The Military Governor, Ondo State & Anor. V. Victor Adegoke Adewunmi (1988)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
NNAEMEKA-AGU, J.S.C.
On the 11th day of April, 1988. this Court dismissed the appeal of the appellants with N500.00 costs and fixed today for giving reasons for the judgment. I now give my reasons.
The background facts leading to this appeal is undisputed. The respondent, Victor Adegoke Adewunmi, sued the appellants and fifteen others challenging the validity of the election of the then Ewi of Ado Ekiti. During the pendency of the case, the 1st appellant, the Governor of Ondo State, promulgated Edict No. 11 of 1984, which made provisions ousting the jurisdiction of courts in chieftaincy matters. The respondent went to court again to challenge the validity of the Edict by seeking a declaration that section 11(7) of the Edict was null and void and for other reliefs. The indorsements to the writ of summons, as amended, read as follows:
“The plaintiff’s claim is against the defendant for
(a) A DECLARATION that Section 11 subsection 7 of Edict No. 11 of 1984 (i.e. The Chiefs Edicts. 1984 is illegal. unconstitutional, null and void in that the Military Governor of Ondo State is not competent to make or promulgate Section 11 subsection 7 of the Chiefs Edict 1984 which reads thus:
“No Civil proceedings shall lie or be instituted in any Court of law for or on account of or in respect of any act, matter or thing done or purported to be done under or pursuant to any provision of this Section and if any such proceedings are instituted prior or subsequent to the commencement of this Edict, the proceedings shall abate, be discharged and made void accordingly.”
(b) A DECLARATION that Section 12 subsection 3(b) of the Chiefs Edict 1984 is illegal, unconstitutional, null and void in that the Military Governor of Ondo State is not competent to make or promulgate Section 12 subsection 3(b) of the Chiefs Edict 1984 which reads thus:
“3. Where a person has been approved as a recognized Chief in accordance with this Part, any other person who-
(a) ………………
(b) by any means illegally challenges or impugns the validity of the appointment of such Chief, shall be guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for two years.”
(c) AN INJUNCTION restraining the defendants, their servants, agents and or officers from executing or carrying out or taking any step pursuant to Section 11 subsection 7 and Section 12 subsection 3(b) of the Chiefs Edict 1984.”
After hearing, the learned trial Judge, Afonja, J. in a detailed reserved judgment, granted to the plaintiff/respondent the reliefs that he claimed. The defendants/appellants’ appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed: coram Omo-Eboh, J.C.A., Belgore, J.C.A. (as he then was) and Ikwechegh, J.C.A. They now further appeal to this Court.
The issues for determination in the appeal have in my opinion been better set out in the brief of the respondent thus:
“(a) Whether or not the Military Governor can derogate from the powers conferred on the State High Court by the Constitution by an Edict in the light of Decree No.1 of 1984
(b) Whether or not the State High Court can declare any inconsistency found in an Edict against a Decree or the unsuspended part of the Constitution notwithstanding the provisions of Decree No.
13 of 1984″
Now the straight question raised by the appeal is whether or not the Military Governor of a State in the Federation can pass an Edict which ousts the jurisdiction of a State High Court over a matter it would otherwise have had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon. The appellants contend that he can do so because the repeal of section 4(8) of the Constitution of 1979 by Decree No.1 of 1984 has impliedly not only enabled the Military Governor of a State to pass such a legislation but also has modified the unlimited jurisdiction of the High Court of a State under section 236(1) of the Constitution. In any event, they contend, the intendment of Decree No. 13 of 1984 was to render any Decree or Edict immune from challenge in any court of law. On the other hand, the respondent contends that by the very words of both Decrees No.1 of 1984 and No. 13 of 1984 it was intended that there should be some limitations to the exercise of legislative powers by a Military Governor of a State. One of those limitations is where the Edict in question is in conflict with the provisions of a Decree or some unsuspended provisions of the Constitution of 1979. It was, therefore, contended that the Edict in question fell foul of both Decree No.1 of 1984 and the unsuspended provisions (sections 6 and 236) of the Constitution of 1979.
For a clearer picture of the implications of the Ondo State Chiefs Edict (No. 11) of 1984, it is useful, I believe, to cast a cursory glance at the chequered history of litigation in chieftaincy matters in this country. From what appears to me to be as a result of misapprehension of colonial courts as to the nature and content of chieftaincy institutions in Nigeria, they declined to exercise jurisdiction over chieftaincy questions. See: Adanji v. Hunvoo (1908) 1 N.L.R. 74. Their reason for so declining was that they thought, erroneously in my view, that it was a position of “mere dignity, a position of honour, of primacy among a particular section of the native community…..” They obviously equated chieftaincy to empty peerages in England. (See Cowley v. Cowley (1901) A.C. 450). But most Nigerians know that most chieftaincy institutions carry with them not only dignity and honour but substantial proprietary interests. Yet the idea in Adanji’s Case (supra) persisted and found its way into our Federal and Regional Constitutions and Laws each of which removed chieftaincy questions from matters justiciable by the courts. The Chiefs Law of Western Region of Nigeria, 1967, (i.e. Cap. 20 of the Laws of Western Region, 1963, which became, on creation of Ondo State, Cap. 20 of the Laws of Ondo State, 1978) was one of such Laws. By section 28 of the Law the jurisdiction of all courts, original, appellate or by way of transfer, was excluded with respect to all matters relating to selection, appointment, installation, deposition, suspension or abdication of a chief, or, with a few exceptions, recovery of property appendant to a chieftaincy, or the exercise of the functions of a chief. But the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, swept away all these laws which ousted the jurisdiction of courts over chieftaincy questions. Section 6(6)( a) and (b) provide as follows:
“(6) The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section
(a) shall extend, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, to all inherent powers and sanctions of a Court of law;
(b) shall extend to all matters between persons, or between government or authority and any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person;”
And section 236 (1) provides as follows:
“236. – (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by law, the High Court of a State shall have unlimited jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil proceedings in which the existence or extent of a legal right, power, duty, liability, privilege, interest, obligation or claim is in issue or to hear and determine any criminal proceedings involving or relating to any penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other liability in respect of an offence committed by any person.”
Thus in a swoop jurisdiction over chieftaincy question became vested in the courts, just as any other causes or matters requiring the determination of the civil rights and obligations of any person, government or authority. Section 236(1), it appears, contemplates that the unlimited jurisdiction could be added to, not subtracted from, by the competent authority. The subtraction can only be done by a constitutional amendment. It was in that state of affairs that the substantive suit challenging the selection of the respondent’s B adversary was instituted. But the passing of the Edict No. 11 of 1984 sought to revert matters to the pre-1979 position. Indeed the learned counsel for the appellants has not denied that the effect of sub-section 7 of section 11of the Edict was to take away chieftaincy matters from the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. The power of decision in the matter was vested in the Executive Council of the State. The decision of the Executive Council in the matter shall be final and shall not be questioned in any court of law. The question is; can the Military Governor of Ondo State, within his constitutional competence validly pass such an Edict ousting the jurisdiction of the High Court
In my opinion, the answer to this question depends upon two other questions, namely:
(i) what is the organic law (grundnorm) of Nigeria as under Decree No.1 of 1984; and
(ii) what is the limit, if any, to the legislative power of the Military Governor of a State as contemplated by Decree No.1 of 1984 or any other relevant Decree
Now it is provided in section 1(1) and (2) of Decree No.1 of 1984 – as follows:
“1.-(1) The provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 mentioned in Schedule 1 to this Decree are hereby suspended.
(2) Subject to this and any other Decree, the provisions of the said Constitution which are not suspended by subsection (1) above shall have effect subject to the modifications specified in Schedule 2 to this Decree.”
It appears clear to me that by these provisions it is the intendment of Decree No.1 of 1984 that the organic law of Nigeria shall be:
(i) Decree NO.1 of 1984 or any other Decree; and
(ii) Unsuspended sections of the Constitution of the Federation.
It follows from this that whatever is in accord with the above provision is intended by the Decree, but whatever is in conflict with it is unconstitutional under the Decree and void.
The answer to the second question is provided by section 2(2)(a) and (b) and (3) and (4) of Decree NO.1 of 1984 which state:
“2.-(2) The Military Governor of a State-
(a) shall not have power to make laws with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List; and except with the prior consent of the Federal Military Government, shall not make any law with respect to any matter in the Concurrent Legislative List relating to Federal Legislative Powers set out in the second column of part II of the Second Schedule to the Constitution.
(3) Subject to subsection (2) above and to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, the Military Governor or a State shall have power to make laws for the peace. order and good government of that State.
(4) If any law-
(a) enacted before 31st December 1983 by the House of Assembly of a State or having effect as if so enacted; or
(b) made after that date by the Military Governor of a State, is inconsistent with any law-
(i) validly made by the National Assembly before that date, or having effect as if so made, or
(ii) made by the Federal Military Government on or after that date, the law made as mentioned in sub-paragraph (i) or (ii) above shall prevail and the State law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.”
In other words, a Military Governor of a State is without power to legislate on any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List. He has also no power to make any law with respect to any matter in the Concurrent Legislative List relating to Federal Legislative Powers, except with the prior consent of the Federal Military Government. In particular, he has no power to make any law which is inconsistent with any law made by the Federal Military Government before or after December, 31, 1983. In the last case, the Edict made by the Military Governor shall be void to the extent of the inconsistency.
It is this last limitation that is most relevant in this appeal. By the clear provisions of section 1(1) and (2) of Decree No.1 of 1984, it was intended that sections 6 and 236 of the Constitution shall remain extant. By those provisions of the Constitution chieftaincy questions among others, shall be matters within the jurisdiction of the High Court of every State. It follows, therefore that any law or Edict which purports to remove those matters from the jurisdiction of a State High Court is inconsistent with the provisions of Decree 1 of 1984 (section 1(1) and (2)) and sections 6 and 236 of the Constitution of 1979.
That an action can always lie to challenge an Edict on the ground that it is inconsistent with the provisions of a Decree is recognized by the 4th Preamble to the Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) Decree (No. 13) of 1984, wherein it was recited:
“And whereas by section 5 of the said Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 1984, no question as to the validity of any Decree or any Edict (in so far as by section 2(4) thereof the provisions of the Edict are not inconsistent with the provisions of a Decree) shall be entertained by any court of law in Nigeria:”
In short whereas one cannot bring an action to challenge the validity of an Edict, it is the intendment of the Supremacy Decree itself that one is entitled to bring such an action when, as in this case, his case is that the Edict is inconsistent with the provisions of a Decree. It is noteworthy in this respect that Decree No. 13 of 1984, i.e. the Supremacy Decree, is a re-enactment, verbatim in most of its provisions, of Decree No.28 of 1970, also called Supremacy Decree Construing the 1970 Supremacy Decree of 1984 (Decree No.13) the Supreme Court in Chief Adebiyi Adejumo v. H. E. Col. Mobolaji Johnson, Military Governor of Lagos State (1972) 3 S.C. 45 recognized the possibility of attacking the provisions of an Edict if it is inconsistent with the provisions of a Decree where it held, per Coker, J .S.C., at p. 55 thus:
“By virtue of the provisions of Decree No. 28 of 1970 one can only attack an Edict if it is inconsistent with a Decree.
But a case which, in my opinion is dead in point in this appeal in that it was decided on inconsistency of an Edict with a Decree and a constitutional provision is Onyiuke v. Eastern States Interim Assets & Liabilities Agency (1974) 1 All N.L.R. (Part 2) 151. In that case the plaintiff commenced proceedings in a Port Harcourt High Court for a declaration that Eastern Nigeria Edict No. 11 of 1966 contravened Decree NO.1 of 1966 and section 31 of the Constitution of 1963.The respondent brought a motion praying the court to dismiss the action on grounds of ouster of jurisdiction. Relying on Decree No. 28 of 1970 (the Supremacy Decree) the respondent contended that the appellant could not challenge the provisions of an Edict. The High Court upheld the respondents’ objection and dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Elias, C.J.N. held that as the gist of the action was that the Edict was inconsistent with provisions of a Decree and an unsuspended provision of the Constitution of 1963, the action was maintainable. The learned C.J.N. (as he then was) held at p. 158:
“We are in agreement with learned counsel that the courts are competent to declare an Edict invalid on ground of its inconsistency with a Decree and that we so expressly held in the Council of the University of Ibadan v. Adamolekun (1967) 1 All N.L.R. 213, at pp. 223-4.”
Later, interpreting section 3 (4) of Decree No.1 of 1966 which is re-enacted in section 3(4) of Decree No.1 of 1984, set out above he held:
“It is equally clear that section 3(4) makes a State law liable to be inconsistent with a Federal law and void to the extent of any inconsistency”
He also held that the Edict was void for being inconsistent with the Federal Constitution i.e. section 31 of the 1983 Constitution of the Federation.
The above interpretations are of great assistance in this appeal, and I shall apply them.
The appellants have argued that Chieftaincy is not on the Exclusive Legislative List and is therefore not a matter on which the Federal Government alone could legislate. Matters relating to Chieftaincy are statutory rights which are open to the Military Governor, they have contended. This submission, in my view, lost sight of the fact that the very essence of sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 2 of Decree No. 1 of 1984 set out above, read together with the 4th Preamble of Decree No. 13 of 1984, is to underscore the supremacy of Decrees, the Constitution and other Federal enactments over Edicts of a State Government. It is, of course, a well-known principle of our federalism, under the doctrine of covering the field, that where the Federal Government has validly legislated on a matter, any State legislation on the same matter which is inconsistent with the Federal legislation will be void to the extent of the inconsistency. As for reference to the Exclusive Legislative List, it appears to me to have been based on a misconception. For it is expressly provided in sub-section (1) of section 2 of Decree No. 1 of 1984 that:
“The Federal Military Government shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria or any part thereof with respect to any matter whatsoever.”
This has altered the legislative pattern under section 4(2) and 4(4) of the 1979 Constitution which limited the legislative power of the National Assembly to:
“any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List” and “any matter in the Concurrent Legislative List set out in the first column of Part II of the Second Schedule….to the extent prescribed in the second column opposite thereto.”
It can be seen, therefore, that whereas the legislative powers of the Federal Government were under the 1979 Constitution tied to the legislative Lists, and limited thereby, the legislative powers of the Federal Military Government were, under Decree No.1 of 1984, not limited or restricted by any legislative list but was exercisable on any subject whatsoever and over the whole country.
It is not true, as the learned counsel for the appellants has submitted, that section 11(7) of the Chiefs Edict No. II of 1984 is not in conflict with Decrees Nos. 1 and 13 of 1984 have shown that whereas the Decrees Nos. 1 and 13 of 1984 and sections 6 and 236 of the 1979 Constitution intend that chieftaincy matters should be within the jurisdiction of the courts, the Edict purports to oust such jurisdiction of courts in such matters. It is puerile, in my view, to argue that because section 11(7) of the Chieftaincy Edict was lifted verbatim from section 1(2)(1) of Decree No. 13 of 1984, the Edict is automatically valid simply because the Decree is valid. For, as I have shown, the Federal Military Government and the Military Governor of a State have not got co-equal legislative powers: the validity of an Edict passed by the latter is determinable, inter alia, from the view point that it is not in conflict with a Decree of the former. It follows that the latter cannot pass every legislation by an Edict, that the former can pass by a Decree.
The argument by the learned counsel for the appellants that, because sub-section 8 of section 4 of the 1979 Constitution, which provides that the exercise of legislative powers of the Federal Government shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts and that the National Assembly shall be incapable of enacting any law which ousts the jurisdiction of the courts, has been suspended, then it follows that section 236 (1) of the Constitution which confers unlimited jurisdiction on State High Courts has been modified or amended is, in, my opinion, a non sequitur. It is to be noted that section 236 (1) of the Constitution of 1979 which gives unlimited jurisdiction to State High Courts is a re-affirmation of the position of things in countries such as England where, prima facie no cause or matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court of record unless it is expressly shown to be so. See: R. v. Chancellor of St. Edmundsbury & Ipswich Diocese, expo White (1948) 1 K.B. 195, at pp. 205-206. One clear implication of the status of a superior court conferred on our State High Courts by the Constitution is that because they are vested with unlimited jurisdiction as to the kind and nature of the actions and matters of which they can take cognizance, such a jurisdiction can only be taken away by express words.
A number of pronouncements of some eminent Justices of this Court in the case of Bronik Motors Ltd. & Anur. v. Wema Bank Ltd. (1983) 1 S.C.N.L.R. 296 are instructive. I shall refer specifically to the opinion of Obaseki, J.S.C. at page 219 where he said:
“The 1979 Constitution was not ordained by the National Assembly and the Houses of Assembly of the States but by the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The unlimited jurisdiction expressly conferred upon the States’ High courts in exercise of their sovereign powers cannot therefore be limited otherwise than by the Constitution.” (Italics mine)
I agree that ordinarily a constitutional amendment is a very serious affair. And when it is intended to divest a court from jurisdiction which has been given to it by the Constitution, it is a more serious affair still. It must be by express and unambiguous words and by a competent amendment of the Constitution. Under our present circumstance it shall be by a Decree which amends the relevant section of (section 236(1) of the Constitution. For as a general principle, even where there is a statute purporting to oust the jurisdiction of a court, the language of any such statute will be jealously watched by the courts: See: Re Vexations Actions Act 1969, R E Boaler (1915) 1 K.B. 21, at p. 36; Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v. Ministry of Housing & Local Government (1960) A.C. 260, H. L.; Barclays Bank of Nigeria Ltd. v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1976) 6 SC. 175, at p. 188. In Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission (1968) 2 A.C. 147, at p.170, H.L., it was held that where a provision purporting to oust the jurisdiction of the Court is reasonably capable of having two meanings, that meaning shall be preferred which is capable of preserving the ordinary jurisdiction of the court. As this is so, it looks to me as utterly ridiculous to suggest that because the limitation to the power of the legislator, under section 4(8) of the 1979 Constitution, to make laws ousting the jurisdiction of the courts has been suspended by Decree No.1 of 1984, then it follows automatically that section 236(1) of the Constitution which gives unlimited jurisdiction to State High Courts has been amended. If such an amendment were contemplated it should have been done by express words. But I do not think that it was ever intended. The section itself, by the words “in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by law” intends that the general jurisdiction thereby conferred could be added to: there is nothing therein or in any other provision of the Constitution or in any Decree amending it to show that the jurisdiction so expressly conferred could be subtracted from. It is significant in this respect to note that the word “law” in section 236(1) is in small letters. It therefore connotes any form of law and includes both a Law or Edict of a State and an Act or Decree of the Federal authority. Because it is in small letters, I believe it is intended that both a State and the Federal Governments can pass laws conferring further jurisdiction upon the High Court but, as I have said, there is nothing to enable a State Government to pass a Law or an Edict which subtracts from the jurisdiction, particularly when such a Law or an Edict conflicts with a Federal Decree or Act. My conclusion is, therefore, that the Military Governor of a State is entirely without competence to subtract anything from the unlimited jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by section 236(1) of the Constitution.
So, for all I have said above, I dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decisions of both the Court of Appeal, Benin Division, and the High Court and awarded N500.00 costs to the respondent.
BELLO, C.J.N.: I had a preview of the Reasons for Judgment just delivered by my learned brother, Nnaemeka-Agu, J.S.C. I agree.
The constitutional effect of an Edict which is inconsistent with any of the unsuspended provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, may be summarised. Since the promulgation of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 1984, which has retrospective effect from 31st December, 1983, as amended by the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 1985, a Decree has supremacy over all laws in the Federation including the Constitution. However, the unsuspended provisions of the Constitution are superior to the provisions of any Edict. Consequently, any Edict which is inconsistent with the provisions of any Decree or repugnant to the unsuspended provisions of the Constitution is null and void to the extent of the inconsistency or repugnancy.
The relevant provisions of the Constitution as modified by the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree 1984, hereinafter referred to as the Decree, may be set out. Section 1(1) of the Constitution reads:
“This Constitution as amended by this or any other Decree is supreme and its provisions shall have binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the Federal Republic of Nigeria.” Section 1 of the Decree further reinforces the binding effect of the unsuspended provisions of the Constitution in these terms:
“1. (1) The provisions of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 mentioned in Schedule 1 to this Decree are hereby suspended.
(2) Subject to this and any other Decree, the provisions of the said Constitution which arc not suspended by subsection (1) above shall have effect subject to the modifications specified in Schedule 2 to this Decree.”
Section 2 of the Decree confers power to make laws on the Military Governor of a State and it also imposes limitations in the exercise of the power. The relevant provisions of the section are:
“2. (1) The Federal Military Government shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria or any part thereof with respect to any matter whatsoever.
(2) The Military Governor of a State –
(a) shall not have power to make laws with respect to any matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List; and
(b) except with the prior consent of the Federal Military Government, shall not make any law with respect to any matter in the Concurrent Legislative List relating to Federal Legislative Powers set out in the second column of Part II of the Second Schedule to the Constitution.
(3) Subject to subsection (2) above and to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, the Military Governor of a State shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of that State.
(4) If any Law-
(a) enacted before 31st December 1983 by the House of Assembly of a State or having effect as if so enacted; or
(b) made after that date by the Military Governor of a State, is inconsistent with any law-
(i) Validly made by the National Assembly before that date, or having effect as if so made, or
(ii) made by the Federal Military Government on or after that date, the law made as mentioned in sub-paragraph (i) or (ii) above shall prevail and the State law shall, be void.”
It is clear from the specific unambiguous provision of section 2(4)(b) that any Edict which is inconsistent with any Act or Decree is void to the extent of the in consistency. On the authorities of Adejumo v. Military Governor of Lagos State 1972 3 S.C. 45 and Onyiuke v. Eastern States Interim Assets and Liabilities Agency (1974) 1 All N.L.R. (Part 2) 151, a court of law can entertain an action as to the validity of an Edict which is inconsistent with a Decree. Consequently, the purported generality of section 5 of the Decree which states:
“5. No question as to the validity of this or any other Decree or of any Edict shall be entertained by any court of law in Nigeria”,
must be construed in the light of the provisions of section 2(4)(i) and (ii) of the Decree which qualify the generality of section 5. Despite the generality of section 5, a court of law has jurisdiction to determine the question as to whether an Edict is inconsistent with a Decree and, if the Edict is inconsistent, to declare it void to the extent of the inconsistency.
The Decree has not specifically rendered an Edict, which is repugnant to the unsuspended provisions of the Constitution, void to the extent of the repugnancy as it has done in the case of inconsistency with a Decree. However, on account of the superiority accorded to the unsuspended provisions of the Constitution by its section 1(1) and section 1(2) of the Decree over any Edict and also the power of a Military Governor to make an Edict has been subjected to the Constitution by section 2(3) of the Decree, one is bound to conclude that any Edict which is repugnant to the unsuspended provisions of the Constitution is void to the extent of the repugnancy. On the same principle as in the case of an Edict which is inconsistent with a Decree, a court of law can entertain a suit questioning the validity of an Edict vis-a-vis the unsuspended provisions of the Constitution.
The Chiefs Edict 1984 of Ondo State purported to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court of Ondo State on chieftaincy matters which jurisdiction has been conferred on the Court by unsuspended section 236 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Edict is repugnant to the section and must be declared unconstitutional and void to the extent of the inconsistency.
The High Court of Ondo State quite rightly declared the Edict unconstitutional and void. Its declaration was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.
For the foregoing reasons and the more comprehensive reasons stated by my learned brother, Nnaemeka-Agu, J.S.C. I dismissed the appeal.
SC.130/1986
