordingly. I make no order as to costs.
SC.22/2005
