Ohene Djan & Anor V. The Queen (1954) LJR-WACA

LawGlobal Hub Judgment Report – West Africa Court of Appeal

Criminal Law—Accomplices—Witnesses treated by Court as accomplices—Corroboration—Conviction on evidence of accomplices.

Facts

“Corroboration must be independent testimony which affects the accused by
connecting or tending to connect him with the crime.

In other words, it must be evidence which implicates him, that is, which confirms in some material particular not only that the crime has been committed, but also that the prisoner committed it per Lord Reading, C.J., in Rex v. Baskerville, 1916, 2 K.B., at p. 667.

The appellants were convicted of corruption as public officers; both were Ministerial Secretaries and the first was also Chairman of the Central Tender Board. They demanded and received a cheque from A., a member of a firm of contractors, and a promise of a percentage on contracts awarded to the firm, in return for which they offered to be influenced as members of the Board.

A. and K.A., both of Kumasi, gave evidence that they came to Accra and following an arrangement between K.A. and the second appellant, visited the house of the first appellant on a Saturday for K.A. to introduce A. as a good contractor, and the two appellants asked A. for a “ drink ” of £150 in the shape of a cheque for “ cash ”, which the second appellant came for later on that Saturday, after which A. and K.A. left for Kumasi. And one B., a provision merchant, testified that on the following Monday someone brought the cheque to him with a note from the first appellant asking for provisions and the balance to be given to the bearer in cash.

The appellants gave evidence to the effect that K.A. on the Saturday was anxious to get money on a Kumasi cheque for £150, that the second appellant took K.A. to the first appellant, who suggested B., the merchant, but remembering he had boxing money in hand gave the £150 on the second appellant’s guarantee for repayment on Monday, on which day K.A. came with £150 and took the cheque. The appellants also testified that A. and K.A. came on Sunday, when K.A. asked that A. be helped to get Government contracts, but was told that no help could be given; and they denied asking for £150 or percentages.

The trial Judge disbelieved the appellants and believed the witnesses A. and K.A. He regarded them as accomplices, but having accepted the evidence of B., into whose hands the cheque came on the Monday and was paid into his bank account that day, regarded it as corroboration not only against the first appellant, but also against the second as the accomplices’ evidence was that it was the second who came to them for the cheque.

There was, besides, the evidence of a police officer that he asked the first appellant whether he had passed the cheque of £150 through the merchant B. and that the first appellant said, ” I would not be surprised if I did. ” The trial Judge believed that officer.

No contract was given to A. though his firm put in tenders. His friend K.A. wrote to the second appellant to complain and mentioned the £150. The second appellant did nothing to repudiate it.

The trial Judge, after warning the assessors in his summing-up as to the danger of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice, said in his judgment that he believed both A. and K.A.

The argument on appeal was confined to the question whether the evidence of B. was adequate corroboration against either appellant.

Held

(1) B.’s evidence, which was believed, that the cheque came to him with a note in the handwriting of the first appellant was corroboration of the accomplices, whose version was fortified by the untruthfulness of the first appellant in regard to the cheque, and B.’s evidence was fortified by what the first appellant said to the police officer.

(2) The second appellant was closely connected with the transaction and as the appellants’ version was untrue about the cheque, the cashing of it by the first appellant also weighed against the second, whose failure to repudiate the accusatory letter from K.A. afforded further corroboration.

Obiter: The conviction would have been proper if based on the evidence of the accomplices only as they were believed after due warning as to the danger of convicting on their evidence alone.

(Editor’s Note: According to the London Times an application for special leave to appeal was refused by the Privy Council on 15th November, 1954.)

Appeals dismissed.