Shittu V. Nigerian Agricultural & Cooperative Bank Limited & Ors (2000)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
OBADINA, J.C.A.
This is an interlocutory appeal against the decision of the Federal High Court, Kano Division delivered on the 6th day of August, 1997. The 1st Respondent as plaintiff before the Federal High Court, Kano Division claimed in its writ of summons as follows:-
A declaration that the action of the defendants in closing and sealing of offices of the plaintiff at Dutse and Hadejia is an unauthorized method of enforcing tax liabilities if any of the plaintiff and therefore illegal, unconstitutional, null and void.
(ii) An injunction restraining the defendants, privies or whosoever acting on their instruction from sealing and closing the offices of the plaintiff in purported enforcing of alleged tax liabilities of the plaintiff to the defendant.”
The 1st Respondent as plaintiff also filed along with the writ of summons a motion on notice dated 13th May, 1997 praying for the following orders:-
“(i) An order of mandatory injunction directing the defendants, their servants, agents or privies by whatever description to open and unseal the premises of the plaintiffs branch offices located at No. 1A, Nguru Road, Hadejia and Kiyawa Road, Dutse, Jigawa State pending the hearing and determination of this suit.
(2) An order of injunction restraining the defendants, their servants, agents, or privies however described from continuing to seal or close the offices of the plaintiff at No.1A, Nguru Road, Hadejia and Kiyawa Road, Dutse, in Jigawa State pending the hearing and determination of this suit.
(3) And such further or other orders as the court may deem fit to make in the circumstances of this case.”
The motion was moved and argued by the parties and the learned trial Judge on the 20th of May, 1997 granted both mandatory and interlocutory orders against the defendants, their servants, agents or privies in respect of the sealing off or closing down of the offices of the plaintiff/respondent. After being served with the orders, the 3rd defendant now the Appellant, filed a motion on notice dated 11/6/97 praying the court as follows:-
(i) An order striking out the plaintiff’s claim for want of jurisdiction;
(ii) An order discharging the order of interlocutory injunction granted on 20th of May, 1997; and (iii) An order awarding damages to the defendants.
The motion was heard by the learned trial Judge. In his ruling, the learned trial Judge dismissed the application of the 3rd defendant/appellant and held that he had jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. The 3rd defendant/appellant was not satisfied with the decision and therefore, he appealed to this Court.
The appellant filed two (2) grounds of appeal from which he formulated only one issue for determination. The issue reads as follows:-
“Whether the Federal High Court, Kano Division can properly assume jurisdiction as it did over the plaintiff/respondent’s claim which bothers on Personal Income Tax as a revenue accruable to Jigawa State Government in view of the combined provisions of the Personal Income Tax Decree No. 104 of 1993 and the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993?”
The 1st Respondent also formulated from the two grounds of appeal filed by the appellant, one issue for determination, namely:-
“Is the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to hear and determine the claims of the plaintiff/respondent as endorsed on its writ of summons ousted having regard to the Federal High Court (Amendment) Decree No. 60 of 1991 Personal Income Tax Decree No. 104 of 1993 and Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993?”
A close reading together of the issues formulated by the Appellant and that raised by the respondent seems to show that the two issues are identical and the same in substance. The substance of the issues is whether the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the claims of the respondent as constituted.
In arguing the only issue for determination, the learned Counsel for the Appellant in his brief of argument argued that the jurisdiction of any court is determined by the claims of the plaintiff as presented before the court. He referred to the claims filed by the Respondent as constituted. He further referred to the Exhibits at pages 6, 7, and 8 of the record. He submitted that the subject matter and cause of action of the plaintiff/respondent’s claim and the principal issue in the case pertain to the revenue accruable to Jigawa State Government. He further submitted that the tax liabilities referred to by the Respondent in the audit exercise arose mainly from the provisions of the Personal Income Tax Decree No. 104 of 1993 and by virtue of Section 2(1) (a) and (2) of the Decree a State is empowered to tax the income of individuals within the state who are not subject to Federal Taxation as provided in Section 2(1) (b) and (2) of the Decree. He argued that taxes are recoverable as provided in section 72 by deduction at source as withholding tax or from emoluments of employee as PAYE, under section 80. He referred to section 81 of the Decree which makes employers of such employees like the plaintiff answerable for the tax so deducted. He referred to section 57, 59, 60, and 64 of the Decree which prescribe the procedure to be followed for reliefs by a person aggrieved with a tax assessment arising from section 53 or 54 of the Decree. He submitted that from the totality of the provisions of Decree No. 104 of 1993, no jurisdiction is conferred on the Federal High Court to entertain claims related to revenue accruable to a State, as Jigawa State. He submitted that only a State High Court has exclusive jurisdiction in the circumstances.
The learned Counsel to the Appellant further referred to the findings of the learned trial Judge at pages 59 and 60 of the record, and submitted that the provisions of section 230 of Decree No.107 of 1993 supercede the provisions of all other enactments including Decrees No. 60 of 1991 and 16 of 1992 as it relates to the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. He submitted that the Federal High Court is no longer clothed with jurisdiction spelt out in section 7(1) (t) of Decree No. 60 of 1991. He referred to the particulars of claim in the plaintiffs writ of summons and submitted that in so far as the claim pertains to the issue of revenue accruable to the State, the Federal High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the action. He relied on the decisions of Mandara v. A-G., the Federation of Nigeria (1984) 4 SC 8, (1984) 1 SCNLR 311; African Newspaper v. A.-G. Federation (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.6) 137 and Bronik Motors v. Wema Bank (1983) 1 SCNLR 296.
He urged the court to allow the appeal.
In his own brief of argument, learned Counsel for the Respondent concedes that it is the claims of the plaintiff that determine the jurisdiction of the Court. He referred to the writ of summons. He argued that the endorsement on the writ of summons questioned the lawfulness and constitutionality of the resort to sealing and closing of business premises as a means of recovering alleged Tax liability arising from Personal Income Tax Decree No. 104 of 1993, and sought injunctive relief to protect the plaintiff/respondent. The learned Counsel further argued that the claim of the plaintiff/1st respondent as endorsed on the writ of summons did not seek the determination of how much tax was due from its employees to Jigawa State Govemment; the claim did not seek a determination of whether the assessment arrived at by the Tax Audit was accurate or not, rather the claim sought a determination that the method adopted in enforcing that liability, if any, was unlawful and whether it was authorised under the Personal Income Tax Decree No. 104 of 1993. He submitted that the cause of action of the plaintiff/1st respondent arose and pertained to or consisted in steps taken by the Appellant in sealing its business premises in purported enforcement of tax liability, and did not arise or pertain to the revenue accruable to the Jigawa State Government. He said the dispute before the court was not the correctness of the assessment but the lawfulness of the method of enforcing the alleged liability.
The learned Counsel however conceded that the Personal Income Tax Decree No. 104 of 1993 gives the High Court of a State appellate jurisdiction on disputes over assessment. He referred to section 77 and 96 of the Decree and submitted that the Decree confers jurisdiction by reference on a court of competent jurisdiction if the statute creating that court or some other statute permits it to exercise the jurisdiction of Tax recovery pursuant to the Personal Income Tax Decree 1993.
He referred to section 7(1) (t) and (u) of Decree No, 60 of 1993 and submitted that the Federal High Court has original jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court to try civil causes or matters connected with or pertaining to any matter in the concurrent legislative list set out in the second column of part II of the second schedule to 1979 Constitution, He said Taxation of Income Profits and Capital gains are on the concurrent legislative list. He finally submitted that the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to determine the action. He urged the Court to dismiss the appeal.
“The substratum of a court is no doubt-jurisdiction. Without it the ‘labourers’ therein, that is both litigants and Counsel on one hand and the Judge on the hand, labour in vain.”
Per Eso, J.S.C. in A.-G., Lagos State v. Dosumu (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.111) 552 at 609.
The law is well settled that the issue as to whether a court has jurisdiction to hear and determine an action is determined by the court looking critically at the writ of summons and the statement of claim. Sunmonu Oladejo & Other v. Bakare Adeyemi & Others (2000) 3 NWLR (pt.647) 25 at 38; Adeyemi v. Opeyori (1976) 9-10 SC 31 at 51; Savannah Bank Ltd. v. Pan-Atlantic (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt.49) 212; A.-G. Anambra State v. A.-G., Federation (1993) 6 NWLR (Pt.302) 692. That brings me to the claim of the plaintiff/1st respondent at that court below. In its writ of summons dated 13th of May, 1997 and filed the same day, the 1st respondent stated inter-alia, as follows:-
“Application For A Writ of Summons.
Kindly cause a writ of summons to issue on behalf of the plaintiff against the defendants upon the following terms:-
(1) Between the 10th February, 1997 and the 19th March, 1997, the 1st and 3rd defendants claim to have established by means of Tax Audit that the plaintiff is liable to tax at its Dutse and Hadejia Branches in the sum of N239,009 and N1,057,758,62 respectively.
(2) The plaintiff has bonafide disputed the said tax liabilities claimed by the defendant.
Notwithstanding, that the said dispute is still pending and unresolved, the defendants have closed down and sealed the branch offices of the plaintiff at Dutse and Hadejia in Jigawa State in purported enforcement of the alleged Tax liability due to the defendants.
Whereof the plaintiff claims against the defendants as follows:-
(1) A declaration that the action of the defendants in closing and sealing the offices of the plaintiff at Dutse and Hadejia is an unauthorized method of enforcing tax liabilities if any of the plaintiff and therefore illegal, unconstitutional, null and void.
(3) An injunction restraining the defendants their servants, agents, privies or whosoever acting on their instruction from sealing and closing the offices of the plaintiff in purported enforcement of alleged tax liabilities of the plaintiff to the defendants.”
The plaintiff/1st respondent also on 13/5/97, filed a motion on notice praying for an order of mandatory injunction directing the defendants to open its offices aforesaid. The affidavit in support of the application throws more light into the nature and subject matter of the 1st respondent’s claim at the lower Court. It shows that the subject matter and cause of action of the claim, is connected with or pertaining to the enforcement of the revenue accruable to the Jigawa State Government. In other words, I would think that the suit arose from a dispute over PAYE withholding Tax and Development Levy said to have been due to Jigawa State Government from the plaintiff company. The subject matter therefore arose from the revenue accruing to a State Government.
The learned Counsel for the Respondent emphasised in his submission that what the Respondent was challenging was the method adopted by the appellant in the enforcement of the said revenue.
Before considering the issue of the method adopted in enforcing the collection of the revenue in question, I think it is necessary to determine which court has the power to enforce the collection of revenue accruable to a government of a State.
Section 7(1) of the Federal High Court Act, 1973 as amended by Decree No. 60 of 1991 provides as follows:-
“The court shall to the exclusion of any other court have original jurisdiction to try civil causes and matters connected with or pertaining to:-
(a) the revenue of the Government of the Federation or any authority established by the Government of the Federation;
(b) the operation of the Companies and Allied Matters Act, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act, Federal enactments and any other common law action regulating the operation of companies or the promotion of Nigerian enterprises;
(c) the taxation of companies and of other bodies established or carrying on business in Nigeria and all other persons subject to Federal taxation;
(d) customs and excise duties, stamp duties and export duties, including any claim by or against the Department of customs and Excise or any member or officer thereof, arising from the performance or purported performance of any duty imposed under any regulation relating to custom and excise duties, stamp duties and export duties;
(e) banks and banking, including any action between one bank and another, any action by or against the Central Bank of Nigeria relating to banking, foreign exchange, coinage, legal tender, bills of exchange, letters of credit, promissory notes and other fiscal measures: Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to any dispute between an individual customer and his bank in respect of banking transactions between the individual customer and the bank;
(f) any Federal enactment or common law relating to copyright, patents, designs, trade marks and passing off, industrial designs and merchandise marks, business names and commercial industrial monopolies, combines and trusts, standards of goods and commodities and industrial standards;
(g) any admiralty matter, including shipping and navigation on the River Niger or River Benue and their affluent and on such inland water ways as may be designated by any enactment to be an International Water way, all Federal Ports, including the Constitution and Powers of the Ports authorities for Federal Ports and carriage by sea;
(h) diplomatic, consular and trade representation;
(i) Citizenship, naturalisation and aliens, deportation of persons who are not citizens of Nigeria, extradition, immigration into and emigration from Nigeria, passport and visas;
(j) bankruptcy and insolvency;
(t) any matter in the Concurrent Legislative List set out in the second column of part II of the Second Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, as amended, upon which Federal Legislation has been passed;
(u) Such other civil or criminal jurisdiction as:-
(i) relate to any matter with respect to which the Federal Military Government has power to make
laws; or
(ii) the Federal Military Government may, from time to time by law or otherwise howsoever confer on the court.”
From the above provisions there can be no doubt that there is no provision conferring jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to try any civil causes or matters connected with or pertaining to the revenue of the Government of a State or any authority established by the Government of a State. On the contrary, section 7(1) (a) specifically confers exclusive original jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to try civil causes and matters connected with or pertaining to the revenue of the Government of the Federation or any authority established by the Government of the Federation.
The learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent referred to section 7(1)(t) and (u) of the Federal High Court Act as amended by Decree No. 60 of 1991, and submitted that section 7(1) (t) and (u) granted jurisdiction to the Federal High Court in and over claims of the plaintiff as endorsed on the writ of summons. For ease of reference section 7(1)(t) and(u) of the Act (as amended) by Decree No. 60 of 1991 provides as follows:-
“The court (i.e. Federal High Court) shall to the exclusion of any other court have original jurisdiction to try civil causes and matters connected with or pertaining to-
(t) any matter in the Concurrent Legislative List set out in the second column of part II of the Second Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 1979, as amended, upon which Federal Legislation has been passed; and
(u) Such other civil or criminal jurisdiction as –
(i) relate to any matter with respect to which the Federal Military Government has power to make law; or
(ii) the Federal Military Government may, from time to time by law or otherwise howsoever, confer on the court jurisdiction.”
Section 230(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 as amended by the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993, provides:-
“230(1) – Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly or a Decree, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters arising from:-
(a) the revenue of the Government of the Federation in which the said Government or any organ thereof or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the said Government is a party;
(b) the taxation of companies and other bodies established or carrying on business in Nigeria and all other persons subject to Federal taxation;
(c) customs and excise duties and export duties, including any claim by or against the Department or Customs and Excise or any member or officer thereof, arising from the performance or purported performance of any duty imposed under any regulation relating to customs and excise duties and export duties.”
Section 230(1) (a) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree No. 107 of 1993, like section7(1) (a) of Decree No. 60 of 1991 prescribes or confers original jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters arising from the revenue of the Government of the Federation or any organ thereof.
However, it is observed that the provisions contained in section 7(1) (t) and (u) of Decree No. 60 of 1991 are conspicuously omitted in section 230(1) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree No. 107 of 1993. However, the omission does not mean that section 7(1) (I) and (u) of Decree No. 60 of 1991 are impliedly repealed; as section 230(1) itself seems to have protected the provisions when it says:-
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly or a Decree, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters arising from…”
A critical look at the provisions of Decree No. 60 of 1991 and section 230(1) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree No. 107 of 1993 seems to show that the gravamen of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court concerns matters connected with or pertaining to the revenue of the Government of the Federation as may be spelt out by the National Assembly; but in addition to jurisdiction over revenue matters the Federal High Court has such other jurisdiction as may be given to it from time to time by the National Assembly from those matters over which the National Assembly has power to make laws:- See African Newspaper & Others v. The A. G. of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt. 6) 137.
The jurisdiction given in section 7(1) (t) and (u) of Decree No. 60 of 1991 is a jurisdiction to try civil causes or matters connected with or pertaining to matters in the concurrent Legislative List upon which the Federal Government made a law, and conferred jurisdiction on the Federal High Court. The jurisdiction given in section 7 (1) (t) and (u) of the Decree does not include jurisdiction to try civil causes and matters connected with or pertaining to matters in the Concurrent Legislative List upon which the Federal Government has not made law or has made law but does not confer jurisdiction on the Federal High Court in the law. Jurisdiction has to be conferred before the Court can exercise it.
As pointed out earlier in this judgment, this suit arose from a dispute over Personal Income Taxes deducted from income of employees, otherwise known as PAYE; Withholding Taxes and Development Levies. The issue then arises as to whether the Federal Government has made a law conferring jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to try civil causes and matters connected with or pertaining to Income Tax deductable from income of employees within a state; Withholding Tax payable by individuals from rents on properties within the State and Development Levies to the State.
Section 2(2) of the Personal Income Tax Decree No. 104 of 1993 empowers the State Government to impose personal income tax for every year of assessment on the personal income of individuals who are residents for the year in the State under the provisions of the First Schedule to the Decree.
Under section 2(1) (b) of the Decree, the personal income tax payable by persons employed in the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Navy, the Nigerian Air force, the Nigerian Police Force other than in civil capacity; Officers of the Nigeria Foreign Service; every resident of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja and a person resident outside Nigeria who derives income or profit from Nigeria goes to the Federal Government.
The taxes payable under section 2(2) of the Decree are recoverable inter-alia by the State either, by deduction at source as provided in section 72 otherwise known as withholding tax (WHT) or from the emoluments paid to employees as provided under section 80 of the Decree and known as PAYE.
Section 81 of the Decree makes the employer answerable for tax deducted from the emoluments of his employees. It provides:-
“An employer required under a provision of this Decree to make deductions from emoluments or amounts on account of emoluments paid by him to an employee shall account to the relevant tax authority in such manner as the relevant tax authority may prescribe for the deductions so made, and in the event of failure by the employer to make the deduction, or properly to account therefor, the amount thereof together with a penalty of 10 per cent per annum of the amount plus interest at the prevailing commercial rate shall be recoverable as a debt due by the employer to the relevant tax authority.”
Section 96 of the Decree i.e. Decree No.104 of 1993, empowers the relevant tax authority to distain for non-payment of tax. It provides:-
“96(1):- Without prejudice to any other power conferred on the relevant tax authority for the enforcement of payment of tax due from a taxable person, where an assessment has become final and conclusive and a demand note has, in accordance with the provisions of this Decree, been served on the taxable person or on the person in whose name the taxable person is chargeable, then, if payment of the tax is not made within the time limited by the demand note, the relevant tax authority may, in the prescribed form, for the purpose of enforcing payment of the tax due:-
(a) distrain the taxpayer by his goods or other chattels, bonds or other securities;
(b) distrain upon any land, premises or place in respect of which the taxpayer is the owner, and subject to the following provisions of this section, recover the amount of tax due by sale of any thing so distrained.”
There is no provision, expressed or implied in the Personal Income Tax Decree No. 104 of 1993 conferring jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to try and determine civil causes and matters connected with or pertaining to the revenue accruable to the government of a State by virtue of the provisions of the Decree. For the subject-matter in this case on appeal to fall within the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court by virtue of section 7(1) (t) and (u) of the Federal High Court Act, 1973 as amended by Decree No. 60 of 1991 as canvassed by the Learned Counsel for the Respondent, there must be an express provision in the Personal Income Tax Decree No. 104 conferring jurisdiction on the Federal High Court to try and determine causes and matters connected with or pertaining to the revenue accruable to the government of a State under the provisions of the Decree. The provisions of section 7(1)(a) of the Federal High Court Act, 1973 as amended by Decree No. 60 of 1993 and 230(1) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree 107 of 1993 are very clear and unambiguous. It says:-
“230(1)-Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly or a Decree, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of any other court in civil causes and matters arising from:- (a) the revenue of the Government of the Federation in which the said Government or any organ thereof or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the said Government is a party.”
In the case on appeal, the complaint of the 1st Respondent at the lower court is that the appellant closed down and sealed the branch offices of the plaintiff/1st respondent at Dutse and Hadejia in Jigawa State in purported enforcement of the revenue due to the government of Jigawa State. No one doubts that given those facts he cannot sue for the reliefs he is claiming at the Federal High Court. The enforcement of revenue due to the government of a State does not pertain to the revenue of the Federal Government or to taxation of Companies, Customs and excise duties; banking or foreign exchange, being issues over which the Federal High Court was granted civil jurisdiction by section 7 of the Federal High Court Act. The fons et origo of the 1st Respondent’s complaint at the lower Court is not one over which the Federal High Court has jurisdiction:- See Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (Supra) 564-565.
One cannot arrive at a correct interpretation of section 230 of the 1979 constitution as amended by Decree No. 107 of 1993 and section 7 of the Federal High Court Act 1973 as amended by Decree No. 60 of 1991 without constantly bearing in mind the object for which the Federal Revenue Court was initially set up. And in interpretation too, one cannot proceed in manner that pretends to show that one is oblivious of the history of a constitutional or statutory provisions or of decisions antecedent to the instant case in order to ensure that violence is not done to the development of the law. Rather, that a constitutional or statutory provision should be interpreted from its historical setting has the support of high authorities – per Nnaemeka – Agu, J.S.C. in Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (Supra) 579. The Federal High Court chosen by the 1st Respondent was not created by section 230 of the 1979 constitution. It was created by the Federal Revenue Court Act, No. 13 of 1973. Section 7 of the Act spelt out the jurisdiction as follows:
“S.7(1) – The Federal Revenue Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction in civil causes and matters:-
(a) relating to the revenue of the Government of the Federation in which the said Government or any organ thereof or a person suing or being sued on behalf of the said Government is a party;
(b) Connected with or pertaining to:-
(i) the taxation of companies and other bodies established or carrying on business in Nigeria and all other persons subject to Federal Taxation;
(ii) customs and excise duties;
(iii) banking, foreign exchange, currency or other fiscal measures;
(c) arising from:-
(i) the operation of the Companies Decree 1968 or any other enactment regulating the operations of companies incorporated under the Companies Decree 1968;
(ii) any enactment relating to copyright, patents, designs, trade marks and merchandise marks;
(d) of Admiralty jurisdiction.
(2) The Federal Revenue Court shall also have and exercise jurisdiction and powers in respect of criminal causes and matters arising out of or connected with any of the matters in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred by sub-section (1) of this section.
(3) The jurisdiction conferred under the foregoing sub-section in respect of criminal causes shall without prejudice to the generality of that sub-section and subject to section 63(3) below include original jurisdiction in respect of offences under the provisions of the Criminal Code being offences in relation to which proceedings may be initiated at the instance of the Attorney-General of the Federation.
The Head of the Federal Military Government may by order published in the Gazette confer jurisdiction on the Federal Revenue Court in respect of such other causes and matters of like nature as those set out on the foregoing sub-sections as he may from time to time at his discretion specify.”
From the above, there can be no doubt that the Federal Revenue Court was established as a court of limited jurisdiction, its jurisdiction having been limited and circumscribed by section 7 of the Act, No.13 of 1973.
Then came the 1979 Constitution which in section 230(2) thereof changed the name of the Federal Revenue Court into the Federal High Court. Although jurisdiction in its broadest sense will encompass legal capacity, power or authority of a court, in a narrower sense, there is a distinction between jurisdiction strictu sensu and power. Thus, as enabled by section 230 of the 1979 Constitution, the Federal High Court retained its jurisdiction “in such matters connected with or pertaining to the revenue of the Government of the Federation” and section 231 gave the Federal High Court, in the exercise of the limited jurisdiction conferred aliunde (that is by the enabling section 230 and not by section 231) “all the powers of the High Court of a State.” This means that although the Federal High Court and the High Court of a State have different jurisdictions (one is limited while the other by section 236 is unlimited) they have, acting within their respective jurisdictions, the same judicial powers. Section 231 did not equate the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court of a State. It did not elevate the Federal High Court to a Court of unlimited jurisdiction. Per Oputa, J.S.C. in Tukur v. Government of Gongola State (supra) 562.
The courts have no power to prescribe jurisdiction for themselves. Neither did they have power to expand or reduce their area of jurisdiction. The exercise of their interpretative jurisdiction is to expound and declare the limits of their jurisdiction:- See African Newspapers Ltd v. The A.-G. of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1985) 2 NWLR (Pt.6) 137 at 165; Odunsi v. Aminu Ojora (1961) All NLR 283; Nwaffia v. Ububa (1966) NMLR 219, (1966) 1 All NLR 80.
A critical analysis of the 1st respondent’s claims before the lower Court leaves no one in doubt that the claims do not pertain to the revenue of the Federal Government or to taxation of Companies, or Customs and excise duties, banking or foreign exchange being issues over which the Federal High Court was granted jurisdiction by section 7 of the Federal High Court Act, 1973. The complaint of the 1st respondent before the lower court is connected with or pertaining to the revenue accruable and due to the government of Jigawa State. When section 2 of the Personal Income Tax Decree No. 104 of 1993 is read along with section 7(1) (a) of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993, it is very clear that the Federal High Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the case in this appeal. In the circumstances it is my view that the Federal High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. The appeal therefore succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The ruling/decision of the Federal High Court, Kano Division, delivered by Abdullahi Mustaph. J. on the 6th of August, 1997 in suit No. FNC/K/CS/59/97 is hereby set aside and the claim of the 1st respondent before the lower Court is struck out. (N5,000.00) five thousand naira costs against the 1st Respondent to the Appellant.
Other Citations: (2000)LCN/0825(CA)
