Peoples Democratic Party (Pdp) & Ors V. Alhaji Atiku Abubakar (2007)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
UWA, J.C.A.
This appeal arose from an interlocutory decision of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Gwagwalada, Abuja delivered on the 31st day of October, 2006.
The respondent commenced the suit at the High Court of the FCT, Gwagwalada division, Abuja, (hereafter called the trial court) with an originating summons dated and filed on the 4th day of October, 2006 wherein he set out the issues for determination by the trial court in paragraphs (i) – (v) contained in pages 1 – 2 of the printed records.
The respondent subsequently sought the reliefs for determination of issues formulated in the paragraphs above, the reliefs are as follows:
“(i) A declaration that the suspension of the plaintiff by the National Executive Committee of the peoples Democratic Party (PDP) for 3 months at the National Executive Committee meeting of Thursday the 28th of September, 2006 is in total violation or the provisions or Section 36( 1) and section 224 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic or Nigeria 1999 and Articles 2 & 16(B)(i)(a) and (b) & (c) of the Constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and to that extent, is unconstitutional, null, void and or no effect whatsoever.
(ii) A declaration that by the combined provisions of sections 36(i) and section 224 of the Constitution or the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and Article 16(b), (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv) of the Constitution of the PDP ratified on December 10, 2005, the 1st defendant has no power to suspend the Plaintiff for a period exceeding one month.
(iii) A declaration that by the provisions of Articles 16(B) (iii) of the Constitution of (PDP) as ratified on December 10, 2005 section 36(1) and section 6(6)(b) or the Constitution or the Federal Republic or Nigeria, 1999, the plaintiff cannot be said to have been given fair hearing with respect to the 1st defendant’s decision to suspend him, taken on the 28th September, 2006, by the defendants.
(iv) A declaration that having regard to the provisions of Article 16(b)(i), (ii), (iv) and Article 16(3) and (f) or the Constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and ratified on December 10, 2005 and sections 36(1) and 224 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, an organ of the party other than the National Working Committee cannot suspend the plaintiff.
(v) A declaration that by the provisions of Article 16(b)(i), (ii) (iii), (iv) of the Constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, the plaintiff was entitled to be given an opportunity to present his case before he was suspended.
(vi) A declaration that the usurpation of the powers of the National Working Committee by the National Executive Committee as relates to power to suspend members contravenes the provisions of Article 16(B) (i) (a) and (b) of the Constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and to that extent, is unconstitutional illegal, null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
(vii) An order setting aside the purported suspension of the plaintiff from the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) by the National Executive Committee of the party being illegal, unconstitutional null and void
(viii) A declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to contest for any election of the 1st defendant.
(ix) A perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from sanctioning the plaintiff except in accordance with provisions of the Constitution of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) ratified in December 10, 2005 and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.
The respondent in support of his originating summons filed a 23 paragraph affidavit deposed to by one Umar A. Pariyah, a persona assistant to the respondent. Exhibits P1-P5 was attached to the said affidavit, which is contained in pages 6-72 of the printed records. The respondent also filed a further affidavit in support of his originating summons on the 11th day of October, 2006 with one exhibit attached, deposed to by one Omotomilola Ikotun, a legal practitioner in the law firm of Messrs Rickey Tarfa & Co. contained in pages 226 – 228 of the printed records.
The respondent also filed a motion ex-parte dated 4th October, 2006 and a motion on notice dated 11th October, 2006 where he sought an interim and interlocutory injunction respectively to restrain the appellants, their servants, agent, privies, however called from taking any step or in recognition of the 1st defendant’s decision of Thursday, 28th September, 2006 suspending the plaintiff (now respondent) for a period of three (3) months, pending the determination of the motion and substantive suit respectively.
Upon service of the Originating summons, the appellants entered a memorandum of conditional appearance dated 13th October, 2006 and filed a notice of preliminary objection dated the same date. The preliminary objection was not supported by an affidavit, hence the respondent filed no counter affidavit and the court ordered for written arguments to be submitted by the parties. In the preliminary objection the appellants challenged the competence of the entire action and jurisdiction of the lower court. Each party amended their written arguments along the line. The preliminary objection was lightly taken first, the substantive originating summons to be taken subsequently if need be.
The respondent then withdrew the two motions and same were struck out on the 31st day of October, 2006 by the trial Judge. Each side along the line with the leave of court amended their written addresses.
The appellants who were the defendants/applicants in the lower court filed a Nine (9) paragraph counter affidavit in opposition to the originating summons of the respondent on the 18th October, 2006 which was deposed to by one M.K. Jubril, the National Legal Adviser of the 1st appellant, in support of the counter affidavit was ‘exhibit PDP1′ the amended Constitution of the 1st appellant.
The arguments on the preliminary objection were heard by the trial Judge and in a considered ruling delivered on the 31st of October, 2006 the preliminary objection of the appellants (then the defendants) was over ruled and dismissed in its entirety. The trial court held that it had jurisdiction to hear and determine the originating summons of the respondent.
The appellants being dissatisfied with the ruling of the trial court appealed to this court and filed twelve (12) grounds of appeal contained in their notice of appeal dated 7th November, 2006, on pages 420 – 430 of the printed records.
Subsequently, the appellants filed an application for stay of proceedings pending appeal before the trial court which was dismissed in a considered ruling delivered on 16th November, 2006.
Upon the dismissal of the application, a similar application was brought before this court; same was also dismissed on Friday 1st December, 2006.
Out of the twelve (12) grounds of appeal, the learned counsel for the appellants formulated six (6) issues for determination of this interlocutory appeal. The issues are:
(a) Whether or not from the facts and circumstances of this case, the lower court can justifiably resolve the dispute submitted to it by parties to this suit by way of an originating summons. (Grounds 1,3,6 & 7).
(b) Whether or not from the facts and circumstances of this case, the proceedings of suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/368/2006 before the Abuja division of the Federal High Court is sufficient to oust the appellant and their officers (a Political Party that is not a party to the suit) from inviting the respondent, (a member of their Political Party who is a party to the aforesaid suit No: FHC/ABJ/CS/368/2006) for briefing on the subject matter of the suit (Ground 2)
(c) Whether or not the facts of this case bothers (sic) on the Internal Affairs (sic) of a political party (the 1st appellant in this case). (Grounds 4 & 5).
(d) Whether or not the National Working Committee of the 1st appellant the committee that suspended the respondent) is the highest decision making body/organ of the 1st appellant as to conclude that the respondent has exhausted the Internal Mechinary (sic) of the 1st appellant to resolve his dispute with the party. (Grounds 8,9, & 10)
(e) Whether or not S. 308 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, does not prohibit the respondent (i.e. plaintiff before the lower cout1 from instituting this suit. (Ground 11).
(f) Whether or not the learned trial judge has not delved into the substantive issue of this case as to disqualify him from proceeding with the case at the lower court. (Ground 12)”.
The learned respondents’ counsel in their brief filed on 11/12/06 adopted the six (6) issues formulated by the appellants with variations as to the way each is couched. The issues as couched by the learned respondents’ counsel are substantially the same as formulated by the appellants, contained in paragraph 3.03(i)-(iv) on page 8 of the respondent’s brief.
When this appeal was argued on 12/12/06, the learned senior counsel Adebayo Adenipekun, (SAN) adopted fully the appellants’ brief filed on 5/12/06 and elaborated on some of the issues.
Similarly, the learned senior counsel Rickey Tarfa, (SAN) for the respondent adopted the respondent’s brief filed on 11/12/06 and also highlighted in detail some of the issues.
Since the issues are virtually the same, I adopt the issues as formulated by the appellants in determining this appeal.
On issue one; the learned senior counsel argued that the learned trial Judge cannot determine this issue through an originating summons. He argued that the facts of the case are in dispute and that the parties substantially differ on facts and circumstances leading to this case. The learned senior counsel referred extensively to the twenty three (23) paragraph affidavit filed by the respondent, with five (5) exhibits attached, a further affidavit filed by the respondent, the counter affidavit filed by the appellants with exhibits, and a reply to the counter affidavit, exhibit PI, of the respondent and exhibit PDP1 of the appellants’ claimed by parties to be the authentic Constitution of the 1st appellant. The details of the disputed facts by the parties were given in paragraphs 40.2(i) – (xiv) on pages 11-13 of the appellants’ brief. I will come to this later.
The learned senior counsel stressed on the conflicting affidavits before the trial court and the need for oral evidence if the conflicts are to be resolved. He cited and relied on the cases of Tanarewa (Nig.) Ltd v. Arzai (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 919) p. 593, 637-638, paras. D-A; and Winlyn Ltd. v. NACB Consultancy & Finance Co. Ltd. (2000) 8 NWLR (Pt.670) 594.
The learned SAN further argued that the irreconcilable conflicts in the affidavits of parties can only be resolved by calling or cross examination of witnesses, the conflicts being in the documents/ exhibits submitted before the trial court. The learned senior counsel argued that the ruling of the trial court cannot stand as the respondent’s case was wrongly commenced at the lower court by originating summons in view of the conflicting affidavits of the parties.
The learned senior counsel argued that originating summons is only applicable in circumstances where there is no dispute or questions of facts or the likelihood of such dispute, but in the present case the appellants have vehemently disputed the facts in issue and referred to Order I rule 2(2) of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004 and submitted that the respondent’s case does not fall within any of the subjects itemized in Order 1 rule 2(2) above. He conceded that a trial court has jurisdiction to convert an originating summons to a writ of summons and order pleadings in the matter if originating summons is found to be improper procedure of commencing an action and referred to Anatogu v. Anatogu (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt.519) 49 at 79 amongst other cases. However the learned senior counsel urged this court to strike out the entire suit on the ground of incompetence and relied on Ajagungbade III v. Adeyelu II (2001) 16NWLR (Pt.738) p. 126 also UBA v. Ekpo (2003) 12 NWLR (Pt.834) p. 332.
Learned senior counsel for the respondent highlighted the reliefs sought by the respondent as appear in paragraph 4.02 of the respondent’s brief, paragraphs (i)-(ix) for the purposes of emphasis, contained in pages 24 of the printed records. The reliefs earlier reproduced in this judgment.
The learned senior counsel argued that reliefs (i)-(vi) which are declaratory in nature sought for the interpretation, meaning and intendments of the provisions of both the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 and the Constitution of the 1st appellant. Reliefs (iii)-(v) sought for a declaration that the respondent was not given a fair hearing before he was suspended by the appellants. Reliefs (vii)-(ix) are consequential reliefs which would flow from the grant of reliefs (i)-(vii).
He relied on Order 1 rule 2 of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja Civil Procedure Rules, 2004 and argued that it is the claim before the Court that confers jurisdiction on the court or tribunal and cited the case of Ajadi v. Ajibola (2004) 16 NWLR (Pt. 898) 91.
Learned senior counsel argued that the respondent’s suit as contained in the originating summons was properly commenced by that means, he argued that there is no substantial dispute of facts in the claims of the respondent. He disagreed with the learned counsel for the appellants that the existence of disputes between the appellants and the respondents on the subject of the claim before the trial court is enough to take the case away from the provision of the originating summons.
Further that unless there is a substantial dispute of facts there is no need for a suit to be commenced by a writ of summons, and relied on the case of Habib Nigeria Bank Ltd. v. Ochete ( 2001) 3 NWLR (Pt.699) 144. He argued that the respondent’s case is a simple one that could be resolved with the documents presented and/or submitted before the court and that there are no “irreconcilable” conflicts as argued by the learned appellants’ counsel.
The learned respondent’s counsel argued that all the cases cited in support of striking out the case are not applicable and are irrelevant to the present case and referred to National Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. Alakija (1978) 2 LRN 78; (1978) 9-10 SC 59 also cited by the appellants where the Supreme Court did not strike out the originating summons but directed that evidence be taken.
Finally on this issue the learned respondent’s counsel argued that the reliefs sought flow from questions for determination which are clear and do not need oral evidence, therefore that the suit was properly commenced by way of originating summons. On the other hand, without conceding, that if there are substantial disputes of fact in the affidavit, the court should convert the matter from one governed by originating summons to one governed by writ of summons and order pleadings to be filed.
He urged this court to resolve this issue in favour of the respondent and to hold that the commencement of this action by way of originating summons was proper and correct in law.
In respect of the first issue, the respondent’s originating summons before the trial court was supported by a twenty three (23) paragraph affidavit filed on 4/10/06 with five (5) exhibits in support that is exhibits ‘P1’ – ‘PS’. Exhibit ‘P1’ is what the respondent exhibited as the 1st appellant’s constitution which the respondent relied on in pursuit of his case.
The respondent also filed a further affidavit in support of his originating summons on 11th October, 2006 with one exhibit, exhibit ‘AA1′ a letter of suspension from PDP dated 29/9/06. The appellants on their part in response filed a nine (9) paragraph counter affidavit with 18 sub-paragraphs on 18th October, 2006. The respondent’s affidavit, further affidavit, and the appellants’ counter affidavit and reply affidavit shows that the facts of this case are in dispute and that the parties are not agreed on the facts; and circumstances leading to this case.
In the counter affidavit the appellants refuted and/or disagreed with almost all the depositions in the affidavit of the respondent. While the respondent made out his exhibit P1 as the Constitution of the 1st appellant, the appellants’ exhibited “PDP1” attached to their counter affidavit the appellants held out as the authentic Constitution of the 1st appellant. For clarity I will hereunder reproduce part of the depositions of both parties concerning the 1st appellant’s Constitution.
In the affidavit in support of the originating summons filed by the respondent (then plaintiff), paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 reads:
“4. That I am also a member of the 1st defendant, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).
- That our party, 1st defendant has a Constitution that governs the relationship and or the affairs of members of the party including disciplinary procedure. A copy of the Constitution is hereby attached and marked exhibit “P1”
- That I know as a fact that under our Constitution a member can only be suspended from the party for a period not exceeding one month.
- That I also know as a fact that under our Constitution it is only the party’s working committee after preliminary hearing that can suspend a member from the party for a period not exceeding one month.
In contrast to the above deposition, the counter affidavit to the originating summons in response to paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 above the appellants deposed as follows:
(b) That with reference to paragraph 5 of the affidavit in support of the originating summons, and the Constitution attached to the affidavit (exhibit ‘P1’), the deponent has not been candid to court. What was attached was the old Constitution of the 1st defendant party which is no longer in use. The new Constitution of the party in (sic) attached as exhibit “PDP1″
(c) That contrary to paragraph 6 of the affidavit under the new Constitution of the party, a member can be suspended for any period of time.
(d) That contrary to paragraph 7 of the affidavit, it is the National Executive Committee of the 1st defendant that has the power to suspend a member from the party.”
Exhibits P1 and PDP1 are both claimed from the above depositions to be the authentic Constitution of the 1st appellant. Even though some of the provisions are basically the same, they are not identical. Since the Constitution of the 1st appellant is what guides the 1st appellant and its members, it is important to determine which is the authentic one before looking into whether the said Constitution has been violated or not. The reliefs sought by the respondent border on interpretation, meaning and intendments of the provisions of the Constitution of the 1st appellant. The Constitution of the 1st appellant would be the one proved to be the authentic one. Certainly, this cannot be resolved or determined with an originating summons. Evidence would need to be called; otherwise there would be no yardstick to determine which of the two, P1 or PDP1 the trial court should prefer in determining the issues before the trial court.
Further, the appellants in their counter affidavit alleged anti-party activities of the respondent; these would need evidence to establish what the anti-party activities are, as violated by the respondent, not shown in what is before the court in the originating summons and affidavits.
There are numerous contradictions and disputes between the parties as shown in their conflicting affidavits before the court. It is trite that the court cannot resolve a conflicting affidavit without reference to oral evidence, except where there are other sufficient materials like documentary evidence, the documents here are also in dispute. See Tanarewa Nig. Ltd. v. Arzai (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 919) p. 593; Winlyn Ltd v. NACB Consultancy & Finance Co. Ltd. (2000) 8 NWLR (Pt. 670) 594. I am of the opinion that a court cannot properly evaluate affidavit evidence that is irreconcilable without calling witnesses who will be subjected to cross-examination.
Further the issue as to whether or not the respondent exhausted the available internal machinery of resolving disputes in the 1st appellant before resorting to court. The question as to whether the National Working Committee of the 1st appellant is the highest decision making organ that the respondent could appeal to. The parties are not agreed as to which body is the highest in the party hierarchy. As it is these questions cannot be adequately resolved without full evidence, contrary to argument of the learned senior counsel for the respondent who argued that there is no substantial dispute of facts in the claims therein. With respect, I disagree with the learned senior counsel. I will hereunder reproduce Order 1 rule 2(2) of the High Court of the FCT, Abuja Civil Procedure Rules, 2004 relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent.
Order 1 rule 2(2) provides:
“Proceedings may commence by originating summons where the main issue is, or likely, to be one of Construction of a written law or of an instrument made under any written law, or of any deed, will, contract, or other document or some other question of law or there is unlikely to be a substantial dispute of law.”
(Italics mine for emphasis)
The above rule would be applicable where there is no substantial dispute of facts between the parties, which is certainly not the case here; therefore the originating summons procedure is inapplicable.
The learned respondent’s counsel agreed that from the originating summons the dispute is as to the interpretation and meaning of certain provisions of the Constitution of the country as well as that of the 1st appellant as it relates to the respondent and whether he was given fair hearing by the appellants before his suspension. The question as to whether the respondent was given “fair hearing” or not before his suspension would remain unresolved by the lower court without oral evidence. See INEC v. Musa (2003) 3 NWLR (Pt. 806) p. 72. No doubt there can be disputed facts which originating summons procedure could resolve but, where the disputed facts are substantial as in the present case, the proper mode of commencing such action is by writ of summons so that pleadings can be filed and exchanged to determine the issues in controversy between the parties. See Jimoh v. Olawoye (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt. 828) p. 307: also Ogunsola v. A.P.P & 2 Ors. (2003) 9 NWLR (Pt. 826) p. 462.
The learned respondent’s counsel argued that the issues to be resolved are neither hostile nor irreconcilable in nature but merely of simple interpretation and construction of the 1st appellant’s Constitution. I am of the view that the authentic one has not been determined as to decide which to interpret. Of course this is a substantial dispute.
The case of Adah v. Adah (1998) 6 NWLR (Pt. 552) 97 at 108 relied upon by the learned appellant’s counsel could be distinguished in that it was decided that a court could suo motu resolve conflicting affidavits without calling oral evidence by resorting to documentary evidence, which is authentic, tilting the balance in favour of the affidavit which agreed with it. In the present case the authentic Constitution has not been determined or identified.
I am in agreement with the learned senior counsel for the appellants that the respondent’s case was wrongly commenced at the trial court by originating summons. The trial court should have examined closely the affidavits in support of the originating summons and the counter affidavit opposing it. Part of which were earlier reproduced, these should have been compared to assist the court to arrive at a correct decision that the suit ought not to have been brought by way of originating summons but by a writ of summons for the dispute to be properly determined, rather than preferring one to the other. See the case of Kankara v. C.O.P (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt.785) p. 596, also referred to by both counsel. In the present case the facts are in substantial dispute between the parties from the 1stappellant’s Constitution, to the reasons for the suspension, the duration of the suspension, whether there was fair hearing or not etc, these could not have been properly and fairly resolved by the originating summons procedure.
I agree that it is the claim of the plaintiff that vests jurisdiction on the court but the procedure has to be right. Reliefs (i)-(vi) reproduced on pages 9 -10 of the respondent’s brief are declaratory reliefs which cannot be brought by originating summons but by writ since the facts are disputed. In Saleh v. Monguno (2003) 1 NWLR (Pt. 801) Page 221, it was decided that where the claims are declaratory, the proceedings should be begun by writ of summons. Also UBA v. Ekpo (supra).
In the present case, I am of the humble opinion that the action should have been commenced by writ of summons so that the claim could be heard on pleadings and the issues resolved based on the evidence that would be led based on the pleaded facts, whether the claim succeeds or not is a different thing. In the case of Obajimi v. A.G Western Nigeria (1967) 1 All NLR 31, the case brought by originating summons instead of a writ of summons was struck out by the trial court as was similarly done in USA v. Ekpo (supra).
On the other hand, a trial court has the jurisdiction to convert an originating summons to a writ of summons and order pleadings in the matter where originating summons is found to be improper procedure of commencing the action, which the trial Court failed to do on seeing that the affidavits of the parties were conflicting and irreconcilable. See – Anatogu v. Anatogu (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 519) 49; National Bank of Nigeria v. Alakija (1978) 2 LRN 78; (1978) 9-10 SC 59.
When a suit is commenced by an originating summons instead of writ of summons, the appropriate order to be made by the court is to direct the suit to proceed with the filing of pleadings for proper determination of the issues before the court. Emezi v. Osuagwu (2005) 12 NWLR (Pt. 939) p.340.
To strike out this suit would be allowing ourselves to be bound or enslaved by rules of court, which no doubt are tools of our trade, to guide the courts but not to enslave us.
In the interest of Justice, we must not allow ourselves to be bound or caught in the web by rules of court, but to follow the preferred prevailing trend of doing substantial Justice. I would therefore do that which the learned trial court failed to do. I would and do hereby order that this matter be properly brought by writ of summons, and order that pleadings be filed by the parties, to enable the trial court properly evaluate and determine the dispute between the parties.
Having held in respect of the first issue that the circumstances and facts of this case could only be properly determined by writ of summons, the mode of commencement of the action obviously covers issues (b)-(e) as reproduced earlier. With a look at issue (d) for instance, whether or not the National Working Committee of the 1st appellant (The Committee that suspended the respondent) is the highest decision making body/organ of the 1st appellant as to determine whether the respondent exhausted the internal machinery of the 1st appellant to resolve his dispute or not before going to court can only be determined in my humble view, if oral evidence is adduced and witnesses cross examined. As it is the parties are not agreed as to the highest authority of the 1st appellant.
I do agree that members of the party are bound by the provisions of their Constitution in line with the decision in Onuoha v. Okafor (1983) 2 SCNLR 244; and Dalhatu v. Turaki (2003) 15 NWLR (Pt. 843) 310. In the present case the authentic Constitution is yet to be determined whether the respondent should be bound by exhibit P1 or PDP1 can only be resolved by oral evidence in Court if need be. As a result it would be a waste of time for this court at this stage to start looking into the provisions of P1 and PDP1 in resolving this issue. To decide whether this action was hastily instituted or not can only be done when both parties file their pleadings. It is also the only way either party or both can show whether the National Convention and the Board of Trustees are the two most superior organs of the 1st appellant in that order or whether it is the National Working Committee that suspended the respondent.
The above reasons cover issues (b), (e), (d) and (e).
With issue (f), the trial court in dismissing the ground of the objection as to whether the respondent failed to exhaust the internal machinery of the 1st appellant to resolve the dispute strayed into arriving at conclusions in respect of the substantive suit in an interlocutory application. A trial court must be cautious in deciding interlocutory issues raised in a suit in order to avoid taking a decision on the substantive issue in the suit, an act which is usually frowned at by the law.
In the present case the trial court has prejudged the substantive suit with its finding in the interlocutory ruling that there was no higher authority than the National Working Committee and has utilized exhibit P1 produced by the respondent in spite of the existence of exhibit PDP1 produced by the appellants in resolving one of the issues in the substantive suit. By this finding, the trial court in effect decided a substantive relief sought by the respondent contrary to the rule that a court should not decide a substantive issue in a case whilst delivering its ruling on an interlocutory issue. This finding should have been after the trial of the substantive suit on merit and not on an interlocutory application. For this reason the trial judge is hereby disqualified from adjudicating on this mater. See the cases of Egbe v. Onogun (1972) 1 All NLR (Pt. 1) 95: UBA v. Ekpo (supra) and NDIC v. S.B.N. Plc (2003) I NWLR (Pt. 801) 311 and Jimoh v. Oalwoye (supra).
Even though learned counsel for both parties proffered detailed arguments in respect of all the issues, reviewing these would be superfluous and a waste of time, since all said and done boils down to the same thing – pleadings being ordered for proper determination of this dispute.
In the final analysis I hereby allow this appeal. Accordingly, the decision of the learned trial Judge of 31st October, 2006 is hereby set aside.
This case is hereby remitted to the Chief Judge of the High Court of Federal Capital Territory for reassignment to another Judge other than M. N. Oniyangi, J, who should order parties to file pleadings in view of the conflicting facts of this case.
I make no order as to costs.
Other Citations: (2007)LCN/2170(CA)
