Smart Essang V. Aureol Plastics Ltd. & Anor. (2001)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
EKPE, J.C.A.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff/appellant against the ruling of Bassey, J., sitting at Uyo in the Uyo Judicial Division of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State, delivered on the 3rd day of June, 1999 in suit No. HU/341/97. The suit was filed or commenced at Uyo High Court under the undefended list procedure by virtue of Order 23 of Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1989. Later, the suit was transferred to the ordinary cause list pursuant to Order 23 rule 3(2) of Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1989 for hearing and determination, and pleadings were accordingly ordered by the learned trial Judge to be filed by the parties. Consequently, pleadings were filed and exchanged by the parties. In paragraph 22 of the statement of claim, the plaintiff/appellant claimed against the defendants/respondents jointly and severally as follows:
“Wherefore, the plaintiff claims against the defendants jointly and severally a total sum of N4,893,855.94 made up as follows:
(a) N1,666,262.11 being capital and interest on the sum of N1,100,000.00 at 21 % per annum interest with effect from 22/11/95 to 19/11/97.
(b) N2,782,697.14 being capital and interest on the sum of N2,000,000.00 at 21 % per annum interest with effect from 19/4/96 to 19/11/97.
(c) N166,626.98 being commission and interest on the sum of N110,000.00 at 21 % per annum with effect from 19/4/96 up to and including 19/11/97.
(d) N278,269.71 being commission and interest with effect from 19/4/96 up to and including 19/11/97.”
The plaintiff’s claim was sequel to an arrangement whereby he (the plaintiff) in the course of his duty as a consultant and at the request of the defendants sourced for funds and passed same to the defendants who, despite demands by the plaintiff, have failed, refused and/or neglected to repay the said sum of money. In paragraph 2 of the joint statement of defence, the defendants raised as a point of law the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court. While in paragraph 4 of the said statement of defence, the defendants pleaded that before the substantive trial of the suit, the matter should be set down for hearing and disposal by the court on the issue of the court’s lack of jurisdiction and the improper joining of the 2nd defendant in the suit.
Subsequently, at the close of pleadings for the parties, the defendants by motion on notice brought under Order 24 rule 2 of the Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1989 prayed the court below for the following orders:
“(1) Setting down for hearing and to dispose of before the trial the following points of law which have been raised in the defendant’s statement of defence.
(a) That the defendants being within Oron Judicial Division ought not to have been sued at Uyo High Court within Oyo Judicial Division.
(b) The 2nd defendant being an agent of and acting with authority on behalf of a known and named principal (the 1st defendant) ought not to have been sued in person along with the said principal in this matter.
- And for any further order(s) as the honourable court may deem fit to make in the circumstances.”
The motion was supported by a seven paragraph affidavit sworn to by the 2nd defendant as the Chairman of the 1st defendant. Annexed to the said affidavit are exhibits 1AC1 to 1AC3. The plaintiff filed a counter-affidavit in support of the motion. There is also a further affidavit filed by the defendants/applicants.
After hearing arguments from counsel for the parties on the said motion, the learned trial Judge on the 3rd of June, 1999 delivered his ruling.
In the ruling at page 121 of the record of appeal, the learned trial Judge held that the 2nd defendant, being an agent of a known and disclosed principal (the 1st defendant), he (the 2nd defendant) was excused from liability and ought not to have been sued in his personal name. The learned trial Judge therefore ordered that the name of the 2nd defendant be struck out from the suit. At page 122 of the record of appeal, the learned trial Judge also held that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and he therefore transferred the suit to Oron High Court i.e. Oron Judicial Division of the State High Court for hearing and determination.
The plaintiff/appellant being dissatisfied with the ruling, appealed against it on three grounds of appeal. The three grounds of appeal shorn of their particulars read as follows:
“Ground I
The ruling is against the weight of evidence.
Ground II
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he held that he could not apply the provisions of Order 10 rule 3 of the Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1989 relating to where the contract was made or ought to have been performed to determine the territorial jurisdiction of a suit based on contract/payment of indebtedness because the said contract was not tendered before him, and consequently transferred suit No. HU/341/97 to Oron, the purpol1ed residence of the 1st and 2nd defendants.
Ground III
The learned trial Judge erred in law when he held that the collateral contract undertaking or guarantee separately entered into by The 2nd defendant which would have made him personally liable has not been brought to the attention of the court and consequently ruled or decided that the 2nd defendant is “excused from liability” and ought not to have been sued in his personal names since the 2nd defendant was an agent of a named principal and consequently ordered the striking out of the name of the 2nd defendant from the suit when the learned Judge had earlier ruled that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter.”
Briefs of argument were filed on behalf of the plaintiff/appellant on one side and the 1st and 2nd defendants/respondents on the other side, who shall hereinafter respectively be referred to as the appellant and the respondent’s simpliciter.
For the appellant, five issues were formulated in the appellant’s brief of argument namely:
“(i) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that he could not apply the provisions of Order 10 rule 3 of the Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1989 to determine the territorial jurisdiction of the suit which is based on contract because (according to the learned Judge) the said contract was not tendered before him during argument of the motion on notice and consequently transferred suit No. HU/341/97 to Oron, the proposed residence of the 1st and 2nd defendants whereas pleadings (statement of claim, defence and reply) have been filed and exchanged and the court’s attention was drawn to the relevant portions thereof.
(ii) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that the collateral contract/undertaking or guarantee separately entered into by the 2nd defendant which would have made him (2nd defendant) personally liable was not brought to the attention of the court during argument of the motion on notice and consequently ruled that 2nd defendant “does not incur any liability” and thus ordered the striking out of the name of the 2nd defendant from the suit whereas pleadings have been filed and exchanged and the court’s attention was drawn to the relevant portions of the pleadings wherein the collateral contract/undertakings was pleaded.
(iii) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in ordering the striking out of the name of the 2nd defendant from the suit when he had ruled that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the said suit.
(iv) Whether on the face of the pleadings, the High Court at Oyo has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim.
(v) Whether on the fact of the pleadings, the 2nd defendant is not a proper party to the suit in issue.”
The respondents on their pan submitted two issues in their brief of argument for determination of the appeal. They read:
“(1) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in transferring the substantive suit to Oron Judicial Division within which the defendants are residents.
(2) Whether the learned trial Judge was right in striking out the name of the 2nd defendant/respondent from the substantive suit.”
A critical look at the grounds of appeal and the issues formulated by the appellant shows that there are three grounds of appeal while the appellant formulated five issues for the determination of the appeal. This is absolutely wrong in law. It has been stressed times without number in a plethora of cases that issues for determination of an appeal cannot be more in number than the grounds of appeal on which the issues are related or based. It is also trite that one issue can cover or traverse several grounds of appeal and not vice versa, that is, several issues covering one ground of appeal. See Adelaja v. Fanoiki & Anor. (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt. 131) 137 at 148; Ayisa v. Akanji (1995) 7 NWLR (pt.406) 129; Nfor v. Ashaka Cement Co. Ltd. (1994) 1 NWLR (Pt. 319) 222. The appellant merely framed the issues without relating them to the grounds of appeal filed by him. This has led to unnecessary confusion and waste of time in identifying the issues with their grounds of appeal. In Ishie v. Mowanso (2000) 13 NWLR (Pt. 684) 279 at pages 288 to 289, this court did stress the importance of ascribing or identifying the grounds of appeal with the issues relating thereto in the brief of argument. See also Union Bank (Nig.) Ltd. v. Odusote Bookstores Ltd. (1995) 9 NWLR (Pt. 421) 558; Igwegbe v. Ezuma (1999) 6 NWLR (Pt. 606) 228. Now upon relating the issues to the grounds of appeal filed in this appeal by the appellant, I observe that ground one of the grounds of appeal is not covered by or related to any of the issues framed by the appellant. Therefore, this ground of appeal is abandoned and consequently it is hereby struck out. See Iyaji v. Eyigebe (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61) 523; Ngilari v. Mothercat (1999) 13 NWLR (Pt. 636) 626 at 657. Also issue No. (V) in the appellant’s brief of argument is not related to any of the grounds of appeal. That issue is incompetent and it is disregarded. See Abioye v. Afolabi (1998) 4 NWLR (Pt. 545) 296; General Oil Ltd. v. Ogunyade (1997) 4 NWLR (Pt. 501) 613 at page 621. I also observe that issue Nos. (i) and (iv) relate to ground 3 while issues Nos. (ii) and (iii) relate to ground 3 thereof. In any case, issues Nos. (i) and (ii) in the appellant’s brief are unnecessarily verbose and argumentative and will not lead to a proper determination of the appeal. Therefore, for the determination of this appeal, I will adopt and consider issues Nos. (iii) and (iv) in the appellant’s brief of argument.
Issues No. (iii) in the appellant’s brief is whether the learned trial Judge was right in ordering the striking out of the name of the 2nd defendant from the suit, when he had ruled that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the said suit. This issue is identical with issue No.2 in the respondents’ brief of argument which is whether the learned trial Judge was right in striking out the name of the defendant/respondent from the substantive suit. It is the appellant’s contention in his brief of argument that the learned trial Judge erred in law by ordering the striking out of the name of the 2nd respondent from the suit after he (the learned trial Judge) had decided that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. He submitted that in law a court cannot make an order in a matter if it has no jurisdiction to entertain the matter and where a court acts without jurisdiction or competence the decision or order made by it is void. The case of Rossek v. African Continental Bank Ltd. (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 312) 382, (1993) 10 SCNJ 20 at page 23 was alluded to. Accordingly, the appellant has urged this court to hold that the order striking out the name of the 2nd respondent from the suit is void and should be set aside. The respondents on the other hand have contended that the prayers of the respondents in their motion on notice under Order 24 rule 2 of Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1989 were preliminary in nature and the learned trial Judge was duly seized with jurisdiction to hear and decide all the preliminary issues raised therein and that being so, the trial Judge was right in considering and pronouncing on the issues well canvassed by the parties before him. Reference was made to Adegbite v. Ogunfaolu (1990) 4 NWLR (Pt. 146) 578 at page 580. The respondents further submitted that it is a misconception on the part of the appellant to contend that the lower court lacked the power to strike out the name of the 2nd respondent from the suit. It was also submitted by the respondents that accepting the appellant’s contention would imply that the lower court ought not to have made the order transferring the suit to Oron Judicial Division, after having declined jurisdiction to hear the suit. Finally, it was submitted that the appellant not having contested that the 2nd respondent was at all material times to the suit an agent/servant of the 1st respondent, a disclosed and known principal and that the alleged collateral contract of guarantee/undertaking by the 2nd respondent not having been clearly stated in both the pleadings of the appellant and his affidavit evidence before the lower court, it was quite proper for the learned trial Judge to strike out the name of the 2nd respondent from the suit.
Issue No. (iv) in the appellant’s brief of argument is whether on the face of the pleadings, the High Court at Uyo has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. This issue is akin to issue No. 1 in the respondent’s brief of argument wherein the respondents have argued that Oron High Court is the proper venue for the commencement of the suit and not Uyo High Court and that the transfer of the suit to Oron High Court by the learned trial Judge was the right course to be taken in the case. The appellant has contended that based on the pleadings of the parties in the suit, Uyo High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the contract in question between the parties was concluded in Uyo partly performed in Uyo and complete performance was to be in Uyo. He referred to Order 10 rule 3 of Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1989 and argued that it was for the plaintiff/appellant to decide where to file the suit, whether in the Judicial Division in which the contract ought to be performed or where the defendants/respondents reside. He therefore urged the court to hold that Uyo High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The totality of the arguments by both parties in this appeal rests firstly on the issue of jurisdiction of Uyo High Court to enter the suit and secondly, on whether it was proper for the learned trial Judge at Uyo High Court to strike out the name of the 2nd respondent from the suit after he had decided in his ruling that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
I shall first and foremost take the issue of jurisdiction of Uyo High Court to entertain the suit. It has to be made abundantly clear from the onset in this appeal that the issue is not that of the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State as against that of another State of Nigeria to entertain the suit, the subject-matter of this appeal. Indeed that issue does not call for a decision here. The issue being agitated here is that of proper venue for the trial that is, whether the Uyo Judicial Division or the Oron Judicial Division of the High court of Akwa Ibom State has the jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit in question. This is an issue of forum convenience.
Section 234(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 (as amended) which was in operation at the time the suit was filed on the 27th of November, 1979 provided for one High Court for each State of the Federation of Nigeria. In fact, this provision is exactly repeated in section 270 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. By that constitutional provision, Akwa Ibom State has only one High Court with jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil or criminal cause or matter in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the Laws of Akwa Ibom State and within the territorial limits of Akwa Ibom State. See Onyema v. Oputa (1987) 2 NWLR (Pt. 60) 259. In Anon Lodge Hotels Ltd. & Anor. v. Mercantile Bank of Nig. Ltd. (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 284) 721 it was held that a court in one State cannot have jurisdiction to hear and determine a matter which lies exclusively within the jurisdiction of a court in another State. See also Ndaeyo v. Ogunnaya (1977) 1 SC 11 at page 25.
Section 22 of the High Court Law of Cross River State, Cap. 51, Volume III, applicable in Akwa Ibom State provides for the civil jurisdiction of the High Court of the State. It reads thus:
“22(1)The court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any suit for specific performance or any suit founded upon a breach of contract if the contract was made within the jurisdiction of the court though the breach occurred elsewhere, or if the contract ought to have been performed within the jurisdiction or if the defendant or one of the defendants resides within the jurisdiction.
(2) The court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil cause or matter other than one referred to in subsection (1) in which the defendant or one of the defendants resides or carries on business within the jurisdiction of the court.”
Order 10 of Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1989 is headed thus: “Place of instituting and of trial of suits”. By Order 10 rule 3 thereof, it is provided as follows:
“All suits for specific performance or upon the breach of any contract shall be commenced and determined in the Judicial Division in which such contract ought to have been performed or in which the defendant resides or carries on business”. From the provisions quoted above, it is clear that the civil jurisdiction of the High Court depends on one of the three provisions above namely (a) where the contract was made or (b) where the contract ought to have been performed or (c) where the defendant or one of the defendants resides or carries on business. See Anon Lodge Hotels Ltd. v. Mercantile Bank of Nig. Ltd. (supra) at page 731. In his ruling at page 117 of the record of appeal the learned trial Judge found as a fact from the affidavit evidence of the parties that the 1st respondent’s residence is at KM8 Oron/Uyo Road, Oti Oron, Okobo Local Government Area within Oron Judicial Division. He also found as a fact that the 2nd respondent resides at No.5 Etim Okpoyo Crescent, Oron. See page 118 line 32 of the record of appeal and page 119 lines 1 to 9 of the said record. There is no appeal against these findings of fact by the learned trial Judge. In my view therefore, the residence of the respondents within Oron Judicial Division cannot be controverted. It cannot also be faulted that the 1st respondent also carries on business at Oron within the Oron Judicial Division. Therefore by virtue of Order 10 rule 3 of Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1989, I hold the view that Oron Judicial Division is the proper venue for the commencement and determination of the suit and not Uyo Judicial Divison. Consequently, the learned trial Judge was right to have transferred the suit to Oron Judicial Division where the suit properly belongs for hearing and determination. Rules 5 of Order 10 of the same High Court Rules empowers a trial Judge to do so. The rule states as follows:
“Rule 5: In case any suit shall be commenced in any other Judicial Division than that in which it ought to have been commenced, the same may, notwithstanding, be tried in the Judicial Division in which it shall have been so commenced, unless the court shall otherwise direct, or the defendant shall plead specially in objection to the jurisdiction before or at the time when he is required to state his answer or to plead in such cause.”
It cannot, however, be strongly argued that in the instant case there is a total lack of jurisdiction in Uyo High Court to entertain the suit in view of the fact that the suit comes within the territorial jurisdiction C of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State. In U.N.N. v. Orazulike Trading Co. Ltd. (1989) 5 NWLR (Pt. 119) 19 it was held that the High Court in anyone Judicial Division of a State has the same powers and exercises the same authority as the High Court in any other Judicial Division of the State and that is why any High Court Judge of a State can adjudicate over any matter brought in the High Court in any Judicial Division he is assigned to serve or any matter may be specially assigned to him from any other Judicial Division of the State High Court. See rule 6 of Order 10 of Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1989. See Ajibade v. Pedro (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 241) 257. In that case, the Supreme Court held that an action commenced in the wrong Judicial Division can be heard and determined in that Judicial Division unless special objection to the hearing is taken and persisted with. This however in my view does not imply that the rule as to venue or place of institution and trial of suits as enshrined in Order 10 of Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1989 should be taken lightly or should not be observed as much as possible and applied because the purpose of creating Judicial Division within the High Court of a State which is primarily for the convenience of the parties and to save time and the costs of litigation may be defeated if parties are allowed to file their suits in any Judicial Division of their choice. See Obasi Bros. (Nig.) Ltd. v.Will Bros. (Nig.) Ltd. (1991) 3 NWLR (pt. 181) 606. I entirely agree with Uwaifo, J.C.A. (as he then was) in the case of U.N.N v. Orazulike Trading Co. Ltd. (supra) at page 25 where he had this to say:
“There is no doubt that each State in the Federation has only one High Court. That preserves a uniform jurisdiction of the High Court throughout a particular State. But Judicial Divisions have been carved out in every State and rules made as to the venue of instituting and hearing particular matters.It will, in my view, discredit the rules made to govern venue, undermine the political and social importance of creating Judicial Divisions and neutralise an aspect of the measures taken by the authorities to ensure even and speedy dispensation of justice in any particular State if parties were simply free to file actions in any Judicial Division they choose because section 234(1) of the (1979) Constitution provides that there is only one High Court of a State. It may lead to the concentration of cases in one Judicial Division, particularly the State Capital. That will cause unnecessary chaos.”
Therefore the conclusion I reach on this issue is that Oron High Court is the proper venue for hearing the case and the court below was right in transferring the suit to Oron Judicial Division. This issue is decided in favour of the respondents.
The other issue for determination is whether the learned trial Judge was right in ordering the striking out of the name of the 2nd defendant (2nd respondent) from the suit when he had ruled that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the said suit. I have already marshalled out the arguments of both parties on this issue. It is a settled principle of law that a court that has no jurisdiction to entertain a matter before it can not exercise judicial power in respect of that matter. See Western Steel Works Ltd. v. Iron and Steel Workers Union (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 30) 617; Uzondu v. Uzondu (1997) 9 NWLR (Pt. 521) 466. But the principle enunciated in the above cases does not apply to the facts or situation in the case in hand. The view I strongly hold is that basically or in principle Uyo High Court does not lack jurisdiction to entertain the suit. As a matter of law, Uyo High Court is a Juidicial Division of the High Court of Akwa Ibom State. In Obasi Bros. (Nig.) Ltd. v. Willbros. (Nig.) Ltd. (supra) it was held that unless an action is shown to be within the area of the territorial jurisdiction of another State, an action commenced in a Judicial Division other than the Judicial Division where it ought properly to have been commenced, but within the area of the territorial jurisdiction of the State High Court shall not be defeated or dismissed by reason only of the fact that the action was commenced in the wrong Judicial Division.
Procedurally, in my view, where an objection as in the instant case, is as to the jurisdiction of a High Court to hear and determine a suit, is infact an objection as to the proper venue of the trial of the suit, Order 10 of Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1989 should be invoked and not Order 24. Order 24 of Akwa Ibom State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1989 (Proceedings in lieu of Demuner) is inapplicable, for while an action instituted in the wrong Judicial Division but within the appropriate area of the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of a State seldom fails because it can be transferred to the appropriate Judicial Divisions; an objection under Order 24 contemplates different considerations and where it succeeds it invariably leads to the striking out of the action on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. In the instant case, there is no doubt that Uyo High Court is a wrong Judicial Division for the commencement or institution and hearing of the suit. Basically, the suit cannot be defeated or dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by that court on the ground that it was commenced in the wrong Judicial Division as there is only one High Court in Akwa Ibom State with territorial jurisdiction over the entire State but it has to be transferred to the proper Judicial Division.
From what can be gleaned from the ruling of the learned trial Judge at pages 121 to 122 of the record of appeal, the learned trial Judge exhaustively discussed the facts and law on the liability of the 2nd respondent as the agent of the 1st respondent a disclosed principal and upheld the motion of the respondents that the 2nd respondent be struck out from the suit because he should not have been sued in his personal capacity. Consequently, the learned trial Judge struck out the name of the 2nd respondent from the suit and transferred the suit to Oron Judicial Division (High Court, Oron) for want of jurisdiction by Uyo High Court. The legal position is that an agent acting on behalf of a known and disclosed principal incurs no liability. The act of the agent is the act of the principal. The situation is in law as if it was the principal that did what the agent did or omitted to do. The common law rule is expressed in the Latin maxim thus “Qui facit per alium facit per se ipsam facere vindetur” which means, “he who does an act through another is deemed in law to do it himself.” Where the principal of an agent is known or disclosed, the correct party to sue or be sued for anything done or omitted to be done by the agent is the principal. See Niger Progress Ltd. v. N.E.L. Corporation (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 107) 68; Leventis Tech. Ltd. v. Petrojessica Ent. Ltd. (1992) 2 NWLR (Pt. 224) 459. In the instant case, the appellant knew from the start with whom he was dealing, namely, the 1st respondent. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the appellant’s affidavit show without any doubt that the 1st respondent is the disclosed principal of the 2nd respondent who is to all intents and purpose its agent. Exhibit “A” annexed to the appellant’s affidavit is a letter written by the 1st respondent to the appellant requesting for financial facility as averred in paragraph 5 of the said affidavit. Indeed, from the appellant’s affidavit the fact or the inference that the 2nd respondent is the agent of the 1st respondent is not in doubt. It is trite law that the Chairman or Director of a limited liability company is an agent of the company. In my view therefore, the complaint of the appellant is misconceived. The learned trial Judge was in my opinion right to have struck out the name of the 2nd respondent from the suit and to have transferred the suit to Oron High Court without striking out the suit in its entirety as that would have been quite improper in law. In Akinbola v. Plisson Fisko (Nig.) Ltd. (1988) 4 NWLR (Pt. 88) 335, it was held that when a court has no jurisdiction to try a case, the proper order to make is to strike out the case. See Ojora v. Odunsi (1959) 4 FSC 189, (1964) 1 All NLR 55 But that is not the case here.
Finally, I wish to emphasise that this is not a case of total lack of jurisdiction by Uyo High Court to entertain the suit. It is only one that concerns the proper venue or the forum convenience (i.e. proper Judicial Division) for the hearing and determination of the suit, hence the suit was merely transferred to Oron High Court by the learned trial Judge and not in the main struck out for the lack of jurisdiction. This issue is also resolved in favour of the respondents.
I therefore see no merits in this appeal. In the circumstances therefore, this appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed by me. I award costs to the respondents assessed as N5, 000.00.
Other Citations: (2001)LCN/1048(CA)
