Nicotes Services Limited V. Oji Lekwuwa (2009)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
MOHAMMED LAWAL GARBA, J.C.A.
The Respondent had commenced an action vide a writ of summons issued at the High Court of Rivers State Port Harcourt (to be called High Court after now) on the 24/6/99 against the Appellant claiming the sum of Twelve Million, Four Hundred and Forty Three Thousand, Four Hundred and Forty Eight Naira only (N12,443,448.00) as special and general damages for negligence resulting in the loss or damage to goods at the Onne Warf Port Harcourt. Pleadings were filed in the case and after trial, the High Court entered judgment in favour of the Respondent on the 20/1/2000 in the following terms:-
“1. N9,443,448.00 being the total value of the 17657 1b weight of the materials stolen.
- N15,000.000 as fees paid by the plaintiff for the survey Report.
- N2 Million for loss of anticipated profit.
- N200,000.00 general damages making a total of N11,658,448.00. Interest at the rate of 21% until date of judgment and thereafter at 10% per annum until the satisfaction the judgment debt.”
Not satisfied with the above decision, the Appellant caused a Notice of Appeal dated the 2/2/02 to be filed with the leave of the court, against it. The appeal was premised on the following two (2) grounds, devoid of the particulars:-
“(1) ERROR IN LAW
The Learned Trial High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain Respondent’s suit/claim in the Court below when the said suit/claim came within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.
(2) ERROR IN LAW
The Learned trial High Court erred in law when it awarded excessive damages namely, loss of anticipated profit, general damages and interests which said interests alone had amounted to N11,425,297.04 at the date of judgment in the suit without any basis in law thereby occasioning miscarriage of justice.”
Pursuant to the requirement of practice and procedure in this court, learned counsel for the parties affected by the appeal filed briefs of argument in support of their respective positions. The Appellants brief argument was filed on the 11/3/03 but deemed filed on the 13/10/05 while the Respondent’s brief was filed on the 1/11/05. The briefs of argument were adopted and relied on by learned counsel at the hearing of the appeal on the 15/6/09 as submissions in support of the points canvassed therein.
The learned counsel for the Appellant A. N. Muoma (Mrs.) had raised two (2) issues in the Appellants’ brief which she submitted for determination in the appeal. They are:-
(a) Whether the learned trial State High court had the jurisdiction to entertain the suit which arose out of maritime transactions and in an exclusive maritime zone of a Federal port complex.
(b) Whether the DAMAGES awarded to the Respondent in the court below for loss of anticipated profit, general damages and interest were excessive.”
Deacon N. Echefu, learned counsel who settled the Respondents’ brief reformulated the Appellants issue (a) slightly and adopted issue (b). The reformulated issue is thus:-
“(a) Whether the claim in this action falls within the admiralty jurisdiction on of the Federal high Court.”
The formulation by both learned counsel is concise and precise in bringing out the actual or real grievance or complaint against the decision of the high Court as embodied in the grounds of appeal. I would use the Appellants’ issue in the determination of the appeal. Before then, however, I should state that the Appellant I had obtained leave of the court on the 15/9/08 to raise the issue of jurisdiction in the appeal, though not required in law. See KALU v. ODILI (1992) 5 NWLR (part 240) 130 at 188 where Supreme Court stated the position clearly thus:-
“The question whether a court has jurisdiction in a matter before it, is a question of law and requires no leave before an appeal can be filed against it.”
I now go to the submissions on the issues raised.
ISSUE NO.2 (A) (as indicated in the Appellants’ brief).
It was submitted for the Appellant that paragraphs 10, 15, 16 and 18 of the Respondents’ Statement of Claim are averments showing that the cause of action arose out of maritime transactions and in an exclusive maritime zone; the Onne Warf, Port Harcourt which is within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal High court. The evidence of PW1 and the Respondent was also referred to and it was argued that by virtue of section 251(1) (g) of the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Federal High Court was vested exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes or matters in respect of or arising from any admiralty jurisdiction including shipping all Federal ports and carriage by sea etc. That Federal High Court is also empowered to exercise jurisdiction in respect of criminal, matters and causes. For that reason, it was contended by learned counsel that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the Respondents suit and that jurisdiction cannot be conferred or vested on a court by consent of the parties any of whom cannot be estopped from contesting such jurisdiction. Further, that jurisdiction cannot be enlarged by estoppel and can be raised at any stage of proceedings because a decision by a court without or in excess of jurisdiction is a nullity. Among others, the cases of ADESOLA V. ABEDOYE (1999) 12 SCNJ 61 at 79, ACHIAKPA V. NDUKA (2001) 7 SCNJ 585 at 606, SPDC V. ISAIAH (2000) 5 SCNJ 218 at 230, ADISA V. OYINWOLA (2000) 2 SCNJQR 1264 at 1308 were cited on the fundamental nature and effect of the issue of jurisdiction. For the above reasons, we were invited and urged to answer the issue in the negative and hold that the High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Respondent’s suit.
The learned counsel for Respondent had submitted on the issue that the claim in the suit did not arise out of a hire of a ship and so does not fall within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as provided in section 251(1)(g) of the 1999 Constitution. According to him, though the goods in question were carried by sea, they were discharged and delivered to the Appellant who had a contact of bailment for safe custody until the Respondent took delivery. That it would be a ridiculous interpretation of section 251(1) (g) of the constitution (which was set out by counsel) to suggest that because goods were carried in a ship, any claim for damage or loss occurring after the completion of the journey by sea to the port will fall within the provisions of the section. The cases of ALUMINIUM MANUF. CO. V. N. P.A. (1987) 1 NWLR (part 51) 475 at 486-7, TEXACO OVERSEAS NIG. LTD. V. PEDMAR LTD (2002) 13 NWLR (part 785) 526 at 541 inter alia, were relied on for the submissions. It was the further submission of learned counsel that section 251(1)(g) of the Constitution is “in all pari material” with section 7 (1)(g) of the Federal High Court Act, 1990 Laws of Federation of Nigeria and that the High Court and not the Federal High Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the Respondents’ suit. All the cases cited by the learned counsel for the Appellant on the issue were said to be different, therefore irrelevant and unhelpful to the Appellant. Finally, we were urged to resolve the issue as framed for the Respondent, in the negative.
The hard bone of the contentions by the learned counsel on the issue resolves around the interpretation and application of the provisions of section 251(1) (g) of the 1999 Constitution which vest exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court over civil causes or matter in respect of or arising in any admiralty jurisdiction including shipping etc. The full provisions of the section are as follow:-
“251-(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters.
(g) Any admiralty jurisdiction, including shipping and navigation on the River Niger or River Benue and their affluent and on such other inland waterway as may be designated by any enactment to be an international waterway, all Federal ports, (including the constitution and powers of the ports authorities for Federal ports) and carriage by sea.”
Also, relevant for consideration in this appeal are the provisions of sections 1 (1)(g), (2) and 19 of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Decree No 59 of 1991, Which by virtue of the provisions of section 315 (1) (g) of the 1999 Constitution is an existing law deemed to be Act of the National Assembly. I would hereafter refer to the Decree as Decree No 59. They are as follows:-
“1 (1) The admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal High Court (in his Decree referred to as “the court)” includes the following:-
1.(1)(g) any matter arising within a Federal port or national airport and its precincts, including claims for loss or damage to goods occurring between the off-loading of goods across, space from a ship or an aircraft and their delivery at the consignee’s premises, or during storage or transportation before delivery to the consignee.
(2) The admiralty jurisdiction of the court in respect of carriage and delivery of goods extends from the time the goods are placed on board a ship for the purpose of shipping to the time the goods are delivered to the consignee or whoever is to receive them whether the goods were transported on land during the process or not.”
“19. Notwithstanding the provisions of any other enactment or law, the court shall, as from the commencement of this Decree, exercise exclusive jurisdiction in admiralty causes or matters, whether civil or criminal.”
The above provisions of both the Constitution and Decree No. 59 are clear and unambiguous in stating or setting out the Scope and extent of the admiralty jurisdiction conferred or vested exclusively in the Federal High Court over the matters or causes named therein. Before the interpretation of these provisions and their application to the facts pleaded in the Respondents’ statement of claim in order to find out if the suit falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal High Court or not, I would like to say that it is now a settled principle of law which requires no further citation of authorities that a court of law must possess or have the requisite jurisdiction in order to adjudicate in a matter. Without jurisdiction it will be an exercise in futility for a court to purport to adjudicate on a matter as was established by the Supreme Court in the locus classicus case of MADUKOLU V. NKEMDILIM (1962) 1 ALL NLR 587, (62) 2 SCNLR 341 almost half a century ago. The fundamental nature and vital effect of the issue of jurisdiction in judicial adjudication can therefore never be overemphasized since it goes to the root of the authority and powers of the court to formally take cognizance of a dispute before it and taking steps to resolve same. That is why the law requires that jurisdiction must be clearly and specifically conferred and cannot be left to assumptions or inferences. This would do as a general statement on the crucial issue of jurisdiction.
By the combined effect of the Constitutional provisions and the provisions of Decree No. 59 I set out above, it is beyond viable argument that the Federal High Court was vested with exclusive jurisdiction in civil claims and criminal matters which pertain to or arise from admiralty. For our specific purposes in this appeal, the provisions of Decree No. 59 vest such jurisdiction on the Federal High Court in matters arising within a Federal port or its precincts, including claims for loss or damage to goods occurring between the time when the goods are put on board the ship for carriage by sea and the time when the goods are delivered to the Consignee or whoever is td receive them. The storage and transportation of the goods at and from the port before delivery to the consignee are all specifically stated in the provisions to form part of the matters or issues that fall within the jurisdiction conferred therein. It is therefore quite clear that the jurisdiction conferred by the provisions cover claims for damage or loss of goods caused or occasioned during storage and transportation before actual delivery to the consignee or whosoever is to receive the goods. The facts as pleaded in statement of claim dated 24/6/99 and filed on 28/6/99 show that the Respondent had imported some goods from America by sea on board a ship and were delivered to the Appellant who kept them in the bonded warehouse within the Onne Warf, Port Harcourt. While in the warehouse and before the Respondent who was the consignee, took delivery part of the goods were stolen and/or damaged by unknown persons. As a result of the loss or damage to the goods, the Respondent instituted the action before the High Court against the Appellant.
Now without the need to waste many words, the facts giving rise to the claim in the suit filed by the Respondent against the Appellant in the High Court as contained in the statement of claim in my view, precisely fall within and accurately and perfectly fit into the realm of the civil causes or matters in the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal-High Court as provided in sections 1(1) (g) (2) and 19 of the Decree No. 59. It is my firm view that the facts are such that the provisions of the Decree No. 59 were specifically intended and deliberately enacted to vest exclulive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court in respect of all claims arising therefrom. When read and considered along with the general provisions in section 251(1) (g) of the 1999 Constitution, that position becomes even compelling. Accordingly, my finding is that the claims arising from the facts pleaded by the Respondent in the statement of claim are ones that fall within the admiralty jurisdiction vested exclusively on the Federal High Court by the combined effect of the provisions of the Constitution and Decree No. 159 set out earlier. In the circumstances, the High Court; (State, High Court) has no jurisdiction to adjudicate over such claims. See ALRAINE SHIPPING NIG. LTD. V. ENDURO AUTO CHEMICALS (2001) 2 NWLR (part 728) 759 at 771 -2 and 776. Let me quickly state that the argument by the learned counsel for the Respondent which was lifted from the observation by Obaseki, JSC in the case of ALUMINIUM MANUF. CO. V. N.PA (supra) that it amounts to a ridiculous interpretation of section 251(1)(g) of the 1999 Constitution to say that because the goods were carried in a ship and therefore any claim for damage or loss occurring after the completion of the journey by sea to the port complex occurring any where on land falls within the provision, has no potency in this appeal in view of the provisions of Decree No.59. It should also be pointed out that the laws considered and applied in the ALUMINIUM case by the Supreme Court were the provisions of section 7(1)(d) of the Federal High Court Act, 1973 and section 1(1) of the Administration of Justice Act, 1956 of England. It is common knowledge that the laws in Nigeria on jurisdiction in admiralty matters have for long now since that case, changed and developed from the positions in the aforesaid enactments. Even in the case of TEXACO V. PEDMAR (supra) also relied on by the learned counsel for the Respondent, the facts are clearly different as the claims were for debt owed by a consignee for the carriage of the goods by sea which he took delivery of at the port. The Supreme Court held that once the goods were discharged in the harbour or delivered to the point of destination of the cargo, the contract for the carriage had been concluded and the claim for the service was simply one of debt owed and not one founded on admiralty under section 230 (1)(g) of the 1979 Constitution (now section 251 (1)(g) of the 1999 Constitution).
In addition, like in the case ALUMINIUM, the provisions of Decree No. 59 set out in this judgment though raised in the submissions of the learned counsel for the Appellant in the appeal, were not considered and pronounced upon by the Supreme Court in that case. So the case resulting in the present appeal is clearly distinguishable in both facts and the law applied from the TEXACO V. PEDMAR case. What the provisions of the Decree No. 59 intended and provided for were for claims arising out of even transporting the goods from the ship at the point of discharge to warehouses within a port and storage in the warehouses before the consignee takes effective delivery. The provisions cover in clear terms all claims in respect of loss or damage to goods from the time they are loaded aboard a ship for carriage to the time the goods were offloaded from the ship at the destination and the storage if any, to the time they were declared to the consignee. The provisions have therefore gone beyond the contract for the carriage of the goods by sea in a ship to the offloading and storage before delivery to the consignee. It is therefore my respectful view that the cases of ALUMINIUM V. N.P.A and TEXACO V. PEDMAR are not applicable to the Respondent’s suit and in this appeal for the reasons stated before now. For the same reason, the cases of PETROJESSICA ENTERPRISES LTD. V. LEVENTIS TECH. CO. (1992) 5 NWLR (part 244) 675 and BAWAL SHIPPING LTD. V. ADHRODITE NIG. LTD (2004) 9 NWLR (part 879) 462 would also not be appropriate authorities for application in this appeal.
In the result, having found as I did before now, that the High Court lacks the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the Respondent’s claim, I accordingly resolved the first issue in the negative and in favour of the Appellant.
The resolution of the above issue in favour of the Appellant has automatically and fully overtaken the second issue on the award of damages and interest by the High Court. It thereby ceases to be a live issue in the appeal.
In the final result, I find merit in the appeal for the reasons given earlier and allow it. Accordingly, the decision of the High Court delivered on 20/1/2090 in suit No PHC/1252/99 is hereby set aside for lack of jurisdiction on the part of that court to adjudicate in the suit.
Since jurisdiction cannot by law be conferred by consent or submission of the parties to the court or even that the court is not aware or mistaken about the defect in jurisdiction, the proper consequential order to be made here is one stricking out the Respondents’ suit.
I hereby so order. Parties to the appeal shall bear their costs in this court.
Other Citations: (2009)LCN/3416(CA)
