Nigerian Railway Corporation V. Mr. Patrick Nwanze (2007)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
NDUKWE-ANYANWU, J.C.A.
The proceedings leading to this appeal were initiated in the High Court of Bauchi State holding at Bauchi on the 28th January 2003. In that court the respondent as plaintiff claimed against the appellant then defendant by way of originating summons and claimed the following reliefs:
“(i) An order enforcing the Fundamental Human Right of the applicant to fair hearing under the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), the African Charter on Human Rights, and 1999 Nigerian Constitution.
(ii) An order setting aside as null and void the defendant’s letter reference No. C/3297/5/1452 dated 30th August 1994 purportedly terminating the plaintiffs employment as same was done in breach of the plaintiffs fundamental Human Right to fair hearing under section 33 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 (as amended) and the African Charter on Human rights and 1999 Nigerian Constitution.
(iii) An order reinstating the plaintiff to his former employment with the defendant without prejudice to all arrears of salaries, allowances and promotion that might have accrued to him since then.”
This matter was tried on affidavit evidence. The trial Judge Hon. Justice I.M. Zango delivered his considered judgment on 15th December 2004.
The defendant now appellant being dissatisfied with the judgment appealed to this court.
The appellant filed its notice and five grounds of appeal. The appellant formulated five issues for determination namely thus:
“(1) Whether the trial Judge had jurisdiction over the appellant being a federal agency.
(2) Whether the court below did not err when it entertained the respondent’s claim by way of Fundamental Rights procedure instead of writ of summons, the action being one of master/servant relationship.
(3) Whether the affidavits are not in conflict which require oral testimony.
(4) Whether the trial court was not in error as regards master/servant relationship when it ordered the appellant to reinstate the respondent with his full entitlements, thereby forcing the respondent on the appellant.
(5) Whether the court below did not err in law and acted without jurisdiction when it entertained the respondent’s action which is statute barred.”
The respondent also formulated five issues for determination namely thus: –
“(1) Whether the respondent’s action at the trial court being one for the enforcement of a Fundamental Right was statute barred.
(2) Whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to entertain the respondent’s suit even when the appellant is a federal agency.
(3) Whether the Fundamental Rights procedure was proper, having regards to the facts of this case.
(4) Whether the trial court was right in determining the suit without recourse to oral evidence as it did.
(5) Whether the trial court was right in making consequential orders reinstating the respondent to his employment with the appellant having regards to the circumstances of this case.”
The issues formulated by both parties are fundamentally the same. The learned appellant’s counsel muddled up his issues starting with issue five. I believe that the issues ought to be formulated with the primary issues first and the secondary ones next in line. If there is an issue on jurisdiction it ought to be issue NO.1 before any other issue is treated.
However I have treated issues bordering on jurisdiction first. If the court holds that the trial court lacks jurisdiction all the other issues would naturally fail.
Running through the issues for determination, three issues border on jurisdiction of the trial court to entertain the suit, the subject matter of this appeal.
In the determination of any matter before a court of law, the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental, for it is the foundation and pivot of adjudication. Where it is absent, the whole matter collapses and fails. Where a court lacks jurisdiction, it becomes incompetent to try the case.
In determining whether a court is competent to determine a matter that is brought before it, the following must be present:o the number and qualification of its membership;
(b) The subject matter of the action must be within its jurisdiction
(a) The court must be properly constituted with respect to jurisdiction;
(c) The action must be initiated by the due process of law; and
(d) Any action necessary to the exercise of its jurisdiction must have been fulfilled. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341. Ogunmokun v. Military Administrator, Osun State (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 594) Page 261.
The appellant in its issues for determination asked; ‘whether the trial Judge had jurisdiction over the appellant being a federal agency’
The plaintiff/respondent is an employee of Nigerian Railway Corporation. See Nigerian Railway Corporation Act Cap. 323, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. The preamble states:
“An Act to provide for the establishment of a corporation to be known as the Nigerian Railway Corporation, for the transfer to the Corporation of the Railway undertaking of the Government of the Federation, for the functions of the Corporation, and for the purposes connected with the matters aforesaid.”
The defendant/appellant is Nigerian Railway Corporation. The name alone should put any court on the enquiry. Is this Federal Government or one of its agencies or one of its organs?
In construing section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution, two important matters arise. They are the parties in the litigation as well as the subject matter of the litigation. The court must consider both.
In construing the parties, the court will have no difficulty in identifying the Federal Government, but it may have some difficulties in identifying an agency of the Federal Government in certain matters. See NEPA v. Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR (Pt. 798) page 79. However in Nigeria, private individuals are not allowed to use Nigeria in registering any company. This presupposes invariably that any name with Nigeria puts any court on the enquiry i.e. that Company or Corporation must be a Federal Government Organ or Agency.
From a plethora of cases, it has been held by the Supreme Court that it is only the Federal High Court that has exclusive jurisdiction in matters relating to the revenue of the Government of the Federation or any organ thereof. See NEPA v. Adegbero (supra).
Furthermore, for the Federal High Court to have exclusive jurisdiction, the matter must be a civil matter arising from the administration, management and control of the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
Finally, the matter must arise from any action or proceedings for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government; or any of its agencies. In the instant case the appellant is an agency of the Federal Government. See Warri Refinery and Petrochemical Company Ltd. v. Benson O. Agbuje (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 917) page 63; NEPA v. Adegbeno (supra).
In F.H.A v. John Shoy International Ltd. (2005) 1 NWLR (Pt.908) page 637 the Court of Appeal held that –
“A careful reading of paragraphs (q), (r) and (s) of section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution and the proviso thereto reveal that the intention of the Lawmakers was to take away the jurisdiction of the State High Court and High Court of the Federal Capital Territory and confer same exclusively on the Federal High Court, in actions in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party. A State High Court or the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory would no longer have jurisdiction in such matters notwithstanding the nature of the claim in the action.”
See Ayeni v. University of Ilorin (2000) 2 NWLR (Pt. 644) Page 290; NEPA v. Adegbero (supra).
In the instant case, the court should have taken a serious look at the parties amongst other things to determine whether it had jurisdiction to adjudicate on this matter. Clearly, the defendant is a Federal Government Agency without more. Nigeria Railway Corporation is definitely an agency of the Federal Government and as such the High Court of Bauchi State had no jurisdiction to deal with this matter concerning a Federal Government Agency i.e. Nigerian Railway Corporation as a defendant.
From the foregoing, I hold that the Bauchi State High Court had no jurisdiction to try this matter with the Nigerian Railway Corporation as a defendant.
Coming to the issue “whether the court below did not err in law and act without jurisdiction when it entertained the respondent’s action which is statute barred. ”
The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the respondent’s action is statute barred.
The appellant by a letter dated 30th August, 1994 exhibit C retired the respondent from service. The respondent became aware of this letter on 26th September 1994 when he received and signed for it.
The cause of action arose when the respondent became aware of exhibit C on 26th September, 1994. The respondent commenced this action in the High Court of Bauchi State on 28th January, 2003.
Eight clear years after the cause of action accrued. See Samson Owie v. Solomon Ighiwi (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 917) page 184; Jallco Ltd. v. Owoniboys Techinical Services Ltd. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 391) page 534; Fadare v. A.-G., Oyo State (1982) 4 SC 1; Odubeko v. Fowler (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 308) page 637.
The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that section 83(1) of the Nigerian Railway Corporation Act, Cap. 323, (1990) Laws of the Federation of Nigeria stated that an action can only be brought within twelve (12) months from the date the cause of action accrued.
Also submitted further that the defence of Limitation Law relates to competence and jurisdiction of a court which can be raised at any time. See Management Enterprises Ltd. v. Otusanya (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 55) page 179; Owei v. Ighini (supra).
Section 83(1) of the Nigerian Railway Corporation Act Cap. 323, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria is a condition precedent for the commencement of an action against Nigerian Railway Corporation.
This condition precedent foists jurisdiction on the court. See Fayemi v. Local Government Service Commission Oyo State (supra).
Learned counsel urged the court to hold that the action was statute barred as at 28th January, 2003 when it was commenced. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the cause of action was one for the enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights as protected by section 36 of the 1999 Constitution.
The respondent’s counsel submits that the appellant sought leave for an extension of time under Order 1 rule 3(I) of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979. The court granted the respondent an extension of time which was not appealed against by the appellant. Learned counsel insists that the action is not statute barred as an extension of time was granted for the enforcement of the respondent’s fundamental rights.
Counsel urged the court to hold that the respondent’s action was not statute barred time having been extended by order of the trial court.
The cause of action in this case accrued on the 26th September, 1994 when the respondent became aware of exhibit C dated 30th August, 1994. See Owie v. Ighiwi (supra) where Edozie, JSC (as he then was) stated
“the accrual of a cause of action is the event whereby a cause of action becomes complete so that the aggrieved party can begin to maintain his action.” See Odubeko v. Fowler (1993) 7 NWLR (Pt. 308) page 637.
In civil matters like this “time begins to run for the purpose of limitation law when the cause of action arose; that is when there is in existence a person who can sue and another who can be sued and when all the facts have happened which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed.”
See Jallco Ltd. v. Owoniboys Tech. Services Ltd. (1995) 4 NWLR (Pt. 391) page 534.
Limitation legislation sets out limitation periods for different classes of cases. This invariably means that certain classes of action shall not be brought after a period of time from the date the cause of action accrued.
Section 83(1) of the Nigerian Railway Corporation Act states-
“(1) No suit against the Corporation or any servant of the Corporation for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act or Law, or of any public duty or authority, or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of such Act or Law, duty or authority, shall lie or be instituted in any court unless it is commenced within twelve months next after the act, neglect or default complained of or, in the case of a continuance of damage or injury, within twelve months next after the ceasing thereof:
Provided that, in the case of a claim for a refund of an overcharge in respect of goods accepted by the Corporation for carriage, or for compensation in respect of loss, damage, deviation, misdelivery, delay or detention of or to any goods so accepted, the cause of action shall be deemed to have arisen on the day of such acceptance.”
Twelve (12) months is the stipulated period for an action to be commenced against Nigerian Railway Corporation. In the instant case, the respondent waited for over eight years before commencing this action. As stated in the case of Sanni v. Okene Local Government (2005) 14 NWLR (Pt. 944) page 60.
“The main purpose of the limitation period is to protect defendant from the injustice of having to face a stale claim.”
The reason behind the Limitation Law is to give a time frame within which an aggrieved plaintiff can commence his action. When claims are stale, the evidence is also stale. Sometimes causes of action are overtaken by prevailing circumstances. In the case of a big corporation like the Railways, officers who are conversant with the facts might have been transferred or retired and sometimes memories of witness would have faded.
Limitation Law is to guard against stale claims which become an inconvenience to the defendant. Outside the limitation period the plaintiff still has a cause of action that unfortunately cannot be enforced any longer.
In this case the plaintiff/respondent commenced this action by way of originating summons on the 28th of January, 2003. The cause of action arose on the 26th September, 1994. The time the cause of action accrued and the time this case was commenced was clearly over eight (8) years. This is definitely beyond the limitation period envisaged by section 83(1) Nigerian Railway Corporation Act Cap 323 LFN. See Egbe v. Adefarasin (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt. 3) page 549; Eboigbe v. N.N.P.C. (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 347) page 649. Utih v. Egorr (1990) 5 NWLR (pt. 153) page 771.
Section 18 Limitation Law of Bauchi State also stipulates a period of 5 years limitation period. If the High Court Bauchi had jurisdiction over this case it would have been statute barred also.
The learned trial Judge had no jurisdiction to enlarge time within which the plaintiff/respondent could bring his originating summons for the enforcement of fundamental right.
The principal issue in this suit is wrongful termination of employment. The learned counsel for the respondent cannot succeed in hoodwinking this court to believe that the Fundamental Rights of the plaintiff/respondent is the principal issue.
It was indeed wrong for this suit to have been commenced by way of originating summons. This action is definitely hostile and commencement of this suit by originating summons was clearly inappropriate.
This action is principally for wrongful termination or retirement, fundamental rights are just the accessories. See Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (1989) 4 NWLR (Pt. 117) page, 517 where it was held inter alia.
“if a party’s primary right and or obligations are transgressed without a fair hearing, then he can apply to the court. There ought to be a primary wrong arising from a breach of a primary right before the party wronged can apply to the court for a relief on the ground that in the determination of his civil rights and obligations he was denied a fair hearing.”
The Bauchi State High Court definitely does not have jurisdiction to entertain matters pertaining to the Federal Government or its agencies. See section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution. The Bauchi High Court cannot deal with the fundamental rights which is incidental to the principal issue of wrongful termination of appointment by Nigerian Railway Corporation “Accessorium non ducit sed seguitur suum principale i.e. “That which is the assessory or incident does not lead but follows its principal per Oputa, JSC (as he then was) in Tukur v. Governor of Gongola State (supra).
From the foregoing, it is clear that the High Court of Bauchi State does not have jurisdiction to try a matter concerning the Federal Government or its agency. Nigerian Railway Corporation is an agency of the Federal Government and therefore the High Court of Bauchi lacks jurisdiction as per the parties to the action i.e. Nigerian Railway Corporation.
I hold that the High Court Bauchi State also lacked jurisdiction as the suit was statute barred, the cause of action having accrued over eight (8) years prior to the commencement of this action.
See section 83(1) of the Nigerian Railway Corporation Act, Cap. 323, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria where it stipulates a period of twelve (12) months.
I do not intend to consider the other issues as formulated by both parties as the High Court of Bauchi State had no jurisdiction to try this suit.
I therefore allow the appeal of the appellant. I make no orders as to cost.
Other Citations: (2007)LCN/2364(CA)
