Saida Sa’ad & Anor V. Mohammed Abubakar Maifata & Ors. (2008)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
MASSOUD ABDULRAHMAN OREDOLA, J.C.A.
The 1st Appellant, Saida Sa’ad contested election under the platform of the 2nd Respondent, Action Congress Party (ACP), during the general election held nationwide on 21st April, 2007, into the Federal House of Representatives for the Tarauni Federal Constituency, Kano. The 1st Respondent, Mohammed Abubakar Maifata also contested the same elective post under the sponsorship of the 2nd Respondent, All Nigerian Peoples Party, (ANPP). The 3rd ‘and 4th Respondents alongside others conducted the said election. The results declared by the 3rd and 4th Respondents returned the 1st Respondent as the winner with 35,932 votes, while the 1st Appellant came third with 6,654 votes.
Being dissatisfied with this unpalatable turn of events, the Appellants herein, on 22nd May, 2007 filed their petition containing 14 paragraphs, before the National Assembly Election Tribunal, holden at Kano, Kano State (Pages 1 – 30 of the record). The petition was predicated on two grounds, namely, invalidity by reason of corrupt practices/non compliance with provisions of the Electoral Act, 2006 and educational disqualification of the 1st Respondent.
On 25th June, 2007, the 1st and 2nd Respondents caused a memorandum of conditional appearance to be filed on their behalf and eventually on 9th July, 2007, they filed their joint reply to the petition. (Pages 84 – 85 and 102 – 116 of the record). Leave was also granted on 27th September, 2007 to the 3rd and 4th Respondents to amend their reply filed on 1ih September, 2007. Series of applications were filed by the parties, taken, heard and determined by the Tribunal with delivery of rulings thereon.
On 25th October, 2007 and in the course of hearing in the matter, the Tribunal observed thus:
In the interim however, the Tribunal would like learned counsel for the Petitioners to confirm as to when filing fees were paid and the date receipt issued.
The response of B. O. Osuji Esq., learned counsel for the Appellants then Petitioners was:
The petition was filed on the 22/5/07 at 5.58 p.m. I cannot however find the receipt now.
He went further and added:
I will apply for a short adjournment to enable me confirm from the office if receipt has been issued or not.
After written addresses have been duly filed and exchanged by the learned counsel for the parties as ordered by the Tribunal, the Tribunal delivered its ruling on 22nd October, 2007 in respect of complaints made against paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the petition regarding the issue of nonjoinder of presiding officers of polling units as respondents in the petition. The stated paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the petition were held incompetent and accordingly struck out. With that development, the first ground of the petition bit the dust.
The Appellants vide motions filed on 20th October, 2007 and 24th October, 2007 sought leave of the Tribunal to summon the erstwhile Secretary of the Tribunal, to produce receipt for filing fees/security for cost paid to her by Appellants and for inspection of requisite court records. The previous motion filed on 20th October, 2007 was withdrawn and struck out.
The one filed on 24th October, 2007 was duly heard and argued and the Tribunal’s ruling thereon, inter alia gave birth to the instant appeal. It is to be noted that the said motion was supported by a 24 paragraph affidavit sworn to by Omereonye C. Morgans, a Kano based legal practitioner who stated therein that he has a working relationship with M. N. Duru Esq., the learned counsel for the Appellants. In yet another affidavit, this time a further and better affidavit sworn to on 1st November, 2007 by one Collins Ukachukwu, a Litigation Secretary in the law firm of M. N. Duru & Co, it was deposed therein that the court’s file in respect of the petition has the assessed requisite fees payable for the petition to be in the sum of N4,895.00 duly stamped as paid and signed with the date of payment by the then Tribunal’s Secretary, Mrs. E. I. Sowemimo. In the ruling of the Tribunal delivered on 21st November, 2007 the prayer relating to summoning Mrs. E. I. Sowemimo was refused while the second prayer for inspection of court documents was granted.
Subsequently and on 19th January, 2008 the Tribunal delivered its ruling on the issue of payment of filing fees and production of receipt evidencing payment of filing fees raised suo motu by the Tribunal. It found therein that:
….issuance of receipts is a condition precedent to the presentation of election petition. In the present case not even a receipt as in Form TF002 was issued as can be seen from the correspondence file.
It added and conclusively too as follows:
Impliedly as the fees were not receipted, it means no payment was made…In the circumstance, we hold that this petition is incompetent and consequently struck out.
The Appellants were dissatisfied with the aforesaid ruling of the Tribunal. They filed a notice of appeal containing four grounds of appeal dated 6th February, 2008 and filed on 6th February, 2008. Pursuant to rules of this Court, briefs of argument were duly filed and exchanged amongst the parties. The Appellants brief is dated 25th February, 2008 and filed on 28th February, 2008. In the said brief, the Appellants formulated three issues for determination in this appeal. They are:
- Whether or not in the circumstances of this case especially in the light of evidence of payment for the filing of the petition, the learned Trial Tribunal was right to have struck out the Petition on the grounds of non production of receipt. Grounds one and four of the Notice of Appeal are covered by this issue.
- Whether or not the learned Trial Tribunal was right to have struck out all paragraphs of the petition complaining of irregularities on the grounds of none (sic) joinder of Presiding Officers, not withstanding that the Independent National Electoral Commission and the fact that some of the said paragraphs contained complaints of overvoting and other irregularities? This issue encompasses ground 2 of the grounds of appeal.
- Whether or not in the circumstances of this matter, the learned Trial Tribunal was right to have refused the petitioners’ application to summon the erstwhile Secretary of the Tribunal Mrs. E. I. Sowemimo to appear before the Tribunal to produce the receipt she issued or to clarify the issue of Receipt she was supposed to have issued to the Petitioners?
The 1st and 2nd Respondent’s brief is dated 7th March, 2008 and deemed duly filed and served on 16th April, 2008 by order of this Court. Also, in the said brief, they submitted three issues for resolution in this appeal. The issues are:
1) Whether or not the Honourable Tribunal was right to have struck out the petition on the grounds of non-production of receipt or payment of filing fees. This issue arose out of grounds 1 and 4.
2) Whether or not the Honourable Tribunal was right to have stuck (sic) out paragraphs 8, 9 and 11 in the light of the averment made on the grounds of non-joinder of presiding officers. This issue arises from ground 2,
3) Whether or not the Honourable Tribunal was not right to have refused the Appellant’s application to summon the former Secretary of the Tribunal Mrs. E. I. Sowemimo on the issue of non-production of receipt by the Appellant.
The 3rd and 4th Respondents brief is dated and filed on 10th March, 2008 and in it, two issues were extracted for determination in this appeal and they are as follows:
- Whether the issuance or giving of a receipt of payment of filing fees by the Secretary of the Tribunal is a condition precedent to the proper presentation of an election petition and if so, do entries made on a petition by the Secretary and/or averments made in affidavits by solicitors amount to such issuance or giving of receipt.
- Whether the complaints made in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of the petition are directed against the conduct of the presiding officers of the units and if so whether the said presiding officers are necessary parties to the petition having regards to the proviso contained in S. 144 (2) of the Electoral Act, 2006.
This appeal came up for hearing on 19th May, 2008. B. O. Osuji Esq., learned counsel for the Appellants adopted their brief and urged that the appeal be allowed. In the same vein, M. L. Ibrahim Esq., learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents adopted their brief and urged that the appeal be dismissed. In a similar fashion, S. D. Alkantara Esq., holding the brief of Sylvester Eigbedion Esq., for the 3rd and 4th Respondents also adopted their brief and urged us to dismiss the appeal.
In view of the antecedents and or surrounding circumstances of this appeal as amply narrated above and after due examination of the issues formulated by the parties herein, I am more inclined towards adopting the three issues framed in the brief of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, for the resolution and determination of this appeal. The same are accordingly adopted by me.
On the first issue, it is contended by M. N. Duru Esq., learned counsel for the Appellants that the Tribunal was wrong to have struck out the petition on the ground of non production of filing fees payment receipt. That there was unequivocal evidence supported by the uncontroverted affidavit evidence of Omereonye C. Morgans Esq., who personally made the payments in respect of the assessed filing fees by and to Mrs. E. I. Sowemimo who accepted the tendered amount as payment.
In another submission, he maintained that the Electoral Act, 2006 unlike the Electoral Act, 2002 did not require that the receipt to be issued for payment of filing fees by the Secretary of the Tribunal, must be in a “particular form” and as such, the receipt may be in any form. Learned counsel for the Appellants then referred to the definition of “receipt” in “The Blacks Law Dictionary”, 6th Edition, P. 1268 with the submission that what Mrs. E. I. Sowemimo did with the petition, when she assessed, accepted payment, issued acknowledgment receipt, signed and stamped paid on the presented 15 copies of the petition, qualifies as a receipt within the definition of the word “receipt” given in the “Blacks Law Dictionary”. He further contended that the authorities of Kamba v. Bawa (2005) FWLR (Pt. 281) P. 1775 at P. 1801 Paras. F – G and Abubakar v. Argungu (2005) ALL FWLR (Pt. 290) P. 1461 relied upon by the Tribunal in arriving at its decision are inappropriate and inapplicable, since both cases construed provisions of the Electoral Act, 2002 which are different from that of the Electoral Act, 2006. It was submitted in conclusion on this issue that our courts have moved away from the old era of technicalities to the new one of doing substantial justice to the parties. Cases were cited to buttress the point being made and we were urged to resolve the issue in favour of the Appellants.
Learned counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents, M. L. Ibrahim Esq. submitted in essence that presentation of an election petition, payment of filing fees as assessed and issuance/production of receipt are statutory requirements which must be strictly complied with. He contended that the resultant fallout is that where an election petition is filed and payment receipt of filing fees is either not produced or issued, such a petition is deemed not to have been filed. He cited Okpoido v. Udoikpong (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt. 604) 595; Onwuabufor v. Okoye (1996) 1 SCNLR 36; Olaniyonu v. Awah (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 122) 493; and Ozobia V. Anah (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt. 601) 1/6. Learned counsel then pointed out that for five months; the Appellants could not get or produce any receipt or any other form of evidence in this regard. He drew attention to the observation made by the Tribunal in this vein:
That on the date this petition was alleged to have been filed, some other petitions were filed and from our records receipts were issued out by the Secretary. Why then is this petition different?
He placed reliance on Ugwu v. Ararume (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt.377) 807 at 921 for the established principle that where a statute provides for a particular way of doing an act, it is mandatory that the laid down procedure shall be complied with.
It is submitted by Sir Sylvester Eigbedion, learned counsel for the 3rd and 4th Respondents that in the presentation of an election petition, there must be strict compliance with the procedural provisions of the Electoral Act, 2006 to the effect that the use of the word “shall” therein is obligatory and connotes a command which is incapable of being waived, overlooked or made optional as it must be obeyed and fulfilled exactly. Cases which include Okpoido v. Udoikpong (supra) and Ozobia V. Anah (supra) were cited in support of the submissions being made.
Again, it was pointed out by the learned counsel for the 3rd and 4th Respondents that undue reliance has been placed by the Appellants on the entries made by the Tribunal’s Secretary on the petition and the payment of unspecified sum of money as filing fees for the petition by Omereonye C. Morgans Esq. The submission was also made that presentation of petition, payment of statutory filing fees are acts which must be done contemporaneously and which should not be regarded as mere technicality. Reference was made to Abubakar v. Argungu (2005) ALL FWLR (Pt. 290) 1461 at 1475. Furthermore, it was argued by the learned counsel for the 3rd and 4th Respondents that issuance of summons for the appearance of the erstwhile Secretary of the Tribunal, would have been a wasted effort as no useful purpose would be served by such a move. This according to him is because, explanation cannot transform into payment receipt.
Before delving into the foregoing arguments and submissions of learned counsel for the parties herein, I need to restate the established point, that election petitions do have certain characteristics. Indeed, it is trite that election petitions have certain peculiar features which make them sui generis. They stand alone, on their own and bound by their distinct set of rules under the law. Such relevant rules are invariably issued in mandatory terms. Consequently, defects, defaults or irregularities which are readily pardonable and are not sufficient to adversely affect the competence of the claim in other proceedings do not enjoy similar kid glove treatment in election petitions. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal which hears the petitions is also of a special category. Thus, a slight default in complying with a procedural step could result in irredeemable and fatal consequence for the petition or petitioner.
The case of Madukolu V. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341 is regarded as the locus classicus on the issue of jurisdiction. It made it clear and beyond any per adventure that there must not be in existence in a proceeding, any feature or circumstance which prevents or is likely to prevent the court or tribunal from exercising its jurisdiction. In this vein, payment of statutory filing fees is compulsory and a pre-condition to the filing of an election petition. Failure to comply with this requirement is grave and fatal. It will render the petition invalid, incompetent and incurably defective. It will derobe the Tribunal of its toga of jurisdiction to entertain and determine it, as the proceeding will metamorphose into a nullity. See Ezeani v. Okosi (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 596) 623; Ozobia v. Anah (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt. 601) 1; Ilukwe v. Anah (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt. 603) 476; Onuorah v. Okeke (2005) 10 NWLR (Pt.932) 40/55 & 58. Proceedings before an election petition tribunal are strict and thus the rules applicable to them are construed strictly. The proceedings being sui generis are special and not ordinary.
In the determination of this appeal, there is the need to construe some provisions of the Electoral Act, 2006. This include Para. 3 (4) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2006 which states:
The Petitioner or his Solicitor, as the case may be, shall, at the time of presenting the election petition, pay the fees for the service and the publication of the petition, and for certifying the copies and, in default of the payment, the election petition shall be deemed not to have been received; unless the Tribunal or Court otherwise orders. (Underlining added)
It is a rule of statutory interpretation that where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, those words shall be construed as to give effect to their natural or literal meanings. Nothing is to be added which is not included or taken out which is included. See Okumagba v. Egbe (1963) 1 NMLR 62; Ogbuanyiya v. Okudo (1979) 6 – 9 SC 32. The above provisions are so clear and unambiguous, that in my respectful but firm view, they need no further elucidation. It is no longer in doubt that the word “shall” when used in a statute or rule of court makes it mandatory that the rule must be observed. See Mokelu v. Federal Commissioner for Works & Housing (1976) 3 SC 35; Madam Alake Aroyewun v. Joseph Adebanji (1976) 11 SC 33; Chief Ifezue v. Mbadugha & Anor. (1984) 5 SC 79; (1984) 1 SCNLR 427 at 456 – 457 and Katto v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt.214) 126; (1991) 12 SCNJ 1 at 17. In other words, generally, the term “shall”, is a word of command and connotes obligation and thus gives no room for discretion. It imposes a duty and a compelling one for that matter. Indeed, with sub – para. (4) of para. 3 above, it is a case of double “shall”, one injunctive and the other prohibitive. It also include the disavowal that the petition would be deemed not to have been received. This simply means, as if it was never received and if received, it shall be discountenanced by the Tribunal, unless it is otherwise ordered. It is also to be noted that the words “pay the fees” in the said subparagraph (4) of the 1st Schedule (supra) covers five types of payments. They are: (i) filing fees (ii) security for costs (iii) service (iv) publication of the petition and (v) certifying copies of the petition.
I must say that the wordings of this sub-paragraph is clear, precise and unambiguous. It says exactly what are the requirements to be complied with when a prospective petitioner presents his or her petition, coupled with the role to be played or steps to be taken by the Secretary of the Tribunal. By virtue of Paragraphs 2 and 36 of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2006, security for costs shall not be less than N5,000.00, filing fees not less than N1,000.00 and hearing fees of N40.00 per day but not exceeding N2,000.00 in all. At the commencement stage, the presentation of an election petition to the Tribunal’s Secretary is just half of the story. It is meant to set the ball rolling and on course. The other half is the payment of the requisite, prescribed, scheduled and assessed filing fees inclusive of security for costs and other fees. The said payments must be receipted for and the dire need exists that evidence of such payments must be produced if and when the need arises. What is required from the Secretary of the Tribunal is the giving of a receipt after due payment. It is correct as argued by the learned counsel for the Appellants that no specific form of receipt has been specified by the rules. Howbeit, the payments made in respect of statutory filing fees must be receipted for. The maze or mystery in the instant case is the difficulty encountered by the Appellants, to produce and or tender any form of proof that they made the required payments at the time their petition was presented for filing.
It is the law that where a statute prescribes a particular mode for the performance of a duty imposed and regularized by the statute, that method and no other must be adopted in the doing of the act. See C.C.B. (Nig) Plc v. Att.-Gen. Anambra State (1992) 8 NWLR (Pt. 261) 528/556. That is exactly why, if a law requires the fulfillment of a pre-condition before a particular act is to be done, non-fulfillment of the pre-condition will be prejudicial to the party in default. See Aina v. Jinadu (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt.233) 91/109 Para. B.
Appellants complained about the Tribunal raising the issue of payment of filing fees suo motu. It is trite that a court or tribunal can suo motu make reference to the case file in a proceeding or matter before it and raise or make use of any document it finds therein. See Fumudoh v. Aboro (1991) 9 NWLR (Pt. 214) 210. I do not think that the Tribunal did anything wrong when it took it upon itself and perused its record of proceedings and also took judicial notice of its contents, even in the absence of an application in that regard by either of the parties before it. It is firmly established that a court of tribunal can do exactly that. See Onwuka v. Owolewa (2001) 7 NWLR (Pt. 713) 695/714. Therefore, the Tribunal in the instant case should not be lambasted or castigated as having gone beyond its calling when it suo motu raised the issue of payment of filing fees and invited the learned counsel for the parties before it to address it thereon.
To my mind, the core issue in this appeal is the effect of nonproduction of payment receipt and or inability on the part of a claimant to produce primary or secondary evidence in order to substantiate such payment. This is moreso, in a case where the payment or otherwise of statutory filing fees is doubtful and hotly contested amongst the parties in the dispute. Howbeit, the law is settled. He or she as in the instant case of the 1st Appellant who asserts must prove. It is interesting and noteworthy that throughout the depositions in the Appellants affidavits in support of the motion filed on 24th October, 2007, the deponent legal practitioner did not state or mention a particular or specific amount as the sum of money paid as filing fees and security for costs to the said Mrs. E. I. Sowemimo, the erstwhile Secretary of the Tribunal, in respect of this particular petition which is in contention. I wish to state my Lords, that if there had been such a payment of filing fees as claimed, it could not have been all that difficult or nigh impossible to prove. It has suddenly became a tall order. Something funny or fishy must have happened along the line.
The first issue under consideration in this appeal questions and challenges the decision of the Tribunal. The learned counsel for the Appellants submitted that the Tribunal was wrong to have done what it did, “in the light of evidence of payment for the filing of the petition.” I say with due respect and disagreement and further ask; which evidence, where and before whom was such evidence tendered or produced? Are we truly dealing with the same printed record of appeal or set of facts? In my view, no vestige or scintilla of such evidence has been produced in the instant case. The Appellants are blaming or pointing fingers, accusatory or otherwise at the erstwhile Secretary of the Tribunal for the failure if any and non-production of evidence of payment of filing fees under one pre or the other. In Olaniyonu v. Awah (supra) M. M. Akanbi JCA, described similar excuse as follows: “That sounds like the story of the tail wagging the dog.”
As to what constitutes filing of an election petition, it has been held in Okpoido v. Udoikpong (1999) 5 NWLR (Pt.604) 595/598, that the presentation of election petition to the Registrar or Secretary of the Tribunal and payment of the assessed requisite filing fees constitutes the filing of an election petition. Furthermore, that receipt in whatever form must be issued as evidence of such payment. Indeed, both the presentation of the petition and payment should be done simultaneously. It is not a question of technicality. Thus, where there is a dispute, doubt or confusion in this regard, it behoves whoever asserts to produce cogent and satisfactory proof that such payment has been made. Plethora of cases exist where non-compliance having to do with nonpayment of filing fees, security for costs, and other fees in accordance with the law, have rendered the petition not properly presented to make it to be heard on its merit. I have earlier considered Olaniyonu V. Professor Awa (supra) above. In it, M. M. A. Akanbi JCA (as he then was) had this to say at P.501.
The issue of payment of fees or security for costs is fundamental to the hearing of the petition. They are not mere matters of form. Without such payments, the petition has no legs to stand on, and it must necessarily collapse.
At P. 504 he said further:
… that even where the petition is filed without payment of necessary fees and the making of the deposit such petition cannot be deemed to have been presented. The fees must be paid before the petition is received and wrongful receipt of the petition by the registrar will not validate it.
In the instant case, the Appellants must have found themselves at a sorry pass. Although, the law may be somewhat stringent or strict, but the provisions of Paragraph 3 (4) of 1st Schedule (supra) are clear and unambiguous and they ought to be strictly construed and complied with.
No matter how strenuous or ingenious is the arguments of learned counsel for the Appellants in this regard; the most decisive factor is the proferment of cogent, credible and satisfactory proof of such payment. Anything short of this will be far off the mark, unconvincing and leaves a sour taste in the mouth. What is more, from the first day when the Tribunal suo motu raised the issue, it accorded the Appellants availing opportunity to redeem and absolve themselves. Alas, they failed. In Olaniyonu v. Awah (supra) the petition was held to be invalid on the basis of payment of inadequate filing fees, notwithstanding administrative lapses of the court registrar in respect thereof. In the instant case, there is no proof of payment of filing fees – be it adequate, talk less of inadequate. It is thus a worse case scenario.
It would seem that most statutory procedural provisions in our electoral law – both substantive and procedural, can be likened to knockout stages in a competition. Once you are down you are out and there may be no second chance, due to its sui generis nature. However, Para. 3(4) of the 1st Schedule (supra) says “unless the Tribunal or Court otherwise orders.” Well it has not been so ordered in the given circumstances of the instant case. For one, no such application was placed before the Tribunal as the Appellants were busy running from pillar to post trying to defend the indefensible, instead of being contrite and penitent.
It is firmly established that for an appellate court to interfere with the exercise of discretionary power vested in the lower court or tribunal, it must be shown in what manner the exercise or non exercise of the power could be said to be wrong in order to justify the intervention of the appellate court. Thus, where a lower court such as an election tribunal has done the necessary and correctly too, the appellate court would not undo what has been done or do what has not been done on the basis of mere sentiment or sheer emotional disposition. In the instant case, the ruling of the Tribunal cannot be declared as arbitrary, perverse or unreasonable. It was an application of the law according to the letters of the law. This to my mind is not engaging in technicality.
Having failed to establish that the requisite filing fees has been paid in respect of the instant petition, the Appellants did not comply with or satisfy a material and necessary feature towards properly placing the petition before the Tribunal. It is settled law that if the law prescribes a method or pre-condition by which an act could be validly done and such method has not been followed or there has been non compliance therewith then it simply means that the act could not have been accomplished and it would be regarded as having been left undone. See Amaechi v. INEC 20085 NWLR (Pt. 1080) 227/318 Paras. C – D.
On whether the question of substantial justice is relevant where court lacks jurisdiction, it has been held times without number by the Supreme Court and this Court that:
If a court lacks jurisdiction the question of doing substantial justice is not relevant since defect of jurisdiction relates to embarking on the case and not to miscarriage in the course of it, or to the correctness of the decision. In the instant case, the issue of substantial justice or fairness raised by the appellant does not so much arise.
See Abdullahi v. Gaya LREC 144 at 159; Nnonye v. Anyichie (1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 101) 110 at 116 -117 P. 604. Paras. F – G.
I am of the firm viewpoint that upon the failure on the part of the Appellants to satisfactorily convince the Tribunal that they had truly complied with fundamental requirements of the law regarding payment of filing fees, the petition thereby became incompetent and the Tribunal cannot be faulted when it struck out the petition on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the hearing and determination of the said petition. The first issue is accordingly resolved against the Appellants.
Having held that the petition is incompetent and that the Tribunal was right in its decision, it becomes a mere academic exercise and a journey without gainful pre-determined destination if I proceed and resolve the two remaining issues, after the first has been resolved in favour of the Respondents. Issues number two and three are now moot. I am thus not prepared or inclined to embark on such a fruitless journey.
On the whole and in the premises of all the above, this appeal cannot succeed. It lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. The ruling of the Tribunal in Petition No. EPT/KNS/HR/41/2007 delivered on 19th January, 2008 is hereby affirmed by me.
I assess costs in the sum of N20,000.00 in favour of each set of Respondents.
Other Citations: (2008)LCN/2936(CA)
