Newswatch Communications Limited V. Alhaji Aliyu Ibrahim Atta (1999)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
MUSDAPHER, J.C.A.
Allhaji Aliyu Ibrahim Atta was the plaintiff before the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, wherein in suit No. FCT/HC/CV/209/84, he instituted the action by Writ of Summons dated the 18th day of May, 1994 against Newswatch Communications Ltd., the printer and publisher of a popular magazine known as the Newswatch as the defendant. The plaintiff’s claims were as follows:
- The sum of N25,000,000.00 (Twenty Five Million Naira) being damages for its libel published by the defendant of and concerning the plaintiff in the Newswatch magazine Volume 19 Number II of 14th March, 1994 at page 7 under the story titled fruits of his “Labour”, particularly the following words:
“There is this little story about him making rounds in Kam Salem House which we thought Ajudua would like to hear. He is said to be a very close friend of the former I.G. Aliyu Atta. One day the story goes, Ana was holding a meeting with top Police Officers when he was informed that a very important visitor had stormed the police Headquarters. The I.G. not one to keep an important visitor waiting promptly (yes) called off the meeting. As the top police Officers filed out of the I.G.’s office, they were shocked to find out Oga’s very important visitor was, wait for it, Ajudua. Ajudua grumble, grumble. We hear that some top Police Officers are still smarting over that incident.”
“A perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, their agents, privies, servants, or otherwise from further publishing the libel complained of or any similar libel or other libelous matters whatsoever of and concerning the plaintiff and of him in the way of his public office as Inspector-General of Police or him in any other position whatsoever.”
Before the action was filed, when the plaintiff read the story he demanded a letter of apology from the defendants (Exhibit P2).
Instead of the apology the appellants wrote an abridged version of the letter in the Newswatch edition of 28th April, 1994 (Exhibit P3). The plaintiff in the meanwhile wrote another letter to the defendants on the 14th of April demanding an apology and compensation which was ignored by the defendants (Exh. P3). The writ as reproduced above was issued and served on the defendants within jurisdiction at Block 4, flat 2, Garki Abuja.
On the 26th day of July, 1994, when the case came up for mention, both parties appeared in court, counsel asked for an adjournment to “enable us regularise our paper”. It should be mentioned, that the writ of summons was accompanied with the statement of claim.
On the next date the 28/9/1994, the defendant’s counsel again asked for an adjournment to “enable us regularise our position.” The matter was adjourned to 17th and 18th January, 1995 for hearing. On the 18th of January, the defendants were absent and unrepresented. But the defendants wrote a letter to the plaintiff’s solicitor on the ground that “one of their lawyers Mr. Dele Awokoya was appearing at the Court of Appeal. Since the defendants did not even file a statement of defence, it appeared to the trial court that the defendants were playing delaying tactics and were frustrating the commencement of the trial. On the plaintiff’s application, the plaintiff was granted leave to lead evidence in proof of the claims.
PW1 and PW2 gave evidence and the matter was adjourned to 21st February, 1995 for continuation of hearing, with an order for hearing notice to issue on the defendants. On the 21/2/1995 when the matter came up, the defendants were absent and not represented even though the defendants solicitors were informed of the date. PW3 gave evidence. The matter was again adjourned to the 9/3/1995 for continuation of hearing.
On the 9/3/1995, the defendant’s counsel moved two applications one, for extension of time to file a statement of defence and counter-claim and two, to recall the plaintiff’s witnesses for cross-examination. The application to extend time to file the statement of defence and counter claim was granted, while the application to recall the plaintiff’s witnesses for cross-examination was adjourned. In the meanwhile PW4 gave his evidence in chief. And the matter was adjourned to the 11/4/1995.
On the 11/4/1995 when the matter came up for hearing, the defendant’s counsel moved the application to recall the plaintiff’s witnesses for cross-examination. The Ruling for the application was adjourned to 2414/1995, when the learned trial judge allowed the application on the condition that the sum of N45,000.00 being the expenses of the witnesses paid within 14 days.
On the 23/511995, the defendant’s counsel filed another application praying the court to set aside the issuance of the writ of summons and all other processes on the grounds that service should have been effected at the Lagos Head office of the defendants and not the Abuja office. The learned trial judge in his Ruling delivered on the 24/7/1995 refused the application to set aside the writ, he held that the defendants had an office within jurisdiction and that service of the writ within the jurisdiction was good service. It should be mentioned that the defendant was absent and unrepresented on the 13/6/1995, 27/6/1995 and on the 24/7/1995 when the Ruling was read. It should also be mentioned that the defendant did not comply with the order of court to tender the sums of money for the witnesses expenses. The matter suffered many adjournments because of the absence of counsel for defendants. On the 28/11/1995 on the plaintiff’s application, the order of recall of witnesses was discharged. The defendants were not in court nor were they represented even though fresh hearing notices were issued. The plaintiff closed its case and the matter was adjourned to the 23/1/1996, with an order for hearing notice to reissue on the defendant’s counsel. When the matter came up on the 23/1/1996, the defendants were not in court nor were they represented even after they acknowledged the hearing date. The matter was again adjourned to 24/1/1996 for defence. The defendants also failed to appear in court to defend the action. The learned trial judge came to the conclusion that the defendant had no defence to offer after recounting their continued numerous absences in court. He again adjourned the matter for addresses to 14/1/1996. On the 14/2/1996, the defendants were still absent in court. The learned trial judge allowed the plaintiff’s counsel to address the court. After the plaintiff’s address, the matter was again adjourned to the 27th day of February, 1996 for the defence to address the court. The defendant was again absent and unrepresented on the 27th of February, 1996 and the learned trial judge adjourned the matter for judgment on the 20/3/1996.
On the 9th day of May, 1996, the learned trial judge delivered his judgment wherein he found the words complained of to be libelous and awarded damage in the sum of Two Million Naira against the defendants.
In the meanwhile and when the matter was adjourned for judgment, the defendant filed an application dated 25/3/1996 for an order “arresting the judgment to be delivered herein” for an “order granting leave to the defendant/applicant to adduce oral and documentary evidence and open its defence in the suit herein before judgment is entered in this suit.”
Another application was filed on the 9/5/1996 for an order “to arresting the judgment to be delivered in the suit herein. An order of court reopening the trial in this case and particularly reopening the defence for the defendants … An order granting leave lo the defendant to adduce oral and documentary evidence and open its defence in the suit and thereafter. Address herein before judgment is entered in the suit”. The latter application was filed on the day the judgment was delivered. The two motions were not listed and argued before judgment was delivered on the 9th day of May, 1996.
The defendant, hereinafter referred to as the appellant felt aggrieved with the decision and has now appealed to this Court. The plaintiff shall from now on be referred to as the respondent. The Notice of appeal contains ten grounds of appeal. Distilled from the ground of appeal four issues have been identified, formulated and submitted to this Court for determination. The respondent agrees with the issues but argued that since grounds 2, 3, 5, 7(a & c) and 9 have no issues framed for them and no arguments have been canvassed for them they are deemed abandoned and should be struck out. I have myself read the grounds of appeal very carefully and I agree that no issue or argument have been advanced for grounds 2, 3, 5, 7(a & c) and 9. These grounds are deemed abandoned and struck out. See Tukur v. Governor of Taraba State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) 549.
Now the four issues raised read as follows:
- Whether the learned trial judge was right in arriving at the conclusion that the defendants were properly served with the Originating processes at their branch office in Abuja and not in Lagos at their registered office.
- Whether the defendants were given a fair hearing in all the circumstances of the case by the learned trial judge in failing to list hear and determine an application filed by the defendants to reopen the trial for purposes of the defendants putting forward their case.
- Whether the learned trial judge was right to hold as he did that the words complained of were in fact defamatory of the respondent and the reliance of the learned trial judge on the entire publication in Exhibit P1 other than the words complained of and set out in the Respondent’s pleading at the lower court was proper.
- Whether the sum of N2 Million (Two million Naira) awarded to the respondent and against the appellant was proper, justified and supported by the evidence”
Now, I shall deal with the issues as they are argued in the appellant’s brief.
Issue 1
This is concerned with the service of the original process, the writ and the statement of claim on the appellant through an address within the jurisdiction of the court at Abuja municipality instead of the Headquarters address of the appellant in Lagos outside the jurisdiction of the trial court. The service of the writ and the statement of claim was in contravention of Section 78 of the Company and Allied Matters Act 1990 and Section 97, 98 and 99 of the Sherrifs and Civil Processes Act 1990 as well as Order 5 Rule 6, 13 and 14 of the Federal Capital Territory High Court Rules. The appellant was given 30 days within which to cause an appearance to enter. It is submitted this clearly indicated that there was a conscious deliberate acknowledgment by the respondent that the Registered office of the appellant was at Lagos and the respondent meant that the writ should be served at Lagos and not Abuja. It is further submitted that by Order 5 Rules 6, 13 and 14 of the Rules of the trial Court, it is mandatory and “peremptory requirement for leave to be sought before a writ can be served outside the jurisdiction of the court”. Order 5 Rule 13 (2 and 3) provides for a concurrent writ to be issued with the original meant for service outside the jurisdiction of the court.
It is again submitted that the respondent never sought for and obtained leave to serve the writ outside the jurisdiction of the court which was an infraction of Section 78 of Company and Allied Matters Act. It submitted that Order 12 Rule 8 which prescribes the mode for service on Company or Corporations within the jurisdiction cannot apply because a branch office of the appellant cannot do for service. It is again submitted that the learned trial judge was wrong to have held that “The writ of summons issued in the present case was not meant for service and neither was it issued outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.” Learned counsel referred to and relied on Nwabueze v. Okoye (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 91) p. 664 – 668; Sken Consult Ltd. v. Ukey (1981) 1 SC 6.
It is further submitted that since the writ was issued not in compliance with the law, that the suit had not been initiated with the due process of the law, and the judge accordingly had no jurisdiction to have entertained the suit. Learned counsel referred to and relied on Western Steel Works Ltd. v. Iron & Steel Workers Union (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 30) 617, 619;Anigboro v. Sea Trucks Nig. Ltd. (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 399) 35 – 44. Fumudoh v. Aboro (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 210 at 218.
It is again submitted that the appellant could not waive the illegality of the service since there is an incurable defect in the initiating process vide Rev. H. A. Elebute v. Faleke (1995) 2 NWLR (Pt. 375) 82 at 86. Adegoke Motors Ltd. v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 at 257.
The learned counsel for the respondent argued that the appellant had on the 23/5/1994 raised the same objection and the learned trial judge made a Ruling on 24/7/95 and dismissed the objection and appellant did not appeal. It is submitted that issue No. 1 was not predicated on the appeal filed against the judgment of the court now an appeal. The decision was not included in the judgment appealed against, it is further submitted that the appellant ought to have filed an interlocutory appeal against the decision within the prescribed time limited by law. There was no leave sought and obtained to canvass this ground and the issue. It is submitted that the ground and the issue ought to be struck out. Learned counsel referred to and relied on the following cases: Ajani v. Giwa (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 32) 796; Ogigie v. Obiyan (1997) 10 NWLR (Pt. 524) 179; Ezewusim v. Okoro (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt. 294) 478: Tijani v. Akinwunmi (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 125) 237.
It is submitted that though this court has the discretion to hear the appellant such discretion cannot be exercised without leave.
It is again submitted that even on the merits, the appellant conceded that it had been served within jurisdiction, on its “branch office”, therefore, sections 97, 98 and 99 of the Sherrifl’s and Civil Processes Act do not apply.
It is submitted that the provisions of the Rules of Court and S.78 of CAMA, the service on the appellant through its branch office at Abuja was good service. A company under CAMA is served in accordance with the Rules of the relevant High Court contrary to provisions of Companies Act of 1968 which demanded service on the Registered office of the company. It is submitted that the word “office” used under Order 12 Rule 8 of the Rules of Court can only refer to “office” within jurisdiction. Vide Texaco Nigeria Plc. v. Lukoko (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) 651; Palm Beach Insurance v. Bruhns (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 519) 80; Ranco Trading v. U.B.A. Ltd. (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 547) 566.
It is further submitted that where a defendant seeks to set aside a writ of summons, he must act timeously before taking any step. In the instant case, the defendant made four appearances without any protest and indeed filed a statement of defence and counter-claim. Learned counsel referred and relied on Adegoke Motors (supra) and Kossen (Nig.) Ltd. v. Savannah Bank (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 420) 439.
Now, as shown above the respondent filed the writ with the statement of claim. The processes were served on the appellant at their branch office within jurisdiction. The respondent did not apply for leave to serve the processes outside the jurisdiction and the fact that the return date was given by the court up to a period of 30 days could not in my view mean that the respondent meant that service should be effected outside the jurisdiction of the court. As far as respondent was concerned Sections 97, 98 and 99 of the Sherriffs and Civil Processes Act did not apply.
The question is how does one effect service on a company that has a branch office within jurisdiction even though its registered office or Head Office is outside the jurisdiction of the Court. There is no doubt that where a writ of summons is intended to be issued outside the jurisdiction of the court failure to so endorse on the Writ under Sections 97 and 98 of the Sherriffs and Civil Processes Act renders the writ invalid and in such a situation, the defendant cannot even waive the irregularity. NNPC v. Elumah (1997) 3 NWLR (Pt. 492) 195.
Now, under CAMA 1990 the service of Court processes by s.78 of the Act is to be effected in accordance with its domestic local provisions of each High Court. See NAB Ltd. v. Felly Keme Nig Ltd. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 387) 100. The intendment of Section 78 of CAMA is to improve service of Court processes on Companies or Corporations which hitherto had been cumbersome under the Companies Act 1968. See 7Up Bottling CO. v. Abiola & Sons (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt. 463) 714. In the case of Palm Beach supra, it was held that service in the branch office of a Company or Corporation is good service. See also Texaco v. Lukoko supra.
In my view, by Section 78 of CAMA 1990 service of a Court processes on a Company is regulated by the domestic rules of the relevant High Court. In the instant case by the provisions of order 12 rule 8 of the rules of the relevant High Court, service was effected by leaving the processes at the principal place of business or branch office within jurisdiction, this was undoubtedly done in the present case and the appellants did not protest until they appeared four times and filed a statement of defence and counter-claim. Since the respondent did not intend to have processes served outside the jurisdiction of the court, therefore the provisions of the Sherriffs and Civil Processes Act did not apply.
In any event, as shown above, the trial court ruled on the validity of the service of the processes on the appellants, in his ruling he discussed Sections 97, 98 and 99 of the Sherriffs and Civil Process Act and held that they did not apply, he finally rejected the arguments of the appellant’s counsel on the objection. That Ruling was delivered on the 24th day of July, 1995 and no appeal was filed. The present appeal is against the judgment of the Court delivered on the 9th day of May, 1996 which judgment did not refer to the issue of the validity of service. The issue is that there was no appeal filed against the interlocutory decision, and no leave was sought to extend time to appeal. In my view issue one is incompetent. See Shell Pet. Dev. Co. Ltd. v. Farah (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt. 382) 148. See also Ogigie v. Obiyan supra where at page 195 Uwais CJN said:
“Now, no reference was made throughout the judgment of the trial judge to the issue of applicability of Land Use Act or Bendel State Legal Notice No. 22 of 1978. Such references were made only on the Ruling delivered on the 31st day of May, 1984. Can the appellants, therefore, raise such interlocutory issue in the appeal against the judgment? I respectfully think not……”
In this appeal, the matter was introduced without following the procedure in accordance with Section 25(2) of the Court of Appeal Act, 1976. To do this a party must obtain leave for extension of time within which to appeal. Since no leave has been sought and obtained the ground upon which this complaint is raised is incompetent, consequently the issue is also struck out since there is no valid ground of appeal upon which it can be hinged.
Issue No.2
This is to do with the appellant’s application to arrest the judgment dated the 25th day of March, 1996. It is submitted that the failure of the learned trial judge to list and listen to the counsel who filed the motion was a violation of the appellant’s right of fair hearing as guaranteed by Section 33 of the Constitution. The judgment ought be set aside on that ground. Vide Onyekwuluje v. Animashaun (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt. 439) 637. Nalsa & Team Associates v. NNPC (1991) 8 NWLR (Pt. 212) 652, FCMB Ltd. v. Abiola & Sons (1991) 1 NWLR (Pt. 165) 14.
The learned counsel also made submission on another interlocutory ruling made by the learned trial judge on which there was no appeal. In view of what I said on the failure to seek leave to appeal on the interlocutory ruling abuse, I do not think it is necessary for me to deal with the subsidiary issue. Indeed the ground of appeal dealing with the issue had been struck out. I accordingly reject the arguments of counsel from paragraph 4.4 of his brief on page 6 to paragraph 4.14 on page 7 thereof.
On the main issue of not listing the motion to arrest the judgment, I am of the view the motion was a mere ploy to delay the determination of the matter. In fact, there were two motions all filed after the appellant had on several occasions failed to appear in court after very many adjournment. I have taken the trouble to recount in great detail of what had transpired in the court below. In Saraki v. Kotoye (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 264) 156 the Supreme Court held:
“The abuse (of process) lies in the multiplicity and manner of the exercise of the right, rather than the exercise of the right per se. It consists of the intention, purpose or aim of the person exercising the right to harass, irritate and annoy the adversary and interfere with the administration of justice.”
I have, as mentioned above recounted in great details the conduct of the appellant throughout the trial before the lower court. In my view, the application to “arrest” the judgment after all the opportunities granted to the appellant which it deliberately refused to take was merely calculated to hinder the due administration of justice. From the records available the appellant always claimed that they would settle the matter out of court when indeed they merely wanted to delay the due administration of justice. ‘The procedure for arrest of judgment is now hardly known in our Civil jurisprudential system. It is the act of staying a judgment, or refusing to render judgment in an action at law in Criminal cases after verdict. It is usually for some intrinsic matter appearing on the face of the record, which would render the judgment if given erroneous or reversible. Under the old Common law rule the procedure for arrest of judgment was not peculiar to the criminal cases alone it was available in civil cases under the Old Common Law Rules, but the procedure is alien to the rule of court and does not apply in civil matters. See Bob-Manuel v. Briggs (1995) 7 NWLR (Pt. 409) 537. The application made to arrest the judgment is accordingly misconceived both in law and in fact. The appellant had been given ample opportunity to defend the claims made against them and also to prosecute their counter-claim. The appellants merely refused to use the opportunity given them. Under the circumstances, the learned trial judge was fully justified to have (1) closed the defence and (2) concluded that the appellants had no evidence to offer on their pleadings. In the end I reject the complaint under this issue and resolve the same against the appellant.
Issue No.3
It is submitted by the appellant counsel that the words complained of and set out in the respondent’s pleading were not libelous of the respondent in their natural and ordinary meaning. In Okolo v. Midwest Newspaper Corporation (1977) 1 SC 33, it was held by the Supreme Court that in considering whether publication in a Newspaper is libelous, it is the broad impression reasonable conveyed by the publication to an ordinary man that is relevant and not the meaning of each word used in the publication; vide Awoniyi v. Registered Trustees of AMORC (1990) 6 NWLR (Pt. 154) 42 at 45. Okafor v. Ifeanyi (1979) 3 – 4 SC 99. It is argued that when the words complained of are looked at as a whole it will be seen that the words were not defamatory.
I am not prepared to countenance or take into account the arguments of counsel on paragraph 5.7 – Section 13. This is because counsel for the appellant led no evidence to justify the truthfulness of the allegation – as contained in the statement of defence and counter claim.
Under paragraph 5.14, the learned counsel further argued that the failure to set out verbatim the full text of the publication in the pleading was fatal to the respondent’s case. See Okpozo v. Bendel Newspaper Corporation (1990) 5 NWLR (Pt. 153) 652 – 654, Okafor v. Ifeanyi supra.
It is finally argued that the learned trial judge was in error to have relied upon the entire article in the publication other than the words complained of and set out in the respondent’s pleadings. Vide Ohanbamu v. M.D. West Newspapers Corporation CCHJ/6/74.
For the respondent, it is argued, that the respondent relied upon the entire article in its pleadings and this pleading is sufficient in law. Learned counsel referred to and relied on the following cases: Sketch v. Ajagbemokeferi (1989) 1 NWLR (Pt. 100) 678, BPPC v. Gwagwada (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 116) 439, Williams v. D.T.N. Ltd. (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 124) 1, Complete Communications Ltd. v. Onoh (1998) 5 NWLR (Pt. 549) 197.
It is finally submitted that the learned trial judge properly directed himself as to proof of libel.
Now, there is no doubt that a portion of the alleged offending article was reproduced verbatim in the statement of claim and paragraph II of the statement incorporated the whole article in the pleading. The question is, can a party in a defamation case refer to the whole article published without the necessity of producing verbatim all the contents of the article but only a bit of it’? The other relevant question is whether the words complained of are capable of having any defamatory meaning.
A defamatory statement is a statement which is calculated to injure the reputation of a person to whom it refers and tended to lower him in the estimation of the right thinking members of the society. The test is whether a reasonable man with ordinary intelligence will likely understand the words as libelous. See Dlin v. African Newspapers Ltd. (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt. 139). See also Esika v. Medolu (1997) 2 NWLR (Pt. 485) 54. It is also defamatory to speak of a person in his profession or calling in a manner conveying an imputation on him disparaging or injurious to him in his office, profession or calling. See N.T.A. v. Babatope (1996) 4 NWLR (Pt. 440) 75. See Okalo v. Midwest Newspapers supra, Dumbo v. Idugboe (1983) 1 SCNLR 29. The law in its wisdom insists that words which are capable of leaving a stain on the reputation of another should not in the absence of lawful excuse be published or uttered of and concerning a person.
Now the learned trial judge in his judgment found that the article would be judged by a person of reasonable intelligence to be in bad taste against the respondent. There is evidence that the words are uttered. Their truth was denied by the respondent. The appellant had not denied publishing the offending article, but have woefully refused to justify the publication. To publish that a person who is said to be wanted by the police was still being given the VIP treatment by Inspector General of Police. Not only that, but to abort a meeting with the Senior Police officers because “the suspect stormed the police headquarters.” In my view the words were capable of having defamatory meaning. In my view the whole publication is capable of defamatory meaning on the respondent who was the Inspector General of Police. The article portrayed Ajudua as a common criminal and a wanted person and there was the respondent giving him VIP treatment to the chagrim of Senior Police officers. I am also of the view that the fact that the whole publication Exhibit A was pleaded under paragraph 11 of the Statement of claim, the learned trial judge is entitled to look into Exhibit 1.
I find no merit in this issue. I resolve it against the appellant.
Issue 4
This is to do with the measure of damages. It is submitted that the amount is extravagant, excessive and unsupported by evidence. It is argued that an award of damages for libel is subjective vide Williams v. Daily Times supra. A C.B. Ltd. v. Apugo (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt. 399) 65 at 74. It is further submitted that the learned trial judge arrived at the figure of Two Million Naira by considering irrelevant matters such as the loss of the oil deal.
It is argued that PW4 a Police ASP said Fred Ajudua was not a convicted felon but was facing criminal trial at a Court in Lagos. The judge was wrong to have created the impression that Fred Ajudua was a criminal. It is submitted further that even if the words are defamatory, damages may not be awarded vide Bulus v. Suleiman (1982) 686 Nigerian Law of Libel and the Press – By Chief Gani Fawehinmi.
It is submitted for the respondent that the award of Two Million Naira as damages for libel was justified, having regard to the conduct of the appellant from the time the libel was published down to the time of the verdict. See Odudu v. Atoyebi (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 58) 660. The depreciation in the value of the Naira Douglas v. Pererside (1994) 3 NWLR (Pt. 330) 37. Status and position in life of the plaintiff. See Ugo v. Okafor (1996) 3 NWLR (Pt. 438) 542, the mode and spread of the publication Mayange v. Punch (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 358) 570. It is submitted that the learned trial judge acted on setttled legal principle in arriving at the figure he did.
Now, when an appellate court is called upon to review and interfere with the award of damages, by the trial court, the principles have been settled, firstly the appellate court will not interfere merely because had it been the trial court it would have awarded a different amount. The appellate court can only interfere if it is shown that the trial court had acted on some wrong principles of law or had taken into consideration extraneous matters which it ought not have taken in the assessment of damages. The court may also interfere on appeal if the amount awarded was so manifestly high or so manifestly small so as to make it an erroneous estimate.
Having considered all the principles involved, I would increase the amount of the damages if the respondent had counter appealed. What I am saying is that the appellant was lucky that the learned trial judge awarded only Two Million Naira. In the circumstances of this case and having regard to the conduct of the appellant, I will not interfere to reduce the amount awarded as damages.
In the result this appeal deserves to fail and I therefore dismiss it. I award the respondents costs assessed at N7,500.00 as costs.
Other Citations: (1999)LCN/0549(CA)
