Vinz International Nigeria Ltd V. Olakunle Morohundiya (2009)
LawGlobal-Hub Lead Judgment Report
ISA AYO SALAMI, J.C.A.
The plaintiff’s claims per his writ of summons read as follows-
“(i) N21,500.00 cost of the Deskjet 695C Printer,
(ii) N2,000.00 per day from 20/12/99 till the day the printer’s cost is refunded or the printer is replaced by the defendant,
(iii) N250,000.00 general damages for the inconvenience and psychological trauma suffered by the plaintiff.”
The same is repeated in the statement of claim. Pleadings were settled at a statement of claim and amended statement of defence. The matter then proceeded to trial with the plaintiff and the defendant calling one and two witnesses respectively. Learned trial judge took speeches of both parties before delivering her reserved and considered judgment. Learned trial judge concluded the judgment as follows-
“I hold that the one year guarantee signed by Chinyere in her capacity as the Defendant’s sales representative is binding on the Defendant having represented the Defendant in the sale.
It is also the evidence of the Plaintiff that he had to print his letter and other jobs in business center during this period is not out of place or remote. He claims N2,000.00 and I find it to be reasonable.
I find general damages for psychological trauma and inconvenience to be unsubstantiated.
An action for mental suffering cannot lie. And there is nothing before me to prove it.
The court should not be seen as a sympathetic under-taker. In view of all I have said, I hereby give judgment for the plaintiff in prayers (i) and (ii).
The Defendant is to pay the sum of N21,500.00 being the cost of the Deskjet 695C printer purchased from the Defendant and stopped work within six months having obtained one year warranty on same.
OR in the alternative to replace the printer with another one.
The Defendant is ordered to pay N2,000.00 from 20/12/99 until such replacement or payment of the cost of the printer.
Prayer (iii) is refused:”
The defendant was dissatisfied with the judgment and being aggrieved appealed to this court on four grounds of appeal. Subsequently an amended notice of appeal was, with the leave of the court, filed. It was deemed filed and served on 12th February, 2008.
The defendant in prosecution of the notice of appeal and in compliance with the practice and procedure of this court filed appellant’s brief which was adopted and relied upon at the hearing of the appeal by the learned counsel for the defendant (herein after referred to as the appellant).
The plaintiff (herein after referred to as the respondent) failed or neglected to file respondent’s brief of argument.
The respondent was also not present nor represented at the hearing of the appeal. It will be recalled that the appellant, however, brought an application dated 23rd January, 2009 and granted on 10th February, 2009 praying for substituted service of the hearing notice in this appeal.
The appellant in its brief of argument formulated four issues for consideration and determination in this appeal. The issues are set out immediately hereunder-
“I. Whether a guarantee allegedly given by the appellant’s staff subsequent to the purchase of the deskjet printer was binding and enforceable against the appellant.
2. Whether the manufacturer’s warranty which was not pleaded is enforceable against the appellant.
3. Assuming without conceding that the guarantee and warranty are binding on the appellant whether the respondent failure to mitigate the loss deprived him of the right to claim loss of use till judgment.
4. Whether the respondent was entitled to N2,000.00 per day for loss of use in the absence of credible or strict proof of the loss suffered.”
Learned counsel for appellant failed to relate any of these issues to the ground or grounds of appeal filed in the notice of appeal. An issue for determination derives its support from the ground of appeal and must be related to the ground of appeal from which it derives as it can not exist independently of the ground of appeal. An issue not deriving from a ground of appeal is incompetent and should be ignored – Egbe v. Alhaji (1990) 1 NWLR (pt 128) 546, Ugo v. Obiekwe (1989) 1 NWLR (pt 99) 566 and Ezemba v. Ibenema trading under the name and style Solde Engineering Works Nigeria Ltd (2005) FWLR 302, 320. It is therefore trite that where argument is not presented in support of issues deriving from competent grounds of appeal such argument could be ignored for going to no issue and the appeal dismissed.
Appellant’s issue 1 is whether a guarantee given by its staff subsequent to the purchase of the deskjet printer was binding and enforceable against it. Learned counsel for appellant referred court to paragraph 5 of the statement of claim which averred that the guarantee was not stamped on the invoice and receipt which were tendered as exhibit “A” and “A1”. He argued that exhibit B and B1 counter parts of “A” and “A1” do not have any such guarantee. He stated that appellant two witnesses testified to the effect that appellant does not give any guarantee, whether written or oral, but would always replace defective item traceable to factory fault and that any guarantee given by Miss Chinyere after the sale transaction was without authorization and therefore null and void and of no effect. He conceded that the so called guarantee was purportedly endorsed on its pro forma invoice. He also referred to the evidence-in-chief of respondent when he testified that “they will always repair if anything goes wrong within I year” and referred to the writ of summons wherein the respondent claimed replacement or the deskjet printer and not cost of repairs promised by the appellant. Learned counsel submitted that the reliance on the pro forma invoice is a fatal error that should affect the entire claim as a pro forma invoice does not evidence a sale transaction rather it is the receipt. Learned counsel after reading, in the appellants brief, the definition of the words “pro forma” invoice in Blacks Law Dictionary 8th Edition Pp 1247 and 1296 contended that exhibit A, the purchase receipt, was an acknowledgement of receipt of money in exchange for the deskjet printer.
Upon the issuance of the purchase receipt for the deskjet printer, the property in it passed to the respondent and consequently the risk associated therewith. He cited the case of Orji; v. Anyaso (2002) 2 NWLR (pt843) 1, 33.
Learned counsel further submitted that the guarantee given, assuming that Chinyere could give a guarantee that could bind the appellant, it was one without consideration. He referred to In Re McArdle (1957) I Ch D 699 and also Rescorla v. Thomas England Report Volume 114. 496. I am unable to lay my hands on the latter report.
The submission of the learned counsel for appellant is misconceived.
It is also adroit but not candid. The respondent pleaded in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the statement of claim as follows-
3. On 7/6/99, the plaintiff asked Mr. Timothy Olubor, a legal practitioner in his law firm to purchase a deskjet 695C printer from the defendant at N21,500.00.
4. The printer was bought by the plaintiff on the condition that there was a 1 year guarantee on same.
2. After the printer with the purchase receipt NO.000J819, and invoice No.0003431 were brought to the plaintiff, the plaintiff telephoned Chinyere, the defendant’s sales person/staff to complain that the guarantee was not stamped on the invoice and receipt, and she said that the plaintiff should write same on it.”
The respondent testified in this connection as follows –
“I sent one of my staff, Timothy Olubor to buy a printer at N21,500.00 and a receipt was given to him. This is a copy of the receipt and invoice
A one year guarantee was given to me before we bought the printer. I spoke to Miss Chinyere Njoku who was the defendants’ stuff at that time on the receipt being brought; the guarantee was not endorsed on it. I then telephoned her and complained and she told me not to worry that they will always repair it if any thing goes wrong within 1 year but I insisted and she eventually said I should write it at the back of the receipt/invoice which I did.
I still take the receipt/invoice back to her and she signed my endorsement at the back and also signed it the front for the invoice.”
(Underlining mine)
Under xx, the respondent who incidentally was the plaintiff at the trial court answered as follows –
“I bought it sometime in June or July; the date is in the statement of claim. I negotiated for the printer and told Mr. Oluhor to go and buy it.”
On the evidence and pleadings which have been set out above, the submission of the learned counsel for appellant that the consideration for the agreement was wholly past is without foundation. It is baseless. The respondent approached the appellant through its sales staff or person for the purpose of buying a deskjet printer. The transaction was negotiated and it was agreed that the deskjet printer would go for N21,500.00 with a year guarantee. He subsequently sent one Timothy Olubor, a legal practitioner, in his firm to pay for and collect the printer apparently on the terms and conditions that had already been agreed upon. Mr. Olubor paid for the printer and was issued with the necessary sales documents. When the printer with the receipt and invoice was taken to him, without endorsement of the guarantee, he telephoned to register his complain with Chinyere Njoku, the sales person, who readily agreed with him. She advised that the relevant endorsement be made on the documents which he did. The respondent subsequently took the papers to Miss Njoku for her signature and she obliged him.
The appellant’s two witnesses were not in attendance and are not in a position to admit or deny the evidence adduced by the respondent. The appellant has the evidential burden of showing that Miss Chinyere Njoku did not make the endorsement on exhibit A1. It had considerable opportunity of debunking the evidential burden which shifted on the appellant at the trial but failed to utilize it. The neglect or failure to call Chinyere Njoku was fatal to its case notwithstanding the statement of Mr. Okoh, appellant’s counsel, to the effect that he asked her but she denied. The evidence of denial is inadmissible. It constitutes hearsay evidence. This denial being oral evidence must be direct. See sections 75 and 76 of the Evidence Act Cap E 14 of the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2004. There is evidence that one year guarantee/warranty was agreed upon before the sale of the deskjet printer to the respondent. The cases of In RcMeArdle (supra) and Reseorla v. Thomas (supra) are in applicable to the circumstance of this case. The respondent gave consideration for the guarantee/warranty by buying the equipment on condition there was a year guarantee.
The other point raised in this issue was whether the guarantee should have been given on the receipt or pro forma invoice. I do not think that the medium of communication is important in the circumstance of this case. To my mind, there is no difference between six and half a dozen eggs. Both documents were issued and given to Mr. Timothy Olubor contemporaneously. The pro forma invoice was never issued “in advance to describe items, predicts results or secure approval” as stated in Black’s Law Dictionary 8th Edition page 1247. If it was issued along with the receipt on completion of the sale transaction, it is my respectful opinion that it would be immaterial on which of the two documents, exhibits A and A1, the guarantee was endorsed. I agree with the submission of the learned counsel for appellant that in trading parlance, a pro forma mayor may not lead to a concluded transaction on the same day or at all. I am, however, unable to fathom his grouse since the transaction here was concluded on the same day. The pro forma and the receipt evidencing a sale transaction were issued and delivered together to the respondent on the same day on payment of purchase price. As it was observed earlier the circumstances of this case makes the definition of Black’s Law Dictionary in appropriate. The argument would have been weightier if the invoice were issued to the respondent when he went to negotiate for the buying of the printer before sending Mr. Olubor to go and pay for it.
Courts are set up to do substantial and not technical or clustered justice. The staff of the appellant endorsed on exhibit A1 thus-
“1. One year warranty/guarantee Chinny for Vinz”
Exhibit A I produced in evidence by respondent discharges the onus of proof placed on the respondent by his assertion that he was given a year enforceable guarantee or warranty. The burden of proof which is not static shifts on it to show that the endorsement on exhibit A1 credited to its staff was infact not made by the staff or any other member of its staff. See sections 136 and 137 of the Evidence Act. The evidential burden is not relieved by informing the court that the witness who was available to deny the assertion to Mr. Okoh, learned counsel for appellant, could not be found to testify in court where her testimony could be tested under cross examination. She was at all times material an employee of the appellant. If the appellant thought that reporting her denial to the court would satisfy the or burden of proof and thereby shielded her from court, it had no one to blame but itself. The statement of Mr. Okoh, learned counsel, from the Bar had certainly no evidential value and has not discharged the burden of proof.
Exhibit Al was endorsed by Miss Chinyere Njoku who was appellant’s sales person at the time of the transaction. Indeed she under took the transaction in that capacity. She was not only appellant’s agent she had apparent authority to do what she did. Acts of an agent with managerial status with ostensible authority to act binds the principal whether such act are for the benefit of principal or not provided they are shown, as in the instant appeal, scope of their authority: Lolyd”S Grace, Smith & Co. (1912) AC 716 and Trenco Nig Ltd v. Investment Co. Ltd Anor (1978) I L R N 146. The general principle of law is that a contract made by an agent acting within the scope of authority for a disclosed principal is in law the contract of the principal and it is the principal and not the agent that is entitled to sue or be sued upon such contract Carlen Nig Ltd v. University of Jos (1994) 1 NWLR (pt 323) 631, 656. If she, therefore, made the endorsement on a wrong document, the act of omission or commission relating to her function in the course of her employment cannot exonerate the appellant. She was not on the frolic of her own. Appellant’s contention that it gave the warranty or guarantee on a wrong document cannot avail it because it is settled that a party should not be permitted to benefit from his own default or wrong. This is encapsulated in the Latin maxim of- nollus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria
See First Bank of Nigeria Plc v. May Medical Clinics (1996) 9 NWLR (pt. 471) 195,204; Adedeji v. National Bank of Nigeria Limited (1989) 1 NWLR (pt 96) 212, 226 – 227 and Solanke v. Abed (1962) 1 All NLR 230.
The submission of the learned counsel for appellant that the court should have preferred the oral testimony of its first and second defence witnesses on the guarantee is oblivious of the principle of evidence which has remained with our legal system from our colonial heritage. It is settled that parol evidence cannot be admitted to add to, vary or contradict a written instrument: see section 132 of the Evidence Act, Cap E14 and Olanlege v. Afro Continental Nigeria Ltd (1996) 7 NWLR (pt 458) 29, 40 where it was enunciated as follows –
“Accordingly parol evidence will not be admitted to add to, vary or contradict instrument such as exhibits A, B and C admitted to prove that some particular term which had not been verbally agreed upon had been omitted (by design or otherwise from a written agreement constituting a valid and operative contract between the parties: See Jacobs v. Batayia and General Plantation Trust (1924) 1 Ch D 287, 295.”
The oral evidence adduced by two witnesses called by the appellant, to the effect that it does not offer guarantee to its customers, but only effect repairs of defects that occurred within six months of purchase of its goods, cannot add to, nor vary nor contradict the written statement on exhibit Al credited to one of its employees, Chinyere, a sales person of the appellant at the material time. The admissible evidence which the learned trial judge rightly admitted was the endorsement of one year guarantee on exhibit A 1.
The answer to this question is positive. The relevant ground of appeal (if any) fails and is dismissed.
Under appellants’ issue 2, learned counsel contended that respondent suddenly changed while cross-examining the defence witness by introducing the issue of manufacturer’s warranty and tendered exhibit C through second defence witness. He referred to the cases of Alwau v. Yakubu (2004) 4 W R N 86,108 and Ige v. Olunlovo (2004) 2 W R N 116.
Learned counsel still in the appellant’s brief further submitted that evidence elicited during cross-examination and not pleaded should be discountenanced. He referred to the cases of Kayode v. Odutola (2001) 11 NWLR (pt 72) 695 at 674 (sic), Tewogbade v. Agbabiaka (2001) 5 NWLR (pt 705) 38, 53 and Shanu v. Afribank Plc (2003) 4 WRN 42.
There is merit in the submission of the learned counsel for appellant, in its brief of argument, that not only are parties bound by their pleadings the court is also bound by the pleadings and to allow a party to lead evidence and contend otherwise than pleaded equals to making a case contrary to pleadings. See Cardoso v. Executors of Doherty 4 WACA 28, 50, Dr. Orizu v. Anyaegbunam (1978) 5 SC 21, 86 and thereby permitting him to approbate and reprobate: Amida v. Oshoboja (1984) 7 SC 66, 80. It is settled that court of trial are to limit themselves severely to the issues raised by the parties in their pleadings. To act to the contrary might well result in denial of justice to one or the other of the two contesting parties.
See African Continental Seaways Ltd v. Nigerian Dredging Roads and General Works Ltd (1977) 5 SC 235, 248, Metalimpex v. A.G. Leventis and Co. Ltd (1976) 2 SC 91 and Odiase & Another v. Agho & Others (1973) 11 SC 71, 77 where the Supreme Court said that –
“Indeed we would agree in principle with the general proposition enunciated by Lord Wrenbury in Wilson v. United Counties Hank Ltd (1920) A.C 102, 143 he said: “It is certainly a salutary principle that a court of justice should confine itself to adjudicating upon the questions raised by the parties litigant to the exclusions of other questions which they do not advance.”
See also statement by the learned authors of Bullen & Leake on Precedents of Pleadings 12′” Edition p8.
The plaintiff s case, on his pleadings, has been that he bought the deskjet printer after a negotiation in which it was agreed that the goods would be guaranteed for one year from the date of purchase nevertheless at the trial he was permitted to lead evidence indicating another ground of claim to the effect that manufacturers warranty enures to the end consumer of the product. This Court and the Supreme Court have stated a number of times that evidence on facts not pleaded goes to no issue and the trial court ought not to have permitted such evidence to be led.
Even where such evidence had been wrongly adduced and received through inadvertence at the trial, the court should discountenance it as irrelevant to the issues properly joined on the pleadings: Alwa’u v. Yakubu (supra), Ige v. Olunloyo (supra) Kavode v. Odutola (supra).
See also Tewogbade v. Agbabiaka (supra) and Shanu v. Afribank Plc (2003) 4 W R N 42. The evidence led in respect of manufacturer’s warranty, not being with regard to matters raised in the pleading which is, however, inadvertently obtained is irrelevant and should be ignored.
The answer to appellant’s issue 2 is positive. The ground of appeal (if any) from which it is formulated succeeds and is allowed. In the result other argument raised in this issue are no longer useful or pertinent to the determination of this appeal.
I propose to consider, at this stage, appellant’s issue 4 which is questioning the respondent’s entitlement to N2,000.00 per day for loss of use in the absence of strict proof of the loss suffered.
In this connection, learned counsel for appellant, in the appellant’s brief of argument, referred to the pleading and evidence of the respondent in regard 10 this issue and submitted that they do not meet the standard of proof required to prove special damage.
The respondent, as regard 10 his claim for loss of use of N2,000.00 per day, claimed as follows in the statement of claim –
‘”10. WHEREOF the plaintiff claims from the defendant,
(i) N21 ,500.00 cost of the deskjet 695c printer,
(ii) N2,000.00 per day from 20/12/99 till the day the printer’s cost is refunded or the printer is replaced by the defendant.
(iii) N250,000.00 general damages for the inconvenience and psychological trauma suffer by the plaintiff.
(Underlining mine)
He concluded his evidence-in-chief at the trial thus –
“I refused to pay. I am asking for a refund of N21,500.00 used for the printer. Also N2,000.00 per day from the day the printer got spoil until the judgment date.
N250,000.00 psychological trauma and the delay they put us through.
(Underlining mine)
What he said in his pleadings clearly is no averment of the facts which entitled him to the claim. Before making the claim or prayer for the relief or reliefs sought, respondent is required to state succinctly the necessary facts which gave him right to the claim he is making. He is required ordinarily to plead and prove it strictly.
In his evidence-in-chief, he led no evidence in support of the claim.
He merely repeated the prayers in the statement of claim. The recitation of reliefs adumbrated in the statement of claim respectfully is no evidence. The material averments giving rise to the claim of N2,000.00 per day is conspicuously absent from the pleadings. Neither was there evidence adduced in support of the said claim. Not only must the parties join issue on the material facts including the particulars of the claim same must be proved strictly. I am not unaware that the respondent testified as follows when being cross-examined:
‘I was spending N2,000.00 for business centre until i bought a new printer.”
This piece of evidence would have been sufficient to ground the claim if there were adequate pleadings. The evidence given in proof of the claim for lack of use of N2,000.00 could have been challenged and was not in fact so challenged by the appellant who had the opportunity to do so. Indeed the damaging piece of evidence was elicited during cross-examination. In the arena of proof, in a civil case, the onus of proof is not static, but does shifts from party to party and thus in the peculiar circumstance of this case, the onus was clearly on the appellant to produce the evidence which it thought was missing. In Nigeria Maritime Services Ltd v. Alhaji Bello Afolabi (1978) 2 SC 79, 86 the plaintiff merely testified that he makes a profit of N50-100 in support of a claim for a daily profit of N50.00 and the award was made in his favour. See also Obi-Obembe v. Wemabod Estates Ltd (1977) 5 SC 115, 139 and Boshali v. Allied Commercial Exporters Ltd 1961 All N L R 912 the ipsi dixit evidence of 6d profit per yard was taken to be sufficient proof of his claim for loss of profit and Doobay & Ors v. Mohabeer (1967) 2 All E R (P.C) 760, 765 evidence that “the cost of the installation was N1,500.00 dollars including workmanship” was held sufficient proof of damages. Thus the evidence wittingly or unwittingly extracted from the respondent that N2,000.00 was for printing at the business centre is on these authorities sufficient to ground a strict proof of the claim.
The submission of learned counsel for appellant, in the appellant brief, that the respondent did not lead evidence on the quantity of materials he prints in a day is respectfully misconceived. The address of counsel no matter how well prepared and persuasive cannot take the place of credible evidence: Vassilev v. PMS industries Ltd (2000) FWLR (pt 19) 391. If the appellant wanted a break down of the N2,000.00 he would have cross-examined the respondent. It is settled that special damage must be proved specially but specially proving requires no special technique outside daily experience. A price is put on an article by the party claiming the price, it is left to the party against whom the price is quoted to contradict it by producing a price to the contrary or of its own. Producing a receipt or pro forma invoice may not assist in resolving the issue one way or the other hence Akintunde v. Ojeikere (1971) NWLR 91, 98 requires that the issue be contested at cross-examination. See West Africa Shipping agency v. Kala (1978) 3 SC 22, 31 – 32.
It seems to me, however, that a claim for loss of use of equipment pending the refund of the cost of the printer, in the particular circumstance of this case, or its repairs is not essentially a claim in special damage which must be pleaded and proved strictly. The appellant, having refused or neglected to repair or replaced the deskjet printer contrary to the express terms and conditions of their agreement, the respondent herein is entitled to a certain sum as compensation for loss of its use during a reasonable time of repairs or replacement. I am encouraged in this view by the Supreme Court dictum in Kerewi (Thomas) v. Bisiriyu Odegbesan (1965) 1 All N L R 95, 99 where the court stated as follows –
“The evidence, however, is that the respondent’s taxi cab was a total loss as a result of the collision, and the measure of damages, as was pointed out in S.W. Ubani-Ukama v. G.E. Nicol (1962) 1 All N L R 105, is the value of the car at the time of accident plus such further sum as would compensate the owner for loss of earnings and inconvenience of being without a car during the period reasonably required for procuring another car……..
The respondent is, of course, entitled to an award for loss of earnings and inconvenience suffered through being without a car for the time reasonably necessary to get another car and put it on the roads.”
(Underlining: mine)
The Supreme Court followed this decision in Ekpe v. Faghemi (1978) 1 L R N 137, 140 where it said per Bello JSC (as he then was) thus-
“In the case in hand, the damage to the respondent’s motor car is not prospective but, as a matter of fact, it was retrospective. The car had suffered real and actual damage. That being the case, the respondent was entitled to recover the cost of its repairs plus a certain sum as compensation for loss of its use during a reasonable time of repairs.”
(Underlining mine)
It follows from these authorities that, once the damage is real and actual and not prospective, the plaintiff will be entitled to the costs of repair and a certain sum for loss of earning or use. It is apt to add that the repair would never be carried out: The London Corporation (1935) P 70. It is also immaterial that the repairs had not been done or performed at the time of the trial: The Kingsway (1918) P 344.
But, in the peculiar circumstance of this case, it is fairly difficult to fix the reasonable time for the sum awarded for want of use of the printer. I am conscious that it should not be on the basis that would induce respondent not to repair his printer and not to do anything to minimize his loss. But in the circumstance of this case the duty of mitigating loss appears, to my mind, respectfully to be the appellant. It is the appellant that sold the printer which developed fault within the period of one year guaranteed. When the respondent took the printer to appellant for repairs in accordance to the contract the latter refused to comply with a term of the contract requiring it to repair any defect that might arise within one year of the purchase without cost to respondent. Consequently the respondent demanded for the cost of the printer which appellant refused to refund.
This is the situation that forced the respondent to successfully bring an action in the court below for the enforcement of the contract. He sought in the action either the repair or refund of the costs of the printer as well as damages for wants of use of the said printer. Judgment was given on 23rd day of November, 2005; more than three years, the appellant had not sought to repair the equipment or refund price of the printer and thereby reduce his liability or loss in respect of the damages awarded against it. There is no order from this court or the court below staying the execution of the judgment. Rather it is exploring legal technicality to evade or avoid its liability under the contract. The appellant, having willfully breached the contract should not be entitled to any relief because there is no relief for breaker of contract: See Adekoya v. Pan Electric Ltd (1974) V.I.L. R 56, 61. It is the appellant, the contract breaker who should mitigate its loss by repairing the deskjet printer bought from it and which printer developed fault within the guaranteed period or refund the price to the buyer. To ask the buyer, respondent herein to mitigate his loss tantamount to asking him to capitulate and submit meekly to the appellant by repairing the equipment himself and forgetting about the purchase price.
On the whole, the appeal partially succeeds and is allowed to the extent that the respondent is forbidden from founding his case on an additional ground without first amending his pleading to accommodate the fresh ground such as manufacturer’s warranty. The appeal fails in respect of the guarantee given by the vendor, the appellant.
Consequently the decision of the learned trial judge including the order as to costs is affirmed.
Other Citations: (2009)LCN/3244(CA)
