Sylvester Ezekpelechi Ukaegbu & Ors Vs Duru Ononanwa Ugoji & Ors (1991)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
B.O.BABALAKIN, JSC.
This is an appeal by the defendants/appellants against the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Enugu Division, delivered on 11th July, 1988, which dismissed the appeal of the said defendants/appellants against the judgment of the High Court of Orlu delivered in Suit No.HOR/83/74 on 29th June, 1981. The facts that lead to this appeal are as follows:-
The action in this case was instituted by a writ of summons issued in the High Court of the Okigwe Judicial Division of the former East Central State of Nigeria.On the creation of the Imo State of Nigeria the case was transferred to the High Court of Justice, Orlu for hearing and determination.
The claims by the plaintiffs/respondents are as follows:- “1. Declaration of title to all that piece or parcel of land lying, being and situate at Isieke Village Akpulu within Jurisdiction which is in possession of the plaintiffs and more particularly delivered in a plan to be filled, annual value of which is N20.00. 2. N400.00 being general damages for trespass. 3. Perpetual Injunction restraining the defendants, their servants and agents from further acts of trespass on the said land.”
In a considered judgment, the trial court granted the plaintiffs/respondents claims against the defendants/appellants but dismissed their case against the 3rd and 4th defendants. The defendants/appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal, Enugu, against the judgment entered against them and similarly the plaintiffs/respondents also cross appealed to the Court of Appeal against the dismissal of their case against the 3rd and 4th defendants.
The Court of Appeal dismissed both the main appeal and the cross appeal. The appellants in each of the appeals have now appealed to the Supreme Court against the dismissal of their respective appeals. In this court the following Briefs of Arguments were filed and exchanged:- appellants’ brief dated 3/5/90 and Reply Brief dated 20/7/90; respondents’ brief dated 27/6/90; cross appellants’ brief in respect of cross appeal dated 5/5/90; cross respondents’ brief dated 26/5/90. In the appellants’ brief, counsel for the appellants put the issues for determination as follows:-
(1) Whether, (in an action for declaration of title to land, damages for trespass and injunction), a previous judgment pleaded by the PLAINTIFF in his STATEMENT OF CLAIM could sustain a plea of res judicata in favour of such plaintiff? (2a) Whether the Court of Appeal was right in its view that it is a mere irregularity to raise a plea of res judicatain the Statement of Claim? If the answer to 2(a) above is in the affirmative (which is not conceded);
(2b) Whether, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the herein appellants could be said to have waived their right to complain about that said irregularity?” The respondents stated the questions for determination as follows:- “(a) Was it contrary to law for the plaintiffs/respondents to plead the proceedings and judgment of the Mbanasa Native Court in Suit No.172/28 in their Statement of Claim in the above case in support of their case? (b)(i)Were the defendants/appellants entitled to raise before the Court of Appeal without the leave of that court the question of the plaintiffs/respondents pleading the proceedings and judgment of the Mbanasa Native Court in Suit No. 172/28 in their Statement of Claim when that question was not canvassed or contested before the trial court?
(ii) Are the defendants/appellants entitled to pursue before the Supreme Court the question of the plaintiffs/respondents pleading the proceedings and judgment of the Mbanasa Native Court in Suit No. 172/28 in their Statement of Claim?” With regard to the cross- appeal the cross- appellants stated the questions for determination as follows:- “(a) Was the Court of Appeal right in determining the cross-appeal of the plaintiffs-appellants from its conclusion in the appeal of the defendants-appellants when the complaints of the plaintiffs-appellants in their grounds of appeal were distinct and different from those of the defendants-appellants in the main appeal and the cross-appeal were different and when the brief of arguments of the plaintiffs-appellants in support of their cross-appeal were not the same as those of the defendants-appellants in the main appeal. (b) Was the Court of Appeal right in dismissing the appeal of the plaintiffs-appellants when: (i)there was a finding that the land in dispute in this case is the same land as was in dispute in the Mbanasa Native Court Suit No.172/28.
(ii) the judgment in the Mbanasa Native Court Suit No.172/28 is a subsisting judgment and the defendants-respondents were and are not only bound by it but were and are also estopped from disputing the title of the plaintiffs-appellants to the land in dispute. (iii) the whole area of land verged blue in Exhibits “B” and “BI” and the land immediately south of it fall within the land claimed by the plaintiff-appellants. (iv) James Egenti never claimed nor testified that he owned any land within the land in dispute or the land shown as his in Exhibits “B” and “BI”. (v) the evidence in support of the plaintiffs-appellants’ case was in the main appeal accepted by the trial court.” 4 The respondents to the cross- appeal put the issues for determination thus:-
“(1)Whether the Court of Appeal failed or neglected to consider the case put before it by the cross/ appellants? If the answer to the above is in the positive – which is denied -whether the said failure by the Court of Appeal occasioned such a grave miscarriage of justice that its judgment ought not to be allowed to stand? (2) Whether, in view of the concurrent findings of fact of the two lower courts, the cross/appellants are entitled to have judgment entered in their favour against the 3rd and 4th defendants?”
The submissions of counsel for the appellants in the of brief of argument filed on behalf of the said defendants/appellants and orally before us are that in the judgment of the learned trial Judge, he held that the judgment in a native court in Suit No.172/28 tendered as Exhibit C which was pleaded in paragraph 7 of the plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim operated as res judicata against the 1st defendants/appellants and thereafter held that he was satisfied that the portion of land claimed by the 2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th defendants are so connected by locality and similarity with the portion claimed by the 1st defendant, which portion his grandfather Ukaegbu lost in Exhibit C that the plaintiffs also have posession of this area as the area the tambo swamp in dispute in Exhibit C. That the doctrine of res judicata was not available to the plaintiffs/respondents who were plaintiffs in the trial court. That the law has long since been settled in Salawu Yoye v.Olubode & Ors. (1974) 1 ANLR (Pt. 2) 118 that res judicata by its very nature has no place in the plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim. That the doctrine of res judicata does not apply in this case. That the Court of Appeal was in serious error when it treated the fact that plea of res judicata was raised in the Statement of Claim as a mere irregularity which herein appellants have waived by their continued participation in the case after issues had been settled.
That raising a plea of res judicata in the Statement of Claim is not a mere irregularity. It is a default which strikes at the very essence and nature of that plea. That a successful plea of res judicata robs the court of jurisdiction. He urged this court to allow the appeal. The submissions of counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents in the brief filled on behalf of the said plaintiffs/respondents and orally before us are that by Order 33 rule 5 of Rules of High Court of Imo State applicable to this case the plaintiffs/respondents are bound to lead all material facts on which they relied. He then cited the provisions of Sections 53, 54(1) and 54(2) of Evidence Act which permits parties to plead previous judgments obtained in their favour in a subsequent action.
That the plaintiffs/respondents were entitled to plead and rely on the proceedings and the judgment in Exhibit C. He submitted that it has been held in case of Ayiwe Odjerwedje & Anor v. Madam Echanokpe (1987) 1 NWLR (Pt 52) 633 at 644, Chikwendu v. Mbamali & Anor (1980) 3-4 S.C.31 AT 47-48; Ezewani v Onwordi & Ors. (1986) 4 NWL R (Pt 33) 27 that “it has since been settled that although the plea of estoppel is a shield for the protection of a defendant, it can also validly be employed as a sword by a plaintiff.” That as Exhibit C as pleaded raised estoppel is per rem judicatam against the defendants-appellants the lower courts were bound to give effect to the said proceedings and judgment.
That it is also settled that where a person has a judgment in his favour in a land case he could in a subsequent action plead and rely on the previous judgment in support of the subsequent action. He cited the cases of Ojiakor & Ors. v. Ogueze & Ors. (1962) 1 ANLR. (Pt 1) 58 and Adomba & Ors. v Odiese (1990) 1 NWLR (Pt 125) 165 at P.178 in support of these assertions. Learned counsel then commented on the ratio decidendi in Yoye v Olubode’s case heavily relied upon by the appellant. He contended that in that case the Supreme Court held that the plea of res judicata pleaded therein was not sustained. He contended that a plaintiff who has a previous judgment in his favour cannot be barred from pleading such judgment in support of a subsequent action.
That a shield and a sword are both complimentary. That he will at the hearing of this appeal call on this court to review and consider some of the statements contained in Salawu Yoye’s case as to a plea of res judicata not having a place in a Statement of Claim, as to a plaintiff attacking jurisdiction of the court by a successful plea of res judicata because these statements are too wide.
That it is now too late for the appellants to raise the issue of pleading res judicata in Statement of Claim. He urged us to dismiss the appeal. With regard to the cross-appeal, the submissions of counsel for the plaintiffs/cross-appellants in the brief filed are that the Court of Appeal was wrong to have failed to consider the grounds of appeal, in the cross-appeal distinct from the grounds of appeal in the main appeal. That the Court of Appeal only relied on its conclusions in the main appeal in coming to its decision in the cross-appeal and the Court of Appeal was therefore wrong in dismissing the plaintiffs/appellants’ appeal and this occasioned a grave miscarriage of justice. He then referred to paragraphs 3, 7 and 12 of the plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim where the plaintiffs claimed ownership of “Ala Odinude Ngwo” sometimes called “Ofia lyi” land and situated at Akpulu.
PAGE| 6 He then referred to paragraphs 5,12 and 15 of the Statement Of Defence where the defendants denied the plaintiffs’ claim but the trial Judge found that the land in dispute belonged to the plaintiffs and because the 3rd and 4th defendants belong to the community over which the plaintiffs got judgment in Exhibit C, they are bound by that judgment and are estopped by that judgment from disputing the title of the plaintiffs/appellants to any portion of the land in dispute. It was therefore, wrong for the trial Judge and the Court of Appeal to have excluded the 3rd and 4th defendants from being bound by the judgment of the court.
That the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against the 3rd and 4th defendants and this court should so order. He urged us to allow the appeal. On his part, counsel for the cross-respondents in the brief filed on their behalf submitted that it is a misconception on that part of the cross-appellants to contend that the Court of Appeal failed to consider the six grounds of appeal filed by them in this appeal because all the six grounds of appeal and arguments in support thereof pointed out to allegations that certain findings of the trial court were perverse or not supported by evidence.The Court of Appeal found that these grounds of appeal are directed against the trial Judge’s finding of fact.
That after a calm view of all the said grounds of appeal, the Court of Appeal held that no sufficient reasons have been adduced to make the court interfere with the findings of fact of the learned trial Judge. The court also held that the plaintiffs have not established their claim to the portions of land occupied by 3rd and 4th defendants. That there is therefore no basis for the cross/appellants’ complaint especially when there was a finding by the trial court that the land of the 3rd and 4th defendants were never in dispute. These findings being concurrent finding of facts of trial court and that of the Court of Appeal, this court should not interfere with the findings as they are not perverse. He cited the cases of Akpakpuna v. Nzeka (1983) 2 SCNLR 1, Woluchem v Gudi (1981) 5 S.C.319, Ebba v. Ogodo (1984) 1 SCNLR372 and Chinwendu v. Mbamali (1980) 3-4 S.C.31 to support this contention.
He urged the court to dismiss the cross- appeal. The most important complaint in this appeal is that in any action for declaration of title, damages for trespass and injunction a plaintiff cannot plead a previous judgment as res judicata in a Statement of Claim. Section 54 of the Evidence Act enables any party to a proceedings to plead previous judgment in his or her favour. The provisions read thus:- “54(1) If a judgment is not pleaded by way of estoppel it is as between parties and privies deemed to be a relevant fact, wherever any matter, which was, or might have been, decided in the action in which it was given, is in issue, or is deemed to be relevant to the issue, in any subsequent proceeding.
(2) Such a judgment is conclusive proof of the facts which it decides, or might have decided, if the party who gives evidence of it had no opportunity of pleading it as an estoppel.” Numerous plaintiffs have taken advantage of the provisions of this law. In the recent case of Chinwendu v Mbamali & Anor. (1980) 3-4 S.C.31, the fact of which case favour comparison with the case in hand, this court upheld the pleading of a previous case in a Statement of Claim. This court summed up the situation which is of similarity with the present case thus:-
“The Umuezedes in the instant case were obviously estopped from laying claim to the ownership of the land in dispute against the Amadims. But the Amadims, in spite of that, still carried the onus of proving their ownership of the land in dispute, for as found by the Supreme Court in Udekwe Eboha & others v Ikefuna Anakwenze & Another (1967) NMLR.140 the fact that the Umuezedes lost their claim against the Amadims in Exhibit 3 would not, necessarily, confirm the Amadims as the owners of the land in dispute. Some third parties could still be the owners (Eboha v Anakweze Supra). They had to prove their ownership.”
Here on the facts of this case as in Mbamali’s case the Judgment Exhibit C, relied upon by the plaintiff is where the defendants’ father lost to the present plaintiffs as pleaded at paragraph 7 of the plaintiffs’ Statement of Claim which reads:- “7 In or about the year 1928 the first defendant’s father Ukaegbu in collusion with one Nwaizunwa sued the plaintiffs in Mbanasa Native Court Suit No.172/28 claiming possession of and alleging that the said Ala Odinude Ngwa land now in dispute was pledged to him by the said Nwaizunwa, close relation of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th and 5th defendants. His claim was dismissed and after review by the District Officer, on appeal, plaintiffs were ordered to refund the pledge money to the said Ukaegbu but to retain possession and ownership of their said land. The said judgment will be founded upon at the trial.” (See pp.8-9 of the printed Record of proceedings).
The case of Yoye v. Olubode & Ors (1974) 10 S.C. (Pt 2) 118 on which the appellants relied gives the distinction between pleading of res judicata and estoppel as follows:- “It strikes us that, somehow, there is still the tendency on the part of counsel to overlook the distinction between estoppel and the plea of res judicata. From time to time, attention has been drawn by this court to such distinction in a number of cases. We think that,it is desirable that we should once more restate this aspect of the law. Estoppel is an admission, or something which the law views as equivalent to an admission. By its very nature, it is so important, so conclusive, that the party whom it affects is not allowed to plead against it, or adduce evidence to contradict it. Res judicataon the other hand, operates not only against the party whom it affects, but also against the jurisdiction of the court itself. The party affected is estopped per rem judicatam from bringing a fresh claim before the court. At the same time, the jurisdiction of the court to hear such claim is ousted. In Odadhe v Okujani (1973) 11 S.C. 343 at p.353 this court cited with approval, the following illuminating passage from the judgment in the case of Bassil v Honger 14 WACA 569 at p.572:
“Estoppel prohibits a party from proving anything which contradicts his previous acts or declarations to the prejudice of a party, who relying upon them has altered his position. It shuts the mouth of a party. The plea of res judicata prohibits the court from enquiring into a matter already adjudicated upon. It ousts the jurisdiction of the court.” We think that, in the light of this passage, all that there is to be said about the distinction between estoppel and res judicatam has been said. In my view when a party pleads a judgment as estoppel what he is telling the court is that the court should take that judgment into consideration in considering the totality of his present case before the court. Whereas when he pleads res judicata he is saying that although he has already got judgment on this piece or parcel of land, he wants the court to adjudicate on the matter that has already been adjudicated upon in his favour. This is contradiction in terms – he is asking a court to judge what has already been judged. Hence, in Yoye’s case above, it was said that res judicata ousts the jurisdiction of the court.
I will now examine the circumstances when a party could be said to rely on a plea of res judicata and on a plea of estoppel In my view a plea of res judicata will arise where the plaintiff who is pleading the previous judgment was the plaintiff in the said previous judgment or his privy in title were plaintiffs in the previous judgment relied upon. On the other hand, the pleading will be estoppel where plaintiff or his privy in title was defendant in the case pleaded as estoppel as in Mbamali’s case above and as indeed in the present case. From paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim quoted above it is obvious that it was the defendants father who lost to the plaintiffs in Exhibit that it was the defendants father who lost to the plaintiffs in Exhibit C. The plaintiffs-respondents succinctly stated this at paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim.
The learned trial Judge in his subsequent examination of the pleading of the judgment Exhibit C also examined it along the line of estoppel. He said thus:- “I am satisfied by evidence before me more particularly considering Exhibits B and B1 that the portions claimed by the 2nd, 5th, 7th and 8th defendants are so connected by locality and similarity with the portion claimed by the first defendant which portion his grandfather, Ukaegbu lost in Exhibit C, that the plaintiffs also have possession of this area as the area of the tombo swamp in dispute in Exhibit C and that these portions are also connected by locality and similarity with the land adjoining them to the south which the defendants in Exhibit B and B1 admit belongs to the plaintiffs.” (vide pages 106 line 27 to p.107 line 6 of the printed record of proceedings).
So that looking through the pleadings at paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim and the use to which the learned trial Judge put Exhibit C and observing the effects of the pleading in law, I am of the firm view that what the respondent pleaded in this case is estoppel and not res judicata. When however, the issues for determination were framed by the learned trial Judge he mistook the pleading by the plaintiff at paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim to be a plea of res judicata and he framed it thus:-
“Can the judgment in suit No. 172/28 operate as res judicata against the 1st to the 5th defendants?” (Page 21 of the Record). The Court of Appeal also fell into similar error of saying that what was pleaded is res judicata. Now that it is plain as I have explained above that what the plaintiffs pleaded is estoppel, can the appellants be correct to say that what they pleaded is res judicata?I think not.
As pointed out above the plaintiffs were the defendants in Exhibit C the judgment that was pleaded. They were not plaintiffs and therefore cannot plead the judgment as res judicata. Counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents continued to mix up issues by stating that it does not matter if what was pleaded is res judicata. He is wrong in this assertion as I have explained above. He also made the point that the appellants are precluded from raising this point at this stage having failed to raise same earlier in the proceedings.
In my view this being an issue of jurisdiction of the court, if successfully raised the appellant is entitled to raise it at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal as it is now. Now can one hold on to the erroneous formulation of issues settled which puts what counsel for plaintiffs-respondents pleaded in the Statement of Claim as res judicata in view of overwhelming evidence that it is not res judicata and could not be so? My answer is NO.
Having found that the plaintiffs pleaded estoppel and the learned trial Judge made use of the Judgment as such the summing up of issues settled which stated same to be res judicata becomes a mere wrong use of words which is a technicality that should not be allowed to becloud the justice of this case so ably x-rayed by the trial court and the Court of Appeal. This court has often constantly emphasised that mere technicalities should not be allowed to defeat the justice of a case. In fact a court should adjudicate on issues properly submitted by the party and not on matter raised by the parties; See the case of Atoyebi v Odudu (1990)9-10 NWLR (Pt. 157) 384.
Finally on this point it is not every slip in the lower court that will result in an appeal being allowed. The misconception of the counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents that a plaintiff can plead res judicata in a Statement of Claim is not supported by law. Counsel for the appellants also made the point that questions for determination under issues b(i) and b(ii) formulated by the plaintiffs/respondents’ counsel at page 2 of their brief of argument are not derived from those grounds of appeal filed and therefore the argument thereunder should be struck out.
A careful perusal of the grounds of appeal filed show that grounds 2 and 3 of the grounds of appeal at pages 384 to 385 of the printed record of the proceedings are relevant and it is on these grounds of appeal that issue b(i) b(ii) above were based. In the final analysis this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. I however wish to comment on Yoye’s case to the effect that res judicata has no place In a Statement of Claim.
I agree with this statement and the simple reason is that if indeed a plaintiff had got a firm judgment which pleading of res judicata connotes, he does not need to go to court to get another judgment against. He should retain that judgment and use it as a shield if any party to that judgment sues him on the same piece or parcel of land on a subject matter to which that judgment relates.
You do not go to sue again on a land or over a subject matter on which you had already got a subsisting judgment. Therefore, to say that the jurisdiction of the court is ousted in that context is correct. On the other hand, pleading of estoppel connotes that the plaintiffs and his privies have been sued on the land by the defendant or his privies who failed to obtain judgment against the plaintiffs as in Mbamali’s case and by that token plaintiffs cannot say that they have obtained judgment on the land. They still have to go to court to confirm their ownership of the land concerned against those who sued them and failed.
In taking an action to confirm his possession of the land against this set of people he can plead the previous judgment as estoppel for the court to take same into consideration in determining his case which he has now brought to court for adjudication. Hence the following dicta in Yoye’s case are justified:- “It,therefore, sounds anomalous that the same plaintiffs/respondents who had invoked the jurisdiction of the court ab initio, were also the party that thought it fit to attack the court’s jurisdiction. For, that is exactly what the plea of res judicata would in the particular circumstances of this case, amount to.”
“It strikes us that, somehow, there is still the tendency on the part of counsel to overlook the distinction between estoppel and the plea of res judicata. From time to time, attention has been drawn by this court to such distinction in a number of cases. We think that, it is desirable that we should once more restate this aspect of the law. Estoppel is an admission, or something which the law views as equivalent to an admission.
By its very nature, it is so important, so conclusive, that the party whom it affects is not allowed to plead against it, or adduce evidence to contradict it. Res judicata on the other hand, operates not only against the party whom it affects, but also against the jurisdiction of the court itself. The party affected is estopped per rem judicatam from bringing a fresh claim before the court. At the same time the jurisdiction of the court to hear such claim is ousted. In Odadhe v Okujani (1973) 11 S.C. 343 at p.353 this court cited with approval, the following illuminating passage from the judgment in the case of Bassil v, Honger 14 WACA 569 at p.572. ‘Estoppel prohibits a party from proving anything which contradicts his previous act or declarations to the prejudice of a party, who, relying upon them, has altered his position.It shuts the mouth of a party.
The plea of res judicata prohibits the court from enquiring into a matter already adjudicated upon. It ousts the jurisdiction of the court.”We think that, in the light of this passage, all that there is to be said about the distinction between estoppel and res judicata has been said.” (Repetition of quotation for emphasis). On the cross/appeal it is obvious from the six grounds of appeal filed by the cross/appellants that they are on questions of fact in which there was allegation that certain findings of the trial court were perverse or not supported by evidence led. Counsel for the cross/appellants complained that the Court of Appeal did not consider the grounds of appeal in the cross-appeal separately but mixed it up with the main appeal.
This allegation is not supported by what is discernible on the printed record of proceedings where the Court of Appeal held as follows:- The grounds of appeal 1-6 complain primarily of various aspects of the findings made by the learned trial Judge.”
No sufficient reasons have been adduced to make this court interfere with the findings of the learned Judge. On the printed records there is ample evidence for holding that the claims against the cross respondents have not been established. At page 13 lines 9-19 the learned Judge held as follows- “I also hold that the plaintiffs have not established their claim to the portions occupied by 3rd and 4th defendants whose land adjoins to the south with other land of their Okpoko people who have land right down to Ulasi river and the plaintiffs do not have land in the area to the south of the land of the 3rd and 4th defendants. The court can award title to the plaintiffs in the area they have established their claim.” This court will not interfere with that finding which is supported by evidence.
The attitude of the appellate court in a situation like this has already been discussed at great length in this appeal. It is necessary to do so here again. All the grounds of appeal fail.”(See page 373 lines 9-30 of the printed records of proceedings.) So that it is obvious that all the grounds of appeal were considered. Furthermore, the learned trial Judge carefully considered the case of the 3rd and 4th cross-appellants at page 101 line 4 to page 102 line 31 thus and I quote:- “Even though Exhibit “A” plan of the plaintiffs and Exhibit “B”, plan of the defendants were admitted by consent it later transpired during the trial whether the stream the plaintiffs call Ekemiri forming the northern boundary of the land in dispute was the same stream, Nneiyi, forming the northern boundary of the defendant’s plan of the land in dispute. Another point to be resolved was to what extent each of the portions claimed by each of the defendants goes from the bank of Nneiyi as they call the stream into the land in dispute.
This was how Messrs. Chidolue and Ndenu the two Surveyors were invited to appear and instructed to co-operate and reduce both plans to the same scale in metric system and have one plan superimposed on the other. Mr. Ndenu, Surveyor for the defendants, testified as to how this assignment was carried out. he tendered Exhibit “A1” as Exhibit “A” converted into the metric system and Exhibit “B1” as plan produced by super imposing Exhibit A1 on Exhibit B. He also tendered Exhibit ‘B2’ as the process by which Exhibit B1. He also tendered Exhibit B as the process by which Exhibit B1 was developed. From exhibit B1 it became obvious that the stream Nneiyi is the same as the stream, Ekemiri of the plaintiffs. In fact, Mr Ndenu said so under cross-examination.
PAGE| 12 From Exhibit B1 it is obvious that it is the plaintiffs’ ALA ODINUDE NGWO which has common boundary to the south of portions claimed by 1st, 6th, 8th, 7th, 5th and 2nd defendants looking at Exhibit B1 along the Ekemiri or Nneiyi stream from the West to the boundary with Umuisim people. Where it comes to the portions claimed by the 3rd and 4th defendant it is Okeakpukpo people who are part of Okpoko Village that have land with the southern boundary of the land of 3rd and 4th defendan
Other Citation: (1991) LCN/2460(SC)
