Otunba Adesesan Oguntayo (Oraderemo Of Ijebu-ife) V. Prince Fatai Adelaja & Ors (2009)
LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report
J.O. OGEBE, J.S.C
The 1st Respondent in this appeal who was the plaintiff in the High Court of Ogun State sued the appellant and the other respondents claiming in his writ of summons as follows:
“1. A declaration that being a Kingmaker by virtue of the registered declaration for Ajalorun of Ijebu-Ife Chieftaincy, the 1st Defendant is not eligible to be nominated, selected or appointed, approved and installed as the Ajalorun of Ijebu-Ife in the Ijebu East Local Government Area of Ogun State.
- A declaration that being the Oraderemo of Ijebu-Ife the 1st Defendant is not eligible to be nominated selected or appointed, approved and installed Ajalorun of Ijebu-Ife.
- A declaration that the purported nomination of the 1st Defendant as a candidate by the Afurukeregboye House for the filling of the vacant stool of Ajalorun of Ijebu-Ife is irregular, illegal, unconstitutional, null and void.
- A declaration that the purported selection or appointment of the 1st Defendant by the 2nd, 3rd, 5th 6th and 7th Defendants as the Ajalorun of Ijebu-Ife is irregular, illegal, unconstitutional, null and void.
- An order setting aside the purported nomination, selection or appointment of the 1st Defendant as. Ajalorun of Ijebu-Ife.
- Perpetual injunction restraining the 8th and 9th Defendants from giving approval to the purported selection or appointment of the 1st Defendant as Ajalorun of Ijebu-Ife”.
Pleadings were exchanged between the parties and the matter went into full trial. The question turned on the illegibility of the appellant to be nominated and appointed the Ajalorun of Ijebu-Ife on the ground that as the head of the Kingmakers he was not qualified to take the title, and also as a descendant from the male-line he was not qualified. The 1st respondent did not raise the question of the appellant’s descent from the male line in his statement of claim. He only raised it in his reply to the appellant’s Statement of Defence.
Witnesses were called on both sides but the appellant did not testify on his own behalf. During the course of the trial the 1st respondent’s counsel sought to tender proceedings in suit No. SCJ/6/85 to show that the appellant had given evidence in the proceedings that he was of male descent. There was objection to the admissibility of that document. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent failed to reply to the objection. Instead he applied to withdraw the document and the Higher Registrar of the High Court through whom he had tendered the document. The trial court marked the document rejected.
At the conclusion of the case the trial court evaluated the evidence and dismissed the 1st respondent’s claim. He was aggrieved by that decision and appealed to the Court of Appeal Ibadan Division which allowed the appeal and ordered a retrial of the case before another Judge mainly on the view of the Court of appeal that the 1st respondent was not given a fair hearing by the trial court before the proceedings in HCJ/6/85 was rejected.
Dissatisfied with the decision the appellant appealed to this court and the 1st respondent also cross-appealed to this Court. Both of them exchanged briefs in respect of their respective appeal. It should be noted that all the other defendants/respondents have not shown interest in this appeal. The appeal is simply between the appellant and the 1st respondent.
The learned counsel for the appellant in his brief of argument formulated 3 issues for determination as follows:
“(a) Whether having regard to the pleadings and evidence, the Court of Appeal was right in overturning the decision of the trial Court by which that Court held that the 1st Defendant did not descend from the male line of the Afurukeregboye Ruling House. This issue is distilled from Ground 1 of the grounds of appeal.
(b) Whether in the face of the provisions of Section 34 of the Evidence Act and the evidence before the trial Court, the Court of Appeal was right in holding that the learned trial Judge breached the rule of natural justice and was wrong in law in rejecting the proceedings in Suit No. HCJ/6/85 in evidence. This issue is distilled from Grounds 2, 3 and 4 of the grounds of appeal.
(c) Whether in all the circumstances of the case, the Court of Appeal was right in ordering a re-trial of the case This issue is distilled from ground 5 of the grounds of appeal.”
The learned counsel for the 15th respondent filed a brief and distilled 2 issues for determination as follows:
“1. Whether, having regard to the circumstance of this case, the way and manner the proceedings in Suit No. HCJ/61/85 was rejected did not occasion a miscarriage of justice warranting the Court of Appeal to interfere with the decision of the trial court; and
- Whether the Court of Appeal was right in its decision ordering a new trial.
In his brief the 1st respondent’s counsel raised a preliminary objection to the competence of the appeal. During the oral hearing of the appeal he abandoned the objection and I hereby strike it out.
The 1st issue raised in the appellant’s brief showed that the learned counsel for the appellant misunderstood the findings of the Court of Appeal on the question of the appellant’s descent from the male line of the AFURUKEREGBOYE RULING HOUSE. The Court of appeal did not overturn the decision of the trial court that the appellant did not descend from the male line.
The Court of Appeal at pages 335, 336, and 337 of the Record found exhaustibly as follows:
“Whereas, it can be said, that it is doubtful that the appellant proved that the 1st Respondent is a member of the Afurukeregboye Ruling House on the male line, the 1st Respondent pleaded and proved that he is a member of the said house on the female line. In his statement of defence the following facts were averred –
With reference to paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the Statement of Claim, the 1st Defendant avers as follows:
(a) That he is a member of the Afurukeregboye Ruling House of the female line.
(b) That his great paternal grandmother, Princess Adeite Adeoti was a daughter of Oba Olumona Afurukeregboye the 30th Ajalorun of Ijebu-Ife and his claim to the vacant stool of Ajalorun is through Princess Adeite Adeoti.
A cousin of the 1st Respondent, Yekinni Adesanya Oguntayo gave evidence on the genealogy of the 1st Respondent, in a bid to support the supra averment, as follows:
“The 1st defendant is my 1st cousin. The 1st defendant and myself are related to Afurukeregboye through the female line. Olumona was the first to bear the name Afurukeregboye. No other Oba bore the name Afurukeregboye before Olumona. It is not possible that anyone can claim to belong to the Afurukeregboye Ruling House without being related to Oba Olumona. I know Adeiti. She is the daughter of Olumona. Adeiti Adeoti is the mother of Olufowobi Oguntayo and he begat Raji Osibade and he begat Adesesan Oguntayo the 1st defendant.”
Suffice to say that the above piece of evidence, even though not coming from the 1st respondent himself has established his claim that he is a member of the Ruling House by female line through Adeiti his great grand mother.
Then there was the allegation of complaint of the eligibility of the 1st respondent on his descendancy by the Appellant and some other members of the Afurukeregboye Ruling House. In his evidence the Appellant testified that he thought his protest was recorded, but looking at the record of the meeting Exh. ‘C10’ the complaint on the genealogy of the 1st Respondent is not contained therein. The only protest recorded is in respect of the impropriety of the Oladeremo, the position he held, to be nominated or appointed as an Ajalorun. In fact the petition he wrote to the then Military Administrator of Ogun State Exh. ‘C’ did not raise any complaint or protest on the genealogy of the 1st respondent. The complaints on Exhibits ‘C10’ – are all in respect of the 1st respondent’s disqualification because he was an Oladeremo, a Kingmaker, who should not be nominated to fill the vacant stool of Ajalorun. It is as clear as crystal therefore that the Appellant has not established his claim and allegation that the 1st Respondent was not qualified or eligible to be nominated or appointed as the Ajalorun because he did not come within the category of those eligible as stated in the Declaration Exh. ‘L’. In the circumstance I fail to see that the first stage is irregular, illegal, unconstitutional null and void as professed in the Appellant’s brief of argument. I am satisfied therefore that the 1st Respondent was validly nominated, and so the argument canvassed in respect of a second stage of the appointment by the appellant is of no importance”.
It follows therefore that the appellant’s first issue is not relevant to this appeal and I discountenance it.
The remaining two issues are identical with the two issues raised in the respondent’s brief and I shall adopt them in this judgment. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted under the second issue that the trial court was right in rejecting the proceedings in suit No. HCJ/6/85 because its admissibility was objected to and the Respondent’s counsel who had an opportunity to reply to the objection failed to do so. Instead he withdrew both the document and the witness. The learned counsel submitted that that document could only be used to contradict the evidence of the appellant who in this case did not testify at all. The Court of Appeal was therefore wrong in holding that the rejection of the document amounted to denial of fair hearing resulting in miscarriage of justice.
The learned counsel submitted that the proceedings could not be admitted under section 34 of evidence Act as the whole purport of that document was to contradict the evidence of the appellant who as it turned out never testified in the case. He relied on the case of Ogunaike V. Ojayemi (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt. 53) 769.
On this issue, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that the Court of Appeal was right in holding that the rejection of the proceedings without calling on the 1st respondent’s counsel to reply to the objection to its admissibility amounted to denial of fair hearing and miscarriage of justice. He said that that document was critical to the proof of the 1st respondent’s claim. For proper resolution of this issue it is necessary to quote what transpired in the High Court. It is at pages 90 – 92 of the record:-
“P.W.2 – (He is not sworn). I am Kolawole Olufowobi, Higher Registrar, High Court of Justice, Ijebu-Ode. I live at 7, Lagos Road, Obalende, Ijebu-Ode. I have subpoena to tender the proceedings in HCJ/6/85 dated 28th March, 1989. Here is the Certified True Copy of the Proceedings.
Mr. AYANLAJA:
I object to the admissibility of this document. See Section 34 of the Evidence Act. It is evidence in a previous proceedings, it is inadmissible in this proceedings. Lagos State Development and Property Corporation vs. Adoldstamn Inter Nig. Ltd. (1994) 7 N.W.L.R. (Part 358) 545 at 561, C-D, F-G.
Submits that in so far as the proceedings contravene Section 34, it is irrelevant and inadmissible.
MR. OSIMUGA:
I object to the admissibility. I associate myself with the submission of counsel.
MR. MABEKOJE:
I object to the admissibility of the document.
CHIEF COKER
At this stage I withdrew the evidence and the witness.
MR. AYANLAJA:
The document should be marked rejected.
CHIEF COKER:
The witness is withdrawn (sic), the document cannot be marked rejected.
COURT:
This document has already been tendered before an objection was raised on point of law. After the document and the witness were withdrawn by counsel for the plaintiff. Chief Coker submitted that since he had not addressed the court on the submission made by counsel for the 1st defendant, the court ought not to mark the document rejected. It is my view that in view of the facts already placed before this court, the fact that Chief Coker had not replied to the objection raised by learned counsel for the 1st defendant does not preclude the court from making a ruling on the admissibility of the document.
In my view the document is not admissible. It is to be marked rejected.”
It is clear from the proceedings that P.W.2 Kolawole Olufowobi a High Registrar of the High Court of Ijebu Ode was only called to tender the proceedings in case No. HCJ/6/85. The defendant’s counsel objected to its admissibility. The plaintiff’s counsel Chief Coker chose not to reply to the objection even though he had ample opportunity to do so. Instead he applied to withdraw the evidence and the witness. What the trial court ought to have done was to have asked him to reply to the objection so that it could properly rule on -the admissibility of the document or the court would have granted the request to withdraw the evidence and the witness. The trial court was clearly wrong in marking the document rejected when argument had not been concluded on its admissibility. But can it be said that the 15th respondent to this appeal was denied fair hearing as held by the Court of appeal At pages 341 to 342 the Court of Appeal opined as follows:
“That is a very wrong view, for the principle of fair hearing and audi alteram paterm (sic) has been violated. When the Respondents gave their reasons for objecting to the admissibility of the document, it was incumbent on the learned Judge to hear Appellant’s Counsel’s address on it. Equity and fair play demands that both parties be heard in order to ensure that justice prevails, for in depriving the other side the opportunity of being heard before rejecting the document in totality, a miscarriage of justice has been occasioned. See Olagunju V. Oyeniran (1996) 6 NWLR part 453 page 127. The heavy weather made about the breach of the rule of audi alteram paterm to my mind is warranted even if the evidence and witness were voluntarily withdrawn by learned counsel for the Appellant before the ruling. I refuse to endorse the argument of learned State Counsel that the fact that the learned trial Judge failed to give reasons for rejecting the said document is immaterial. That he conceded that the document was inadmissible and withdrew it at that stage does not warrant the rejection of it at that stage, for by so doing the Appellant was completely shut out as far as the record of proceeding of Suit No. HCJ/6/85 upon which he relied heavily was concerned. If it had not been marked rejected he would have found another avenue of tendering it”
With the greatest respect, the Court of Appeal misunderstood the purport of the proceedings sought to be tendered and wrongly castigated the trial court for denying the 1st respondent’s counsel the opportunity to reply to the objection to the admissibility of that document The learned counsel for the 1st respondent who tendered the document heard the objection and had every opportunity to reply to it. For reasons best known to him, he refused to reply. To my mind this was abandonment of his right to reply. Not only that he then withdrew both the document and the witness which meant that he conceded the objection. How else can one explain his withdrawal of both the document and the witness
It is trite law that evidence of a witness taken in an earlier proceeding is not relevant in a later trial except for the purpose of discrediting such a witness in cross-examination and for that purpose only.
See L.S.D.P. V. AdoldStamm Int. Ltd. 19947 NWLR (Pt. 357) 545 at 561 – 562, and Okonji V. Njokanma 1999 14 NWLR CPt.638 at 280-281. The point was succinctly made in the case of Ogunaike V Ojayemi 1987 1 NWLR (Part 53) 769 in the following words:-
“In Ariku V. Ajiwogbo (1962) 1 All NLR (Part 4) Page 629 at Page 631 Ademola CJN delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court stated the law as follows:-
This Court has frequently directed attention to the practice, now not uncommon, of making use of evidence of a witness in another case as if it were evidence in the case on trial. As was pointed out in Alade V. Aborishade 5 F.S.C. 167 at P. 171, this is only permissible under Section 33 or 34 of the Evidence Act. Where a witness in a former case is giving evidence in a case in hand his former evidence may be brought up in cross-examination to discredit him if he was lying, but evidence used for this purpose does not become evidence in the case in hand for any other purpose. There are also pre-requisites to the making use of the former testimony of a witness; for example, his attention must be called to the former case where such evidence was given and he should be reminded of what he had said on that occasion.
In this case at the trial, the respondent was never confronted with Exhibit “C” when she gave evidence and neither was her attention drawn to any specific portion of her testimony in Exhibit “C”. In fact this could not have been possible as Exhibit “C” was tendered by 3rd D.W. towards the end of the case after the respondent and her witnesses had closed their case. In my view the Court of Appeal’s criticism of the Appellate Judge’s use of Exhibit “C” was justified. Accordingly this ground of appeal also fails”…
In the present case the appellant did not testify on his own behalf and so he could not be contradicted by showing him the earlier proceedings. The learned counsel, who sought to tender the proceedings, withdrew both the document and the witness. For all practical purposes that document ceased to be relevant in the case even if it was not marked rejected since the learned counsel who tried to tender it, had withdrawn it. If he tried to tender it again he would be met with the same objection as he had withdrawn the only witness through whom it could be tendered.
It can be seen from my analysis above that nobody violated the 1st respondent’s right of fair hearing and no miscarriage of justice resulted from the rejection of the document.
On his 3rd issue the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Court of Appeal was wrong in ordering a retrial just because the proceedings in suit No. HCJ/6/85 was marked rejected. He said that sending it back just because of that document which was withdrawn by the 1st respondent’s counsel would not in any way help their case.
The learned counsel for the 1st respondent submitted otherwise and urged this Court to admit the document under section 22 of the Supreme Court Act and use it in favour of the 1st respondent’s claim.
This submission is totally misconceived since the 1st respondent’s counsel did not press for the admission of the document in the trial court but withdrew it. How can we now admit it at the Supreme Court level I agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the Court of Appeal was wrong in ordering a retrial as that document was no longer relevant.
The 1st respondent/cross-Appellant filed a cross-appellant’s brief and identified 3 issues for determination as follows:
(1) Having regard to the Ajalorun Chieftaincy Declaration, whether the 1st respondent can validly contest for the office of Ajalorun and whether the 1st respondent’s selection was not fraught with irregularities which vitiate the entire exercise; Grounds 2,3 & 4.
(2) Whether the learned justices of the court below were not in error in holding that the 1st respondent was qualified to contest for the office of Ajalorun without evaluating or properly evaluating the crucial effect which the proceedings in HCJ/6/85 have on the qualification of the 1st respondent; (Ground 1)… ; and
(3) Having regard to the totality of the evidence before the court below, whether it was fair and unconscionable for the 1st respondent to be chosen as the Ajalorun and whether the court below was right not to have found for the plaintiff as per his statement of claim – Grounds 5,6 and 7.”
The appellant/cross-respondent also filed a cross-respondent’s brief and formulated 3 issues for determination as follows:
“(a) Having regard to the Ajaolorun Chieftaincy declaration, whether the 1st Defendant could validly contest for the office of the Ajalorun and whether the 1st Defendant’s selection was tainted with irregularities capable of vitiating the selection process. (Grounds 2, 3 of the Grounds of Appeal).
(b) Whether having regard to its finding that the proceedings in HCJ/6/85 were wrongly rejected in evidence, the Court of Appeal was right in (a) ordering a retrial of the case (b) holding that the 1st Defendant is a member of Afurukeregboye Ruling House through (sic) the female line (Grounds 1 and 4 of the Grounds of Appeal).
(c) Whether the Lower Court was right in upholding the finding of the High Court that neither the allegation of undue influence on the part of the 1st Defendant nor likelihood of bias on the part of 2nd – 7th Defendants was substantiated. (Ground 5).”
On these three issues the learned counsel for the cross-appellant submitted by way of summary that the Ajalorun Chieftaincy declaration is not exhaustive on the qualification of candidates into that office and by Native Law and Custom of Ijebu-Ife the 1st defendant as the head of kingmakers could not contest for that office and the court below was wrong in holding that he was qualified to contest.
The learned counsel for the cross-respondent submitted that the lower court was right in holding that the cross-respondent was properly nominated and selected as Ajalorun despite the fact he held the post of Oradememo and carried out certain procedural functions during the selection process.
The trial court found as a fact that the appellant/cross-respondent was properly nominated and appointed to the disputed stool in accordance with the relevant chieftaincy declaration exhibit ‘TC1’ The Court of Appeal confirmed these findings of facts as I have shown earlier in this Judgment. This amounts to two concurrent findings of facts by the two lower courts and it is not for the Supreme Court to interfere with concurrent findings of facts of lower courts unless they are shown to be perverse and that is not the case in this appeal See MOJEKWU V. IWUCHUKWU (2004) 11 NW.L.R. (Pt. 883) 196, AGBANA V. OWA (2004) 13 NWLR (Pt. 889) 1. I see no merit in the cross-appeal.
Consequently, I see merit in the main appeal, and I allow it. I set aside the judgment of the Court of Appeal as it relates to its order of retrial and restore the judgment of the trial court I dismiss the cross-appeal for lack of merit. I award costs of N50,000.00 in the main appeal in favour of the appellant and N50,000.00 in the cross-appeal in favour of appellant/cross-respondent.
SC.365/2001
