Home » Nigerian Cases » Court of Appeal » The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited V. Helleluja Fishermen Multi-purpose Co-operative Society Limited (2001) LLJR-CA

The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited V. Helleluja Fishermen Multi-purpose Co-operative Society Limited (2001) LLJR-CA

The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited V. Helleluja Fishermen Multi-purpose Co-operative Society Limited (2001)

LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report

OGEBE, J.C.A.

The respondent sued the appellant in the High Court of Rivers State in a writ of summons dated 14th day of December, 1990 as follows: “The plaintiff’s claim against the defendant is for the sum of One Hundred and Sixty-Two Million, Eight Hundred Thousand Naira (N162,800,000.00) being and representing special and general damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of crude oil spillage from the defendant’s crude oil well and/or other oil installations in or near Bukuma in the Degema Local Government Area of Rivers State, within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court on or about the 12th September, 1990 which extensively polluted the plaintiff’s fish ponds, fishing nets, and the creeks and rivers wherein the plaintiff carries on its large scale commercial and modern fishing and fish farming.”

Issues were joined by the parties by the filing of pleadings and amendments thereof. During the course of trial in the lower court the appellant objected to the jurisdiction of the trial court on the ground that the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993 amended section 230(1) of the 1979 Constitution and vested exclusive jurisdiction in civil causes and matters arising from mines and minerals (including oil fields, mining, geological surveys and natural gas). The State High Court ruled that it had jurisdiction. The parties gave evidence and the trial court in its judgment found the appellant liable and awarded to the respondent a total sum of N21,995,000.00 special and general damages. The appellant was dissatisfied with this judgment and appealed to this court.

The learned senior counsel for the appellant Chief Akinjide (SAN), in an amended brief of argument formulated two issues for determination as follows:

“1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that it is the High Court of the State and not the Federal High Court that has jurisdiction to try and determine the claims before him, particularly, having regard to the provisions of Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993.

  1. Whether the plaintiff/respondent proved, and was therefore entitled to the special and general damages awarded in its favour by the learned trial Judge.”

The respondent was also not satisfied with the quantum of damages awarded and cross-appealed and the learned counsel for it, Chief J.L.D. Dagogo in an amended respondent’s brief/cross-appellant’s brief identified two issues for determination in the main appeal as follows:

“1. Whether the learned trial Judge was right in holding that it is the High Court of the State and not the Federal High Court that has jurisdiction to try and determine the claims before him, particularly, having regard to the provisions of Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993.

  1. Whether the plaintiff/respondent proved, and was therefore entitled to the special and general damages awarded in its favour by the learned trial Judge.”

In the cross-appeal he also identified two issues for determination thus:

“1. Was the learned trial Judge right and justified in refusing to award the special damages for loss of fishing rights in the polluted creeks and swamps, after finding the defendant liable to the plaintiff in negligence for the crude oil pollution of the creeks and swamps.

  1. Was the N14.545m awarded as general damages not manifestly too low and was it right to include special damages for loss of fishing rights, having regard to the evidence adduced at the trial and in all the facts and circumstances of this case.”

The appellant filed appellant’s amended reply brief and cross-respondent amended brief.

In the course of argument of this appeal the Court drew the attention of learned counsel on both sides to the Federal High Court (Amendment) Decree No. 60 of 1991 and asked counsel on both sides to submit written briefs on the effect of that legislation on the issue of jurisdiction being canvassed in the appeal. The appellant filed a brief in this respect on the 31st day of May, 2001 while the respondent filed its own on the 1st of June, 2001.

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The main argument of the learned senior counsel for the appellant is that by virtue of the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993 which amended section 230(1) of the 1979 Constitution, only the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear civil causes and matters arising from mines and minerals including (oil fields, mining, geological surveys and natural gas). He relied on the case of Barry & Ors v. Obi A. Eric & Ors. (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt 562) 404. He relied particularly on the recent unreported judgment of the Supreme Court SC 75/1997. The Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd v. Abel Isaiah and Ors delivered on the 18th day of May, 2001; (2001) 1 NWLR (Pt.723) 168 in which the Supreme Court held that in the matter arising from oil spillage as in the present appeal only the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear it and not the State High Court. The Supreme Court took a look at Decree No. 107 of 1993 and Decree No. 60 of 1991 and held that the two decrees had the effect of removing jurisdiction from the State High Court to the Federal High Court.

The learned counsel for the respondent/cross-appellant in his reply submitted that both Decrees No. 107 of 1993 and 60 of 1991 were enacted after the cause of action and the filing of the suit in the present appeal and therefore they are inapplicable to the cause of action. He said that it is the law in force when the cause of action arose that will govern the determination of the action. He referred to the case of Agha v. I.G.P. & Ors (1997) 10 NWLR (Pt.524) 317.

It appears to me that the learned counsel for the respondent is confusing cause of action with jurisdiction of a court to hear a matter. There is no dispute whatsoever that a cause of action is governed by the prevailing law when the cause of action arose. See the cases of A.G. of the Federation v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd (1999) 9 NWLR (Pt 618) 187 and Alese v. Aladetuyi (1995) 6 NWLR (Pt 403) 527.

Jurisdiction however has to do with the authority of the court to adjudicate on the matter. A plaintiff may have a very good cause of action supported by existing law and if he takes his case to a court which has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter or the cause of action, he cannot ventilate his claims before that court. Even if parties are before a court that has jurisdiction and a new law comes into existence which withdraws the jurisdiction of a court from hearing the case, that court automatically ceases to have jurisdiction to continue with the case.

In the case of Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. of Nigeria Ltd v. Abel Isaiah. & Ors (supra), which is a case of oil spillage like the present appeal, the Supreme Court per Uthman Mohammed, JSC, at 179 180, held as follows:

“It is clear from the pleadings that the spillage and pollution occurred when the appellant was trying to repair the indented pipeline by cutting off the said section and installing a new section. I think it cannot be disputed if I say that installation of pipelines, producing, treating and transmitting of crude oil to the storage tanks is part of petroleum mining operations. Therefore if an incident happens during the transmission of petroleum to the storage tanks it can be explained as having arisen from or connected with or pertaining to mines, and minerals, including oil fields, and oil mining. I therefore agree that the subject-matter of the respondents’ claim falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court as is provided under section 230(1)(a) of Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107. Similar opinions concerning claims pertaining to oil spillage have been held by the Court of Appeal in Barry and 2 Ors. v. Obi A. Eric and 3 Ors. (1998) 8 NWLR (pt 562) 404 at 416 and the Shell, Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited v. Otelemaba Maxon and Ors. Maxon’s case is not yet reported (2001) 9 NWLR (Pt.719) 541. It was decided on 20th January, 2001 by Port Harcourt Division of the Court of Appeal.

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Learned counsel for the respondents argued that the ouster Decree could not affect the claim before the court for the simple reason that the cause of action arose before the Decrees were promulgated. He submitted that the Supreme Court had made several decisions that the law applicable to an action is the law existing when the cause of action arose. He referred to the case of Adesina v. Kola (1993) 6 NWLR (pt. 298) 182 at 185.

While it is correct that the cause of action arose before the promulgation of the Decree mentioned above, the trial of the action was in progress when Decree 107 of 1993 was signed into law. From that moment when the Decree was signed into Law the jurisdiction of the State High Court to determine any matter connected with or pertaining to mining and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas has been ousted. Once the jurisdiction of a court to determine a matter has been ousted any further hearing in the matter is indeed null and void because any decision it makes amounts to nothing.

By jurisdiction is meant the authority which a court has to decide matters that are litigated before it, or to take cognisance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. The limits of this authority are imposed by the statute, charter or commission under which the court is constituted and may be extended or restricted by similar means. If no restriction is imposed, the jurisdiction is said to be unlimited. A limitation may be either as to the kind and nature of the actions and matters of which the particular court has cognisance or as to area over which the jurisdiction extends or it may partake of both these characteristic; see Vol. 10 Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition paragraph 715, page 323. There is no pending case where a court in a matter which it has no jurisdiction to decide is of no consequence and is a nullity.

In the result, I agree that the State High Court has no jurisdiction to determine the suit filed by the respondents against the appellant. The first issue is therefore resolved in favour of the appellant. This issue has therefore determined this appeal. I do not have to consider other issues because doing so will amount to an academic exercise.”

Ogwuegbu, JSC in his supporting contribution also held as follows:

“The judgment of the High Court in this case was delivered on 11th March, 1994 after the coming into force of the Decree No. 60 of 1991 and was caught by section 7(6) of Decree No, 60 of 1991. In my view, the enactments which apply to this case are the Federal High Court (Amendment) Decree No. 60 of 1991 and Decree No. 107 of 1993. They came into operation on 26th August, 1993 and 17th November, 1993 respectively. The other enactments set out above are for a better appreciation of the legislative history of the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.

For the Federal High Court to have exclusive jurisdiction under section 7(1)(p) of the Federal High Court (Amendment) Decree, 1991, the cause or matter should be connected with or pertain to mines and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas and the jurisdiction shall be construed to include jurisdiction to hear and determine all issues relating to, arising from or ancillary to mines and minerals, oil fields, oil mining et cetera.

The verb “connected” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. as “joined; united by junction, by an intervening substance or medium, by dependence or relation, or by order in a series.” Whereas the verb “pertain” is defined in Longman’s Dictionary of Contemporary English to mean “to belong or have connection with (something)”.

I should also say that section 7(5) of Decree No. 60 of 1991 ousted the jurisdiction conferred on State High Courts and Magistrate Courts under section 19 and 20 of Oil Pipelines Act, Cap. 338 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. As a result, State High Court and Magistrate Courts have no jurisdiction whatsoever in matters under section 7(1) and (2) of Decree No. 60 of 1991. Having regard to the state of the law and the facts of this case, oil spillage from the defendant’s dented oil pipe line is a thing associated with, related to arising from or ancillary to mines and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas as provided in section 7(1) and (2) of Decree No. 60 of 1991.

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From the facts established, there is close affinity between oil spillage which is the cause of action and section 7(1)(p) of the 1991 Decree. The words of section 7(1) of the aforesaid Decree are plain and unambiguous and I have no hesitation in giving them their natural and ordinary meaning in the con in which I find them. See Allen v. Thorn Electrical Industries Ltd. (1967) 2 All ER 1137 at 1141.

I therefore entertain no doubt that by the provisions of Decree No. 60 of 1981, the Rivers State High Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the suit giving rise to this appeal and the court below equally lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) 2 SCNLR 341; (1962) 1 All NLR (Pt. 4) 587 and Barry & Ors. v. Eric & Ors. (1998) 8 NWLR (Pt. 562) 404 C.A.

Section 230(1)(0) of the 1979 Constitution as amended by Decree No. 107 of 1993 reads:

“230(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Constitution and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly or a Decree, the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion to any other court in civil causes and matters arising from:-

(o) mines and minerals (including oil fields, mining, geological surveys and natural gas)”

Section 7 of the Federal High Court Act as amended by Decree No. 60 of 1991 which came into operation on the 26th of August, 1993 by statutory instrument made by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria No.9 of 1993 reads:

“7(1) The court shall to the exclusion of any other court have original jurisdiction to try causes and matters connected with or pertaining to:-

(p) mines and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas.

(3) Where jurisdiction is conferred upon the court under sub-sections (1) and (2) of this section, such jurisdiction shall be construed to include jurisdiction to hear and determine all issues relating to, arising from or ancillary to such subject-matter.

(4) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other enactment or rule of law including the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, any power conferred on a State High Court or any other court of similar jurisdiction to hear and determine any civil matter or proceedings shall not extend to any matter in respect of which jurisdiction is conferred on the Court under provisions of this section.

(5) Any decision made after the commencement of this section by any court of law in any purported exercise of any power under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or any Federal or State law shall, as from date of making of the decision be null and void…”

The combined effect of these two enactments as interpreted by the Supreme Court is that the State High Court had no jurisdiction to hear this matter as at the time it gave judgment on the 10th day of July, 1995.

Accordingly, I allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the trial court as a nullity. All other issues raised in this appeal and cross-appeal are now merely academic and no longer of relevance. The respondent’s claim before the lower court is struck out for want of jurisdiction. The appellant is entitled to costs of N5,000.00 against the respondent.


Other Citations: (2001)LCN/1036(CA)

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