Prince Sikiru Adebayo Sobamowo V. Prince Alhaji Waheed Elemuren & Ors (2008)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
AUGIE, J.C.A.
The Elemuren of Emuren Stool is a recognized Chieftaincy in Ogun State with three Ruling Houses from which the Elemuren of Emuren is selected – Owuyo, Osiyewo & Adebo. After the death of Oba Abass Adeola from the Osiyewo Ruling House, the 2nd respondent, who was the Secretary to Sagamu Local Government, issued a Public Notice dated 17th October, 1994, part of it reads –
“The Head of Adebo Ruling House is hereby required… to summon a meeting of the family within 14 days from the date of this notice ….for the purpose of selecting a candidate to fill the vacancy.” (Italics mine)
Pursuant to the said public Notice, 177 members of the Adebo Ruling House attended the family meeting, which held at the Olomimeji Community High School, Emuren on the 29th October, 1994. A number of disputes arose and were settled at the meeting, but in the main, 137 members supported a motion NOT to present a candidate to the Kingmakers, while 40 members supported the nomination of the appellant as a candidate for the vacant stool. At the end of the day, the Adebo Ruling House did not forward the name of the appellant within 14 days as stipulated by section 15(1) of the Chiefs Law, and the appellant instituted an action at the Sagamu High Court claiming-
- A declaration that the purported decision of Adebo Ruling House meeting held on 29/10/1994 NOT to present the plaintiff as a candidate for the vacant stool of Elemuren of Emuren is null and void and of no effect.
- An order directing the Adebo Ruling House to present the plaintiff as a candidate to fill the vacant stool of Elemuren to the Kingmakers of Emuren.
- An injunction restraining the 3rd defendant and or any person succeeding him as secretary to Sagamu Local Government from calling any other Ruling House of Emuren to fill the vacant stool of Emuren pending the final determination of this action.
- An injunction restraining the 4th defendant from approving the appointment of any person as Elemuren pending the final determination of this action.
At the trial, the appellant called three witnesses and testified himself as PW4; the 1st defendant, who later died and was struck out as a party by this court, adopted the evidence of the appellant and his witnesses: the 2nd defendant, who is now the 1st respondent in this appeal, testified as DW6 and called five other witnesses: while the 3rd defendant, now the 2nd respondent, testified on his own behalf and did not call any other witnesses. At the close of pleadings, three core issues were presented for resolution by the lower court-
(1) Whether the appellant is a member of Adebo Ruling House?
(2) Who was the Head of Adebo Ruling House at the material time between the 1st and 2nd defendant?
(3) Whether the decision of the majority members of Adebo Ruling House at the meeting of 29/10/94 not to nominate a candidate was valid in law?
The 1st issue was resolved in favour of the appellant as the lower court held that he and 1st defendant “are members of Adebo Family”. The 2nd issue was resolved in favour of the 1st respondent as the lower court accepted his evidence and that of his witnesses that he was the Head of Adebo Family. In resolving the 3rd issue in favour of the 1st respondent, the lower court relying on section 53 (a) of the Interpretation Law, Laws of Ogun State, held-
” … On the whole, it is my considered view, and I hold, that the decision taken by 137 members of the family not to nominate a candidate comes within the contemplation of section 15 of the Chiefs Law … I hold that the decision taken by the 137 members of 29/10/94 was validly made”.
Aggrieved, the appellant appealed to this court with a notice of appeal containing two grounds of appeal, with ground two complaining against the lower court’s decision that the 1st respondent was the head of the family.
However, the notice of appeal was later amended with the leave of this court and therein the appellant focused his grievance with the leave of this court’s decision on the 3rd Issue, and dropped his complaint against that on issue 2. Briefs of arguments were duly filed and in the appellant’s brief prepared by Taiye Onafowokan, Esq., the appellant formulated two issues as follows –
- Whether or not the lower court was right when it held that the decision taken by 137 members of the family not to nominate a candidate comes within the contemplation of section 15 of the Chiefs Law, Cap. 20, Laws of Ogun State.
- Whether or not the lower court was right when it held that plaintiff’s nomination by a minority of those present, 40 of them, has not been unanimously made and has not been validly nominated by a majority of the Adebo Ruling House as their candidate to fill the vacant stool of Emuren.
The 1st respondent adopted the appellant’s issues in his brief settled by Adetunji Onabawo, Esq. The 2nd – 4th respondents did same in their own brief settled by J.K. Omotosho, Esq., but they couched issue 2 differently.
“Whether or not the lower court was right when it held that plaintiff’s nomination by a minority of those present, (40 of them) has not been unanimously made and consequently plaintiff has not been validly nominated by a majority of the Adebo Ruling House as their candidate to fill the vacant stool of Emuren.”
In my view, the two issues are intertwined and will be considered together, particularly as the appellant argued them together in his brief. To start with, the outcome of this appeal is hinged on the proper interpretation and application of section 15(1) of the Chiefs Law of Ogun State, which provide:-
“Where a vacancy occurs in a Ruling House Chieftaincy and a declaration has effect with respect to that Chieftaincy:
(a) The Secretary of the competent council shall announce the name of the Ruling House entitled according to customary law to provide a candidate or candidates, as the case may be, to fill the vacancy.
(b) Not later than 14 days after the announcement by the Secretary, the members of the Ruling House … shall submit the name of a candidate or the names of candidates … to the Kingmakers.
(c) If within the time prescribed by paragraph (b) of this subsection the Ruling House named in the announcement fails to submit the name or names of a candidate or candidates and there is more than one Ruling House, the secretary shall make an announcement accordingly and the Ruling House next entitled according to the order of rotation contained in the declaration and so on according to the same procedure until the name of a candidate or candidates is submitted to the Kingmakers.”
Clauses (iii) & (v) of the declaration of the Customary Law Regulating the selection of the Elemuren of Emuren, which was admitted as exhibit E, says –
(iii) The persons who may be proposed as candidates by a Ruling House entitled to fill a vacancy in the Chieftaincy shall be:
(a) Members of the Ruling House
(b) Of the male or female line at will, with education and\or character.
(v) The Ruling House whose turn it is to provide a candidate shall nominate at a family meeting summoned for the purpose a candidate for the Chieftaincy to be presented by the Family Head to the Kingmakers. (Italics mine)
It is the appellant’s contention in this appeal that the word “shall” is clear in both section 15(1) (b) of the Chiefs Law and Clause (v) of the Registered Declaration, thus the lower court introduced its own words when it said-
“In my view, nomination of a candidate includes taking a decision on the nomination.”
It was further submitted that the intention of the law makers is for the family to nominate a candidate and not to decide whether or not to nominate, citing Olanrewaju v. Governor of Oyo State (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 265) 835; (1992) 23 NSCC (Pt. 3) 389; Afolabi v. Governor of Oyo State (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.9) 734; (1985) 2 N.S.C.C. 1151, Okumagba v. Egbe (1965) 1 ALL NLR 62 & Ifezue v. Mbadugha (1984) 1 SCNLR 427; (1984) 5 SC 79; and that the decision of the 137 members not to nominate a candidate is not valid as they did not comply with the mandatory requirements of the Chiefs’ Law. As to the issue of waiver, it was argued that the combination of the section 15(1) and clauses (iii) & (v) of the declaration confers on each member of the Ruling House, a statutory right to nominate or be nominated, thus the question is whether the 137 members waived their right or not to nominate, citing Ariori & Ors v. Elemo & Ors. (1983) 1 SCNLR 1; (1983) NSCC (Pt. 14) 1; and that the meeting of 29/10/94 was called for the purpose of nominating a candidate, and having declared that they were not interested in nominating a candidate, the 137 members waived their rights to partake in the nomination, so the only valid exercise at the meeting is the nomination of the appellant by 40 members who exercised their rights. The 1st respondent however submitted that if subsections (1) (b) and (c) of section 15 of the Chiefs Law are read together, as is required to discover the intention of the lawmakers, it will be seen that section 15 of the said law envisages and contemplates a situation where the Ruling House may not want, or is unable to nominate a candidate.
It was further submitted that a Ruling House must have a candidate acceptable to the Ruling House or a majority thereof before it can nominate a candidate for the stool; that to interpret the said section to mean that a Ruling House must willy-nilly produce a candidate will surely lead to absurdity, citing Afolabi v. Governor of Oyo State (supra); and that under section 15(1) (b) the roles of the Secretary of the competent Council and Kingmakers are public duties which they must perform, but the Ruling House has a right to nominate which it may choose NOT to exercise and when a Ruling House chooses not to exercise that right, the provision of section 15(1)(c) applies, citing Olanrewaju case (supra). This Court was therefore urged to hold that the decision of the majority of 137 members of Adebo Ruling House not to nominate a candidate, is a valid decision in law and one contemplated by section 15(1) (c) of the Chiefs Law.
On the issue of waiver, it was argued that the appellant’s submission loses sight of the fact that the right to nominate a candidate resides in the Ruling House itself, therefore the right can only be waived by the Ruling House and not simply by a member or members, citing section 53(a) of the Interpretation Law, Adefulu & Ors. v. Oyesile & Ors. (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 122) 377 and; Oba Lipede & Ors. v. Sonekan & Ors. (1995) 1 NWLR (Pt. 374) 668, and although the appellant tried to distinguish Sonekan’s case (supra) from this one, the ratio of that case is applicable to this appeal. The 2nd- 4th respondents canvassed more or less the arguments, that the Ruling House waived its right when it failed to present a candidate B within the 14 days stipulated by the Chiefs Law, citing Adefulu v. Oyesile (supra), that the right to present a candidate is invested in the Adebo Ruling House only, which they exercised by choosing not to nominate a candidate for the stool.
On the issue of waiver, that it is the Adebo Ruling House that is vested with the right to nominate, which can be waived or exercised through unanimous or majority decision of the House, citing section 53(a) of the Interpretation Law, Adefulu v. Oyesile (supra) & Lipede v. Sonekan (supra), so the mere mention of the appellant’s name is not sufficient to submit his name, as the right to the stool is vested in the Ruling House, and not a branch thereof.
Now, it is trite law that statutes are to be construed according to the intention expressed in the statutes themselves, and if the words are unambiguous, all that is needed is to expound the word in their natural and ordinary sense – See Ayeni v. University of Ilorin (2000) E 2 NWLR (Pt. 644) 290; and Ekwnola v. C.B.N. (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt. 1000) 292 where the court further said:-
“The words of the statute alone in such a case best declare the intentions of the lawmakers. Courts will decline to read into any enactment or statute words that are not to be found there, and/or which will alter its operative effect.” (Italics mine)
The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of the lawmakers, and in performing this duty, the Court are enjoined to give adequate consideration to the words used in the Statute – see Din v. A.-G., Federation (2004) 12 NWLR (Pt. 888) 459. In other words, the best way to address the meaning and application of a statute or its provisions is to look at the very words of the provision – see Anzaku v. Gov., Nasarawa State (2005) 5 NWLR (Pt. 919) 448. In this case, it is clear from a close reading of section 15(1) of the Chiefs Law and the relevant clauses of the declaration that the sole intention of the lawmakers is to provide a framework for the selection of a candidate to fill a vacant stool. This is more than obvious from the first sentence of section 15(1) of the Chiefs Law – “Where a vacancy occurs in a Ruling House Chieftaincy” and the said section goes on to say in (a) that the Secretary shall announce the name of the Ruling House entitled to provide a candidate or candidates, as the case may be, to fill the vacancy. The Public Notice issued by the 2nd respondent is titled – “Filling of the vacancy in the Elemuren of Emuren Chieftaincy” and the 1st paragraph reads –
“The public is hereby notified that a vacancy has occurred in the Elemuren of Emuren Chieftaincy. In accordance with the approved registered declaration regulating the selection to the office of the Elemuren of Emuren, it is the turn of Adebo Ruling House to nominate a candidate to fill the vacant stool.” (Italics mine)
The 2nd paragraph of the Public Notice (exhibit F) is more specific, it says –
“The Head of Adebo Ruling House is hereby required under section 15 of the Chiefs Law of Ogun State, 1978 (Cap. 20) and the 1957 Registered Declaration to summon a meeting of the family within 14 days from the date of this notice (i.e. on or before Monday 31st October, 1994) for the purpose of selecting a candidate to fill the vacancy. After the meeting, the name of the candidate so selected will be presented to the Kingmakers by the Family Head.” (Italics mine)
On the top of that, the full title of the Registered Declaration is:
“Declaration made under section 4(2) of the Chiefs Law, 1957, of the Customary Law Regulating the selection to the Elemuren of Emuren Chieftaincy”
And it says in clause (v) that the Ruling House whose turn it is to provide a candidate shall nominate a candidate at a family meeting summoned for that purpose. It is trite that in certain amount, commonsense must be applied in construing statutes, and the object of the statute has to be considered – see Elabanjo v. Dawodu (2006) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1001) 76. Another principle is that the construction most agreeable to justice and reason must be adopted, and this position is well set out in Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, thus:-
“In determining either the general object of the legislature, or the meaning of its language in any particular passage, it is obvious that the intention which appears to be most in accord with convenience, reason, justice and principles should, in all cases of doubtful significance, be presumed to be the true one.”
In this case, it was the turn of the Adebo Ruling House to provide a candidate for the stool after the death of Oba Abass Adeola from Osiyewo Ruling House, and the only reason they were summoned to the meeting of 29/10/94 was to nominate a candidate to fill the vacant stool, nothing more and nothing less.
Contrary to the argument proffered by the 1st respondent that section 15 of the Chiefs Law “envisages and has in contemplation a situation where the Ruling House may not, for a variety of reasons want, or is unable to nominate a candidate as required of it by the enabling law”, there is absolutely nothing in the Chiefs Law or the Registered Declaration that gives room for the members of the Adebo Ruling House to decide NOT to nominate a candidate.
The whole essence of the Law and Declaration is to provide solutions to the recurring litigations over Chieftaincy disputes in this part of the country, and this standpoint is aptly explained by Karibi-Whyte, JSC in Olanrewaju v. Gov., Oyo State (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt. 265) 335, wherein he said –
“This is yet another of the recurring litigations over chieftaincy disputes in the Southern part of this country. Several efforts have been made to control litigations on chieftaincy by means of legislation and through administrative regulations. The jurisdiction of the courts have been ousted and restored; the categories of chiefs have been classified and defined. Chieftaincy declarations have been encouraged to prescribe the customary law on the matter. The problem remains G hydra-headed, insoluble and un-abating.”
In this case, I have to agree with the appellant that the problem remains hydra-headed, insoluble and un-abating indeed, which is why “some majority members of a Ruling House whose turn it is to nominate a candidate to fill a vacant stool, resolved not to nominate a candidate”. This is an odd situation and the appellant and this Court are not the only ones to find this unusual. The Commissioner for Special Duties, in the office of the Military Administrator of Ogun State, expressed the same sentiment in a letter dated 30th September, 1994 addressed to the 2nd respondent (exhibit V), it reads Filling of the vacant Chieftaincy of the Elemuren of Emuren-
“Kindly refer to your letter… it is observed that this appointment exercise is likely to be long and complex one and therefore every step in the process must be faultless. The decision taken at the nomination meeting held by Adebo Ruling House on 1st May, 1994 is an unusual one, having agreed not to present a candidate for the vacant stool. Unfortunately, since the meeting was also attended by children and the notice appeared not to have reached all interested members of the Ruling
House it stands vitiated.”
The 2nd respondent testified as DW7 that after he received the above letter, he read it to the 1st respondent as the head of the family, and thereafter issued a fresh public notice (exhibit F), which led to the meeting of 29/10/94. He attended the meeting as an observer and testified as to what happened –
“When the meeting started, the Head of family was inviting those present to contribute to the discussions at the meeting. The first set of people who spoke stated that they were not interested in choosing any Oba from their family. Another person among those who are interested was invited to speak. He stated that they were interested and they nominated Sikiru Sobamowo (appellant)… There were 137 members who voted in favour of non-presentation of a candidate while 40 voted infavour of presentation of a candidate “, (Italics mine)
In answering its question whether the appellant had been validly nominated unanimously by the Ruling House as the candidate to fill the vacancy, the lower court relied on section 53(a) of the Interpretation Law that says –
“Whenever any act or thing is by any written law required to be done, or any decision taken, by a body or persons consisting of not less than three, such act or thing may be done, or such decision taken, in the name of that body by a majority of those persons”.
And which was interpreted in Lipede v. Sonekan (supra), to hold as follows –
“The 177 members were present at the nomination meeting. It would be different matter if the majority had been invited and had stayed away; in that case they could be taken as having waived their right to be present to take a decision on the nomination of a candidate. ”
Now, the term waiver means the voluntary relinquishing or abandonment, expressed or implied, of a legal right or advantage. The party alleged to have waived a right must have had both knowledge of the existing right and the intention of forgoing it – see Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Ed. See also Ariori & Ors v. Elemo & Ors (supra), where Eso, JSC stated as follows at pg. 8 –
“The concept of waiver must be one that presupposes that the person who is to enjoy a benefit or who has the choice of two benefit, is fully aware of his right to the benefit or benefits, but he either neglects to exercise his right to the benefit, or where he has a choice of two, he decides to take one but not both. The exercise has to be a voluntary act. …When a right is conferred solely for the benefit of an individual, there should be no problem as to the extent to which he can waive such right. The right is for his benefit. He is sui juris. He is under no legal disability. He should be able to forgo the right or in other words waive it either completely or partially, depending on his free choice. The extent to which he has foregone his right would be a matter of fact and each case will depend on its peculiar facts.”
(Italics mine)
In this case, the appellant submitted that the concept of waiver was not properly considered by the lower court, and that it wrongly applied section 53 of the Interpretation Law and the ratio in Lipede v. Sonekanto this one. In that case of Lipede v. Sonekan (supra), the Supreme Court held –
“Since … the 3rd appellant is neither from the Balogun nor from the Jaguna lines of Chiefs in Itoko … His purported appointment to that stool illegal, null and void …. Apart from (that) the appointment of the 3rd appellant was so characterized by some irregularities…
One of such … is that only 4 out of 12 Chiefs … eligible to nominate an Ashipa Egba appointed 3rd appellant. That irregularity ought to vitiate the appointment. For, as provided in section 53 (a) of the Interpretation Law of Ogun State … In the instant case, the decision was not taken by the majority of 12 members constituting the Kingmakers in the purported appointment of 3rd appellant as Ashipa Egba … (Italics mine)
Ratio decidendi means “the reason for deciding”. It represents the reasoning or principle upon which a case is decided. It is the legal principle formulated by the court, which is necessary in the determination of the issues raised in the case – see Mohammed v. Lawal (2006) 9 NWLR (Pt. 985) 400. Yes, the Supreme Court held in Lipede v. Sonekan (supra) that the decision to appoint the 3rd appellant was not taken by the majority of 12 members constituting the Kingmakers eligible to nominate an Ashipa Egba, and at first glance that case may appear to be on all fours with the instant case, but a closer look at the facts and circumstances show that they are distinguishable.
In this case, the 1st respondent in his evidence as DW6, testified as follows –
“The decision of my family at that meeting is that Adebo Ruling House is not prepared to present a candidate.
…. After my family had their decision not a present candidate, another person in the hall stood up and said that some other persons in the hall have a candidate. The decision of members of my family was reached by voting. The result of the voting was 137 for those who do not wish to present a candidate and 40 voted in favour of presenting a candidate.”
In other words, 137 members elected not to nominate any candidate at all. Obviously, the only conclusion one can reach is that the 137 members waived their rights as members of the Adebo Ruling House to nominate a candidate. It would have been a different matter altogether if the 40 members had nominated the appellant and the 137 members objected to his nomination, then the decision in Lipede v. Sonekan (supra) would apply to this case, but in this situation, they elected not to nominate any candidate at all even before the 40 members decided to nominate the appellant as their candidate. I wholeheartedly agree with the appellant that the said 137 members were aware of their rights and chose not to exercise it, and I must add that if the other 40 members decided to do what the meeting was called for and nominated the appellant as their candidate for the vacant stool, the 137 members who chose to abstain from nominating a candidate have no cause to prevail or have their way merely because they are in the majority and the other 40 in the minority. By electing not to nominate a candidate for the vacant stool at the meeting summoned for that purpose, the 137 members waived their rights as members of the Adebo Ruling House to nominate one, and the lower court was definitely wrong, in my view, to find in their favour. The two issues formulated by the appellant in this appeal are resolved in his favour and the result is that this appeal succeeds and is thus allowed. The judgment of the lower court delivered on 19/3/98 is therefore set aside, and the appellant is hereby granted the two declaratory reliefs he claimed.
There will be no order as to costs.
Other Citations: (2008)LCN/2646(CA)
