Sama’ila V. State (2021)

LAWGLOBAL HUB Lead Judgment Report

AMINA ADAMU AUGIE, J.S.C.

On 22/10/2009, at Hadejia Town, Hadejia Local Government Area, Jigawa State, a little girl was rescued from drowning in a river, and she was handed over to the Appellant, who said he was her father. On the same day, one Tanimu Mohammed reported to the Police that his six-year-old daughter, called Hadiza, was missing.

Four days later on 26/10/2009, based on information received by the Police, Appellant was arrested and he led the Police to where the partially decomposed body of a little girl was found, with the two eyes, heart and other organs removed, and Tanimu Mohammed identified the body to the Coroner as that of his daughter.

The Appellant was arraigned before the High Court of Jigawa State on a two-Court Charge of Kidnapping punishable under Section 273 of the Penal Code and culpable homicide punishable with death under Section 221(a) of same Code.

He pleaded not guilty to the Charge and to prove its case, the Prosecution called five witnesses. The first three testified as to how PW1, Yakubu Ibrahim, had saved the deceased from drowning, and handed her over to the Appellant. The father of the deceased testified as PW4, and the Investigating Police Officer, Sergeant Ibrahim Abdullahi, who testified as PW5, tendered the Statements made by the Appellant to the Police in evidence. Defence Counsel informed the Court that ‘‘the Accused Person said he did not sign the Statement and that he did not even give any Statement”. In overruling the Objection, the trial Court held that –

The Statements are admitted in evidence as it is relevant under Section 6 of the Evidence Act. The weight to be attached to it would be considered by the Court in view of the Accused Person’s observation on the Statement. They are to be marked Exhibit A & B respectively.

In Exhibit B, English translation of his Statement recorded in Hausa [Exhibit A], the Appellant stated that he and one Ado Roki, were contracted by one S/Jeji Abdullahi Abubakar, to supply him with human eyes and heart, and he was given N5,000 balance of the contract sum of N10, 000. He further stated as follows –

After one day, I took passenger from market to Gulamri area where I saw Hadiza and took her on my motor cycle … I told her that I will take her to their house because I know the house – – I took her to the bush. On the way, she fell down and run entered (sic) river, I inform one Yakubu Fisherman to removed (sic) her from the river, after he removed her, he handed over her to me. I took her to the bush and killed removed her two eyes and went away, I removed her eyes with a knell (sic). On the same date – -I went and inform Ado Roki, I took him to the scene on my motorcycle, he use a knell (sic) also and cut her stomach and removed her heart and some part – – On the same date at about 2000 hrs, I took the two eyes to S/Jeji Abdullahi Abubakar, he gave me N5,000 because the contract was N10, 000 – – After four days, I met with Ado Roki – – he informed me that he took the Hadiza pad to the S/Jeji Abdullahi Abubakar. After I committed the offence, I was in the market, Policemen went and arrested me and took me to the Police Station – – Actually, I committed the offence and S/Jeji assigned me for the contract at the rate of N10,000.

All efforts to ‘‘secure the attendance” of the Medical Officer, who examined the body of the deceased at the Hadejia General Hospital, “proved abortive”, and the Medical Report was tendered from the Bar. With no objection from the Defence, the Medical Report issued by one Dr. Oyinloye Gbolahan Damilola on 26/10/2009, was admitted in Evidence as Exhibit C. In Exhibit C, the Medical Officer stated:

Corpse examined in state of partial decomposition. Cause of death could not the ascertained. Missing organs – Eyes and heart from the corpse.

The Appellant testified in his defence as DW1, and did not call any other witness. He said the testimonies of the Prosecution Witnesses were “not true”, that he was beaten up by the Police, and a Police Officer pressed a car tyre on his head and told him to admit that he committed the offences. He further testified as follows:

There was a conflict between me and Prosecution Witnesses over a farmland and they vowed to destroy me. We no longer talk to each other with the Prosecution Witnesses, who are relations with each other. I don’t know anything about their allegations. They just fabricated lies against me. I did not mutilate or harm the girl. I am speaking the truth to the Court and nothing but the truth.

In his Judgment delivered on 22/3/2011, the learned trial Judge, Sambo, J., held:

I have found from the totality of the evidence before me without doubt that the Accused Person caused the death of the victim (Hadiza Hussaini) as described in Exhibit C. From the cause of death described therein and the state of the corpse, I believe the Accused Person knew that death would be the probable consequences of his acts when he plucked out the victim’s eyes, heart and other body organs with a nail. All the ingredients for the proof of offence of kidnapping have been proved by the Prosecution. It has been proved that the deceased (victim) was a minor, who the Accused lured away from the custody of PW4, her father (guardian) without his consent before he killed her afterwards. I am therefore convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused Person committed the offence of culpable homicide and kidnapping – – The Convict is therefore sentenced to 10 years imprisonment and a fine of N10,000.00 for the offence of kidnapping. For the offence of culpable homicide, he is sentenced to death by hanging until he dies. May God have mercy on his soul.

He appealed to the Court of Appeal. In dismissing his Appeal and affirming the trial Court’s decision, the Court of Appeal held in its Judgment of 30/1/2015 that:

The Records of this Appeal show convincingly that the learned trial Judge gave thorough consideration to the evidence of the witnesses before him, the Confessional Statement of the Appellant, and his being the last person seen with the deceased before arriving at the conclusion that the Prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. I find no reason to fault the reasoning and conclusion of the learned trial Judge. In sum, I hold that this Appeal has no merit and I dismiss it accordingly. I uphold the decision of the High Court of Jigawa State, including the conviction and sentence of the Appellant.

Aggrieved, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal in this Court that contains seven Grounds of Appeal. He formulated a sole Issue for Determination in his Brief i.e.

Whether from the facts and circumstances of this case, the learned Justices of the lower Court were right in affirming the conviction and sentence of the Appellant by the trial Court for the offences charged.

Although, the Respondent adopted the sole issue as formulated by the Appellant in its own Brief of Argument, it pointed out that a careful look at the issue raised and the arguments canvassed by the Appellant thereon in his Brief disclose that the main complaint is on alleged hearsay evidence of PW4, and corroboration of Exhibits A & B; and that only Grounds 2, 5 and 6 touched or bordered on them.

It submitted that the law is that any ground of appeal from which no issue for determination is distilled, is deemed abandoned and liable to be struck out or ignored by an appellate Court, citing Martins V. COP (2005) 7 NWLR (Pt. 925) 614 at 627, Eke V. Ogbonda (2006) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1012) 506 at 523, Akpa V. State (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1019) 500 at 514 and W.A.E.C V. Adeyanju (2008) 9 NWLR (Pt. 1092) 270. The Respondent, therefore, urged this Court to strike out the other Grounds 1, 3, 4 and 7 of the Grounds of Appeal in the Appellant’s Notice of Appeal since no issue for determination has been distilled from those Grounds.

​The cases cited by the Respondent say clearly that a ground of appeal from which no issue is distilled is deemed abandoned, and is liable to be struck out or ignored by an appellate Court. But, to be more specific with regards to this case, the position of the law is that arguments in a Brief filed at the appellate Court must be based on the issues formulated, as derived from the grounds of appeal – see Chukwuogor V. Obuora (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 454, wherein Oputa, JSC, stated:

There was a Ground 6 complaining about the costs awarded as “arbitrary, punitive and excessive”. This was not canvassed before us and one should, therefore, regard it as abandoned.

In this case, the Appellant’s complaints as gathered from the Grounds of Appeal are that the Court of Appeal was wrong to affirm the trial Court’s decision because:

– There is evidence that he retracted his alleged confession [Ground 1]

– There was no evidence to corroborate his conviction for culpable homicide [Ground 2]

– The evidence of PW1. PW2 and PW3 are contradictory [Ground 3]

– There is no evidence that he was not the father of the girl handed to him [Ground 4]

– The evidence of PW4, which the Court relied upon, is hearsay evidence [Ground 5]

– The two lower Courts cannot pick and choose the evidence of PW4 [Ground 6]

– The decision cannot be supported having regard to the evidence [Ground 7]

He formulated one Issue for determination in his Brief, which I will restate here –

Whether from the facts and circumstances of this case, the learned Justices of the lower Court were right in affirming the conviction and sentence of the Appellant by the trial Court for the offences charged.

On the face of it, it is my view that the sole issue formulated by the Appellant is broad enough to encompass the complaints in the seven Grounds of Appeal. But, as the Respondent submitted, arguments in his Brief focused purely on whether the Confessional Statements [Exhibit A & B], required corroboration and whether the evidence of PW4 is partly hearsay evidence in the circumstances of this case. In effect, the other complaints not addressed in his Brief are deemed abandoned.

​Based on the arguments in his Brief, the Appellant’s contention is that the evidence of PW4 was partly hearsay evidence, and the lower Courts were wrong to pick and choose from PW4’s evidence to convict him. PW4 testified as follows:

On Thursday I gave out some millet for grinding. Hadiza was giving the millet (sic) to deliver it at the grinding place. The Accused who knew my home and the girl for about 3 years took away the girl to the river side. We search fruitlessly for the girl (Hadiza), we even reported at the police station where announcement was made for whereabout of the girl. The following day we reported at the police station about the missing girl. My report was written down that my girl could not be found for up till 4 days the whereabout of the girl could not be traced. On Sunday, the Accused came to ask me that is it true the girl could not be found. I told him yes. My junior brother later came to inform me there is information in respect of whereabout of my child. He also informed me that Usaini (the Accused) was seen along with the girl so we should go and meet him. I said no we should not go and met him. He also told me that Yusuf (a friend to PW1) informed him Yakubu brought out a girl from the river we should meet him to inquire about the girl. We met Yakubu (PW1) at home and inquire about the girl and he informed us that indeed he rescued a girl from inside the river and handed her over to the Accused. I told Yakubu I am the father of the girl and I want to report the matter to the police station since Yakubu (PW1) is familiar with the Accused. The three of us then went to the police station where we reported that it was the Accused, who kidnapped my daughter. At the police station they referred back to my report 3 days ago and confirmed same. He asked me if we know where to find the Accused and I said yes. The DPO then attached some policeman to us to arrest the Accused. I declined to follow the team for the arrest – – to avoid a fight as I am angry but I suggested the team should be led by PW1 to arrest the Accused. The Accused was eventually arrested as he was pinpointed – – by PW1. At the police station PW1 revealed what transpired between him and the Accused that he picked out the girl from the river and handed her over to the Accused. The Accused also admitted taken custody of the girl as she was removed from the river and handed over to him by PW1. The DPO told the Accused to show where the girl is and he agreed to show where the girl is. I was left at the police station when DPO and the team went to the place where the girl was kept by the Accused. The team later on came with the girl. I was happy and delighted but I was told by one Shuaibu, who was amongst the team that the girl was killed. People then came and drive me away from the scene. The girl was inside the police vehicle, as I was told she is dead I left the scene, the girl is now buried (sic).

With particular reference to PW4’s evidence, the trial Court observed as follows:

Though there was element of hearsay in the testimony of PW4, it does not affect the testimony of facts directly known to him that his daughter got missing, which he reported at the Police Station. That he was even present at the Police Station four days after when the corpse of his daughter was brought along with the Accused Person, who led the Police to the whereabouts of the corpse. These facts known to PW4 was corroborated and consistent with the facts of the death of PW4’s daughter as reported in Exhibit C. The objections raised on the Prosecution’s evidence on grounds of lack of identification of the deceased victim and on grounds of hearsay in respect of PW4’s evidence is, therefore, unfounded and devoid of merit and I so hold.

In its own Judgment, the Court of Appeal observed as follows on PW4’s evidence:

It is quite clear that the Appellant has not considered the totality of the evidence of PW4 as hearsay, as that will be completely against the guiding principle of hearsay evidence as laid down by the Privy Council in … Subramanian V. Public Prosecutor (1956) 1 WLR 965 at 969 that evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person, who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay, it is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made … PW4 fully participated in the whole scenario of the case, he as the father of the missing and later deceased girl, lodged a complaint to the Police and identified the corpse of the deceased when she was eventually brought from where she was killed. On all those aspects, his evidence of what he witnessed himself cannot amount to hearsay, and the learned trial Judge showed full consciousness of the type of evidence of PW4. What Appellant’s counsel has emphasized in this Appeal on the evidence of PW4, is not the decision of the trial Court but a comment by the learned trial Judge. The argument … does not relate to the ultimate decision of the Court. The duty of the appellate Court is to determine whether the decision of the trial Court is right and not whether the reasons for the decision is right.

The Appellant argued that the trial Court’s decision that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal has occasioned a miscarriage of justice against him; that the trial Court having held that “there was some element of hearsay in the testimony of PW4”, ought not to have relied on his evidence, which is hearsay and thus, inadmissible.

He submitted that hearsay evidence is not admissible to establish a crime, citing Kasa V. The State (1994) 6 SCNJ (sic), Buhari V. Obasanjo (2005) 9 SCM 1, Sylvester Utteh V. The State (1992) 2 SCNJ 183; Chima V. The State (2001) SCM 107; that the trial Court’s Judgment is replete with instances where it made references to PW4’s evidence, which it admitted contain hearsay evidence; that without that evidence, it is difficult to say whether the two lower Courts would still have convicted him; and that if they properly evaluated the evidence of PW4, he would not have been convicted for the offences that he was standing trial for.

The Respondent submitted that the whole version of the testimony of PW4 could not be covered by the description of hearsay evidence given by this Court in the case of Ojo V. Gharoro (2006) ALL FWLR (Pt. 316) 197 at 219, as follows:

“In most cases, hearsay evidence is to the following or like effect: I was told by XYZ that, or XYZ told me that, or I heard that XYZ told ABC that, or I made inquiries and I was told that:”

It also argued in the alternative that even if part of the evidence of PW4 is hearsay; it is trite law that unless such an admission occasions a miscarriage of justice, the evidence would not be expunged by the appellate Court, citing Umeojiako V. Ezenamuo (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt. 126) 253; that PW4’s evidence did not affect the credibility of the evidence of the other prosecution witnesses, which directly linked the Appellant to the death of the deceased; that even if part of PW4’s evidence is expunged, the decision of the two lower Courts would have still been the same because there was credible indicting direct evidence showing beyond reasonable doubt that the Appellant committed the offences charged; and that the Appellant did not point out the purported hearsay evidence in PW4’s testimony that is fatal.

It further argued that the Appellant left this Court to hazard a guess as to what aspect of his testimony qualified as hearsay, and that such aspect could be:

My junior brother later came to inform me there is information in respect of whereabout of my child. He also informed me that Usaini (the Accused) was seen along with the girl so we should go and meet him. I said no we should not go and meet him. He also told me that Yusuf (a friend to PW1) informed him Yakubu brought out a girl from the river we should meet him to inquire about the girl.

It submitted that these were made to show that they were made and not that they were true; that the rule does not include the evidence of facts known to a witness, and where the purpose is not to establish the truth of the statement but the fact that it was made, citing Arogundade V. State (2009) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1136) 165, Ojo V. Gharoro (supra), Subramanian V. Public Prosecutor (1956) 1 WLR 965 at 969.

Yes, the position of the law is that hearsay evidence, which is the testimony by a witness of what others have said and not what he or she knew personally, is inadmissible. It is not hearsay and is, therefore, admissible, if it is only intended to be used to show the fact that it was made – see Utteh V. State (supra), wherein this Court quoted with approval the Judgment of the Privy Council in Subramanian V. Public Prosecutor (supra), and Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC, further explained that –

A piece of evidence is hearsay if it is evidence of the contents of a statement made by a Witness, who is himself not called to testify. It presupposes that if any fact is to be proved against anyone, it ought to be proved in his presence by the testimony of a witness sworn to speak the truth and testifying to facts within his personal knowledge, subject to recognized exceptions – – As Taylor has put it in his classic on “Evidence” (12th Ed.):

“In its legal sense, hearsay evidence is all EVIDENCE, which does not derive its values solely from the credit given to the Witness himself, but which rests also, in part, on the veracity and competence of some other person”. If any such evidence is designed to prove the truth of the statement and not merely the fact that the statement was made, then it is hearsay and inadmissible: see Subramanian V. Public Prosecutor … What a Witness heard in the presence of an Accused cannot be hearsay.

Unlike the Evidence Acts of 1990 and 2004, which made no reference to the term “hearsay evidence”, the Evidence Act 2011 contains two substantive provisions dealing with hearsay evidence. Section 37 of the said Evidence Act provides that:

Hearsay means a statement-

(a) Oral or written made otherwise than by a witness in a proceeding: or

(b) Contained or recorded in a book, document or any record whatever, proof of which is not admissible under any provision of this Act, which is tendered in evidence for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter stated in it.

Section 38 of the said Evidence Act, 2011, further provides as follows-

Hearsay evidence is not admissible except as provided in this part or by or under any other provision of this or any other Act.

Clearly, when evidence of a statement, oral or written, by someone other than the witness testifying before a Court, is inadmissible as hearsay evidence, depends on the purpose for which the evidence is given or tendered by the witness in Court. In effect, the focus is on the purpose or use of the statement rather than the mere fact that it was made by a person not called as a Witness. If the only relevance of the statement is the truth it asserts, it is a hearsay statement, see FRN V. Usman (2012) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1301) 141 at 160, wherein Rhodes Vivour, JSC, observed:

A Witness is expected to testify in Court on oath on what he knows personally, if the Witness testifies on what he heard some other person say, his evidence is hearsay. Such evidence is to inform the Court of what he heard the other person say … if … his testimony is to establish the truth of an event in question … it is hearsay and inadmissible evidence. Hearsay evidence is secondary evidence of an oral statement best described as second-hand evidence. What a Witness says he heard from another person is unreliable for many reasons.

Where, however, the statement is relevant for some purpose other than the truth of their contents, it is not a hearsay statement, and it is admissible in evidence – Utteh V. State (supra), Arogundade V. State (supra), Ojo V. Gharoro (supra).

In this case, as the Respondent pointed out, the Appellant did not refer to, or tag the statements he considered hearsay in the testimony of PW4. However, it is clear that he hinged his grouse on the comment made by the trial Court that – “there was some element of hearsay in the testimony of PW4”, and his contention is that having so held, the trial Court ought not to have relied on PW4’s testimony.

But I must say that the Court of Appeal hit the nail on the head when it said that what the Appellant emphasized on the evidence of PW4, “is not the decision of the trial Court, but a comment by the learned trial Judge”, and that is very true.

​It is settled that an appeal is usually against a ratio and not against an obiter. “Obiter dictum” is Latin for “something said in passing”. “It is a judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and, therefore, not precedential”- see Black’s Law Dictionary: 9th Ed.. wherein it was explained that “ratio decidendi” [Latin for “the reason for deciding”},

“May mean either (1) the rule that the Judge, who decided the case, intended to lay down and apply to the facts, or (2) the rule that a later Court concedes him to have had the power to lay down” – [Glanville Williams, Learning the Law 75, 11th Ed., 19821. “There are – – two steps involved in the ascertainment of the ratio decidendi – – First, it is necessary to determine all the facts of the case as seen by the Judge; secondly, it is necessary to discover which of those facts were treated as material by the Judge ‘. [Rupert Cross & J. W. Harris, Precedent in English Law 65-66,4th Ed., 1991]

In this case, what the learned trial Judge actually said was – “Though there was element of hearsay in the testimony of PW4, it does not affect the testimony of facts directly known to him” and he overruled the objection on grounds of hearsay.

The word “though” simply means “despite the fact that” – Dictionary.com. So, the comment he made was something said in passing, it was an obiter dictum, which had no impact on his reason for deciding; the ratio decidendi of the case.

At the end of the day, the two lower Courts found that PW4’s evidence could not be hearsay because, as the Court of Appeal put it, “he fully participated in the whole scenario of the case”, and I see no reason whatsoever to fault their findings.

It is clear from his testimony that PW4 gave evidence of facts known to him, and his account of what his brother, who was not called as a Witness, said to him, came in when he was narrating how he went from Point A to Point B in the course of finding his missing daughter, who was later found dead with body parts missing.

​PW4 narrated how his daughter got missing after she was sent to take millet to the grinding place, and he reported the matter to the Police. He said that when his brother told him that the Appellant was seen with his daughter, and asked him to go and see the Appellant he refused, but when his brother told him about PW1 rescuing a girl from the river and giving her to the Appellant, he went to see PW1.

He convinced PW1 to go with him to the Police Station, and he was there at the Police Station when the Police arrested the Appellant with the help of PW1 and was there when the Appellant led the Police to where the body of his daughter was found and the body was brought back to the Police Station in a Police vehicle.

It goes without saying that his evidence of what he saw or witnessed himself on that fateful day cannot be hearsay, and that whatever his brother said to him, had no relevance to the issue of whether the Appellant is guilty as charged or not. In the circumstances, the Appellant’s argument that without the evidence of PW4. “it is difficult to say whether the two Courts would still have convicted [him] for the offence of culpable homicide and kidnapping”, is bereft of merit. I have no doubts that the two lower Courts arrived at the right conclusion on this issue of hearsay.

The Appellant also argued that Exhibit A & B, his Statements to the Police, which he retracted, require corroboration, and citing Iko V. State (2001) LPELR – 1480 (SC), he submitted that the Court of Appeal erred when it held as follows:

From the foregoing and clear content thereof, I am not in any doubt that the extra judicial statement of the Appellant admitted as Exhibits A and B amounts to a confession notwithstanding the retraction thereof by the Appellant

The Respondent submitted that a free and voluntary confession alone can lead to a conviction, even without corroboration, as held in Nwachukwu V. State (2007) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1062) 65, Solola V. State (2005) 11 NWLR (Pt. 937) 460, Idowu V. State (2000) 7 SC (Pt. 11) 50, Natasha v. State (2017) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1596) 38, and Emoga v. State (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 519) 25. It argued in the alternative that even if Exhibits A & B requires corroboration, the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3, PW5 and part of PW4’s evidence provided the required corroboration; and that equally of corroborative relevance is Exhibit C, which confirmed the death of the deceased, and also corroborated certain aspects of the Appellant’s Confession.

​The Respondent is right, and it is clear that the Appellant is merely grasping at straws with his argument that his retracted confession required corroboration. First off, there is a distinction between a confession objected to on the ground that it was not made at all and one objected to on the ground that it was not voluntary. In the latter case, a trial-within-trial must be held to determine whether the said Confession is voluntary or not. In the former case, where the confession has been wholly retracted, the trial Court is entitled to admit the confession in evidence, and thereafter, decide whether or not the Accused Person did make the Confession, as alleged by the Police – Ikpasa V. Bendel State (1981) NSCC (Vol. 12) 300.

In other words, where an Accused Person contends that he did not make the confession, the trial Court is entitled to admit it in evidence, and thereafter, decide whether he made the statement at the conclusion of trial; a trial-within-trial is not required in such circumstances. In this case, the trial Court observed that –

The Accused Person denied giving the confessional statement to the Police – – The Accused Person also denied signing the statement. The Defence Counsel, however, did not object to the admission of the statement in evidence but urged the Court to determine weight to be attached to the statement – – After admission of Exhibits A & B, the Accused while giving oral evidence – – stated that he was beaten by the Police until he made the Confession. Once an Accused retracts his confessional statement, the Court must test same through a number of guidelines – – before the Court could determine whether to convict on the confessional statement or not – – I have found that –the question is whether the Accused made the confessional statement he retracted or not. It is not an issue of whether the Accused made the confessional statement voluntarily or involuntarily under duress. Since the Defence never objected to the admittance of the statement in evidence and never applied at the material time the Accused was denying making the statement for a trial-within-trial to determine whether [he] made the statement voluntarily or not—I would consider the weight to be attached to Exhibit A & B, as submitted by learned counsel to the Defence.

After reviewing the evidence before the Court, the trial Court concluded as follows:

Having gone through other evidence tendered through PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4 and Exhibit C, which have all corroborated substantially fads stated in the Accused’s confession in Exhibit B, I believe there is enough weight to conclude that Exhibit B is a true confession of the Accused Person.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial Court’s finding and the Appellant has argued that it erred in law when it also concluded that his statements in Exhibits A&B “amounts to a confession notwithstanding the retraction thereof by the Appellant’.

The Appellant has no case. He retracted his confessional statement and a retracted Confession is admissible in evidence – Ikpasa V. Bendel State (supra). So, the trial Court took the right steps when it admitted the Statement in evidence, and after reviewing evidence before it, it decided that he did make the confession.

The Court can also convict on the retracted confessional statement of an Accused, even without corroboration, so long as the Court is satisfied of the truth – see Oseni V. State (2012) 5 NWLR (Pi. 1293) 351, where this Court held that:

In Nigeria, a free and voluntary confession of guilt by [an Accused], if it is direct and positive and is duly made and satisfactorily proved, it is sufficient to warrant conviction without corroborative evidence, as long as the Court is satisfied as to the truth of the Confession.

In this case, the two lower Courts were satisfied that the evidence of PW1, PW2, PW3, PW4 and Exhibit C, corroborated the Appellant’s confessional Statement, and the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts are undoubtedly unassailable.

The Appellant’s Confession in the said Exhibit B is so detailed that no one can be left in doubt as to its truth. The identity of the deceased was not in doubt; it was PW4’s daughter, who was reported missing. Although, the body was partially decomposed when it was found and handed over to the Doctor for post-mortem examination, his report of the “missing organs – eyes and heart from the corpse”, is consistent with the Appellant’s confession as to how he killed her and removed her eyes with a nail, and how he took his friend to remove her heart with a nail.

​The Appellant’s confession in Exhibit B solidified the Prosecution’s case, and since he has not presented this Court with good reasons to interfere with the concurrent findings of the two lower Courts, there is nothing this Court can do.

Consequently, this Appeal lacks merit. It fails and it is, therefore, dismissed. I affirm the Court of Appeal’s Judgment, which upheld the trial Court’s decision.

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SC.188/2015