Sanusi Abdullahi V. The State (1985)

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KAWU, J.S.C.

At the High Court of Oyo State, holden at Oyo, the appellant was charged with the offences of (1) causing death on the highway by dangerous driving contrary to S.4 of the Federal Highway Act, No.4 of 1971; (2) dangerous driving contrary to S.5(1) of the same Act.

He pleaded not guilty to both counts.

The facts of the case are fairly simple and straight forward. The prosecution’s case was that in the evening of 5th December, 1979, Nuru Wangara (1PW) was driving a trailer, Registration No. 6323K from Lagos to Kano. When he got to a point between Oyo and Ogbomoso and was ascending a hill, another trailer, Registration No. LAD 3323A, driven by the appellant, suddenly emerged from the opposite direction. 1 PW was on his own side of the road when the appellant’s vehicle left its side, and brushed the left side of 1 PW’s vehicle and ended up in the gutter. A passenger in the appellant’s vehicle, who, incidentally, happened to be the appellant’s master, got killed in the accident.

The appellant’s case was that as he was descending the hill, he saw two vehicles coming from the opposite direction. According to him, both vehicles were moving side by side, and on seeing this, he applied his brakes, but that notwithstanding, 1 PW’s vehicle collided with his own which eventually somersaulted into a ditch.

At the end of the trial, the learned trial judge carefully evaluated all the evidence adduced by both parties and came to the conclusion that the case against the appellant had been proved. He accordingly found the appellant guilty on both counts and sentenced him to 3 years imprisonment on the first count, and six months on the second count. Both sentences were to run concurrently. In addition, he disqualified the appellant from driving for a period of 3 years after the expiration of the terms of imprisonment.

The appellant, being dissatisfied with his conviction and the sentences imposed, appealed to the Court of Appeal which dismissed his appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeal, however, set aside the order disqualifying him from driving for 3 years.

The appellant, still dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeal has appealed to the Supreme Court on several grounds of appeal.

The complaint in the first ground of appeal is that the Court of Appeal made two contradictory statements on the degree of negligence which the prosecution must prove in order to establish a charge under SA of the Federal Highway Act. It was contended in the appellant’s brief of argument that the Court of Appeal, having accepted the principles of law enunciated in R. v. Tatimu, 20 N.L.R. 20 and in Andrews v. D.P.P. (1937) A.C. 576 at 583 that Court was wrong to have held that the degree of negligence required in this case is not as high as that required to prove manslaughter as laid down in Andrews’ case (Supra).

I cannot see any contradictions at all. The learned justices of the Court of Appeal were right in their statement that the proof required to establish a case under S.4 of the Federal Highway Act, 1971 is not as high as the one required to establish a case of manslaughter under the Criminal Code. In Brett and MacClean’s Criminal Law and Procedure of the Six Southern States of Nigeria, 2nd Ed. paragraph 1870 at 717 (1974) it is stated as follows:

(In) causing death by dangerous or reckless driving the degree of negligence falls short of that required for a conviction for manslaughter.

It is however, pertinent to note that in his judgment, the learned trial judge did not indulge in the exercise of comparing the relevant degree of negligence that must be established in order to sustain a charge of causing death by dangerous driving and one of manslaughter under the Criminal Code. He was mainly concerned with the proof required to establish the charge before him.

As to the appellant’s manner of driving that night, the learned trial judge accepted the evidence of the prosecution witnesses that the appellant left his own side of the road to hit 1P.W’s vehicle at the rear. He rejected the appellant’s version of the story. It was from those primary facts deposed to by the 1st and 2nd prosecution witnesses that the learned trial judge drew his conclusion as follows:

To leave one’s lane for another when another vehicle is approaching from the opposite direction and thereby causes one’s vehicle to hit that other in the process is to my mind a dangerous piece of driving.