Nelson Gbafe Vs Prince Frank Gbafe & Ors (1996)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

ADIO, J.S.C.

In the Igarra Judicial Division of the High Court of the defunct Bendel State of Nigeria, the respondent and one other person, as plaintiffs, for themselves and on behalf of their family known as Imiokposokeke family in Atte, Akoko-Edo Local Government Area, brought an action against the appellant and the 2nd to 4th respondents. The claim was as follows:

“Declarations:

(1) That it is the turn of the Imiokposokeke family in the Imioveka ruling house, Atte, to produce, instal or appoint, as the case may be, a candidate to fill the vacant stool or title of Ogiewa of Atte Clan, Akoko-Edo Local Government Area, Bendel State of Nigeria in accordance with the Traditional Rulers and Chiefs Edict, 1979.

(2) That the first plaintiff, Prince Francis Gbafe, the nominee of the Imiokposokeke family is the right person to the title or stool of Ogiewa of Atte in accordance with the current Traditional Rulers and Chiefs Edict 1979 regulating succession to the title of the Igiewa.

(3) That the first plaintiff has been duly nominated by the lmioveka Ruling House, and therefore he should be appointed and installed as the Ogiewa of Atte by setting in motion forthwith all machineries of government towards this effect by the 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants, while the appointment (if any) of first defendant should be cancelled or declared null and void and of no effect as being against the provisions of the Traditional Rulers and Chiefs Edict 1979.

(4) That the 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants are individually or jointly and severally wrong to recommend, recognise, appoint or deal with, in any manner (if already done) or should not appoint or have appointed first defendant as the Ogiewa of Atte Clan, contrary to the provisions of the Traditional Rulers and Chiefs Edict, 1979.

(5) That the 1st defendant is from Imiomoshi and not being from Imiokposokeke family is not qualified to ascend the throne or take the title of Ogiewa of Atte Clan, in accordance with the provisions of the Traditional Rulers and Chiefs Edict 1979.

(6) A perpetual injunction restraining the first defendant from parading himself as the Ogiewa of Atte and 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants from appointing and/or recognising in any manner whatsoever the first defendant as the Ogiewa of Atte Clan.”

The parties were agreed on certain aspects of the case. It was, for example, common ground that there was only one ruling house, known as Imioveka ruling house, in relation to the Chieftaincy in question. The six family sub-units, in order of rotation were: Imiomosi (to which the last holder of the title in question belonged), Imioposokeke, Imiokhanigbe, Imiakpasi, Imiorerue and Imioshimi.

After the death of the last holder of the title, it became necessary to nominate another person to fill the vacancy in accordance with the provisions of the relevant registered chieftaincy declaration. A meeting of the family, attended by the representatives of the sub-units of the family, was held for the aforesaid purpose on the 8th of September, 1982. It was the turn of the Imiokposokeke sub-unit of the family to produce a candidate. It was common ground that the 1st respondent was nominated. The case of the 1st respondent was that he accepted the nomination and went to Lagos to pack his things before his installation. According to the 1st respondent, on his return from Lagos, he saw the person who acted as Secretary at the meeting. She gave him a copy of what was said to be a type-written copy of the minutes of the meeting held by the family. He observed, on reading it, that it was not an accurate record of the proceedings at the meeting. The document was Exhibit “A” and it contained a statement, which was not true, that after his nomination and with the permission of members of the family present at the meeting, he nominated the appellant to succeed the last holder of the title. The position of the appellant was that it was true that the 1st respondent, after thanking the family for nominating him, declined to accept his nomination and with the permission of the family nominated him (the appellant) for the purpose of filling the vacancy.

The 1st respondent contended that apart from other things, the appellant was not qualified for nomination because the sub-unit of the family to which the appellant belonged was the same as the sub-unit of the family to which the last holder of the title belonged and it was, therefore, not the turn of that sub-unit to produce a candidate for the purpose of filling the vacancy. In fact, the 1st respondent’s contention was that the father of the appellant was the last holder of the title whose death created the vacancy which was to be filled. The appellant’s position was that his mother was not an indigene. His mother married Gbafe, the last holder of the title after the death of the appellant’s father, Awodi Balogun, who belonged to the family sub-unit that was to produce a candidate for the purpose of filling the vacancy. The said Gbafe took care of him (appellant) till he grew up and that was why, in accordance with the native law and custom of the area, he was bearing the name of Gbafe as his surname.

The learned trial Judge after a meticulous consideration of the evidence and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, gave judgment for the 1st respondent. He granted all the reliefs. The appellant lodged an appeal against it to the Court of Appeal. The court below dismissed the appeal. The appellant, dissatisfied with the judgment of the court below, has appealed to this court.

One of the complaints in the appellant’s brief was, inter alia, that the court below did not consider all the grounds of appeal and/or the issues set down for determination in the appellant’s brief one by one. I am not surprised that the court below identified the real issues requiring determination for the purpose of determining the appeal instead of wasting its time on what, in my view, were minor matters or issues which would not have resolved any issue conclusively. It seemed to me that it was the usual practice for the appellant to repeat or split one issue into two or three. What was done in relation to the framing of the ground of appeal and framing of issues in the present appeal was a repeat-performance of what was done in the court below. Altogether there were more than seventeen grounds of appeal and in many cases a ground of appeal had more than two particulars of misdirection.