Paul Coure & Anor V. The Probate Registrar, Lagos (1964)
IDIGBE, J.S.C.
The point in this appeal is whether the fees payable on the grant of Letters of Administration by an applicant should be assessed by the Respondent on the gross value of the personal property of a deceased person or on the value of such property less debts due from the deceased to third parties, at the time of his death. The contention of the appellants that the fees should be assessed on what may be described as the net value of the personal property of a deceased person was rejected by the High Court, and against this decision they now appeal to this Court.
The relevant provisions on the subject are contained in Rule 11 of Order 48 of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, Cap. 211 in Vol. X of the 1948 Edition of the Laws of Nigeria, and in item 28 of Part (1) of the Second Schedule to the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules-(hereafter referred to as the Supreme Court Rules). Rule 11 of Order 48 of the Supreme Court Rules as amended by Section 2 of the Supreme Court Ordinance Rules of Court No. 1 of 1952, reads as follows:-
“Every applicant for a grant of Probate or Letters of Administration shall file in Court a true declaration of all the personal property of the deceased and the value thereof.”
The proviso to this rule clearly states that, for the purpose of fees payable on probate or letters of administration the value of property in respect of which the grant is made shall not be deemed to include (1) any gratuity payable by the Government of Nigeria or by the Nigerian Railway, and (2) any sums of money payable from statutory funds, to the estate of a deceased person. Item 28 of part (1) of the Second Schedule to the Supreme Court Rules makes provision for fees payable in respect of the “value of property affected by the grant.” (underline, by the Court).
In support of his contention, learned Counsel for appellants drew our attention to a number of cases decided on certain relevant statutory provisions in respect of Duty payable on the estate of deceased persons in England. We think, however, that the provisions of the rule under consideration are quite clear, and they relate to fees payable in respect of the value of the property affected by the grant of Letters of Administration. Such a grant clearly affects the gross value, not the net value, of the personal property of a deceased person; and the only allowances made are set out in the proviso to rule 11 of Order 48 of the Supreme Court Rules.
Learned Counsel for appellants has also argued that an assessment which is based on the gross value of the personal property of the deceased would result in considerable hardship and inconvenience to the estate. That may well be true, but we feel bound to construe the plain and unambiguous words of the rule under consideration in their ordinary meaning; and as was said in an old case:
“The argument from inconvenience is not to be lightly entertained, and never for the purpose of construing a statute which is clear in its terms, and indicates, unmistakably, the purpose of the legislature…. `-per Lord O’Hagan in Hutton v. Harper (1875-76) 1 App. Cas. 464 at p. 474.
In our view, the learned Judge was right in his interpretation of the provisions of Order 48 rule 11, of the Supreme Court Rules and item 28 of part (1) of the Second Schedule thereto. The appeal is dismissed with costs assessed at twelve guineas.
Other Citation: (1964) LCN/1120(SC)
