Prince Paully Ikpong & Anor. V. Obong Ini Udobong (2006)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
OMOKRI, J.C.A.
This is an appeal against the ruling of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State of Nigeria, presided over by Mbaba, J, delivered on the 19th of August, 2004 wherein the court dismissed the application of the appellants for an order setting aside the judgment in favour of the respondent delivered by the court below on the 31st of May, 2004.
The facts of the instant case on appeal are that on or about the 27/6/2001 the appellants engaged the services of the respondent, a legal practitioner, to defend them in Suit No. HU/199/2001: Prince E.S. Etukeye & Ors. v. Prince Paully Ikpong & Ors and also to reconcile the warring factions in 2nd appellant, National Association of Small Scale Industries (NASSI) Akwa Ibom State Chapter. The 1st appellant entered into an agreement with the respondent by executing a Client’s Instruction/Agreement form on “behalf of the 2nd appellant, where the respondent’s instruction was clearly stated and the fee due to him was also agreed. The respondent apparently diligently carried out the appellants’ instruction but the appellants failed or refused to pay the bill of professional charges of N500,000.00 despite repeated demands.
On the 11th of March, 2004, the respondent, as plaintiff, took out a writ of summons against the appellants, as defendants, claiming thus:-
“The plaintiff claims against the defendants jointly and severally the sum of N500,000.00 being amount due and payable to the plaintiff by the defendants being bill of professional charges from the professional services rendered by the plaintiff to the defendants on the defendants’ request by defending the defendants in Suit No. HU/199/2001.”
Subsequently, the respondent, on 19/3/04 filed a motion ex-parte with an affidavit praying that the suit be entered for hearing under the undefended list. The motion was heard and granted. The writ of summons, affidavit and order made by the learned trial Judge were duly served on the appellants.
On the 25/4/04 when the matter was listed for hearing, the appellants filed only a notice of intention to defend without an affidavit disclosing a defence on the merit. The case was adjourned to the 28/4/04 but the court did not sit. The case was adjourned to 31/5/04 one of the dates suggested by counsel to the appellants who had written to the registrar for an adjournment. On 31/5/04 the appellant and their counsel were absent from court and no affidavit was filed setting out or disclosing the defence of the appellants. That being the case the learned trial Judge entered judgment in favour of the respondent.
Thereafter the appellants brought a motion seeking an order that the said judgment be set aside before the trial court. The learned trial Judge on 19/8/04 dismissed this motion on the ground that the judgment sought to be set aside by the appellants was a judgment on the merit and the court was functus officio.
Apparently aggrieved by the ruling delivered on 19/8/04, the appellants appealed to this court on two grounds on the 30/8/04. The appellants in their brief of argument dated 4/11/05 and filed on 7/11/05, abandoned ground 1 and distilled a lone issue for determination from ground 2.
The issue for determination is as follows:-
“Whether a judgment on the undefended list procedure based on the High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules of Akwa Ibom State can be set aside in the circumstance of this case.”
The respondent in his brief dated 1/1/06 and filed on 26/1/06 also formulated one issue for determination, which is as follows:-
“Was the judgment delivered by the lower court on 31st May, 2004, a judgment on the merit? And if the answer is in the affirmative; was the learned trial Judge correct to decline jurisdiction to hear the motion of the appellants seeking to set aside the said judgment?”
On the lone issue for determination learned counsel for the appellants, Mrs. Oludare, submitted that it is trite law that a court of law reserves the right to set aside its judgment which was given otherwise than on the merit upon good grounds shown. She relied on Tom v. Ameh (1992) 1 NWLR (Pt.217) page 306 at 310; Mohammed v. Husseini (1998) 64 LRCN 5319 at 5323; (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 108 and Teno Eng. Ltd. v.Adisa (2005) 125 LRCN 544 at 546; (2005) 10 NWLR (Pt. 933) 346, and submitted that though the above conditions apply generally to cases heard on the general cause list, they equally apply to the ones heard on the undefended list. She pointed out that they have in paragraphs 3 – 11 of their supporting affidavit in their motion to set aside the judgment set out the reason why they could not file an affidavit to disclose their defence as at the time judgment was entered. The reason the appellants gave was that their counsel, Mr. Ekanem-Ekanem, whose duty it was to file the affidavit, could not do so early enough because he was bereaved. See pages 41 – 42 of the record. Counsel contended that contrary to the allegation of the respondent that the appellants have refused to pay, the appellants have exhibited receipts showing various payments made to the respondent in their proposed defence. She relied on Ataguba & Co. v. Gum (Nig.) Ltd. (2005) 126 LRCN 982 at 990, (2005) 8 NWLR (Pt. 927) 429; Amadi v. Orisakwe (2005) 123 LRCN 1 at 3; (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt. 924) 385 and concluded that the appellants have a defence worthy of being heard and therefore they are entitled to have the judgment set aside. Mrs. Oludare also contended that the court has the right to set aside its judgment even in the undefended list procedure. She relied on Akuneziri v. Okemva (2000) 82 LRCN 3367 at 3370, (2000) 15 NWLR (Pt. 691) 526; Planwell Watershed Ltd. v. Ogala (2003) 113 LRCN 2436 at 2438, (2003) 18 NWLR (Pt. 852) 478; Tom v. Ameh (supra) and submitted that the only way the court can determine whether or not the affidavit of the appellants has disclosed a defence on the merit is to consider it and this can only happen in this case when it goes back for trial. Counsel urged the court to allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the court below.
Learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. O. O. Obono-Obla contended that the appellants defaulted in filing a defence on the merit to the claim of the respondent as enjoined by the provisions of Order 23 rule 3(1) of the Akwa Ibom High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules and the trial Judge was right in entering judgment in favour of the respondent. It was also his contention that the trial Judge was right in dismissing the application seeking for an order setting aside the judgment on the ground that it was a judgment on the merits. Counsel pointed out that the trial Judge was correct when he held that he no longer possess the jurisdiction to hear the application brought by the appellants for the judgment to be set aside and the matter be retried. Mr. Obono-Obla submitted that the provisions of Orders 2 rules 1 and 47 and rule 1 of the Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules are inapplicable to the facts of this case. He also contended that a judgment obtained in the undefended list is one on the merits and cannot be set aside except where it is proved that the judgment is a nullity, in which case the trial court which gave the judgment can also set it aside. He referred to Mark v. Eke (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt.865) 54.
He further submitted that the appellants did not do what is expected of them after they were served with the writ of summons, they were required to file a notice of intention to defend and an affidavit disclosing a defence on the merit. However, the appellants did not do that, rather, they chose to file a bare notice to defend without an affidavit disclosing a defence on the merits. Counsel submitted that the appellants not having filed an affidavit disclosing a defence, the trial court had no option but to enter judgment for the respondent. He relied on the cases of Ataguba & Co. v. Gura (Nig.) Ltd. (2000) FWLR (Pt.24) 1522 at 1532 – 1533; Alale v. Olu (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt.71) 119, (2000) FWLR (Pt. 23) 1294 at 1299; Ogbaegbe v. F.B.N. Plc. (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt.957) 357 at 363 and submitted that the procedure under the undefended list is different and it is a special procedure designed to assist in the speedy and quick dispensation of justice in matters that have to do with the recovery of debt or liquidated monetary claims. He submitted that the cases of Planwell v. Ogala (supra) and Busari v. Oseni (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt.237) 557 cited by the appellants to reinforce their proposition that the court below had jurisdiction to set aside its judgment, were markedly different. Mr. Obla concluded that reliance on Order 37 rule 9 of the Akwa Ibom High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules by the appellants is misleading because the judgment obtained by the respondent was not as a result of failure of the appellants to appear in court. He pointed out that the appellants were duly served with the process of the court. They appeared in court in answer to the summons but they refused and failed to discharge the duty and responsibility placed on them by law to file a defence to the claim of the respondent.
I have carefully considered and reflected on the issues for determination formulated by the parties in this appeal. Though the issues formulated by the parties are substantially similar, I find the respondent’s issue more elegant, precise and comprehensive. I, therefore, adopt and rely on it in the determination of this appeal.
The appellants filed two grounds of appeal in their notice of appeal but in their brief of argument they formulated no issue in respect of ground 1 and no argument was advanced or proffered thereto. For a ground of appeal to be relevant, an issue must be raised from it, where no issue is raised from or predicated on the ground of appeal, it is deemed to be abandoned and liable to be struck out. See Ibiyemi v. F.B.N. Plc. (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt.848) 196; Akibu v. Oduntan (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt.685) 446; Iweka v. S.C.O.A. Nig. Ltd. (2000) 7 NWLR (Pt.664) 325 and Godwin v. Christ Apostolic Church (1998) 12 SCNJ 213 at 225; (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt. 584) 162. That being the case, ground 1 of the grounds of appeal having been abandoned is hereby struck out.
Presently, the instant appeal is limited, confined and restricted to the very narrow compass of whether or not a judgment on the undefended list procedure can be set aside. It is settled law that a court of law reserves the right to set aside its judgment which was given otherwise than on the merit upon good grounds shown. See Tom v. Ameh (supra). In Mohammed v. Husseini (1998) 14 NWLR (Pt.584) 108, (1998) 12 SCN3 136, the Supreme Court held thus:-
“The principles in respect of the right of a Court to set aside a default judgment is that unless and until the court has pronounced a judgment on merit or by consent it retains the power to set aside its own default judgment. The power to do so is discretionary and that the discretion has to be exercised judiciously … ” See also Teno Eng. v. Adisa (supra).
However, we are dealing with a judgment entered in an undefended list procedure, which is quite different from default judgment in the ordinary civil proceedings. The undefended list procedure is a truncated form of the ordinary civil hearing peculiar to Nigeria adversary system where the ordinary hearing is rendered unnecessary due in the main to the absence of an issue to be tried or the quantum of the plaintiff’s claim disputed to necessitate such hearing. The procedure is designed to expedite the hearing of a suit for a debt or liquidated money demand and to ensure a quick dispensation of justice to prevent sham defences. See Ogbaegbe v. F.B.N. Plc. (supra). The procedure under the undefended list procedure is different. It is a special procedure provided for under the Rules of Court, particularly Order 23 of the Akwa lbom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1989.
It is not in dispute that the suit of the respondent was heard under the undefended list procedure and the appellants admittedly were duly served with the writ of summons and other processes pursuant to Order 23 rules 1 and 2 of the Rules. See page 24 of the record. Of particular interest is the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3(1) of the said Rules and it provides:-
“If the party served with the writ of summons and affidavit delivers to the Registrar, not less than five days before the day fixed for hearing, a notice in writing that he intends to defend the suit, together with an affidavit disclosing a defence on the merit, the court may give him leave to defend upon such terms as the court may think just.”
By virtue of the above provision the appellants were obliged to deliver their notice of intention to defend the suit together with an affidavit disclosing a defence. It is clear that the notice of an intention to defend and the affidavit disclosing a defence must be filed simultaneously. There is no provision for filing the intention to defend separately from the affidavit disclosing a defence as was done by the appellants in the instant case on appeal.
On 1/4/04, when the case came up for hearing the appellants were in court and they were duly represented by Mr. Ekanem-Ekanem. On that day he filed only a notice of intention to defend without an affidavit disclosing the appellants’ defence. Ordinarily when a case under the undefended list comes before the court for the first time it is not for mention but for hearing. See Bell Thomas Hotels Ltd. v. Sebi Furniture Ltd. (1989) 12 SCNJ 171; (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 123) 523. However, the appellants applied for an adjournment to regularize their position, namely, to file an affidavit disclosing their defence to the respondent’s claim. The trial court graciously granted it and the matter was adjourned to 28/4/04 for hearing.
On the 28/4/04, the court did not sit because the trial Judge was bereaved. Mr. Ekanem-Ekanem for the appellants was absent but he was courteous enough to write for an adjournment. The case was adjourned to 31/5/04, one of the dates suggested by the appellants’ counsel in his letter of adjournment. See pages 25 to 26a of the record. On the 31/5/04 when the court resumed sitting the respondent appeared in person but the appellants and their counsel were absent from court and this time there was no letter written to explain their absence. More seriously, the appellants as at 31/5/04 did not file any affidavit disclosing their defence as required by the rules. At that stage the trial court had no option than to enter judgment on the undefended list procedure in favour of the respondent in accordance with the provisions of Order 23 rule 4 of the Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules which provides thus:-
“Where any defendant neglects to deliver the notice of defence and affidavit prescribed by rule 3(1) or is not given leave to defend the case, the suit shall be heard as an undefended suit, and judgment given thereon, without calling upon the plaintiff to summon witnesses before the court to prove his case formally.”
It appears that the appellants after filing a bare notice of an intention to defend went into slumber without filing their affidavit disclosing their defence. It is significant to state here clearly that from 1/4/04 when the case first came up for hearing to the 31/5/04 when judgment was delivered is about 60 days and yet the appellants bluntly refused or neglected to file their affidavit disclosing whatever defence they had to the claim of the respondent. This is a clear case of indolence and non-challance on the part of the appellants. Equity does not aid the indolent.
The appellants upon service of the writ placed under the undefended list are required to file a notice of intention to defend together with a supporting affidavit, setting out the grounds of their defence. In this case the appellants flagrantly violated the provisions of Order 23 rule 3(1) of the Rules when they did not file their supporting affidavit disclosing their defence. Their filing of a bare notice of an intention to defend is grossly incompetent, as it had no legs to stand. Without the supporting affidavit disclosing the defence of the appellants the notice of intention to defend is worthless and has no legal effect. In fact, it would have benefited the appellants more if they had filed an affidavit disclosing their defence without notice of an intention to defend. The affidavit disclosing a defence would have been more useful to the appellants. The notice of intention to defend cannot stand alone. For it to be of any benefit to the appellants it must be filed together with a supporting affidavit disclosing their defence.
Where the defendant to an action in the undefended list procedure fails to file a notice of intention to defend together with an affidavit disclosing the defence, that means he has no defence to the plaintiff’s claim. Such a failure amounts to an admission of the plaintiff’s claim and as facts admitted require no further proof; the plaintiff is therefore not called upon to prove his case formally. This is in consonance with the spirit and letters of Order 23 Rule 4 of the Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules.
In Ataguba & Co. v. Gura (supra) at pages 1532 – 1533 of the report, the court held thus:
“Where a defendant has not disclosed facts constituting any real defence to the plaintiffs claim, he should not be allowed to indulge in delay tactics aimed at gaining time and postponing the performance of his obligation to the plaintiff. Under such circumstance, he should not be granted leave to defend and judgment should be entered in favour of the plaintiff.”
Also in Tahir v. J. Udeagbala Holdings Ltd. (2004) 2 NWLR (Pt.857) page 438 at 451 – 452, the court held thus:-
“Where a trial court finds that the appellants have no defence to the respondent’s suit which has been placed under the undefended list, the court has no option other than to enter judgment for the plaintiff for the sum of money that it claimed.”
See also Alale v. Olu (supra) and Daniels v. Insight Eng. Co. Ltd. (2002) 10 NWLR (Pt.775) page 231 at 249. That being the case there was no defence for the trial court to consider and the court had no option than to enter judgment for the respondent. See Eastern Plastics Ltd. v. Synco West African Ltd. (1999) 1 NWLR (Pt.587) 456; Jipreze v. Okonkwo (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt.62) 737 and Macaulay v. NAL Merchant Bank Ltd. (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 144) 283.
It is well settled law that a judgment entered under the undefended list procedure is a judgment on the merits and not a judgment entered in default, therefore, it cannot be set aside through the same procedure prescribed by the rules of court for setting aside a default judgment. A judgment entered under the undefended list, is not a default judgment, it is a judgment on the merit and a trial court will have no jurisdiction to set it aside even if there was a mistake, unless the judgment is a nullity. See Mark vs. Eke (supra).
In Daniels v. Insight Eng. Co. Ltd. (supra) at page 249, Onnoghen, JCA, (as he then was) held thus:-
“A judgment entered on the undefended list is a judgment entered on its merit and not a judgment in default. Such judgment can therefore only be set aside on appeal.”
Now, at the time the appellants filed their application to set aside the judgment, the trial court had no jurisdiction. It is not possible nor permissible for the trial court to sit on appeal over its own judgment and annul it and set it aside and thereafter open the case up again for the appellants to file their supporting affidavit disclosing their defence. The trial Judge is now functus officio and has no jurisdiction to re-open the case. The learned trial Judge in its ruling at page 66 of the record held thus:-
” … They want this court to sit over its earlier decision, annul it and open the case up again for them to file their possible defences (exhibit B) for the consideration of the court. That will make nonsense of the court and the entire court process (sic) adjudication. It will apply (sic) to aid the indolence of the appellants and/or counsel. I have become functus officio in that case and cannot re-open it. Whatever the merit in the alleged defence (exhibit B) which the applicants did not file or did not bring to the attention of the court at the time of entering judgment… ”
The phrase ‘functus officio” means a task performed, fulfilling the function, discharging the office or accomplishing the purpose and thereby becoming of no further force or authority. See Anyaegbunam v. A.-G., Anambra State (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt.710) 532; Onyemobi v. President O.C.C. (1995) 3 NWLR (Pt.381) 50 and Ukachukwu v. Uba (2005) 18 NWLR (Pt.956) 1 at 60. And in Mohammed v. Husseini (supra), the Supreme Court held at page 163 – 164 that:-
“The latin expression Functus Officio simply means “task performed”. Therefore applying it to the judiciary, it means that a judge cannot give a decision or make an order on a matter twice. In other words, once a judge gives a decision or makes an order on a matter, he no longer has the competence or jurisdiction to give another decision or order on the same matter … a judge is functus officio if he gives judgment on the merits … ”
A court is said to be functus officio in respect of a matter if the court has fulfilled or accomplished its function in respect of that matter and it lacks potency to review, re-open or revisit the matter. Once a court delivers its judgment on a matter it cannot revisit or review the said judgment except under certain conditions mentioned elsewhere in this judgment.
More importantly, a court lacks jurisdiction to determine an issue where it is functus officio in respect of the issue or where the proceedings relating to the issue is an abuse of court process. See Ukachukwu v. Uba (supra) at pages 62 – 63.
A Court may set aside its judgment in any of the following instances and circumstances:-
(a) Where the judgment is obtained by fraud or deceit either in the court, or of one or more of the parties.
(b) When the judgment is a nullity.
(c) When it is obvious that the court was misled into giving judgment under a mistaken belief that the parties consented to it.
(d) Where the judgment was given in the absence of jurisdiction.
(e) Where the procedure adopted was such as to deprive the decision or judgment of the character of a legitimate adjudication.
In the instant case on appeal, none of the conditions warranting a court to set aside its judgment exist. See Igwe v. Kalu (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt.787) 435 and Ukachukwu v. Uba (supra) pages 60, 61 – 62.
The appellants are not complaining that the judgment was obtained by fraud perpetrated by one of the parties. There is no complain that there was a mistake by the court. The appellants did not complain that there was no service of the court processes on them. The judgment of the trial court is not a nullity. The judgment was not given in the absence of jurisdiction. The court was not misled into giving judgment under a mistaken belief that the parties consented to. Lastly, the procedure adopted was not such as to deprive the decision or judgment of the character of a legitimate adjudication. The judgment of the trial court has no feature that would render it a nullity. In the instant appeal, the complain of the appellants was that they had a defence which they did not raise before the trial court when they had the opportunity. The judgment of the trial court having been delivered on the merits pursuant to the provisions of Order 23 rule 4 of the rules cannot be set aside by the trial Court. The trial court was therefore perfectly correct and right when he dismissed the application of the appellants.
Before concluding this judgment I feel obliged to consider the provisions of the rules which the appellants relied upon in this application.
Firstly, the appellants referred and relied on the provisions of Order 2 rule 1(1) and (2) of the Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1989, and it provides thus:-
“(1) Where in beginning or purporting to begin any proceedings or at any stage in the course of or in connection with any proceedings, there has, by reason of anything done or left undone, been a failure to comply with the requirements of these rules whether in respect of time, place, manner, form or content or in any other respect, the failure may be treated as an irregularity and if so treated, will not nullify the proceedings, or any document, judgment or order therein.
(2) The court may on the ground that there has been such a failure as mentioned in paragraph (1) and on such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks just, set aside either wholly or in part the proceedings in which the failure occurred, any step taken in those proceedings or any document, judgment or order therein or it may exercise its powers under these rules to allow such amendments (if any) to be made and to make such order (if any) dealing with the proceedings generally as it thinks fit.”
The wordings in Order 2 rule 1(1) and (2) of the Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules are very clear, simple, unequivocal and unambiguous, therefore they must be given their literal, natural and grammatical meaning. See Atuyeye v. Ashamu (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.49) 267; Araka v. Egbue (2003) 17 NWLR (Pt.848) 1 at 18 – 19, 20 – 21, 23 – 24 and 25 – 26. From the clear provisions of Order 2 rule 1(1) and (2) of the rules it is obvious that they do not apply to the facts and circumstances of this instant appeal. They are relevant where there is a proceeding pending before the court and not when proceeding or trial has been concluded and judgment of the court delivered. Here we are dealing with an application to set aside a judgment of the court on the merits. The trial Judge is now functus officio and there is nothing left for the trial Judge to do now for the appellants.
The appellants also sought refuge under Order 37 rule 9 of the same Rules. The Rule provides thus:
“Any judgment obtained where one party does not appear at the trial may be set aside by the court upon such terms as may seem just, upon an application made within six days after the trial or within such longer period as the court may allow for good cause shown.”
Clearly, the above rule is irrelevant and therefore inapplicable to the facts of this case on appeal. The judgment of the trial court in the instant appeal was not based on the default of appearance of the appellants, rather it was based on the fact that the appellants did not file a supporting affidavit disclosing their defence in the undefended list procedure. The judgment of the trial court was entered for the respondent pursuant to the provisions of Order 23 rule 4 of the said Rules. That being the case, the cases of Tom v. Ameh (supra) and Akuneziri v. Okenwa (supra) are quite distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of this case on appeal. They are therefore inapplicable. The same goes for Planwell v. Ogala (supra). In that case, the Supreme Court held at page 2438 ratio 4 thus:-
“This matter comes under the undefended list which is subject to the summary judgment procedure. It is without dispute the law that any judgment given against a party under that procedure whereof the party did not appear at the hearing, may be set aside under Order 37 rule 9.” (Italics mine).
Again, I repeat, this is not a case of the appellants not appearing at the hearing. So, though the case is very illuminating and sound, it is not applicable to this case.
The appellants also relied on the provisions of Order 47 rule 1 of the rules, the Rule provides as follows:-
“Subject to particular rules, the court may in all causes and matters make any order which it considers necessary for doing justice, whether such order has been expressly asked for by the person entitled to the benefit of the order or not.”
The above rule is the general provision which the court is expected to observe in all causes and matters to make such orders it considers necessary for the purpose of ensuring that justice is done whether expressly asked for by the person entitled or not. Although, Order 47 rule 1 is quite wide and extensive, it has no relevance to the facts and circumstances of the instant case on appeal because the proceedings before the trial court have been concluded and judgment delivered. The trial Judge is now functus officio. The provisions of Orders 2 rule 1(1) and (2) and 37 rule 9 and 47 rule 1 of the Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules are only relevant when proceedings is pending before the court of trial and the trial court is seised with jurisdiction. In this case the trial court is functus officio and the court has no jurisdiction to hear or determine any issue in the matter. Reliance on the provisions of the aforesaid rules in the circumstances is a futile attempt to flog a dead horse that can no longer run. Alternatively, it is like applying medicine after death. The appellants relied on Order 2 rule 1(1) and (2), then Orders 37 rule 9 and then 47 rule 1 of the said Rules. It appears the appellants are fishing in troubled waters and running from pillar to post.
It is from this backdrop that I reach the conclusion that there is no merit whatsoever in this appeal. I, therefore, resolve the lone issue formulated for determination in favour of the respondent and against the appellants.
Accordingly, this appeal is devoid of substance and it has no merit. I, therefore, dismiss this appeal. I affirm the judgment of the trial Judge delivered on 19/8/2004 in Suit No. HU/199/2001. Costs is assessed and affixed at N10,000.00 in favour of the respondent and against the appellants.
Appeal dismissed.
Other Citations: (2006)LCN/1983(CA)
