Samuel Harcourt Olawole Williams V. Attorney-general Of The Federation (1975)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

G. B. A. COKER, J.S.C. 

This case undoubtedly originated from the High Court, Ibadan, where the present respondent, that is the Attorney-General of the Federation, had sued the appellant, as defendant therein, on a writ endorsed as follows:

“1. The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant is for a sum of 644: 16:2d (Six Hundred and Forty Four Pounds, Sixteen Shillings and Two Pence) being the amount granted to the defendant as a loan by the  Federal Government of Nigeria under an Agreement dated 30th October, 1952.”

The case came up before the learned Chief Justice of the Western State on the 18th September 1972, and pleadings were duly ordered and, in pursuance of that order, the plaintiff duly filed a statement of claim. When the case was mentioned before the learned Chief Justice again on the 18th September, 1972, the defendant was not in court and the records show that it was recorded of him that “defendant served but absent”. As he could not be found for purpose of serving the statement of claim on him, the plaintiff moved the court for substituted service on the defendant of the plaintiff’s statement of claim.

On the 26th June, 1973, when the case again was called before the learned Chief Justice, he made an order as prayed on the motion of the plaintiff for substituted service of the plaintiff’s statement of claim on the defendant. There was no other record as to any further proceedings or orders in the High Court, Ibadan, but on the 18th February, 1974, the case was listed before Sowemimo, Ag. J., in the Federal Revenue Court in Lagos.

The plaintiff was represented at this hearing before the Federal Revenue Court and that Court, in adjourning the matter to the 4th March, 1974, observed that there was no indication on the files that the defendant had been served with the plaintiff’s statement of claim. On the 4th March, 1974, the case was called again and as there was nothing to show that the defendant had then been served with the plaintiff’s statement of claim, the case was further adjourned to the 21st May, 1974. Likewise, and for the same reason, the case was adjourned again to the 22nd July, 1974. On that day, the defendant was represented by learned counsel by whom he appeared and on his behalf learned counsel objected to the competence of the Federal Revenue Court to try or continue with the trial of a case which was manifestly begun in the High Court, Ibadan, and that section 7 of the Federal Revenue Court Decree, 1973, had made no provisions concerning the type of transfer postulated by these proceedings. For his own part, learned counsel for the plaintiff resisted the argument against jurisdiction and against the competence of the Federal Revenue Court to hear the case and he argued, inter alia, as follows:

“The objection is misconceived and should be dismissed. The plaintiff or the defendant has not asked for the transfer of this case to this Court. If this case has been wrongfully transferred or commenced in this Court, the only remedy this Court can do is to transfer the case back to the Western State High Court as provided by section 22 (2) of the Federal Revenue Court Decree, 1973. The objection is to be dismissed without merit. ”

In a written ruling, the learned trial judge of the Federal Revenue Court overruled the objection to jurisdiction and ordered the plaintiff to serve the defendant with a copy of the statement of claim and also that the defendant should file his statement of defence thereafter. In the course of that ruling, the learned trial judge referred freely to section 7 and section 8 of the Federal Revenue Court Decree No. 13, of 1973, and then observed thus:

“The present suit is not part-heard at the time the file of the case was sent to the Federal Revenue Court only the statement of claim had been filed, so that the High Court of Justice, Western State, ceased to have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. In my view, the fact that by virtue of the Federal Revenue Court Decree 1973, which made the High Court of a State cease to have jurisdiction in matters which section 7 of the Federal Revenue Court Decree 1973 will not affect the validity of the original suit filed in that Court and neither will it affect subsequent proceedings being entertained in the Federal  Revenue Court. The case was not transferred to this Court on application of either party, but since the High Court ceased to have Jurisdiction to entertain the suit it was sent to the Federal Revenue Court which has jurisdiction to deal with such cause of action. It is therefore a misconception to contend that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit merely because the suit was originally filed in the High Court of Western State, Ibadan.

The objection is therefore overruled. Defendant to pay costs of N10.”

This appeal is against that decision and ruling and understandably the complaint is that the Federal Revenue Court is incompetent to try the case.

There is nothing on the record of appeal to show how the case itself arrived at the Federal Revenue Court in Lagos since, as we stated above, it was filed in the High Court, Ibadan. There was no order of transfer of the case and all we were told by learned Senior State Counsel appearing for the respondent, is that the case is one of the many files of which were simply bundled together and sent over by the Chief Registrar of the High Court, Ibadan, to the Chief Registrar of the Federal Revenue Court in Lagos.
The High Court, Ibadan, as part of the High Court of Justice of the Western State, was established by the High Court Law, cap. 44, Laws of Western Nigeria, 1959. This legislation contains no powers of transfer thereout to another State or jurisdiction of any case or matter already pending in the court. Sections 31 to 35 of the High Court Law of the Western State, deal with powers of transfer of cases among the courts of the State and in no respect suggest the transfer of a case from the jurisdiction of the State to another State. The Federal Revenue Court was established by the Federal Revenue Court Decree No. 13 of 1973 and section 1 of that Decree provides as follows:

“1(1) There is hereby established a High Court of Justice which shall be styled “The Federal Revenue Court”.
(2) The Federal Revenue Court shall consist of the following:
(a) The President, who shall have overall control and supervision of the Administration Federal Revenue Court and
(b) Such number of Judges (not being less than 4) as the Head of the Federal Military Government may by order prescribe.
(3) The Federal Revenue Court shall be a superior court of record and, save as otherwise provided by law, shall have all the powers of the High Court of Justice of any of the States in the Federation.
(4) The Court shall assume its functions on such dates as may be appointed by an order made by the Head of the Federal Military Government. ”

Section 7 of the Decree deals with and spells out the jurisdiction of the Federal Revenue Court and it is undisputed that the subject-matter of the present Suit falls within the ambit of the jurisdictional provisions of section 7 (1) (a) of the Decree. The next section of the Decree, that is to say section 8, deals with cesser of jurisdiction of other courts with respect to the matters comprehended by section 7. The provisions of section 8 are as follows:

“8 (1) In so far as jurisdiction is conferred upon the Federal Revenue Court in respect of the causes or matters mentioned in the foregoing provisions of this Part the High Court or any other court of a State shall, to the extent that jurisdiction is so conferred upon the Federal Revenue Court, cease to have jurisdiction in relation to such causes or matters.

(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) above, the Head of the Federal Military Government may by order and to the extent set out in the said order vest in the High Court or any other court of a State Federal jurisdiction either generally in relation to the causes and matters set out in the preceding section or specially in relation to any particular cause or matter which may be specified in the said order.
(3) Nothing in the foregoing provisions shall affect the jurisdiction and all other powers of the High Court or any other court of a State to continue to hear and determine causes and matters which are pending (now altered to “part-heard”) before such court at the date of the assumption of the functions of the Federal Revenue Court or at the date when jurisdiction is otherwise conferred on the Federal Revenue Court by the Head of the Federal Military Government, and any proceedings in any such causes and matters, which are still pending at the expiration of the period of six months beginning with the date of assumption of the functions of the Federal Revenue Court or at the date when jurisdiction is otherwise conferred on the Federal Revenue Court, shall abate on the expiration of that period.”
So, section 8 (1) reserves exclusively to the jurisdiction of the Federal Revenue Court the matters contemplated in the subject-matter of the writ in the present proceedings and evidently by the provisions of the subsection, the High Court, Ibadan, “shall cease to have jurisdiction” in relation to the case in hand at the time prescribed. Section 8 (3) however makes provisions for some transitional stages and matters, which were part-heard before any other court “at the date of the assumption of the functions of the Federal Revenue Court or at the date when Jurisdiction is otherwise conferred on the Federal Revenue Court” and still pending thereat at the expiration of the period of six months thereafter “shall abate upon the expiration of the period”. By the provisions of section 1 of the Federal Revenue Court (Amendment) Decree No. 38 of 1973, the word “pending” which had appeared in section 8 (3) has been altered to “part-heard”. The effect of section 8 (3) as amended therefore is that matters which fall within the competence of the Federal Revenue Court by virtue of section 7 of the Federal Revenue Court Decree but which were part-heard in any other court on the date of the assumption of jurisdiction over same by the Federal Revenue Court, may be continued and disposed of by that other court provided that the exercise of completing the hearing was effected within a period of six months from the date when the Federal Revenue Court assumed jurisdiction over that matter; for after such period by virtue of the provisions of section 8 (3) of the Decree any such matters shall abate.

Section 1 (4) of the Federal Revenue Court Decree provides that the Federal Revenue Court shall assume its functions on such date as may be appointed by an order made by the Head of the Federal Military Government. By Legal Notice No. 61 of 1973 (dated 15th October, 1973) entitled the “Federal Revenue Court (Number of Judges and Date of Assumption of Functions) Order 1973”, it was stated in section 2 of the Order that the day appointed by the Head of the Federal Military Government for the assumption of the functions of the Federal Revenue Court, shall be the 1st August, 1973. This means that any matters within the purview of section 7 of the Decree then part-heard before any other court on the 1st August, 1973, may, by virtue of the provisions of section 8 (3), be completely disposed of in that court on or before the 31st January, 1974, after which date the said matter shall abate.

The present action was instituted on behalf of the Attorney-General of the Federation in the High Court, Ibadan, on the 3rd February, 1972, and on the 1st August, 1973, when the Federal Revenue Court assumed jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action, the case was still in the High Court, Ibadan, but clearly it was not part-heard and surely according to the provisions of section 8 (3) of the Federal Revenue Court Decree, the case must be considered clearly outside the saving provisions of that sub-section. The plaintiff filed his statement of claim on the 25th September, 1972; the defendant could not be found to be served with a copy of that statement of claim in accordance with the Order of Court and the case apparently went to sleep in the High Court Registry at Ibadan until the 31st May, 1973, when someone thought of filing a motion in that court to ask for an order for substituted service of the statement of claim on the defendant. On the 16th July, 1973, the learned Chief Justice of the Western State, before whom the case was listed, purported to make an order as prayed on that motion but it is apt to say that on that date and indeed as far back as from the 1st February, 1973, the matter had abated in the High Court, Ibadan. All orders made by the High Court, Ibadan, in respect of the case since then are incompetent since, by the peremptory provisions of section 8 (3) of the Federal Revenue Court Decree, the matter had abated. Indeed, when the case appeared in court on the 16th July 1973, the learned Chief Justice should have struck it out.

Before us in these appeal proceedings, it was not argued that the Chief Registrar of the High Court of the Western State possessed any powers of transferring a case from one State to another and indeed learned Senior State Counsel who appeared for the Attorney-General conceded that he had no such powers: even the High Court of Justice in the Western State does not possess such powers inasmuch of the enabling legislation does not so prescribe. We are satisfied that the learned Chief Justice was in error of law in acceding to the prayer of the motion to serve the statement of claim on the defendant at the time the motion came up it being evident that long before that date the matter had abated in the High Court, Ibadan. When the Chief Registrar, High Court of the Western State or whoever did so, purported to forward the file of the case to the Federal Revenue Court in Lagos, he was clearly forwarding a nudum pactum, an empty file of sterile papers. Even if the statutory time or period had not elapsed, we entertain no doubt whatsoever that neither the Chief Registrar of that Court nor the Court itself had any powers of transferring a case or indeed to transfer this particular case to the Federal Revenue Court in the way in which it appeared to have been done and to have been listed before the Federal Revenue Court as indeed it was on the 18th February, 1974.
It is opportune at this juncture to consider the meaning and implications of section 22 of the Federal Revenue Court Decree. That section provides in full as follows:
“22 (1) A Judge of the Federal Revenue Court may at any time or at any stage of the proceedings in any cause or matter before final judgment, either with or without application from any of the parties thereto, transfer such cause or matter before him to any other Judge of the Federal Revenue Court.

(2) No cause or matter shall be struck out by the Federal Revenue Court merely on the ground that such cause or matter was taken in the Federal Revenue Court instead of the High Court of a State in which it ought to have been brought, and the Judge of the Federal Revenue Court before whom such cause or matter is brought may cause such cause or matter to be transferred to the appropriate High Court of a State in accordance with rules of court to be made under section 43 of this Decree.

(3) Every order of transfer made pursuant to subsection (2) above shall operate as a stay of proceedings before the President or the Judge before whom such proceedings are brought or instituted.
(4) Any order made pursuant to this section shall not be subject to appeal.”

By the provisions of section 22 (4), an Order of Transfer made by virtue of that section shall not be subject to any appeal. Section 22 (1) deals with the transfer of cases by one judge of the Federal Revenue Court to another judge of the same Court. Truly, section 22 (2) deals with orders of transfers, which have effect extra-territorially but on its proper construction the section relates only to matters “taken in the Federal Revenue Court instead of the High Court of a State”. In that case, section 22 (2) empowers the judge of the Federal Revenue Court before whom the case is listed to cause such cause or matter to be transferred to the appropriate High Court of a State”, in accordance with the Rules of Court made for the Federal Revenue Court by virtue of powers conferred by section 43 of the Federal Revenue Court Decree. In the case in hand, there was no action taken in the Federal Revenue Court and although section 22 of the Decree was cited to him in argument by learned counsel for the  appellant, the learned trial judge made no reference whatsoever to that section in his ruling. He certainly thought, as we do, that section 22 (2) does not apply to the present proceedings.

In the course of his ruling on the objection of learned counsel for the appellant in these proceedings, the learned trial judge of the Federal Revenue Court in a passage which is far from being clear, took and expressed the view that the cesser of jurisdiction by the High Court, Ibadan, “will not affect the validity of the original Suit filed in that Court and neither will it affect subsequently proceedings being entertained in the Federal Revenue Court”.

These conclusions seem to us a non sequitor and although we have been at pains to discern the real reasons for upholding the jurisdiction of this court, we are unable to discern any such from the ruling under appeal. The learned trial judge’s view of the law was clearly mistaken.

In the circumstances, we decide that the complaint of the appellant is fully justified and his appeal must and does succeed. The appeal is allowed and the ruling of the Federal Revenue Court, Lagos, in this matter dated the 30th September, 1974, including the order for costs, is set aside. It is ordered that the plaintiff’s case be struck out and that this shall be the judgment of the Court. The respondent shall pay to the appellant the costs of these proceedings fixed in the Federal Revenue Court at N10 and in this Court at N142.

Other Citation: (1975) LCN/2036(SC)