The Queen Vs Asuquo Eseno (1960)

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ADEMOLA, CJF

We dismissed the appeal of the appellant on the 25th March 2960. We now give our reasons for doing so. The appellant was tried and convicted of the offence of murder by Kaine, J., in the High Court of Calabar Judicial Division holder at Uyo. The deceased was his wife. The case for the Crown was that the deceased after a quarrel with the appellant left him to live with her brother. The appellant continued to visit her in the brother’s house and ate his food there. Later the deceased refused to prepare food for him. The appellant left that day with annoyance. He waylaid the deceased who was going out with their two children. The appellant jumped out of the bush, and in the presence of the children attacked the deceased with his matchet; he dealt her blows until she died on the spot. He then chased the son, King John Akpan, a lad about 16 years of age, who ran to the village shouting. The appellant then disappeared and hid himself in the bush where a search party later found him and arrested him.

In his evidence in his own defence, and indeed in his statement to the Police, the appellant said he was attacked by three men he saw on the road with the deceased. He said he was beaten up by these men and as he was defending himself with the matchet he was holding (in his statement it was his own matchet; in his evidence, £he seized the matchet from one of his attackers) he used it on his own wife by mistake. He admitted his son King John Akpan was present at the scene.

The learned trial Judge accepted the evidence of the witnesses for the Crown; he relied on the evidence of the son, King John Akpan, who he said was evidently present at the scene from the evidence of the appellant himself. He said the appellant was lying, especially with regard to the attack on him by three men.

The learned trial Judge also considered the matter of provocation and found, rightly in our view, that a refusal to prepare food for the appellant would not constitute provocation in law.

We have considered the whole case and we see no reason whatever to interfere with the findings of the learned trial Judge. In fact, we think that it was not possible to return any verdict in the case other than one of guilty of the offence charged. We therefore dismissed the appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

Other Citation: (1960) LCN/0872(SC)