Home » Nigerian Cases » Supreme Court » Professor Dupe Olatubosun Vs Texaco Nigeria Plc & Anor (2012) LLJR-SC

Professor Dupe Olatubosun Vs Texaco Nigeria Plc & Anor (2012) LLJR-SC

Professor Dupe Olatubosun Vs Texaco Nigeria Plc & Anor (2012)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

MAHMUD MOHAMMED, J.S.C.

This interlocutory appeal is against the Ruling of the Court of Appeal Ibadan delivered on 9th July, 2003 dismissing the Appellant/Applicant’s application for extension of time to perfect the conditions of appeal imposed by the trial High court on the Appellant who was also the Appellant/Applicant in the Court of Appeal. Dissatisfied with that decision, the Appellant is now on a further appeal to this court on three grounds of appeal contained in his Notice of Appeal filed on 23rd July, 2003 from which the following issues were distilled in the Appellant’s brief of argument. The issues framed in the alternative are:-

“i. Whether the Appellant who is seeking extension of time to perfect the conditions of appeal imposed by the High Court is required under the Court Rules to exhibit the Notice of Appeal to his application.

OR

Whether the failure of the Appellant to exhibit his Notice of Appeal to his application for extension of time to perfect the conditions of appeal imposed by the High Court is fatal to his application.

  1. Whether from the affidavit evidence Placed before the Court, the Court below was right in refusing the Appellant’s application for extension of time to perfect the conditions of appeal by the High Court”

In the Respondents brief of argument, only one issue was identified from the Appellant’s 3 grounds of appeal. The issue as identified is:-

“Whether or not the Supreme Court will interfere with the exercise of judicial discretion by the Court of Appeal to refuse to grant extension of time to Perfect conditions of appeal in order to enable the Appellant to prosecute this appeal having regard to all the circumstances of the case”

The Appellant was the plaintiff at the High court of Justice Ibadan where he filed a case on 6th October, 2002 against the Respondents who were the Defendants in the action, challenging the termination of the operator’s Agreement dated October 1997 between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent/Defendant. On 22nd October, 2002, the Appellant as Plaintiff filed an application for interlocutory injunction restraining the Defendants, their agents, servants and or privies from taking over the running and management of the petrol station in dispute or transferring same to anybody whatsoever pending the determination of the substantive action. The application was heard and refused by the High court in its Ruling of 21st November, 2003. Dissatisfied with this decision of the High court, the Appellant then appealed against it to the Court of Appeal where he at the same time filed another application for injunction on 25th November, 2002, pending the determination of the appeal. Following the failure of the Appellant/plaintiff to perfect the conditions of appeal imposed by the trial High court within the time prescribed, the Appellant applied to the Court of Appeal for an extension of time to perfect the conditions of appeal imposed by the trial High court. This application was heard and dismissed by the Court of Appeal thereby giving rise to the present appeal which I shall determine on the issues as framed in the Appellant’s brief of argument.

Arguing the first issue for determination, learned counsel to the Appellant quoted from the Ruling of the Court of Appeal and argued that the court was wrong in dismissing the application on the ground that the application was not accompanied by the Notice of Appeal, particularly when that court held that it was the provisions of order 3 Rule 4(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2002, that applied to the application. Learned counsel explained that the Appellant’s application was brought under order 3 Rule 4(1) and 11 of the Rules of that court; that since by the Notice of compliance Exhibit ‘A’ to the application the Appellant was given 30 days to comply with the conditions of appeal, the Appellant having failed to comply with the conditions of appeal within the time prescribed, all he was required to do under the rules was to give reasons for the failure to comply without exhibiting his Notice of Appeal; that the application is not the same as the one under order 3 Rule 4(2) of the Rules of the Court of Appeal; that what was required of the Appellant/Applicant under Order 4 Rule 1 of the Rules, was to justify reasons for the failure to comply with the conditions of appeal within the time given by the Registrar of the High Court as contained in the guiding principles stated in Long John v. Black (1998) 6 NWLR (Pt.555) 524 at 542, Learned Counsel further submitted that the requirements for the grant of an application for extension of time to perfect the conditions of appeal under Order 3 Rule 20 of the Court of Appeal Rules are the same with the requirements for extension of time within which to file brief which are quite different from the requirements under order 3 Rule 20(a) of the Rules where the appeal had been dismissed and application is brought to restore the appeal on the cause list. Learned Counsel emphasized that even where the certificate of non-compliance had been issued and the appeal is listed for dismissal, the appellate Courts have always exercised their discretion by extending time within which to comply with the conditions of appeal imposed by trial courts as was done in Soleye v. Sonibare (2002) FWLR (Pt.95) 221 at 235. In conclusion, learned Counsel maintained that the Court of Appeal was clearly in error in applying the requirements of extension of time to appeal under order 3 Rule 4(2) of the Court of Appeals Rules as applied in cases like Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd. v. Agadaigho (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt.77) 383, in the present application by the Appellant for extension of time to perfect conditions of appeal, as the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal was already filed within time.

In response to this first issue for determination, learned senior counsel to the Respondents pointed out that the application of the Appellant was not dismissed solely on the ground that he did not exhibit his notice of appeal as there are other factors taken into consideration by the court below in refusing the application particularly those contained at page 69 of the record; that as the Appellant not having appealed against the other factors upon which the application was dismissed, is deemed to have conceded the appeal on those points to justify dismissing the appeal if cases like Ibodo v. Enarofia (1980) 12 N.S.C.C. 195 and Unilag v. Olaniyan (1985) 1 N.W.L.R (Pt.1) 156, are taken into consideration where insufficient materials filed by Applicants for extension of time, resulted in the refusal of the applications. Relying further on the case of Okere v. Nlem (1992) 4 N.W.L.R. (pt.234) 132 at 149, the learned senior counsel insisted that the court below was right in applying the requirements under order 3 Rule 4(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules in dismissing the Appellant’s application for failure to exhibit his notice of appeal in support of the application.

The Appellant’s application brought under order 3 Rule 4(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2002, was filed in that court on 7th March, 2003, asking for a single relief:-

“Extending the time within which the Appellant/Applicant may perfect the conditions of appeal’”

Order 3 Rule 4(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2002, under which the application was brought states as follows:-

“4.(1) The Court may enlarge the time Provided by these Rules for the doing of anything to which these Rules apply.”

However, order 3 Rule 4(2) of the same Rules under which the Court of Appeal considered the Appellant’s application states:-

” 4.(2) Every application for enlargement of time in which to appeal shall be supported by an affidavit setting forth good and substantial reasons for failure to appeal within the prescribed Period, and grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard. When the time is so enlarged a copy of the order granting such enlargement shall be annexed to the notice of appeal.”

It is quite clear that while the provisions of Rule 4(1) of order 3 of the Rules are for any application for the doing of anything to which the Rules of the court apply, such as filing of any processes like briefs of argument or the taking of any step in the proceeding of court like compliance with conditions of appeal the provisions of Rule 4(2) are specifically for enlargement of time within which to appeal and the conditions required under the rule for making the application certainly the Appellant whose appeal was already on the ground having been filed within the time prescribed by law, is not required to comply with the requirements of Rule 4(2) of the Rules which require the application for enlargement of time in which to appeal to be supported by a notice of appeal with grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the Appellant’s appeal should be heard. All the Appellant was looking for in his application in the instant case was for enlargement of time to perfect the conditions of appeal so as to allow the Registrar of the trial High court to prepare the record upon which his appeal shall be heard. He was indeed properly before the court under order 3 Rule 4(1) of the Rules of the Court of Appeal.

See also  Rev. Wilson Sabiya V. Alhaji Bamanga Tukur & Ors. (1983) LLJR-SC

There is no doubt that for an application for an enlargement of time within which an Appellant may take certain procedural steps to succeed, all the Applicant is required to do is to establish good substantial or exceptional reasons or circumstances, to explain satisfactorily the delay in taking the steps in the issue required to justify the grant of the enlargement of time applied for. See Chief T.O.S. Benson v. Nigeria Agip Oil Co. (1982) 5 S.C. 1. In this respect, whatever decision a court arrives at in such application, entirely depends on the exercise of its discretion, taking into consideration the general principles of law governing the exercise of discretionary powers by the court and guided by the consideration of doing justice to all the parties to the dispute.

In this regard, it is well settled that all judicial discretions must be exercised according to the common sense and justice in the matter. Where there is any miscarriage of justice in the exercise of such discretion, it is within the powers and competence of an appellate court to interfere and have that exercise of discretion reviewed, as was decided in the case of Abiodun Odusote v. Olaitan Odusote (1971) 1 All NLR 219 at 222.

In the case at hand where the Appellant’s application before the court below was merely for an enlargement of time to comply with conditions of appeal earlier imposed by the Registrar of the trial High court in the preparation of records of appeal but in the process he was required to comply with conditions which did not apply to his application, it is difficult to say that a miscarriage of justice did not creep into the exercise of discretion by the court below. It is therefore within the powers and competence of this court to interfere and have the discretion exercised under a wrong rule of court reviewed.

I am also not unaware that when there is an application for enlargement of time within which to do certain things or take certain procedural steps prescribed by the rule of court, the court should always bear in mind that the rules of court must prima facie be obeyed and that to justify the exercise of its discretion, there must be some concrete materials upon which to base such exercise of discretion as was explained by this court in N. A. Williams & ors. v. Hope Rising Voluntary Fund Society (1982) 1 – 2 S.C. 145 at 152.

One may also emphasize that in the exercise of judicial discretion to extend time for the doing of anything under the rules of court, particularly in appellate courts where this appeal arose, substantial justice to the parties must be the main target or the cardinal determining factor. See Otem Odey v. Ovat Edim of Akam (1990) 6 W.A.C.A 63 at 64. In other words, in the exercise of discretion in such application for enlargement of time to take steps in the course of proceedings of court, the court must necessarily be guided by consideration of doing substantial justice between the parties where the applicant’s appeal giving rise to the application is ensured a hearing on its merits provided that no injustice is thereby caused to the Respondent on the other side. See Nalsa and Team Associates v, N.N.P.C. (1991) 8 NWLR. (Pt.212) 652 and Kwaham v. Elias (1960) S.C.N.L.R. 516.

In the resolution of this issue therefore, I am firmly of the view that since the Appellant’s application that was heard and determined by the Court below was not an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of the High Court, the Court of Appeal was certainly in error in placing a burden on the Appellant/Applicant to exhibit his notice and grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why his appeal should be heard before his application could be granted. The Appellant who had already filed a valid Notice and grounds of appeal, was merely seeking an enlargement of time within which to comply with the conditions of appeal imposed by the Registrar of the trial Court and as such the letter of the Registrar of the trial Exhibit ‘A’ to the affidavit in support of the application showing that the period of 30 days within which the Appellant was required to comply with conditions 1 and 2 of the appeal had expired on 3rd February, 2003, was indeed enough to support the application. To this end, the absence of the Appellant’s Notice and grounds of appeal was not fatal to his application as found by the Court below thereby making it possible for this Court to interfere with the exercise of discretion by that Court to refuse the application.

The second issue in the Appellant’s brief is whether from the affidavit evidence placed before the court, the court below was right in refusing the Appellant’s application for extension of time to perfect the conditions of appeal by the High court. Learned counsel to the Appellant referred to the facts averred in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the affidavit in support of the application and submitted that clear reasons have been disclosed for the failure of the Appellant to comply with the conditions of appeal within the time given by the Registrar of the trial court, to justify granting the application.

Learned senior counsel to the Respondents is however of the view that having regard to the points considered by the court below, there can be no doubt that that court considered all the merits of the case before exercising its discretion to refuse the application; that the appeal being one against exercise of discretion, the general principle is that appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion merely because it would have acted differently but that it will interfere where the discretion exercised is manifestly wrong, arbitrary, reckless and injudicious as was decided in University of Lagos v. Olaniyan (1985) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt.1) 155.

In the second issue for determination I do not think it is in dispute at all that the Appellant/Applicant’s affidavit in support of his application for enlargement of time of 30 days earlier given to him to comply with conditions of appeal, contains clear facts averred in paragraphs 5-8 of the affidavit and the letter of the Registrar of the trial court dated 3rd January, 2003 Exhibit ‘A’ to the affidavit in support of the application giving him 30 days to comply with conditions 1 and 2 of the conditions of appeal, are enough in the absence of his Notice and grounds of appeal, to support his application. Thus, the appeal being one against exercise of discretion, the general principle is that an appellate court like ours will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court below merely because this court would have acted differently. However, as laid down by this court in the case of University of Lagos v. Olaniyan (supra), this court will interfere where the discretion exercised is manifestly wrong, arbitrary, reckless and injudicious.

In the present case however, I have found it necessary to interfere in the discretion exercised by the court below not because it was arbitrarily or recklessly exercised but because it was manifestly wrong and injudicious having been exercised on wrong principle of law not applicable to the application of the Appellant that was heard and determined by that Court.

Taking into consideration the circumstances under which the Court below exercised its discretion in refusing the Appellant’s application, I find merit in this appeal which I hereby allow. The decision of the Court below in its Ruling of 9th July, 2003, is hereby set aside and replaced with an order granting the Appellant/Applicants application. Accordingly the Appellant/Applicant shall have 30 days from today to comply with the conditions of appeal given by the Registrar of the High Court Ibadan on 3rd January, 2003.

There is no order on costs.


This interlocutory appeal is against the Ruling of the Court of Appeal Ibadan delivered on 9th July, 2003 dismissing the Appellant/Applicant’s application for extension of time to perfect the conditions of appeal imposed by the trial High court on the Appellant who was also the Appellant/Applicant in the Court of Appeal. Dissatisfied with that decision, the Appellant is now on a further appeal to this court on three grounds of appeal contained in his Notice of Appeal filed on 23rd July, 2003 from which the following issues were distilled in the Appellant’s brief of argument. The issues framed in the alternative are:-

See also  Attorney-general Of The Federation & 2 Ors V Alhaji Atiku Abubakar & 3 Ors (2007) LLJR-SC

“i. Whether the Appellant who is seeking extension of time to perfect the conditions of appeal imposed by the High Court is required under the Court Rules to exhibit the Notice of Appeal to his application.

OR

Whether the failure of the Appellant to exhibit his Notice of Appeal to his application for extension of time to perfect the conditions of appeal imposed by the High Court is fatal to his application.

  1. Whether from the affidavit evidence Placed before the Court, the Court below was right in refusing the Appellant’s application for extension of time to perfect the conditions of appeal by the High Court”

In the Respondents brief of argument, only one issue was identified from the Appellant’s 3 grounds of appeal. The issue as identified is:-

“Whether or not the Supreme Court will interfere with the exercise of judicial discretion by the Court of Appeal to refuse to grant extension of time to Perfect conditions of appeal in order to enable the Appellant to prosecute this appeal having regard to all the circumstances of the case”

The Appellant was the plaintiff at the High court of Justice Ibadan where he filed a case on 6th October, 2002 against the Respondents who were the Defendants in the action, challenging the termination of the operator’s Agreement dated October 1997 between the Appellant and the 1st Respondent/Defendant. On 22nd October, 2002, the Appellant as Plaintiff filed an application for interlocutory injunction restraining the Defendants, their agents, servants and or privies from taking over the running and management of the petrol station in dispute or transferring same to anybody whatsoever pending the determination of the substantive action. The application was heard and refused by the High court in its Ruling of 21st November, 2003. Dissatisfied with this decision of the High court, the Appellant then appealed against it to the Court of Appeal where he at the same time filed another application for injunction on 25th November, 2002, pending the determination of the appeal. Following the failure of the Appellant/plaintiff to perfect the conditions of appeal imposed by the trial High court within the time prescribed, the Appellant applied to the Court of Appeal for an extension of time to perfect the conditions of appeal imposed by the trial High court. This application was heard and dismissed by the Court of Appeal thereby giving rise to the present appeal which I shall determine on the issues as framed in the Appellant’s brief of argument.

Arguing the first issue for determination, learned counsel to the Appellant quoted from the Ruling of the Court of Appeal and argued that the court was wrong in dismissing the application on the ground that the application was not accompanied by the Notice of Appeal, particularly when that court held that it was the provisions of order 3 Rule 4(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2002, that applied to the application. Learned counsel explained that the Appellant’s application was brought under order 3 Rule 4(1) and 11 of the Rules of that court; that since by the Notice of compliance Exhibit ‘A’ to the application the Appellant was given 30 days to comply with the conditions of appeal, the Appellant having failed to comply with the conditions of appeal within the time prescribed, all he was required to do under the rules was to give reasons for the failure to comply without exhibiting his Notice of Appeal; that the application is not the same as the one under order 3 Rule 4(2) of the Rules of the Court of Appeal; that what was required of the Appellant/Applicant under Order 4 Rule 1 of the Rules, was to justify reasons for the failure to comply with the conditions of appeal within the time given by the Registrar of the High Court as contained in the guiding principles stated in Long John v. Black (1998) 6 NWLR (Pt.555) 524 at 542, Learned Counsel further submitted that the requirements for the grant of an application for extension of time to perfect the conditions of appeal under Order 3 Rule 20 of the Court of Appeal Rules are the same with the requirements for extension of time within which to file brief which are quite different from the requirements under order 3 Rule 20(a) of the Rules where the appeal had been dismissed and application is brought to restore the appeal on the cause list. Learned Counsel emphasized that even where the certificate of non-compliance had been issued and the appeal is listed for dismissal, the appellate Courts have always exercised their discretion by extending time within which to comply with the conditions of appeal imposed by trial courts as was done in Soleye v. Sonibare (2002) FWLR (Pt.95) 221 at 235. In conclusion, learned Counsel maintained that the Court of Appeal was clearly in error in applying the requirements of extension of time to appeal under order 3 Rule 4(2) of the Court of Appeals Rules as applied in cases like Mobil Oil (Nig.) Ltd. v. Agadaigho (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt.77) 383, in the present application by the Appellant for extension of time to perfect conditions of appeal, as the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal was already filed within time.

In response to this first issue for determination, learned senior counsel to the Respondents pointed out that the application of the Appellant was not dismissed solely on the ground that he did not exhibit his notice of appeal as there are other factors taken into consideration by the court below in refusing the application particularly those contained at page 69 of the record; that as the Appellant not having appealed against the other factors upon which the application was dismissed, is deemed to have conceded the appeal on those points to justify dismissing the appeal if cases like Ibodo v. Enarofia (1980) 12 N.S.C.C. 195 and Unilag v. Olaniyan (1985) 1 N.W.L.R (Pt.1) 156, are taken into consideration where insufficient materials filed by Applicants for extension of time, resulted in the refusal of the applications. Relying further on the case of Okere v. Nlem (1992) 4 N.W.L.R. (pt.234) 132 at 149, the learned senior counsel insisted that the court below was right in applying the requirements under order 3 Rule 4(2) of the Court of Appeal Rules in dismissing the Appellant’s application for failure to exhibit his notice of appeal in support of the application.

The Appellant’s application brought under order 3 Rule 4(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules 2002, was filed in that court on 7th March, 2003, asking for a single relief:-

“Extending the time within which the Appellant/Applicant may perfect the conditions of appeal’”

Order 3 Rule 4(1) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2002, under which the application was brought states as follows:-

“4.(1) The Court may enlarge the time Provided by these Rules for the doing of anything to which these Rules apply.”

However, order 3 Rule 4(2) of the same Rules under which the Court of Appeal considered the Appellant’s application states:-

” 4.(2) Every application for enlargement of time in which to appeal shall be supported by an affidavit setting forth good and substantial reasons for failure to appeal within the prescribed Period, and grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the appeal should be heard. When the time is so enlarged a copy of the order granting such enlargement shall be annexed to the notice of appeal.”

It is quite clear that while the provisions of Rule 4(1) of order 3 of the Rules are for any application for the doing of anything to which the Rules of the court apply, such as filing of any processes like briefs of argument or the taking of any step in the proceeding of court like compliance with conditions of appeal the provisions of Rule 4(2) are specifically for enlargement of time within which to appeal and the conditions required under the rule for making the application certainly the Appellant whose appeal was already on the ground having been filed within the time prescribed by law, is not required to comply with the requirements of Rule 4(2) of the Rules which require the application for enlargement of time in which to appeal to be supported by a notice of appeal with grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why the Appellant’s appeal should be heard. All the Appellant was looking for in his application in the instant case was for enlargement of time to perfect the conditions of appeal so as to allow the Registrar of the trial High court to prepare the record upon which his appeal shall be heard. He was indeed properly before the court under order 3 Rule 4(1) of the Rules of the Court of Appeal.

See also  Stephens Industries Limited & Anor. V. Bank Of Credit And Commerce & Anor. (1999) LLJR-SC

There is no doubt that for an application for an enlargement of time within which an Appellant may take certain procedural steps to succeed, all the Applicant is required to do is to establish good substantial or exceptional reasons or circumstances, to explain satisfactorily the delay in taking the steps in the issue required to justify the grant of the enlargement of time applied for. See Chief T.O.S. Benson v. Nigeria Agip Oil Co. (1982) 5 S.C. 1. In this respect, whatever decision a court arrives at in such application, entirely depends on the exercise of its discretion, taking into consideration the general principles of law governing the exercise of discretionary powers by the court and guided by the consideration of doing justice to all the parties to the dispute.

In this regard, it is well settled that all judicial discretions must be exercised according to the common sense and justice in the matter. Where there is any miscarriage of justice in the exercise of such discretion, it is within the powers and competence of an appellate court to interfere and have that exercise of discretion reviewed, as was decided in the case of Abiodun Odusote v. Olaitan Odusote (1971) 1 All NLR 219 at 222.

In the case at hand where the Appellant’s application before the court below was merely for an enlargement of time to comply with conditions of appeal earlier imposed by the Registrar of the trial High court in the preparation of records of appeal but in the process he was required to comply with conditions which did not apply to his application, it is difficult to say that a miscarriage of justice did not creep into the exercise of discretion by the court below. It is therefore within the powers and competence of this court to interfere and have the discretion exercised under a wrong rule of court reviewed.

I am also not unaware that when there is an application for enlargement of time within which to do certain things or take certain procedural steps prescribed by the rule of court, the court should always bear in mind that the rules of court must prima facie be obeyed and that to justify the exercise of its discretion, there must be some concrete materials upon which to base such exercise of discretion as was explained by this court in N. A. Williams & ors. v. Hope Rising Voluntary Fund Society (1982) 1 – 2 S.C. 145 at 152.

One may also emphasize that in the exercise of judicial discretion to extend time for the doing of anything under the rules of court, particularly in appellate courts where this appeal arose, substantial justice to the parties must be the main target or the cardinal determining factor. See Otem Odey v. Ovat Edim of Akam (1990) 6 W.A.C.A 63 at 64. In other words, in the exercise of discretion in such application for enlargement of time to take steps in the course of proceedings of court, the court must necessarily be guided by consideration of doing substantial justice between the parties where the applicant’s appeal giving rise to the application is ensured a hearing on its merits provided that no injustice is thereby caused to the Respondent on the other side. See Nalsa and Team Associates v, N.N.P.C. (1991) 8 NWLR. (Pt.212) 652 and Kwaham v. Elias (1960) S.C.N.L.R. 516.

In the resolution of this issue therefore, I am firmly of the view that since the Appellant’s application that was heard and determined by the Court below was not an application for extension of time to appeal against the decision of the High Court, the Court of Appeal was certainly in error in placing a burden on the Appellant/Applicant to exhibit his notice and grounds of appeal which prima facie show good cause why his appeal should be heard before his application could be granted. The Appellant who had already filed a valid Notice and grounds of appeal, was merely seeking an enlargement of time within which to comply with the conditions of appeal imposed by the Registrar of the trial Court and as such the letter of the Registrar of the trial Exhibit ‘A’ to the affidavit in support of the application showing that the period of 30 days within which the Appellant was required to comply with conditions 1 and 2 of the appeal had expired on 3rd February, 2003, was indeed enough to support the application. To this end, the absence of the Appellant’s Notice and grounds of appeal was not fatal to his application as found by the Court below thereby making it possible for this Court to interfere with the exercise of discretion by that Court to refuse the application.

The second issue in the Appellant’s brief is whether from the affidavit evidence placed before the court, the court below was right in refusing the Appellant’s application for extension of time to perfect the conditions of appeal by the High court. Learned counsel to the Appellant referred to the facts averred in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the affidavit in support of the application and submitted that clear reasons have been disclosed for the failure of the Appellant to comply with the conditions of appeal within the time given by the Registrar of the trial court, to justify granting the application.

Learned senior counsel to the Respondents is however of the view that having regard to the points considered by the court below, there can be no doubt that that court considered all the merits of the case before exercising its discretion to refuse the application; that the appeal being one against exercise of discretion, the general principle is that appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion merely because it would have acted differently but that it will interfere where the discretion exercised is manifestly wrong, arbitrary, reckless and injudicious as was decided in University of Lagos v. Olaniyan (1985) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt.1) 155.

In the second issue for determination I do not think it is in dispute at all that the Appellant/Applicant’s affidavit in support of his application for enlargement of time of 30 days earlier given to him to comply with conditions of appeal, contains clear facts averred in paragraphs 5-8 of the affidavit and the letter of the Registrar of the trial court dated 3rd January, 2003 Exhibit ‘A’ to the affidavit in support of the application giving him 30 days to comply with conditions 1 and 2 of the conditions of appeal, are enough in the absence of his Notice and grounds of appeal, to support his application. Thus, the appeal being one against exercise of discretion, the general principle is that an appellate court like ours will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court below merely because this court would have acted differently. However, as laid down by this court in the case of University of Lagos v. Olaniyan (supra), this court will interfere where the discretion exercised is manifestly wrong, arbitrary, reckless and injudicious.

In the present case however, I have found it necessary to interfere in the discretion exercised by the court below not because it was arbitrarily or recklessly exercised but because it was manifestly wrong and injudicious having been exercised on wrong principle of law not applicable to the application of the Appellant that was heard and determined by that Court.

Taking into consideration the circumstances under which the Court below exercised its discretion in refusing the Appellant’s application, I find merit in this appeal which I hereby allow. The decision of the Court below in its Ruling of 9th July, 2003, is hereby set aside and replaced with an order granting the Appellant/Applicants application. Accordingly the Appellant/Applicant shall have 30 days from today to comply with the conditions of appeal given by the Registrar of the High Court Ibadan on 3rd January, 2003.

There is no order on costs.


SC.84/2004(R)

More Posts

Section 47 EFCC Act 2004: Short Title

Section 47 EFCC Act 2004 Section 47 of the EFCC Act 2004 is about Short Title. This Act may be cited as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment,

Section 46 EFCC Act 2004: Interpretation

Section 46 EFCC Act 2004 Section 46 of the EFCC Act 2004 is about Interpretation. In this Act – Interpretation “Commission” means the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission established

Section 45 EFCC Act 2004: Savings

Section 45 EFCC Act 2004 Section 45 of the EFCC Act 2004 is about Savings. The repeal of the Act specified in section 43 of this Act shall not

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

LawGlobal Hub is your innovative global resource of law and more. We ensure easy accessibility to the laws of countries around the world, among others