Oladele Funsho Oladipo V. Nigeria Customs Service Board (2009)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
CHIMA CENTUS NWEZE, J.C.A.
It is very worrisome that thirty six years after its creation, the determination of the question of the precise ambit of the substantive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court has continued to excite curious reactions and provoke divergent interpretations.
The chequered movement of this case exemplifies the odd consequence of this state of affairs. Whereas the Federal High Court holden at Ilorin declined the invitation to adjudicate on the matter on the ground that it lacked the jurisdiction to do so, the State High Court equally chased the plaintiff away from the temple of justice, pleading the same want of jurisdiction.
The effect is that the appellant, like the bat which is neither a bird nor a mammal, has been unable to ventilate his grievance in either of the courts since 2002 when he took out his writ of summons. This speaks ill of our jurisprudence.
The plaintiff, a registered Estate Surveyor and Valuer, sued the Nigeria Customs Services, a Federal Government agency, at the Federal High Court, Ilorin. For their bearing on the question of the appropriate forum for the determination of the matter, we shall take liberty to set out the crucial averments in the Statement of Claim dated April 5, 2002. Specifically, we shall set out the averments in paragraphs 3, 6, 10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 and the reliefs sought:
- The Kwara State Land Use and Allocation Committee of the Ministry of Lands and Housing allocated Plot No. 18 G. T. T. S. Road, Adewole Housing Estate, ILorin to the plaintiff…
- The plaintiff on 14th December, 1998, visited his plot at No 18 G. T. T. S. Road, Adewole Housing Estate, Ilorin and discovered that the Customs Services, Kwara State Command, had encroached on his land by seven metres.
- Following the plaintiff (sic) complaint the Secretary to the State Government wrote a letter to the Controller of Customs for Kwara State on 6th July, 1999, asking the defendant to readjust the wall fence by limiting it to the defendant’s boundary…
- The Ministry of Lands and Housing again on 30th November, 1999, wrote another letter to the defendant asking it to remove the wall fence which constitute (sic) an encroachment on the plaintiff (sic) land…
- Despite all these letters the defendant has refused to remove its wall fence thereby disturbing the plaintiff from constructing his wall fence at the side where the encroachment took place.
- The plaintiff had planned to fence his land in December 1998 but could not do so because of the refusal of the defendant to remove it is (sic) wall fence erected on the plaintiff’s land.
- The plaintiff up till now could not construct his own fence to demarcate his own land so as to start his project on site.
- As a result of this undue and unwarranted delay caused by the defendant the plaintiff had and has continue (sic) to suffer loss. Whereof the plaintiff’s claim from the defendant are (sic):
(a) A declaration that the defendant trespass (sic) on the plaintiff (sic) land at plot No 18 G. T. T. S. Adewole Housing Estate, Ilorin by erecting a fence wall on the plaintiff’s land and outside the boundary between the plaintiff and the defendant.
(b) An order that the defendant should remove the said fence and abate further encroachment.
(c) N72,756.00 special damages for the delay in removing the fence despite persistent demand and warning by the plaintiff and Ministry of Lands and Housing
(d) N10, 000. 00 as general damages
(e) Injunction restraining the defendant its servants, agents or any of them from committing further acts of trespass on the plaintiff’s land…
Against the background of these averments, the Federal High Court raised the question of jurisdiction suo motu. It called for addresses on the question. The parties duly addressed it. The court was not persuaded that it had the jurisdiction to entertain the matter; hence, it struck it out. It gratuitously advised the plaintiff to approach the State High Court.
The plaintiff hearkened to the court’s advice: he filed this action at the State High Court. The learned trial Judge, Elelu-Habeeb J equally implored counsel to address the court on the jurisdiction of the State High Court to entertain the matter. They did. In its ruling of March 20, 2004 [about five years ago!], the court voiced its disavowal of the plaintiff’s approach to the State High Court thus:
I am of the view that the proper court that has jurisdiction to adjudicate over this matter is the Federal High Court sitting at Ilorin.
More especially as the claim of the plaintiff is one seeking for a declaration and an injunction against the defendant which there is no dispute over her being an agency of the Federal Government of Nigeria.
[page 38 of the record]
Dissatisfied with the court’s ruling, the plaintiff appealed to this court entreating it to determine the following questions:
- Whether the trial Court was right in holding that it has no jurisdiction over this suit by virtue of section 251 (1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Grounds 1& 2).
- Whether the trial Court (sic) failure to consider and distinguished (sic) the two decided cases cited before it by the learned Counsel to the appellant with the case of NEPA VS. EDEGBERO & 12 ORS (2002 12 S.C. 119 has not occasioned a miscarriage of Justice against the Appellant (Grounds 3 & 4).
The respondent identified the issue for determination thus:
Whether the lower Court was right when it held that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit by virtue of the provisions of Section 251 (1), CFRN, 1999 in the light of the claims endorsed on the writ of summons and statement of claim before it.
I take the view that against the background of the gravamen of the appellant’s main complaint in the grounds of appeal, the sole issue identified by the respondent will suffice for the determination of this appeal. I shall, therefore, adopt that sole issue as the only question for determination here. For the avoidance of doubt, the issue is:
Whether the lower court was right when it held that it lacked the jurisdiction to entertain the suit by virtue of the provisions of section 251 (1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 in the light of the claims endorsed on the writ of summons and statement of claim before it.
The parties filed and exchanged briefs of argument which were adopted at the hearing. For the appellant, it was argued that in determining whether the State High Court had the jurisdiction in the matter two important matters had to be considered: first, the parties before the court and secondly, the subject matter of the litigation. Counsel argued that the trial court was required to consider both questions in deciding whether it had jurisdiction over the matter or not, citing NEPA v. Edegbero (2002) 12 S.C. (pt.11) 119.
On the first issue, counsel noted that there is no doubt that the defendant is an agency of the Federal Government since it is the body responsible for the management of item 16 of the exclusive legislative list in the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
He maintained that the plaintiff’s claims are for declaration, injunction and damages, all based on the defendant’s trespass on the plaintiff’s land. Counsel observed that from a perusal of Decree No. 107 of 1993, which was reenacted in section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution, it would be apparent that the section set out matters under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.
Thus, trespass to land simpliciter, such as the appellant was alleging at the lower court, is not included in the sub-section. On the other hand, it falls within the residual jurisdiction of the State High Court pursuant to section 272(1) of the 1999 Constitution. He urged the court to resolve this issue in favour of the appellant and to set aside the ruling of the lower court.
Learned counsel for the respondent canvassed the view that the reliefs set out above put the suit squarely within the ambit of section 251 (1) of the Constitution. In effect, the lower court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate over the matter, citing Minister of Works & Housing v. Shittu (2007) 16 NWLR (pt 1060) 351, 376-377 paragraphs G- A. Counsel further placed reliance on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the provisions of section 251 (1) (p) (q) and (r) of the 1999 Constitution in Obi v. INEC (2007) 45 WRN 1, 127-128, lines 45 – 25. He urged the court to discountenance the appellant’s argument that the claims were based on trespass to land simpliciter, thus falling within the residual jurisdiction of state High Courts.
He invited the court to place reliance on Minister of Works & Housing v. Shittu (2007) 16 NWLR (pt 1060) 351, 374-375 paragraphs F-B and Ansa v. R.T.P.CN. (2008) ALL FWLR (pt.405) 1681, 1703-1704, paragraphs H-A.
CONSIDERATION OF THE ARGUMENTS
The prototype enactment that spelt out the substantive jurisdiction of what is now known as the Federal High Court was the Federal Revenue Court Act No. 13 of 1973. Somewhat, enigmatically, ever since the evolution of that court as a superior court of record in Nigeria, that is, for about thirty six years now, the determination of the question of its substantive jurisdiction has been enveloped in a web of recondity.
Prior to the inauguration of the 1999 Constitution, the determination of the precise extent of the court’s jurisdiction had become such a heady and exciting question that it provoked a handful of forensic contests, see, C. C. Nweze, “Jurisdiction of the State High Court”, in E. Azinge (ed), Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction (Abuja: Oliz Publisher, 2005) 85, 90, citing Jammal Steel Structures Ltd v ACB Ltd (1973) 11 SC 77; Bronik Motors Ltd and Anor v Wema Bank Ltd (1993) 6 SC1; American International v Ceekay (1981) 5 SC 81; Savannah Bank v Pan-Atlantic Shipping Transport Shipping Agencies (1987) 1 SCNJ 88 etc.
Expectedly, these developments elicited engaging responses from jurists: A. G. Karibi-Whyte, The Federal High Court: Law and Practice (Enugu: FOP. 1986); A. Emiola, “Implication and Complications of Federal High Court (Amendment) Decree 1991”, in Oct- Dec 1992 Jus. 1; M. B. Belgore, “The Parallel System of Federal and State High Courts in a Federation”, in Nigerian Law and Practice Journal 1997, 86; Y. Fashakin, “Jurisdictional Limitation of the Federal High Court in Banker/Customer Relationship”, in Modern Practice Journal of Finance and Investment Law Vol. 7 Nos. 1-2, 2003, 231, 234; O. K. Edu and I. Ehighelua, “Revisiting the Issues arising from the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in the Banker/Customer Relationship: Sam Fam Financiers Ltd v. Charles Aina (2003) FWLR (pt 159) 1482”, in The Constitution Vol. 4 NO.3 Sept. 2004, 49; P. C. Okorie, “Extent of the Jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in Fundamental Human Rights Casesin Nigeria: A Review of the Supreme Court Decision in Grace Jack v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi …”, in Nigerian Bar Journal Vol. 2, 2004, 241 etc. The authoritative books of Justice Obande Ogbuinya, Understanding The Concept of Jurisdiction in the Nigerian Legal System (Enugu: Snaap Press Ltd, 2008) 290- 333 and S. T. Hon. Civil Procedure in Nigeria (Volume 1) (Port Harcourt: Pearl Publishers, 2008) 357-384 have also dealt admirably with the problematic of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.
Decree No 107 of 1993 introduced the most radical innovation into the question of the substantive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court: it divested State High Courts of jurisdiction over matters involving the Federal Government and its agencies. Section 251 (1) (p) (q) (r) of the 1999 Constitution perpetuated this divestiture. As I observed elsewhere, somewhat curiously, the inelegant phraseology of most of the provisions of that section [section 251] unwittingly afforded occasion for broadening the frontiers of the already existing hermeneutic divergences, see, C. C. Nweze, “Jurisdiction of the State High Court”, in E. Azinge (ed), (supra) 101.
Such were the divergent judicial reactions to the correct interpretation of this radical element in the above section that this court was forced to point to the “frenzy of doctrinal debates …in the Law Reports over the scope of the additional powers conferred on the Federal High Court …”, see, Achebe v Nwosu (2002) FWLR (pt 106) 1000, per Olagunju JCA (of the blessed memory).
True, indeed, the doctrinal debates polarised judicial attitudes in this regard. On the one hand, some decisions interpreted the provisions as ousting the jurisdiction of the State High Court once a Federal agency was a party.
Such agencies include: the Central Bank of Nigeria, Ali v CBN (1997) 4 NWLR (pt 498) 192; the Independent National Electoral Commission, Onyenucheya v. Military Administrator, Imo State (1997) 1 NWLR (pt 482) 429; Federal Universities, University of Abuja v Ologe (1996) 4 NWLR (pt 445) 206; University of Ilorin Teaching Hospital v. Akilo (2001) 4 NWLR (203) 246; National Youth Service Corps, Adah v. NYSC (2004) 13 NWLR (pt 891) 639 etc.
The other line of cases rested their reasoning on the logic that it was the subject matter of the suit that determined the proper forum. Hence, the law maker never intended that State High Courts must, like Pontus Pilate, wash off their hands each time an agency of the Federal Government was brought before them, Omosowan v. Chiedozie (1998) 9 NWLR (pt 566) 477; Okoroma v UBA (1999) 1 NWLR (pt 587) 359.
In NEPA v Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR (pt 798) 79, the Supreme Court considerably illuminated the foggy jurisdictional landscape in section 251 (1), yet the categories of vexed or heady issues in the section were not closed.
As shown above, counsel for the respondent took the view that the reliefs set out above put the suit squarely within the ambit of section 251 (r) of the Constitution. In effect, the lower court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate over the matter, citing Minister of Works & Housing v. Shittu (2007) 16 NWLR (pt 1060) 351, 376-377 paragraphs. G- A. That provision, which is the only one relevant in this case, reads thus:
251 (1) notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters-
(r) any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal Government or any of its agencies.
So, does the plaintiff’s suit come within the matters exclusively reserved for the Federal High Court in section 251 (1) (r) above such that the lower court had no jurisdiction as claimed by the respondent’s counsel?
We had earlier set out the crucial averments in the Statement of Claim. The gist of his grouse against the respondent is that it encroached on his land. Indeed, all pleas to the defendant to remove its fence which constitutes encroachment on the plaintiff’s land have been rebuffed by the defendant.
This prompted the claim for a declaration against the defendant for trespassing on the plaintiff’s land “by erecting a fence wall on the plaintiff’s land and outside the boundary between the plaintiff and the defendant ….” [paragraph 21 (a) of the Statement of Claim).
Although the plaintiff claimed both declaratory and injunctive reliefs against the defendant, the question is: in what way does his action for declaration and injunction affect the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the defendant, a federal agency?
Before we return to this question, we must first return to the implication of the drafting technique in section 251 (supra). The point must be noted that the draftsman of that section painstakingly itemised the subject matters that fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.
In all, that section vested exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court in eighteen major items, see, per Tobi JSC in Olutola v. UNILORIN (2004) 18 NWLR (pt 905) 416, 462.
The implication of this technique is that the said court [Federal High Court) is actually a court of enumerated jurisdiction, that is, a court whose jurisdiction is not only delimited by statute but whose jurisdiction is delineated in relation only to the subject matters enumerated therein.
It would, therefore, amount to wreaking havoc on the express letters and intendment of the said section 251 to construe it as granting the said court a carte blanche to deal with every conceivable matter [that is, beyond those expressly enumerated above] that relates to a federal agency. This cannot be so.
The effect of the circumscription of the jurisdiction of the court to those eighteen major items is that whenever the question of the jurisdiction of the court is canvassed, attention ought to be focused on the subject matter of the suit. If the subject matter of the suit cannot be pitch forked into any of those eighteen major items, then that court is not the proper forum for the ventilation of the action.
Authority for this proposition can be found in Onuorah v K. R. P. Co Ltd (2005) 16 WRN 1. A t page 18, Edozie JSC (as he then was) explained that:
A careful perusal of section 230 (1) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree No. 107 of 1993 [now re-enacted in section 251 of the 1999 Constitution] which set out matters under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court show clearly that action for breach of contract simpliciter such as the plaintiff’s claim is not included in the subsection rather, it falls within the residual jurisdiction of the State High Court …
[italics supplied]
In this case, the plaintiff’s action was anchored on trespass, that is, the allegation was that the defendant unjustifiably interfered with the land in his possession: a land in his possession by virtue of the allocation of Plot No. 18 G. T. T. S. Road, Adewole Housing Estate, Ilorin to him.
Now, in what way does the plaintiff’s action on trespass for declaration and injunction affect the validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the defendant, a federal agency?
I take the view that the phrase “executive or administrative action” as employed in section 251 (1) (r) must have a direct relationship with the management and administration of the agency concerned. Hence, an executive action must be an action concerned with, or relating to the effectuation of the orders or plans or policies of the agency in question. Equally, an administrative action must be an action directed towards carrying out the policy of the agency.
Put simply, therefore, paragraph (r ) (supra) simply confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court where an action or proceeding is for a declaration or injunction which is likely to affect the validity of an action concerned with, or relating to the effectuation of the orders or plans or policies of a federal agency or the validity of any action directed towards carrying out the policy of such an agency.
In answer to the question, therefore, I take the view that the respondent misconstrued the meaning of that section [paragraph r]. To be able to rob the State High Court of jurisdiction over that action for trespass, it had a duty to show that the action on trespass for declaratory and injunctive reliefs was one which was likely to affect the validity of its action concerned with, or relating to, the effectuation of the orders, plans or policies or the validity of any of its actions directed towards carrying out its policies.
This is not the position in this case. On the other hand, I do not see how the action for declaratory and injunctive reliefs for the alleged trespassory acts of “erecting a fence wall on the plaintiff’s land and outside the boundary between the plaintiff and the defendant” can affect the validity of the respondent’s action concerned with, or relating to, the effectuation of its orders, plans or policies or the validity of any of its actions directed towards carrying out its policies to warrant the deprivation of the State High Court of the jurisdiction over this matter that orbits around the canvass of the determination of the precise dimensions of the plot of land which the Land Use and Allocation Committee allocated to the appellant.
The respondent’s case is not that there is a policy decision by the Nigerian Customs Service to enter into parcels of land which are adjacent to their offices wherever they may be located. In such a situation, the question of the proper forum for the determination of the question of the validity of such an executive or policy decision of the respondent will no doubt arise.
The sum total of what I am saying is that notwithstanding that the respondent [Nigeria Customs Service] is admittedly a federal agency, and so ordinarily comes under the jurisdiction ratione personae of the Federal High Court, the subject matter of the suit, not being one of the eighteen matters in section 251 (supra), is outside the jurisdiction ratione materiae or subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. In effect, the lower court was wrong in chasing away the appellant from its hallowed temple.
This brings me to the question whether the lower court took the pains to consider the claim of the plaintiff/appellant before driving him away from the throne of justice. Indeed, it would appear that the lower court, simply, glossed over the timely prescription of Katsina-Alu in Osun State Government v. Dalami (NIG) Ltd (2007) All FWLR (pt 365) 438 that:
The guide in the determination of jurisdiction of a Court is the subject matter of the claim as endorsed in the writ of summons. It is a fundamental principle of law that is the claim of the plaintiff that determines the jurisdiction of the Court which entertains the claim.
Consistent with this authority, what the court was required to do was to consider the subject matter of the plaintiff’s claim. By paragraph 21 (a) of the Statement of Claim, the claim was that the defendant trespassed on the plaintiff’s land “by erecting a fence wall on the plaintiff’s land and outside the boundary between the plaintiff and the defendant. …”
Now, in my leading judgment in Appeal No CA/IL/17/08: Fatoyimbo v. Osadeyi, I explained that trespass to land is a wrongful entry into the land in actual or constructive possession of another, Olaniyan v Fatoki (2003) 13 NWLR (pt 837) 273, 286. A person who is not in possession cannot sue in trespass, Akibu v Azeez (2003) 5 NWLR (pt. 814) 643, 670.
I equally noted that trespass is rooted or based on exclusive possession or right to possession, Unakamba v Nze (2002) 28 WRN 53, 64. As such any unlawful interference with the possession, however slight, amounts to trespass, Oyebanji v. Fabiyi (2003) 12 NWLR (pt 834) 271, 302; Dantosho v Mohammed (2003) 6 NWLR (pt 817) 457, 488. Being rooted in exclusive possession, all a plaintiff needs to prove is that he has exclusive possession or that he has the right to such possession of the land in dispute, Oyebanji v Fabiyi (supra) 290; Amakor v Obiefuna (1974) NMLR 331.
I, equally, explained that the tort of trespass is so inextricably tied to possession that a person in possession of land even as a trespasser can sue another person who thereafter comes upon the land. In other words, a person who has no title over a piece of land but who is in possession may successfully sue for trespass if an entry is made into the land without his consent. Olaniyan v Fataki (supra) p. 286; Olowolagba v Bakare (1998) 3 N W L R(pt 543) 528.
However, such a person cannot proceed against the owner or someone who shows some title which gives him a better right to be on the land, Aromire v Awoyemi (1972) 2 S C 182; Tumo v Murana (2000) 12 (N W L R) pt 681, 370; Eze v Atasie (2000) 9 WRN 73, 83.
This is the crux of a claim in trespass and that is why the lower court ought to have considered the claim as expressed in the Statement of Claim. In paragraph 3, the appellant, as plaintiff, averred that:
- The Kwara State Land Use and Allocation Committee of the Ministry of Lands and Housing allocated Plot No. 18 G. T. T. S. Road, Adewole Housing Estate, Ilorin to the plaintiff…
Clearly, this averment threw up the question whether the plaintiff had any title which gave him a better right to the excusive possession of the said plot. Put differently, the above averments in paragraph 3, just like those in paragraphs 6, 10, 12, 13, 15 etc, formed the fulcra of the facts-in-issue or the pivotal materials which the plaintiff must establish in order to show that it could maintain an action in trespass against the respondent.
Above all, if the lower court had painstakingly considered the above averments, it would have been obvious to it that the proof of the averment in paragraph 3, for example, would involve the issue of entitlement to the right of occupancy over the said plot 18, G. T. T. S. Road, Adewole Housing Estate, Ilorin. Was the lower court not entitled to take judicial notice that Plot No. 18 G. T. T. S. Road, Adewole Housing Estate, Ilorin is within the Ilorin urban area under the Urban Area Designation enactment?
Quite apart from the fact the subject matter is not one of those enumerated in section 251 (supra), the lower court, if it had considered the claim, would have found out that from the plaintiff’s said claim only the court vested with the jurisdiction to deal with matters in section 39 of the Land Use Act, 1978 could take cognizance of the plaintiff’s claim. That is, that only the court which has the exclusive original jurisdiction to determine the issue of title to land in an urban area, could deal with the case, Erhunmwunse v. Ehanire (2003) 30 WRN 126, 143- 144.
Surely, the question of the plaintiff’s exclusive possession of plot 18, G. T. T. S. Road, Adewole Housing Estate, Ilorin or the right to such possession of the said plot of land: the very pivot of the plaintiff’s claim in trespass Oyebanji v Fabiyi (supra); Amakor v. Obiefuna (supra) is not one of the items enumerated, and thus, exclusively reserved for the Federal High Court under section 251 (1) (supra). Indeed, by express proclamation in section 39 of the Land Use Act the only court which could competently resolve this question is the lower court that is, the High Court of Kwara State). I am in complete agreement with the reasoning of Olagunju JCA (as he then was) on this matter in Achebe v Nwosu (2002) FWLR (pt 106) 1000, 1921.
In that case, the Federal High Court, holden at Enugu, assumed jurisdiction in respect of an action for declaration of title to land. Olagunju JCA (now of the Blessed Memory), on appeal, held inter alia:
Sections 39 and 41 of the Land Use Act have donated the courts that are vested with jurisdiction to entertain actions in land matters which do not include the Federal High Court. This point has been settled beyond any par adventure by the Supreme Court in its decision in Adisa v Oyiwolo, in which the courts established by the States enumerated in sections 39 and 41 of the Land Use Act, which do not include the Federal High Court, are the only ones courts in Nigeria vested with original jurisdiction over land matters
[Achebe v Nwosu (2002) FWLR (pt.106) 1000, 1020, 1021]
Having said this, it remains to be added that I am not unmindful of the position which this court took in Ansa v The Registered Trustees of the Presbyterian Church of Nigeria (2008) 7 NWLR (pt 1086) 421. However, I take the view that the decision in Ansa v. The Registered Trustees of the Presbyterian Church of Nigeria (supra) will have to yield its place to the unimpeachable logic that yielded the earlier Supreme Court judgment in Onuorah v K. R. P. Co Ltd (supra). As shown above, in Onuorah the apex court took the view that matters which are not included in those enumerated in section 230 (supra) [now section 251) do not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.
In all, I hold that the Elelu-Habeeb J was wrong in declining jurisdiction to entertain this matter. This appeal, therefore, succeeds. I hereby enter an order setting aside the said ruling of the lower court. This matter is, hereby, remitted to the lower court for reassignment to another Judge of that jurisdiction.
Other Citations: (2009)LCN/3169(CA)
